Communist politics and shop stewards in engineering, 1935-46 by Croucher, Richard
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/4081
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Communist Politics and Shop Stewards in 
P. n(; ineerinC, 1935-46. 
S 
by 
Richard Croucher 
Thesis submitted in accordance 
with the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of '. darwick, 
April, 1977. 
Best Copy 
Available 
A}3 JTJZriC; 2. 
This thesis is about the activities of Communist militants within the 
en,,; ineering industry between 1935 and i9kG arºd attempts to show the 
importance of these militants to the history of industrial relations 
in this period in which shop stewards as we know them today first 
emerged as ran important group. Tlie work is primarily concerned with 
examining the relative importance of political and industrial factors 
in determining the relationships obtaining between shop stewards and 
their constituents during '.; orld ',! cur II. 
1'he importance of Communist politics to Communist and non- 
Communist shop stewards is exarnined, but the main area of research is 
into the way in which different local industrial contexts influenced 
shop stewards' behaviour. 'The importance of methods of wa e payment, 
local agreements, typo of technology and rates of technological change, 
and a whole range of atller industrial considerations was often greater 
in the minds of even come left-wing shop stewards than the latest left- 
wing discuszions. Also, the way in which shop stewards took up(or failed 
to take up) the problems arising; for their members out of a war in which 
Munition . wor kerd were almost as much in the front line as were 
se. ^vicomen and women themselves is touched upon. 
The thesis is divided into two main sections. The first 
L, -"01P of chapters doal:; in a general and introductory way with the 
topics mentioned above. The second and rather more important section 
builds on do,, irst In that it deals with the problems in a deeper 
(though necessarily na rr ower)way. It comprises four local studies of 
nlajor engineering dintrýcts during the period 1; 39--1946. 
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Introduction 
I 
In general, it is only comparatively recently that British labour 
"hictorians have directed their attention to ard; the history of 
trorl: place representatives within the trade unions. 2hic apparent lcssitude 
certainly does not derive from the subject's insignific-uce. On the 
contrary one of the Hoot striking features of British trade unionism 
has been the frequency with' which it has thrown up such representatives s 
perhap-., the r-iost significant of whom in terms of their ir., portazice in 
industrial relations have been the shop stewards in engineering. 
In this area, we are particularly fortunate in that some founda. tiors 
have been laid for a study of the shop stewards in their second major 
Period of growth and influence during the Second '. World l. tar. James Jefferys 
was the first historian to help in this direction, w. aith his book 
The Story of the, En? ineers, published in 1945 for the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the formation of the Ar. Ra1gamate>d o, n ineerin Union. 
Jefferys wrotqin excellent book when we consider the difficulties 
involved in pioneering a. path through a jungle of previously unworked V 
sourcec. Iiis book drew particular attention to the importance of the chop 
stewards in engineering from the First World liar onwards. `T'he next 
coxitributor, Branko Pribicevic, producod his 'cook The -. ")hon Stewards 
I", ovcm^nt and 'c'orkers' Control, 1910-22(Oxford)in 1959. F1'ribicevic cave us. 
an account of the shop : stewards' movement in" the First World t,,, ri and 
fociiac; ed in particular on the political force; at work within it. týor 
recently, James Hinton in de a much more detailed and ric; ourous study in 
tb,? `ua. 'L.? AEý field in his The First : äý10T) ýtewiard. ýt ? lcivýlSr. nt(1ý'jý). l ýntor_'" 
work showed the i: nportnznce cf the cra. ftümen' s tradition of control, and 
plotted the hintory of the stewards under the peculiar conditiou3 of 
wartime. It described the unsuccessful attempts m&de by the craftsmen. ' 
leaders to drag the movement out of cr"a. ftism's sectional concern: and 
tot: lardh an all-grades ftiht for peace, and ceded by de: nonstratiný; the 
z 
importance of the whole experience to the engineers who went on to 
constitute a major section of the Communist Party's in ustrial cadre. 
Used in conjunction with Richard Hyma n's `she "Jor. {ers' Union(Oxford, 1971) " 
these works give quite a good picture of the engineering industry 
during the First '-; orld : ar. ihis was probably a major prerequisite for 
a study of engineering workers in the Second ". world '-ar, when the 
shop stewards as we know them today first became a force in the factories. 
This corpus of work had to exist for work on the Second 
: torld dar to begin for two reasons. rirs tly, so that it was possible 
to see the importance of the traditions of excly'Tsiveness and craft 
control, and their breckdown, as the central motif of the skilled 
engineers' union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Secor_dly, because 
without this work, it would have been rather more difficult to appreciate 
the importance of the shop stewards in the formation of the Communist 
Party, and the influence "-. r? hich this fact had in determining the :; P's 
orientation towardse shoo stewards in later ea. rs. 3ut it was in any 14 
case impossible to wor'. c on the period of the second 'Jorld ', lar until 
1972, when Government records began to be available for research up to 
and including 1945. 
Labour and social history is by now well established as 
an important area for research, and within this developing subject 
area, the field of social history during the World . jars is considered 
of some particular interest by a large nu. uber of historians. The same 
could not be said, on the other hand, of Communist history between 1939 
and 1945. ', ihy was it decided to concentrate on the Communists and the 
Members of tiny groups to the left of them amongst the shop stewards 
rather than on, for example, members of the Labour Party? 
It cannot be denied that members of the Labour Party were 
often important shop stewards, and that it would be interesting to study 
their hi3tory. 3ut there were two closely related reasons for our 
concentration on the Communists and the extreme left. The first reason 
was that these groups all 'consciously directed themselves in an 
ý 
organised way towards influencing shop stewards, and towards providing a 
political leadership for a putative shop stewards' movement. The Labour 
Party did not attempt to do this; its whole purpose and raison d' etre 
was parliamentary and not industrial. The second reason derives directly 
from the first. 6 Communist Party and their antagonists on the extreme 
left published newspapers which allow us to follow in some detail the 
activities of the various groups at a local and factory level. To attempt 
to do this for the Labour Party would be more difficult, because the 
sources do not appear to exist. 
Using the Communist and 'ultra-left' press as a major set of 
source materials undoubtedly gives rise to its own set of acute problems, 
which have to be squarely faced at this introductory stage. The information 
derived from these papers has clearly to be used with extreme caution, 
because of the bitterly polemical context within which much of it is 
situated. Yet, freiiuently, we have to rely on'only one source, and are thrown 
back on our sense of ver isimilitude, internal consistency, and so on. 
Unsatisfactory an, this is, it is the price that has to be'paid for writing 
about industrial politics at the level of the individual factory. 
There is another problem involved in using these sources which 
needs to be pointed out, anxd that is the difficulty of assessing claims 
by different groups to influence or 'control' in a given factory. In this 
case, it is possible to list certain criteria which are applied in 
determinin 
Iwo whether such claims were justified. It should- be stressed that 
none of these criteria is by itself considered: sufficient to establish 
that a factory war a 10P, or ' TrotskJ ist' factory. However, it in felt 
that adequate proof of e . group's influence in a given factory has been 
furnished if several of the following eight criteria have been satisfied: 
tiiat the convt. uor was a member of the group in question; that a relatively 
l1gh level of contributions to the group's funds was regularly acheived; 
that a relatively high number of articles about the factory was printed 
by the group's 
4 
paper; that other ; roues referred to the group as politically do inapt 
in the factory; that the local Conciliation Officer of the `Ministry of 
Labour referred to the group in the same way; that the factory did 
relatively well in group literature selling or fund-raising competitions; 
that the group claimed a high membership and/or a factory branch in 
the factory; that the shop stewards' paper was clearly under the group's 
r 
influence. Such an approximate set of criteria will no doubt be 
criticised individually, but taken together, it is felt that they 
are adequate tools for a difficult task. 
In setting out to look into the history of the extreme left, 
we inherited a very small historiographical legacy. The only book to 
touch. on the CPG3's history(if we discount more general histories of 
the Third International, often more misleading than helpful when 
considari. ng the 9ritish Party)was Henry Pelling's The British 
Communist Party.; % 'Historical Profile. (1956). The legacy diminished 
almost to vanishing point when topic was limited to the GP Shop 
stewards. A similar situation existed with regard to the extreme 
left 
wins groups: no serious wor_c existed on the lrotskyistgroups, the 
ILP 
or the Anarchist Federation in the dar. Ilevertheless, all these group s 
had to be looked at if their influence among shop stewards was to 
be 
assessed. 
It will be'useful at this stage to state some of the main assumptions 
on which this thesis°is based. For the sake-of convenience, these 
assumptions may be'divided into two categories: assunptions about 
the 
relationships within trade unzons, and those concerning the 
relations between the Communist Party and its industrial members. 
'lb take the first category first. It is assumed that some 
degree of tension exists within a trade union between institutions 
based on the union's branch structure(-wxecutive Committees, District 
Committees), and those based directly on workshop or3anisation 
(shop stewards' committees, 'combire'committees). 2ichard : iyman 
has noted one source of these tensions as being the relatively 
large ability of the workplace representatives to bring collective 
sanctions to bear on the ernployer. ie also calls attention to a number 
of other causes(the 'ýrofessionalisation'of trade union oTficials, for 
exarrrple), but these concern us less. 
1 
This ability of the shop stewards to bring collective 
pressure to-bear on the employer is; not, however, soraething that can 
simply be taken for granted in all situations, since the shop stewards 
have also to relate. to their members. Here a ain, it is assumed that 
there may be tensions between shop stewards and their membars, but 
that there are much stricter limits to these in the case of the 
steward-member relationship than in the case of the member-official 
ýghýsyprýs' -: r elationship. These limits- are imposed by the workshop 
Which gave rise to the shop steward syste in the first lace, 
called 'primitive democracy' by Hyman2 
The nature of these power relations obviously differs 
between trade unions, largely because of the different tasks which, 
unions have adopted. Unfortunately, in this thesis, we have been forced 
to examine them more thouroughly in the case of the, AE than in the 
cases of the general unions caterin, '; for engineering workers (the 
TGWU and the GMWU). This is because the requisite source materials have 
not been made available to me by the trade unions concerned, and not 
because these unions were considered uniwportant3 
1R.: Iyrnan: Industrial '_ielations. A Marxist Introduction(1975), 
pp-158 ff. 
2 Ibi3., P"56o.. 
31 
refer here to the unavailability of Minute books at both 
Executive and regional levels; some other, more fragmentary, 
sources have been usad, and are referred to in the text and 
in footnotes. 
I 
the second set of assumptions relates to the interaction of the 
leadership of the CPG3 and Communist shop stewards. It is assumed 
that there was an interaction of some sort, and that CP shop stewards 
did not simply carry out the instructions of the Party leadership. 
In taking this point of view, it has been decided to reject that put 
forward by Henry-Pelling, who appears never to question whether or not 
CP shop stewards and industrial members put the 'Party line' forward 
inside the-factories. Thus, when the CP changed its view of the nature 
of the war in duly 1941, Pelling claims: 
"... the great bulk of the membership rapidly 
adapted themselves to the new situation, and 
set about encouraging. higher productivity and 
discouraging striices, where previously they had 
been doing the reverse. 1"1 
It is thought by this writer that such a situation is inherently 
unlikely, because the industrial members had to somehow come to terms 
with a rising strthe rate; it is not. denied that the change of line 
was important, but it is assumed that the room available for 
complete somersaults was limited in the industrial context. 
It has been thought important to state these 
preconeeptions, because they relate directly to the two central themes 
of the thesis, the industrial and the political- aspects of shop steward 
history. Tha purpose'of the research has been to discover how these 
tensions interacted, evolved and worked themselves out in practice in 
our period, and to discover the main determinants involved in their 
resolution. In other words, such questions as: ho: i did the relationships 
between shop stewards and their members change, and what caused these 
chanoes, had to be poaed. Similarly, the different factors affecting 
the left-wing affiliations of politically active shop stewards, and the 
ways in which these in turn affected them as shop stewards, had to be 
examined. 
1H. Pelling: The British Comyunist Party. A Historical Profile. 
(1958), pp. 119-120. 
7 
At this point, the reader should be warned that there is in fact 
a strong concern with the technological and. industrial determination 
of shop steward behaviour. This is because it became evident at quite 
an early stage in the research that there were substantial differences 
in the way that shop stewards behaved in different districts, and that 
these could often be traced to differing industrial structures, 
rates of technological change, ttskill nixes", local agreenents, and other 
strictly non-political considerations. Tha , ray that the Clydeside 
craftsmen expected their stewards to behave, the type of -issues the latter 
would take up, was quite different to the way that, for exa-. Iple, Coventry 
aircraft workers expected their stewards to operate. Thus, a local 
approach which allowed such factors as technology and so on their 
appropriate weight, was adopted. 
Yet , there is a sense in which this thesis is intended to be 
neither her a history of the shop stewards in enýineerin;, wo: a history 
of extreme left-wing groups in this period. Primarily, it is 
concerned with the often fascinating overlap, interper_etrat'-on and 
interaction of the two areas. 
The thesis is divided into two parts: the first attempts a general 
coverage of the topic for the 1930s, and seeks to provide background 
for the more detailed studies, whilst the second is a set of local 
studies directed towards a detailed examination of our themes for the 
war period itself. 
The first chapter traces the history of the engineering 
industry from 1919 to 1945, to provide the context for later analyses. 
This is followed by an attempt to show the importance of skill 
within the engineering workforces of four important districts. In the 
next chapter, Communist theory on the shop stewärds is introduced and the 
way which these theories corresponded to what was actually going 
on in the industry is considered. The following section takes this 
history into the war. Ohe following group of chapters preceding the 
r 
local studies deal with some general trends amongst the shop stewards 
during the war, and how Government labour policy affected them. The 
attitudes of trade union officials to their shop stewards is also 
described here 
In the second group of chapters, a detailed comparison of the 
Ar 
relationships between shop stewards and their members in four major 
en;; ineerinä dictricts(Coventry, 1, Manchester, Clydeside, Tyneside)alloids us 
to explore some of the questions raised in earlier chapters in more depth- 
within a comparative framework. The four districts named were chosen 
both because of their importance in war production, and because of the 
contrasts which they offer in terms of industrial structure, left-wing 
politics and militancy. In many ways, this second section is regarded as 
the most important of the two by the writer, because it is able to 
explore themes in some depth where the sources are most useful. 
Finally, a series of short biographies of many of the 
individuals named in the text is appended, as an aid to reading the local 
studies. 
*** 
a 
The Engineering Industry 
1919 - 1945. 
ý 
This chapter deals with the main developments in the cn J-neerino 
industry from the end of the First World War to the end of the ; äccond, 
It is divided into three main sections. The first covers the period from 
the growth of the major arms firias in the late Nineteenth Century to 
the World )epression, ending. in 1934. The second takes the account through 
a 
the rearmament period to the end of the Second World 'aw'ar. The primary aim 
of these sections is to provide background on the changing importance of 
the different branches of the industry. The basic argument is that from 
1921 onwards, the heavy and marine sectörs-centred in the North of England 
and in Scotland were in decline, whilct the motor, electrical and aircraft 
industries of the Midlands and South were expanding. The third section 
takes the analysis a stage further by describing the 'skill-mix' of the 
workforce; in both of the main divisions of the industry, and, by examining 
the relationship between these mixes, unemployment, and the level of 
trade union memberrhip. It is suggested that these three things are related, 
and that skilled engineers had a relatively high degree of resistance 
to the erosion of trade union membership by unemployment. 
The engineering industry established itself as the major British 
manufacturing industry during the second half of the Nineteenth Century. 
It was what people thought of when they described Britain as the workshop 
of the world'. British textile machinery, locomotives and marine engines 
formed the basis of the industry's dominance in world terns and wsre well 
able to take the opportunities created by free trade. British craftsmen 
acquired 8kill3 which allowed them to travel all over the world and to 
find work wherever there were ensineerin- workshop:.. Indeed, it i imposE,.. biF: 
to penetrate the 'labour aristocratic-' rnentýtlity of these skilled 
enGineers without understanding the key role which they oaw themselves 
If 
/D 
as playing within the greatest engineering industry in the world. 
By 1881, there were nearly a million men employed in the metal 
trades as a whole, although the engineering industry itself was rather 
smaller than this. 
1 Bngineers were concerned not with making the metal, 
but only with cutting, shaping and assembling it into a variety of 
products. These products included ships, but shipbuilding is defined 
as being outside of the engineering industry for the purposes of our 
study. This is because although engineers were involved in shipbuilding, 
the majority of workers in that industry were craftsmen of the ship- 
building trades (boilermakers, platers, caulkers, rivetters, etc. ) with 
their own quite distinct traditions. 
By the outbreak of the Pirat World War, the workforce of the 
metal industries had climbed to just over the one and three quarter 
million mark. 
2 Much of this increase was due to the expansion of the 
engineering trades, and especially to the mushroom growth of the arms 
firmss Vickers, Beardmore, Armstrong-Whitworth, John Brown and Cammell 
Laird. These firms built massive, factories on the Clyde and Tyne and 
spawned a whole number of sub-contracting firms to provide them with 
specialised tools and components. At the beginning of 1915, the Board 
of Trade discovered that most sizeable engineering firms in London were 
either directly contracted to the Government to produce arms, or were 
sub-contractors to a large arms firm or the Arsenal. They also found 
that Armstrong Whitworth had at least 1,500 sub-contractors, mostly in 
the North East and Scotland. 
3 By this time, of course, war production 
1J. 5. Hinton, o . oit. l p. 24 
(Table 1). 
2lbid. 
31bid. 
j pp. 26-27. 
12 d 
was well under way, and the metal'trades workforce had begun to expand 
even more rapidly: between 1915 and 1918, it grew by an average 12.3% 
to reach nearly two and a half millions in mid-1918.1 
The huge arms firms had dominated war production in terms of 
shipbuilding, marine engineering, and shell and gun manufacture. Their 
concentration on these products, requiring large-scale investment in 
heavy, specialised plant proved a positive liability in adapting to 
peace time conditions by diversification. The aircraft and aero- 
engine manufacturers were in a much better position to return to their 
pre-war business of motor manufacture, on the other hand. They had 
been the beneficiaries of large-scale Government orders, and had been 
able to expand aero-engine production from a minor backwater into a 
major contributor to war production. The change over to motor car work 
presented few technical problems and could be approached with new 
plant. 
2 
Thus, the engineering industry between the wars may be divided 
into two sectors in terms of its economic position: the traditional 
sector, based in the North-East, Scotland (and to a lesser extent in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire), making marine engines, arms, locomotives and 
textile machinery; and the new sector, based in the Midlands and the 
South East, making electrical and radio goods, motor cars and aircraft. 
The relative buoyancy of the 'new' industries may be seen in tablel , 
which shows the number of factories and workers engaged in different 
branches of engineering in 1924 and 1935. The Census of Production 
'J. S. Hinton, op. cit., p. 24. 
2Ibid., 
pp. 27-28. 
't'able I"Wierage lrunber of Establishments and workers in some of the 
rain Branches of Engineering, I92Q and 1935. 
Ave. no. of Establishments Ave. no. of workers employed 
Mechanical 1924 z T01 AAP ^ne Engineering " y" 
1935 3,133 4321621 
Electrical 1924 
Engineering I935 
150 , 88 
J! 1%1 -+wvf --" 
722 
s 
854 247t948 
Motor vehicleq, 1924 
Cycles: -:. - 193) 
--ý 
Aircraft 1924 
1935 
. Railway carriages 1924 
and wagons 1935 
I, 708- 192t708 
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also shows-how. the, engineering industry's centre of gravity was shifting 
towards the: Midlands and the Soüth. In 1930, in the branches covered 
by the-Census, 20% of engineering workers were employed in Greater 
London, 25% in Lancashire and Yorkshire and slightly under 20% in the 
Midlands (Warwickshire, Worcestershire and. Staffordshire). In 1935, 
25%ýworked in Greater London, less than 20% in Yorkshire and Lancashire, 
and 22% in the. Midlands. 
l 
,, 
,... 'wýThe position-of the more depressed branches of the industry will 
be dealt with first. " Shipbuilding and marine engineering was the largest 
of these, and, the. consequences of depression were therefore grave in 
terms of-the unemployment caused. Shipbuilding as such is not our 
concern, but. the fate of, marine engineering is so obviously tied up 
with that of shipbuilding, ýthat, the distinction may largely be ignored 
in this case. I 
Shipbuilding and marine engineering were inextricably linked. 
Almost all of the shipbuilding firms undertook marine engineering work 
in their 'inside' departments, although some marine engineering'concerns 
did not undertake shipbuilding.. 
i.: ý: " ý"'r cx, - 
I 
, ,, cý 
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After an initial boom in 1920 caused by a 
temporary increase in demand, for ships, the bottom fell out of shipbuilding 
until the beginning of the Second World War. Government orders for 
warships were extremely few and far between, and world merchant demand 
was only slightly more buoyant. 
2 In consequence, many yards were 
completely closed down, whilst marine engineering works had to look 
4. 
'Census of Production, 1930, p. 35. 
2Committee 
on Industry and Trade: Survey of Metal Industries 
(1928), PP- - 382-3. 
/? 
for alternative work to remain open. Vickers huge yard and works at 
Barrow had to take on work building locomotives, steam, diesel and gas 
engines. 
I Yet large firms like Vickers were relatively well off, 
because they could at least rely on some Government arms orders placed 
for the sake of preventing expensive specialised plant from becoming 
derelict. 2 
It was this Government concern that arms manufacturing capacity 
should not be destroyed by time that saved the large arms firms from 
extinction in the 1920s, and led to quite large Government investment 
in their plant during the rearmament period, from about 1935 onwards. 
The Admiralty was particularly worried about the facilities for such 
heavy work as gun-mounting. Naval guns could weigh as much as 1,500 
tons and take three years to mount, requiring the use of heavy lifting 
tackle, cranes and so on. 
3 In 1935, the Admiralty made a quarter of a 
million pounds available to Vickers to expand their gun mounting 
ýfaQilities at Elswick (Newcastle)l4 and Beardmores received similar 
sums for a programme of re-equipment for gun-mounting work from 1936 
onwards. 
5 Thus, the major Admiralty contractors had been brought 
back to operational efficiency by the outbreak of the Second World War. 
1J. D. Scott, Vic= Q= A Hi (1962)j p. 140. 
J. D. Scott and R. Hughess The Administration of War Production 
(1955)9 p. 161. 
3J. D. Scott, OD-cit., pp. 220-1. 
4W. Hornbys Factories and Plant (1958), p" 59" 
5J. D. Scott, op. cit., p. 222. 
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There were many shipbuilding and marine engineering firms who were 
not so fortunate as to receive Government support between the wars. 
These firms felt the world depression in shipping very severely and had 
therefore to dismiss large numbers of workers. Consequently, ship- 
building had by far the highest rate of unemployment of any of the metal 
industries in this period, and these high rates were also felt (though 
less acutely) in marine engineering. Unemployment rates are given in 
table 2-. Locomotive building was another very depressed branch of the 
industry centred on the Northern areas. Like shipbuilding, locomotive 
manufacture was mainly dependent On its ability to export, since British 
railway companies made their own locomotives*' Immediately after the war, 
there had been an increase in demand as some countries renewed their 
rolling stock after the ravages of war, but the revival was short 
lived. In 1921,47,379 tons of locomotives were exported, but by 1927, 
this had slumped to 26,936 tons. 
2 One of the industry's problems was 
its refusal to relax its high technical standards in a situation in 
which developing countries simply could not afford their inevitably 
high prices. 
3 This branch of the industry was revived by War Office 
orders for tanks, but these were small until just before the outbreak 
of war. 
4 
The total number of workers employed in the metal trades as a whole 
continued to expand slightly during the 1920s, because the decline 
1W. Hornby, OP-cit., pp. 58-60. 
2Committee 
on Industry and Trade, loc . cit., p. 172. 
3 bid. 
4W. Hornby, op. cit., p. 27. 
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in the numbers employed in the traditional seotors of the industry 
was more than offset by the increase in the number of those employed 
in the new sectors. 
I Easily the largest of these new branches was the 
manufacture of motor cars and bicycles. 
Daimler set up the first British motor factory in Coventry in 
1896. A large number of small experimental firma were thrown up in 
the Midlands during the years before and immediately after the First 
World War to try to develop viable motor cars. 
2 In 1919 and 1920 
alone, no less than forty new car firms were set up. 
3 By 1938, only 
twenty-two remained. The limited adoption of flow production methods 
4 
by Austin and Morris had led to the elimination of the smaller firms; 
the best of them were gobbled up by the larger ones, whilst smaller 
concerns simply went bankrupt. 
During this period, British car production increased tremendously 
quickly, and captured a large portion of the world market outside of 
the U. S. A. During the 1920x, production increased more than five-fold; 
about 35,000 cars were produced in 1920, which had become 182,000 by 
1929.5 By 1938, total output stood at 341,000 cars, with the six 
largest firms (Morris, Austin, Ford, Vauxhall, Rootes and Standard) 
producing 92% of the total. 
6 
1Committee 
on Industry and Trade, loc_cit., pp. 132-3. 
2G. C. Unwins The Industrial Revolution in the Black Country, 
1860-1927 k1929), p. 297" 
3D. G. Rhyss The Motor Industrys Economic Survex (1972), V. 9. 
4G. Maxcys"The MotorIndustry, *+in P. L. Cook (ed. ), The Effects of 
Mergers (19)8), p. 305. 
5lbid., 
pp. 359 and 364. 
61bid., 
p. 367. 
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It is slightly deceptive to describe the progress of the motor 
manufacturers after 1935 solely in terms of motor car production. 
The major motor manufacturers were all employed on Air Ministry schemes 
for the production of aero engines from 1936 onwards. The car firms were 
thought to be the most adaptable to this sort of production, and they 
were brought in to a''shadow' scheme to provide extra capacity to supplement 
the small existing aero-engine industry. Factories were to be built 
at Government expiense, but run by their 'parent' companies under 
commercial wages and conditions. Initially, contracts were signed on a 
'cost-plus' basis whereby when adapting to new work, the firms were 
paid a fixed profit on top of their costs. In subsequent contracts, 
total prices were supposed to be fixed, but in practice contractors 
would argue about the price until the contract was completed. In this 
way, they allowed for the inflation of costs caused by wage increases 
in both their own and sub-contraotors' factories. The MAP had'been 
unable to stamp this practice out by 1943, despite the fact that this 
type of contract (and this type of haggling) was typical of Government 
munitions contracts in general. 
1 
The 'shadow' scheme was firmly established by 1938, when the Air 
Ministry turned to the expansion of the 'professional' side of the air- 
craft industry, represented by the old established firms. The manu- 
facturing capacity of these firms was expanded by Government expenditure 
on new factories and extensions to existing establishments. By 
September 1945, the entire factory building programme had cost the Air 
Ministry L425 millions. Once again, the motor and aircraft industries 
16 
1Report 
of the Select Committee on National Expenditure (1943), 
pp. 18-19. 
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(which were virtually indistinguishable in wartime) had benefitted 
considerably from rearmament and war.. Modern, well-equipped factories 
were acquired from the Government at relatively low prices, and, as 
Political and Economic Planning put it, "considerable liquid assets" had 
been accumulated. 
I 
As we have already suggested, the old aircraft firms benefitted 
from rearmament at least as much as the motor companies. As we can 
see from tablet-, there were very few firms involved in the actual 
building and assembly of aircraft in 1925, but the number of factories 
used for this purpose had more than doubled by 1935. The industry was 
not only compact in terms of the number of companies involved, but 
also had a highly concentrated structure of control by the mid-1930s. 
By this date, the core of the industry was owned by one large concern: 
Hawker-Siddeley, which controlled Armstrong-Siddeley Motors, Armstrong 
Whitworth Aircraft, A. V. Roe, Hawker Aircraft, Gloster Aircraft and 
Air Service and Aircraft Technical Services. 
2 Vickers was another 
important controlling company, owning its-own large factory at Weybridge, 
and-buying Supermarine in 1928.3 De Havilland, Napiers and Saunders-Roe 
(linked through the A. V. Roe connection to Hawker-Siddeley) also 
developed their own offshoots. 
4 This tight-knit bloo of firms was 
allied through the Society of British Aircraft Constructors known as 
1Political 
and Economic Planning, The Motor Industry, in Planning, 
July 2,1948, p" 25" 
A. Plummer, New British Industries in the Twentieth Century (1937), 
p. 98. 
3 J. D. Scott, op. cit., pp. 209-10. 
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4A. Plummer, o . oit., p. 98. 
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'The Ring' by other engineering employers. 
The apparent breakdown of disarmament talks at the end of 1933 
led to a good deal of speculation in aircraft shares. Hawker five 
shilling shares rose by 150% between July 1933 and May 1934; De 
Havilland's L1 shares registered a 200% rise between August 1933 and 
June 1934; Napier's five shilling shares showed a 400% increase between 
May 1933 and May 1934. Rolls-Royce, Vickers and components firms also 
showed large rises because of their links with the industry. 
2 This 
tendency was further encouraged by the Government's announcement in 
early 1936 that orders for new aircraft were to be double the existing 
size. The Stock Exchange's confidence was quite justified. Between 1935 
and 1938, the aircraft firms registered the following profits: 
Table . 
3.. 1935: £767,146 
1936: £1,091,651 
1937: £1,637,543 
1938: £2,310,004 3 
Simultaneously, the number of workers employed in the industry rose 
considerablys 
1J. B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 201. 
An expert on the RAF made the following comments about 'The Ring's 
"Between 1935 and 1937 firms outside The Ring consistently made 
losses, while those inside it made profits.... No standards of 
competence or efficiency were exacted by the Government from 
the firms comprising The Ring. The Minister's policy seems to 
have been to maintain the privileges of the Approved Firms, 
although national security has been and still is at stake. " 
(Lieut. -Commander R. Fletchers Air Defence of Britain 
(1938), 
p. 4 ) 
2LR, June, 1934, p. 126: 
lý- 
31bid., August 1939, p. 170. 
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Table -4 1930: 17,600 
1935: 29,100 
1936: 60,000 
1938: 120,000 
(spring) 1939: 140,000 
IS 
In other words, the workforce expanded eightfold between 1930 and the 
spring of 1939. 
This expansion went very much further during the war years 
themselves, as the Air Ministry concentrated on expanding the existing 
aircraft firms and the components industry from 1938 onwards. By 1943, 
the industry (including components and materials) was employing one and 
a half million workers, and was therefore the largest single manufacturing 
industry. 2 In the pre-. war years, most of the new factories had been 
built in country areas in the South, with adjacent aerodromes. After 
the German air raids in the summer of 1940, the industry had to become 
much more geographically dispersed. 
3 Similarly, the trend towards 
larger factories dominating the industry which had been discernible from 
the mid-1930s was reversed as small workshops, garages and even back 
Yards and bedrooms were made to serve as temporary factories and sub- 
assembly areas. But the old aircraft firms grew even more in importance 
during the war, as other engineering firms were brought under their 
supervision by means of 'agency' agreements to manufacture both complete 
aircraft and components. 
1LR, August 1939, p. 169. 
2 W. Hornby, o . cit., p. 251. 
3lbid., 
cap. 9. 
It remains only to consider one other expanding sector of engineering 
. which was 
itself gradually incorporated into the aircraft industry during 
the war yearss electrical engineering. The main parts of electrical 
engineering (ignition magnetos for cars and aircraft and permanent 
magnets for telephones) had been practically non-existent in Britain 
prior to the First World War. 
1 The war blocked off German supplies of 
these important components, and by 1926 Britain was entirely self- 
sufficient in them. 
2 Between 1924 and 1930, the volume of production 
increased by 33%. 3 Based mainly in the Midlands, the South of England 
and Lancashire, employers expanded their workforce considerably: 
Table S 1911: 85,000 
1921: 175,000 
1931: 211,000 
1934: 257,830 
1936: 291,690 4 
By the later 1930s, many of these workers (including an unusually high 
proportion of women: 20% in London in 1929) were working for a few giant 
concerns. At this point, four companies controlled over 30% of the 
invested capital. 
5 
I A. Plummer, OP-cit., p. 40. 
-Ibid. 
3ýid., 
p. 46. 
'ý_ý P" 57" 
SIbid. 
ý P" 47" 
By the outbreak of war, many of these workers were becoming 
directly or indirectly involved in arms production. This was especially 
the case in the larger concerns; Metropolitan-Vickers had been entrusted 
with undertaking gun production, and supervising other private firms in 
Lancashire taking on similar work. 
l 
By September 1939, most of the main features of wartime industrial 
organisation had already been determined. The crucial position of air- 
craft production had been recognised, and the 'shadow' factories were 
built or about to be built. The old arms firms had been helped to 
restore their plant to operational efficiency to enable them to play a 
key role in the manufacture of heavy armaments. Large numbers of small 
and medium sized engineering firms were being drawn into the orbit of 
one of these major sectors by sub-contracting. However, there was one 
feature which was slightly underdeveloped at this point: the expansion 
of the state-owned, and managed Royal Ordnance Factories. 
The importance of the Royal Ordnance Factories in engineering 
production was much greater than it had been during the First World War. 
The existing engineering ROFs at Woolwich and Enfield Lock were supplemented 
by twenty new factories at the peak of war production, employing just under 
100,000 workers, and costing £31 millions for plant and buildings alone. 
2 
The Weir Committee had already decided in 1935 that the ROFs should provide 
the basis of small arms and ammunition production, but only three of a 
group of ten new gun factories had even been approved by the outbreak 
of war. 
3 Therefore, a high proportion of the new ROFa had to be built 
and brought into production during late 1939 and 1940. 
1W. Hornby, op. cit., p. 171. 
2Ibid. 
j p. 121, p. 133. 
31bid. 
g p. 124. 
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Despite this slow start, the policy of expanding the role of the 
ROFs in arms production was highly successful. The new factories were 
well-equipped, achieved high levels of efficiency on the basis of 
extensively diluted labour forces, and were little troubled by strikes. 
Notwithstanding these facts, there were some problems in terms of 
the managerial chain of command in the new ROFs which gave rise to a 
certain amount of friction between plant management and the Ministry of 
Supply on the one hand, and management and trade unions on the other. 
These derived from the unclear position of the factory supervisors. 
Each factory had a supervisor appointed by the Ministry of Supply, to 
which the former was responsible. It was this. latter responsibility 
which tended to cause the trouble, because supervisors were continually 
referring labour matters to the Ministry rather than dealing with them 
at plant level. Their fear of creating precedents in their factories 
which could be used elsewhere often appeared as simple delaying tactics 
to trade unionists. Some small attempts were made to overcome this 
problem during the war, but they did not tackle the problem radically, 
and it remained down to 1945.1 
Although the basic framework for the development of the engineering 
industry during the war had been established by September 1939, massive 
changes went on within that framework during the following six years. 
These changes were most important in terms of the position of engineering 
within industry as a whole, and, within engineering, in the dilution of 
the existing workforce. 
The metal and engineering industries grew to an unprecedented 
size during the Second World Wax. At the peak of the industry's 
1W. Hornby, op. cit., p. 134 ff. 
2' 
expansion in the First World War, 2,418,000 workers had been employed; 
1 
at the corresponding point in the Second World War, 3,594,700 were 
employed on Government work alone. 
2 Within this large workforce, the 
largest single bloc was formed by those working on Ministry of Aircraft 
Production contracts. There were 1,678,200 workers in this category at 
the peak of production. 
3 
The aircraft industry had expanded to this size 'largely by means 
of sub-contracting large amounts of component work to small and medium- 
sized companies. In the productive sense, the industry was still 
dominated by the old 'ring' firms, who supervised the extension of their 
work under the 'shadow' and 'agency' schemes as well as to their sub- 
contractors. At the height of war production, no less than fourteen 
thousand engineering factories were employed on MAP contracts. 
4 
The major aim of this extensive use of sub-contracting was the, 
maximum use of the skilled labour outside of the major engineering 
factories. 5 This. was one way of extending the pool of skilled labour 
available to the aircraft industry, but it clearly had a very definite 
limit, at the point where all the suitable skilled labour in Britain was 
being used. By the beginning of 1942, this point had been reached. 
1J. 
S. Hinton, op. cit., p. 24- 
2 P* I=an: Labour in the Munitions Industries (1957), p" 3" 
31bid. 
4W. Hornby, op. cit., p. 80. 
5P. Inman, o . cit., p. 24. 
Z? 
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There was an acute and general shortage of skilled labour, which could 
only be overcome through the more efficient use of the skilled workers 
available, is., dilution. 
There were a number of problems involved in diluting the labour 
force, ranging from managerial reluctance and inefficiency, through an 
insufficient supply of, unskilled labour, to opposition from the skilled 
men themselves. But the central problem was the existing technological 
level of the given factory. The other factors enumerated tended to even 
out across different branches of engineering, but dilution could not be 
undertaken unless the machine tools and methods appropriate to mass- 
production were adopted, and it was'clearly more difficult to do this in 
factories which had a 'high proportion of old plant. 
Thus, in order to provide some background to the levels of dilution 
achieved in the different branches of engineering, it is important to 
first survey the methods of production commonly in use. In doing this, 
the industry has to be divided not only into its constituent branches, 
but also into machining and assembly sectors within each branch, so that 
some appropriate comparisons may be made between the different branches. 
The machining side of the industry will be considered first. Here, 
automatic machinery (usually American or German in origin) and the use of 
flow-production to link up machines typify the mass-production methods 
used in motor and electrical production and adapted during the war to 
aero- and tank engines. Modern machinery and flow-production (which will 
be described in more detail in the next chapter) had been largely 
introduced by the motor manufacturers by the late 1930s. Thus, when 
W. F. Watson went to work in the turnery of a motor factory in the early 
19300, he found thats 
"... The machinery was reasonably moderns at 
any rate, in good condition. The auto, turret, 
grinding and brass shops, the drifting plant and 
. ý: l 
the toolroom, were good. " 1 
Watson's experience seems to have been typical. The motor industry was 
the most active of all sectors of British engineering in importing 
American machine tools between the wars. 
2 Austin, Morris and Ford had 
pioneered with the new machines and methods in the early 1920s (from 
1911 in the case of Ford). Morris linked up transfer machines to form 
a continuous machining sequence at his Coventry factory as early as 
1923, although he had later to abandon this. 
3 
During the war, the greatest demand for automatic and special 
purpose American machine tools (considerably more advanced than their 
British equivalents, where equivalents existed) came from the aero- 
engine machining departments. 
4 By 1941, almost one-third of the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production's demand for machine tools was satisfied by 
American imports. 5 The general tendency was towards the situation 
described by Vic Feather when he visited Ford's Dagenham plant (largely 
engaged in aero-engine work) in 1944: 
"Different jobs within Ford's have been broken 
down to such an extent that workers... are not 
divided into occupational groups... Different 
jobs are so machined that a transfer from one 
job to another can be easily effected. The 
workers in the main are machine operators. " 6 
W. F. Watson: "The Working Mechanic's View", in C. T. Cramp: 
The Workers' View. A Symposium, (1933), p. 16. 
2W. Hornbyv P. 328. 
3H. A. Turner, G. Clack, G. Robertas Labour Relations in the Motor 
Industry (1967), p. 78. 
4W. Hornby, OP-cit., p. 311. 
51b, 
p. 315" 
6TUC 602.57.4. Memo. by V. Feather, 21 February, 1944. 
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It would probably be wrong to ascribe a similar level of automation 
to British-owned firms on similar work, since Ford was the great pioneer 
of mass-production methods in Britain as well as the USA. 
1 Nevertheless, 
Ford was setting an example which some British firms had gone a long 
way towards emulating. 
In marine engineering, on the other hand, machining processes 
were antiquated throughout the inter-war years, and this situation 
persisted into the war. The official historian accurately described 
technology in these factories as 'persistently regressive'. The majority 
of machines in-some works dated from the First World War or-before, 
2 
whilst one firm had machinery reaching seventy years old in 1942. 
This type of machinery could not be run at acceptable speeds, and caused 
bottlenecks during the war despite special shift arrangements to ensure 
maximum use. 
3 All of these facts were unearthed by an Admiralty inquiry 
of 1942. It is doubtful whether the inquiry led to a great improvement; 
most, of the money allocated to improvement went to shipyard development 
and the extension of welding facilities in the yards, rather than to the 
4 
engine works. 
The contrast was equally sharp on the assembly side of the industry. 
Austin, Morris and Ford had all introduced conveyors into assembly work 
by the early 1930s (Ford: 1933; Austin 31925; Morris: 1933). 
5 : Forii, s, 
11n luxury motor manufacture, skilled men still constituted as much 
as 15% of the direct production workforce in some British car 
plants in the 1950s- (H. A. Turner et al., op. cit., p. 86. ) 
2W. Hornby, OP-cit., p. 55" 
31bid. 
4Thid. 
t PP- 57-8. 
SEt. 
ýI. Leeson: Strike -'(1973)j,,, -7P-%I26_. Z*E. Lamberitrand R. J. Wyatt: Lord Austin. The Man (1968); pp. 142-5. 
P. W. S. Andrews: The Life of Lord Nuffield. A Study in Enterprise 
and Benevolence Oxford, 1955 t P" 197" See also the photograph 
facing 
p. 225. 
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as one might expect, set an example in this field by using conveyors on 
several assembly jobs when the Dagenham factory was opened in 1933.1 
Conveyors were used wherever possible in the important new group of 
'shadow' factories built in the late 1930s to supplement existing aero- 
engine capacity. 
2 During the war, marry other factories of this'type 
adopted these methods. At the Humber, Coventry, conveyors had been 
introduced on staff and scout car production by the end of the war;, 
Austin introduced the assembly line to jerrican production in its South 
Wales factory; the new engineering ROFs used conveyors fora number of 
3 
processes. Thus, by the end of the war, substantial advances had been 
made in this direction. 
Marine and heavy engineering were far less amenable to these 
methods. The marine engine normally took months to erect, even in 
wartime. Even extensive use of sub-assembly was difficult, because an 
extremely large and complicated mechanism was involved. The only type 
of work undertaken by the-arms firms on which something approaching 
continuous flow production could be undertaken was tank building. 
Vickers-Armstrong, who had previous experience of this type of work, were 
able to use a system at their Elswick works whereby tanks were'taken 
through all the stages of construction by being moved through their 
adjacent assembly shops. It was the realisation that this sort of method 
could be adopted in tank production that led the War Office to begin to 
1Conveyor, January, 1937" 
2W. 
Hornbyº pp. 229-30. 
Z7 
3Minutes 
of a Works Conference held at the Humber Co., February 1,1945" 
Z. E. Lambert and R. J. Wyatj- op. cit., p. 167 and The Timest British War Production. A Record, photograph on p. 57- 
E- Prow, 3 April, 1974" 
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give tank work to motor manufacturers in the latter years of the war. 
1 
Both in machining and assembly methods, the marine and heavy 
engineering firms were well behind the electrical and motor concerns 
which provided supplementary capacity for the aero-engine industry 
during the war. The airframe and aircraft assembly firms of 'the ring' 
fell, as quite a skilled branch, somewhere in between these two models. 
By the end of 1941, dilution had reached a point at which these companies 
could be regarded as broadly similar to the motor and electrical model. 
Prior to'1935 and the increase in metal aircraft dictated by the 
Government contracts, airframes had been largely made of wood. Therefore, 
most of the workers were skilled woodworkers, and woodworking continued 
to be important in the London area where the Mosquito was manufactured 
throughout the war period. In general, wood gave way to metal, and this 
meant employing large numbers of skilled sheet metal workers and other 
skilled engineers, 
2 
for what The Aeroplane described as 'light accurate 
work of varied character'. 
3 
Dilution was much more difficult in this part of the industry than 
it was in the aero-engine sector. New machines could be introduced on 
some operations, but sheet metal work remained as the great bottleneck. 
This was exacerbated by the fierce opposition to dilution of the sheet 
metal workers, who successfully managed to defy Government attempts to 
induce them to accept female dilution throughout the entire war. 
4 
The Ministry of Aircraft Production, through its Technical Officers 
1J. D. Scott, o . cit., pp. 284-5. 
2W. Hornby, o . cit., p. 197. 
3The Aeroplane, January 22,1936. 
4P. Inman, o . cit., pp. 60-62. 
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attached to the aircraft firms began to bring this sector into line 
with the aero-engine firms during 1941. At Vickers' Castle r3romwich 
factory(building Spitfires), the hAP succeeded in bringing-in and 
upgradini; women, to bring the factory up to the. average level of dilution 
obtained in the rotor vehicleicycle and aircraft firms in 1941 Thus, 
it seerm that täble 26, which lumps motor vehicles cycles and aircraft 
togother, does not conceal any large differences between the different 
sectors within the category. 
To sumsarise the argument so far. The marine and heavy sectors, 
concentrated in the North of England and in Scotland were in a much more 
difficult position with respect to their product markets in the inter-war 
years than were the motor electrical and aircraft sectors of the Midlands 
and the South. The Northern branches of the industry tended also to be 
technologically backward compared to their Southern count epparts 
At this point, we turn our attention to the implications of 
this division of the industry in terms of the skill unemployment and 
trade union structure obtaining in the inter-war years. This section is 
arranged in the following way: first some figures on trade union membership 
and unemployment are presented; next, the proportion of skilled workers in 
four rlajor ensineering districts is established; finally, it ir. argued thct 
neither trade union memberalUp nor shop floor orjanisation are simply and 
mechanically related to unemployment but that the proportion of skilled 
men in the workforce is an important factor that needs to be considered. 
The first problem to be considered will be that of the 'skill- 
mix' in the districts. , It is6possible to obtain quite a good idea of, 
this from"the 1931 Census by, analysing the number of workers in the 
constituent occupations on the machining side of the industry (as 
distinct from assembly, where it is not possible to establish a similar 
relationship between different-groups of workers). The"key relation, 
ship foran analysis of skill is that between the number of workers in 
the hold-all category=of 'metal machinist' and the number of: tool- 
setters and'toolmakers: In addition, -to supplement and confirmthese 
results, 'the''ratio of-femaleato male metal machinists is used. 
The first relationship (between the number of machinists and the 
number of toolmakers and setters)-is important because it shows how 
many skilled then were required-to service°the machinists. Mass production 
methods of machining became increasingly widespread in general and 
electrical engineering, -and especially°in motor manufacture, during the 
1920s, as components rapidly became standardised. - . Special purpose 
machine tools were linked together by flow-lines for the production 
of components, replacing the all-purpose universal: grinding and milling 
machines, and centre'lathes. ¢ These special purpose machines were 
fitted with high speed steel tools of increasing strength and durability, 
so that they could'perform the maximum amount of operations before 
breaking or wearing. 
1 Thus, all that was required was a workforce of 
machine operators of rather=less skill than the specialised journeymen 
machinists. 
2 At the same time, skilled workers were required to set 
ýJefferys, p. '244. Jefferys'quotes the example of''Widia' tipped 
tools at Leyland. Motors, the introduction of which led to an increase of 60%'in chassis production without any extra labour. 
2The 
effects of this on the type of work that could be carried out 
by the semi-skilled, and the impact on trade unionism, are dealt 
with in an unsigned article in The Worker, April 5,1929. 
the machines and small tools=up-for the semi-skilled operators, just as 
they were for making the tools in the first place. These were the roles 
of the toolsetters and toolmakers. respectively. 
& 
Looking at these relationships in table. it is apparent that 
the dilution of-skill was most advanced, in Coventry, and that Manchester 
was, the, next most advanced along the same road. -, Newcastle was some 
way behind, and although the categories of-toolmaker and setter were 
not used by the Scottish Census, the male-female ratio allows the 
suspicion that Glasgow's skill-mix was of a similar order. These 
results are broadly confirmed, by table ,' in which. it is, immediately 
apparent'that the Coventry employers had been easily the most successful 
in introducing women into the workshops as machinists, and that there 
was very little to differentiate the other districts. ' - 
In, the"North-East and Scotland, the sort of organisation of 
machining described above did not exist to anything like the same 
extent as it did in the Southern mass production centres. The type of 
machinist to be found in the North was still the man who made (or at 
least part-machined) his own tools. Since almost every job was 
different, he would calculate the 'speeds and feeds' required to complete 
the'work as quickly as possible without subjecting either the tools or 
the work'to undue stress. He would then collect a tool from his own 
toolbox or make one for the job and grind it himself. Alteznatively, 
of course, he'could have recourse to the toolmakers or the stores. He 
would then see the job through all the various operations required, 
possibly with the help of a labourer if the work was heavy. When the 
term 'machinist' was applied to these men, it clearly meant skilled 
machinist (normally a turner or miller, since most of the other categories 
were specified in the Cez*13s), because skilled men were much less 
important for the replacement of small tools than they were in Coventry 
or even Manchester. 
4 ý2 
Although these figures relate-to 1931, they are reasonably reliable 
as a general indication of skill at least for the subsequent seven years, 
since the engineering employers estimated the extent of dilution as well 
under five percent in the interim. 
I Dilution accelerated much more 
quickly during the war, but it seems likely that the changes Were 
necessarily constrained by the existing local plant, and that these 
relationships continued to hold good in general terms at least. 
Table 
,6 
TABLE SHOWING THE PROPORTION ON SKILLP) MACHINISTS AMCNCST MEAL 
MACHINISTS IN FOUR MAJOR DISTRICTS. 
4LA M COMM MANCHESTER NEWCASTLE 
Toolmakers and 
Toolaetters NIX* 1,360 640 104 
Metal Machinists 7,601 6,059- 2,302 
Number of machinists 5.6 9.4 22.1 
per toolmaker and 
setter 
(1931 Csnsue)ý-j ý Wý 7.4&. ýig14)%'.. ZT6-ý ýý6-7,364-1 
*Category not used in Scottish Cenvus. 
13agineering 
and Allied Trades National Federation and AEUs 
Proceeding at a Special Conference, December 6p 1938, p. 21. 
i$ ý3 
Table 7 
TABLE SHOWING THE PROPORTION OF WOMbN -AMMIGST ' MMAL MACHINISTS' 
Th 
FOUR MAJOR , DISTRICTS, -193'x. 
COVENTRY MANCHESTER NEWCASTLE GLASGOW 
Women 1,163 202 120 414 
Men 6,438 5,857 2,812 8,604 
Percentage 18% 3.4% 3.5% 4-8% 
(1931 Ceneue )`ý 
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These figures give us a rough idea of the proportion of piece 
workers in the different areas. Broadly speaking, piece working was 
introduced as dilution increased, and that form of payment became 
more feasible as operations were broken down into readily identifiable 
parts. Thus, the proportion of piece workers in the industry as a whole 
increased with the proportion of semi-skilled between 1923 and 1940.1 
J. B. Jefferys estimated that a high proportion of fully skilled men were 
time workers in this period. 
2 Detailed figures are not available to 
show directly the number of piece workers in each area, but it seems 
clear that the dilution of the traditional skills was a prerequisite of 
introducing piece work. 
The proportion of skilled workers in each district will be returned 
to in order to help explain local variations in trade union organisation, 
the other main relationship which needs to be established. Trade 
union membership has to be related to the number of workers eligible 
1J. B. Jefferyq p. 210 
2lbid. 
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for the AEU, and: then considered against the background of different 
skill distributions and levels of. unemployment. There are some important 
problems to be considered when performing these operations if we are 
not to be misled, as to the significance of the result. First of all, 
the number of AEU members has to be compared to the number of possible 
members, using the AEU Monthly Report and the 1931 Census as sources. 
The main problem in this connection is the fact that-the{Census boundaries 
never coincide with those of the AEU branches. Next, the resultant 
figure has to be considered against the background of the unemployment 
rate* once again, there is the problem of geographical boundaries, but 
in this case there'is an additional problem posed by the fact that 
unemployment figures by Labour Exchanges are not available. We have 
therefore to rely on M. P. Fogarty's statistics for . 1932, since he did 
have access to-Labour Exchange records. It is unlikely that very much 
error is thereby incurred, since the relationship between the different 
towns is unlikely to have changed in such a short period. 
Table 'shows the result of the first operation, the object of 
which is to-find out what'proportion of employed and unemployed engineers 
belonged to the AEU. It shows that around a fifth of Coventry and 
Manchester engineers, about a tenth of Glasgow engineers, and just over 
.. t, 
a half of those in Newcastle belonged to the AEU. Clearly, the figures 
which deserve the most critical attention are those at either extreme: 
Glasgow and Newcastle. Taking Glasgow first, it seems that the figure 
is likely tobe reasonably accurate, for two reasons. Firstly, the average 
total size of branches was the lowest of all the districts, at 170 
compared to 225 on average in the other districts. 
1 Secondly, Glasgow 
1Calculated 
from AEU Monthly Journal, January, 1931. 
had the highest proportion of unemployed members in their branches, 
with 24% compared to Newcastle's 21%, and Coventry and Manchester's 
14%. 1 Trade union membership was clearly at a low point in Glasgow, 
and this can probably be linked to the importance of exceptionally 
depressed sectors of the engineering industry such as locomotive 
engineering in the town. 
2 The Newcastle figure is much more suspect 
than its Glasgow equivalent, even if only because the town had a 
broadly similar industrial structure to that of Glasgow. There is one 
3 
Table $ 
TABLE SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED ENGINEERING 
WORKERS ELIGIBLE FOR THE AEU WHO WERE M]1BERS IN JANUARY 1931. 
Glas w Coventry Manchester Newcastle 
Number of AEU members 2,216 3,224 3,592 4,429 
Total number of local 
workers eligible for AEU. 21,414 16,128 16,132 8,146 
% AEU membership. 9.7 19.9 22.2 54.3 
(Sourcess AEU Monthly Journal and 1931 Census). 
Notes on Table. 
The table includes employed and unemployed workers in both cases, 
and therefore may reflect different habits with regard to the retention 
of membership among the unemployed. It may also reflect the whims of 
branch secretaries in recording such workers as members. Therefore, it 
does not show the strength of shop floor organisation in the different 
areas. 
1Calculated from AEU Monthly Journal, January, 1931. 
2Committee 
on Industry and Trade, loc. cit., pp. 180-182. 
3H. A. Mess: Industrial Tyneside (1928), caps. 3 and 4, pp. 39-65. 
"1 ýb 
Certain categories of engineering worker have been pruned fiom the 
Census definition of metalworker, in order to reflect potential AEU 
membership as closely as possible. These are those who had alternative 
unions catering for them, or those who were known to be almost completely 
unorganised. They are: patternmakers, tinsmiths, coppersmiths, 
mechanical engineers. 
Tabler 
TABLE SHOWING THE MONTHLY AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST INSURED WORK= 
DURING 1932. 
Glasgow: 30.7% 
Coventry: 15-1% 
Manchester:. 18.7% 
Newcastle: 26.7% 
(Sources M. P.. Fogarty, Prospects of the Industrial Areas of Great 
Britain (1945), pp. 31-33)- 
possible cause of error in this cases 
the town had an exceptionally low number of engineers, with less than 
half of the number ascribed to-Coventry and Manchester. It seems likely 
.- at 
that the boundaries have issteif*wbd''/ this point to decrease the 
number of engineers. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that Newcastle did have a good 
membership record when compared to the other areas, because the absolute 
total of AEU members was the highest by 19% over Manchester, its nearest 
rival. Why was this? Before answering the question, it should be 
recalled that it was not simply a high proportion of unemployed members, 
as we have already seen in the proportions of unemployed members quoted 
earlier. One likely-explanation might be the identification of the 
skilled engineer with his union, which may have been strained beyond 
breaking point in the case of Glasgow. 
1 It is also possible. that the 
On this question of the different attitudes of skilled and semi- 
skilled workers to trade union membership, see J. D. M. Bells 
Union Structure in A. 'landers and H. A. Clegg, (eds. ) The System 
Of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (1951), PP- 134-5" 
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Distrit; tICömnittees and branch secretaries were especially keen in the 
area. In any event, it would be very difficult to evaluate the relative 
impact of these factors, and we must be-content with establishing this 
fact, however tenuously. 
r "n 
The importance of the figures can be briefly indicated here, because 
of the light-it throws on the subsequent analysis. ThW-i-he1g: ue-to 
understand the hold'of the right wing in Newcastle because they were 
able to hold on to the membership very effectively in the face of high 
levels of unemployment, thus denying the Communist Party the opportunities 
they had elsewhere for organising workers into the trade unions. 
Conversely, it is possible to see how the CP was able to establish itself 
in Glasgow despite the small scale of industrial expansion there during 
the war. 
There is a good deal of literary evidence to support the contention 
that differences in trade union membership might be at least partly 
understandable in terms of the different levels of skill. If we consider 
the areas of new and expanding industry in the Midlands and South, then 
we can see the importance of skill quite clearly. During 1931, the TUC 
carried out a survey of these areas to discover how trade union membership 
compared with the rest of the country. The secretary of the committee 
responsible for the survey wrote than 
"... so far as could be ascertained there was 
little sign of activity in the localities concerned 
in the survey of new and rapidly expanding 
industries. " I 
The example of Coventry was typical. Unions catering for the craftsmen 
were doing well; the sheet metal workers and coppersmiths were "well 
organised and approaching 100%. They are quite capable of looking after 
their organisation. " The report on the National Union of Vehicle 
, TUC D. 30t 
Minutes of Organisation Committee, January 199 1932. 
5'ý ?p 
Builders pointed to one of the reasons for poorer membership in their 
union: 
"... a very good branch. Up till recently 
practically 100% and very powerful: recent 
depression and changes in methods (ration- 
alisation) has somewhat weakened them, but 
they are still strong. " 1 
.4 
The overall remarks dealt with"the semi-skilled and womens 
"Craftsmen generally (not including the large 
number of specialised engineers in the motor 
industry) are fairly well organised. General 
workers poor to bad. Women very poor. " 2 
Clearly, the rapid rate of technological change in the motor industry 
was taking its toll of trade union organisation. Relatively high earnings 
might sometimes be obtained by exploiting 'loose' piece rates, but the 
report asserted that this could prove an obstruction to trade unionism, 
and was certainly not a result of it. 
3 
The Northern engineering centres did not at least have to deal 
with rapid technological change, 
4 
although unemployment there was much 
higher, and that in turn meant a greater likelihood of the victimisation 
of shop stewards. The Organising District Delegate of the AEU for 
1 
TUC D30. Reply of Coventry, January 28,1931. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4W. Hornby, o . cit., P" 55" 
Clydeside reported in 1931 thats 
"The situation has had an extremely detrimental 
effect on the shop organisation, quite a number, 
of convenors and shop stewards, who have rendered 
excellent service in years past, have been 
amongst the number whose services have terminated. " I 
This was not surprising, but the Organising District Delegates' report 
went on to show that shop steward activity was still far from being 
extinct. He briefly reported a meeting of a district shop stewards' 
organisation called the 'Joint Trades Shop Stewards' in Greenock, as 
well as a meeting of the 'Glasgow and West of Scotland Organising Trade 
Union Committee', attended by officials and stewards of the major unions. 
2 
Mass meetings were still being held, even in the depths of the Depression. 
At the North British Locomotive Co., the engineers met to discuss resistance 
to the company's attempt to change over from piece work to day rate on 
3 
some sections because of the shortage of work. 
The AEU stewards kept up their quarterly meetings which they were 
allowed under rule. Indeed, the Depression conditions do not seem to have 
dampened their enthusiasm at all; the Glasgow Organiser reported that the 
November 1931 Quarterly meeting was "as usual" well attended, despite 
the fact that it had to be held . on a week night instead of the usual 
Sunday night. The Organiser went on to say that "given the stimulus of 
more satisfactory conditions their efforts would be more fruitful". 
4 
Some of the other skilled trades in engineering were equally active in 
the area, and one or two were probably better organised in the workshops. 
During 1930, the United Patternmakers expressed pleasure at a largely 
attended meeting of convenors on the Clyde. 
5 In most engineering trades, 
AEIJ Monthly Journal, March, 1931. 
2lbid. . 
31bid., January, 1931. 
ibid., November, 1931. 
5United Patternmakers Association Report, August, 1930. 
a district meetinC of convenor, would have been a small. one indeedl 
This evidence is a further reminder of the dangers involved in sugý; esting 
any simple and direct connection between trace union membership and s't'op 
or a. nisation. Skillcd workers in particular were doSCedly persistent in 
mäintaininLoj some form of shop floor or-, ý; anisation, however rudimen. tary. 
1 
In conclusion, it is clear that the central division between, 
the to main sectors of the industry posited in the first part of the 
chaptercras also to be found when the proportion of skilled workers in 
the workforces of the different districts was examined. Skill was found 
to be an important factor in determining the extent of trade union 
member3hip and the level of shop floor union work, and this meant that 
the secular trend towards decline in the older branches of engineerinC 
was to some extent mitigated in trade union terms by the nature of the 
workforce; 
*. ** 
1The 
question of what shop stewards were able to do remains 
an important, and unanswered one which requires more detailed 
research. There is, however, rome evidence to suggest that 
'crafty concerns such as dilution took up more of the Tdorthern 
stewards time, whilepiece work was a major issue for their 
counterparts in Coventry. Thus, we find the Clydeside Organising 
District Delegate of the AEU reporting in Hay 1936: 
"A number of complaints have been considered by the 
Glasgow DC with reference to the esplo;; ment of 
certain classes of labour, semi-skilled and unskilled, 
which indicated attempts at dilution, and from which 
it would appear that this, in the main, is the reäult 
of increased activity on the part of the increasing 
number of shop stewards, rather than a radical chane 
of practice on(sic)come of the firms concerned". 
(AEU 1: onthly Journal, Plovember 1936. ) 
In Coventry, on the other hand, the AEU DC considered seven strikes 
during 1935 and 1936; four of these concerned piece working. (AEU DC, January 8, July 23,1935; Septe, iber 8,24, October 6,27,11, -36) Similarly in Uxford, piece work was a factor in all of the : strike; (nine)that made Pres.; ed Sreel the most strike-prone factory in 
the motor industry in the inter-war period. 
gineeri , districts before the war. 
0ý 
Two tables are appended to this chapter to show the level of 
wages obtaining in the major engineering districts before the war. 
10 
Table shows the earnings of skilled fitters in Coventry, and on the 
U 
Clyde and Tyne. Table 'gives the wages of apprentices in these 
districts and Lancashire after the advances won in the apprentices' 
strikes of 1937. 
In both tables, a considerable gap exists between the earnings 
and wages obtaining in Coventry compared to the other districts. A 
relatively low rate of unemployment and extensive piece working explain 
Coventry's Positions The gap between Coventry and the other two 
io 
districts shown in table widens even further after only nine months 
of war, so that Coventry fitters were by then earning well over half 
as much again as fitters on the Clyde and Tyne. 
41 
ýý 9z 
Table /o 
Comparative Earnings of Skilled Fitters 
Oct. 1 936 Oct. 1, U8 July 1 940 
Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. 
earnings hours earnings hours earnings hours 
Coventry 91/9 48.5 107/1 
Clyde 
Tyne 
Notes 
71/8k 49.6 86/- 
73/11 50.3 85/7-1 
46.7 193/111 57.6 
51.5 116/10 57.7 
51.3 118/4 57.8 
1) No comparable figures are available for Manchester. 
The Manchester rate for skilled fitters in October 1936 
was 63/-. (M. L. Yates w es and Labour Conditions in 
British Engineering (1937), and if allowance is made for 
piece work bonus at the national average of 33b,, shift 
allowances and overtime payments, then Manchester's earnings 
would be second only to Coventry's. 
2) The standard week in engineering throughout the period was 
47 hours. 
Sources EngineerinK F}nployera' Federations Average Hours and Earnings 
of Fitters... Time and Payments by 
Results workers combined. 
70 
Table ' 
Apprentices' Wages, October. 
--1937 
Age 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
COVENTRY 
Payment by results 
Min. 9/- 11/- 13/- 16/- 19/- 23/- 26/- 
Max. 13/- 15/- 18/6 22/- 27/- 30/- 34/- 
Dayworkers 
II 
Min. 1o/ 12/- 14/- 16/ " 19/ 23/- 26/ 
Max. 13/- 17/- 21/6 26/- 31/- 34/- 38/- 
Dayworkers 
-in Toolrooms, 
Pattern and 
Dmp-Forging 
Shops. 
35/- 39/- 44/- 
MANCHESTER 13/- 14/- 16/6 18/6 24/- 27/6 32/- 
NORTH FAST COAST 
Apprentices 
Boys & Youths 
14ORTH WEST 
Fitters 
Turners, etc. 
12/6 14/6 17/6 21/6 26/6 
9/- 10/6 17/- 20/- 23/6 27/6 32/6 
11/6 14/- 16/6 20/6 25/- 
12/6 15/- 17/6 21/6 26/- 
93 
Sources LAB 10/80. Table dated 28 October, 1937. 
The Communist Party in 
the Engineering Industry (1) 1927-1939. 
_ 
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Thi$ chapter is devoted to an examination of the nature and history of 
Comnrarist organisation in the enäineering industry between 1927 and 
' 939, focussinz3 in particular on the events of 193 and. 1937. `fnese fears 
saw the ; rowth of a national unofficial or; anisation in the aircraft 
indästry, a large wale of strikes air ng en; ineering apprentices and 
It raimees all over the country, and a _ýrolon; ed debate within the CP 
on the' direction which rank and file movements should take. They are 
covered, in some detail because they allow us to examine the relationshi 
between the internal debates and the actual shop-floor practice of 
Communist en$ineers. In this way, it is hoped to provide some basis for 
aj- generalisation about the importance of theory to Communist industrz 
activity.. 
The chapter is divided into three Hain sections. Tiie opening 
section deals with two sets of theoretical debates: tbe first concerned 
the question of whether or not the policy of dual unionism should be 
'iir, plerAerited or not, and was carried on in the Coventry branch of the 11M 
in 192$, `ihe other,: ýore important discussion, centred on the matter of 
what direction the nascent rank and file movements should take, and ; was 
carried . on 
in the pages of the CP internal journal Discussion durin;; 
1; ýý. he middle section lives an account of the birth and early 
deve1öpment of the Aircraft shop stewards' National Council and its 
paver New Prop, -. 116r , the apprentices' 3trillces of 1937, and the day- 
to-day role of Communists as trade union orauiäers in the 1930s. 
Final I ly, sone general reflections on the importance ox theoretical 
debates(and of thaor-J in general)to CP activists in ensineerins are 
of=ered, based on the information presented in the previou3 two eection 
.k** 
4ý" 
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Since an important aim of the subsequent pages is to relate CP theory 
to their shop floor practice, there is no need to become too deeply 
immersed in defining our terms. To a large extent they are defined for us 
by more competent theorists as we follow the contemporary debates. 
Howeverlit may be helpful to begin by reminding the reader that discussions 
on the nature of rank and file movements had taken place prior to the 
founding of the CPGB. 
Indeed, not only the first, but perhaps also the clearest 
definition of the ideal relationship between a rank and file movement 
, 
the, trade union officials was that given by the Clyde Workers' Committee 
in 1915: 
"We will support the officials just so long 
as. they rightly represent the workers, but we 
will act independently immediately they 
misrepresent them. " 1 
Thus, the Committee aimed to work within the trade unions of which they 
were members, and not to build dual unions. Un the other hand, they were 
willing to, take direct action as soon as they felt that the officials 
were misrepresenting the workers. This conception of how a rank and file 
movement should operate was taken up and developed by J. T. Murphy in his 
pamphlet The Workers' Committee(Sheffield, 1917), which was accepted as 
official policy by the National Administrative Committee of the Shop 
2 
Stewards' and Workers' Committee I"; cvement. 
In broad terms, the CP's organisation in the trade unions the 
Minority Movement, adopted a similar position between 1924 and 1928. 
1Clyde Workers' Committee: 'Fellow Workers', quoted by J. S. Hinton 
in 'The Clyde Workers' Committee and the Dilution Struggle', in 
A. Briggs and J. Saville(eds. ): Essays in Labour History_(vol. 2), 
1886-1923(1971), p. 164, note 54.. 
2Ibid., 
p. 165, note 11 
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The Communist Party's organisation in the trade unions, the Minority 
Movement, could not, even if it had wanted to, adopt a theory such as 
that held by the CWC without modifications. This was because the context 
in which it had to operate was quite different to that of the years 
1915-1918. After a brief post-war 'booi: l', macu unemployment set in, enabling 
the enL; ineeriný enployers to break the rtrenGth of the chop floor 
union organisation through the lockout of 192 . The employers victor;; 
in 
the lockout meant that the Metalworkers I; inority Idovi(eº. mert(1-11-1)could never 
hope to organise action independently of the officials, because the 
shop stewards had been destroyed as a force in the factories, The entirely 
understandable failure of the I'1Ii to make much headway in the factories 
led, i. t has been argued by two recent historians of the movement, to a 
close and dependent relationship with the left trade union leaao_rc 
as' S; iales of the Ai, U1Up until, the General : )'trike, the MFI lent uncritical 
support to these officials, only to regret it after the defeat of the 
strike. 'dith the debacle cave a fundamental reappraisal of the ICIi s 
strate y; many militants, both incirde and outside the M1,1, felt 
disillusio7ed with trade union leaders of both left and right, and were 
therefore receptive to the Comintern suCGestion, first nuüc at the cnd 
of, 19P-?, that 'independent' dual unions ,: should be formed in direct 
opposition to the existing 'roformist' trade, unions. 
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"Why We Don't Want-Rank and File Movements" in January 1936.1 
'PJ' asserted that there were two possible uses for a rank and file 
movements either to strengthen the existing trade union machinery, or 
to act independently of. it. If the first possibility was what was 
being sought after, then it was a waste of time, because it simply 
duplicated the existing structure. 
,.. The second alternative was also rejected: 
"(the movement) is harmful because it represents 
a diversion of energy which should be used , by. 
the militant and progressive forces to win the 
union machine and because it tends to develop 
serious splitting activities which bring a section 
of workers into conflict with the trade union. " 2 
Another argument used'by 'PJ' was especially emotive, because he linked 
the failure of Third-Period trade union. tactics (he obviously considered 
a rank and file movement to apertain to that period) with Hitler's rise 
in Germany. ' The RG4- the German Red Trade Union opposition - had 
divided the working class and let. Hitler in. 
3 'PJ' thought that to 
be a shop steward or branch official was quite sufficient; he ridiculed 
the idea of a rank and file movement in the AM 
"Would anyone propose building a rank and file 
movement in the AEU, where there are already branches, 
area committees and District Committees and official 
union support and recognition for shop stewards and 
shop stewards' committees? " 4 
1Discussion, January 1936, (II/S) 
2lbid., 
p. 9. 
3Ib id., p. 10. 
AMC 
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Many of his 'readers must have gasped with astonishment when they read 
this last statement, and wondered where 'PJ' had been hiding in the 
previous few months. A rank and file movement was not only'proposed, 
it was well'under way in the AXU. 
Arthur Downton took up his pen to reply to 'PJ'. The remarkable 
feature of the exchange, is the area of agreement between the two 
protagonists. Downton's'article begans 
"It is with some hesitation that I take up the pen 
to reply to so valiant a fighter for the working 
class as PJ. Who can deny that the general line 
of his arguments is correct? " 1 
Downton gently reminded 'PJ' of the existence of the aircraft shop 
stewards and the New Propellor, stating that the latter was not, 
unlike official union journals, gagged in any way. Positions had to 
be campaigned for, and democracy extended in the unions. How else 
could this be done? 
2 Finally, Downton pointed out that rank and file 
movements existed to provide 'alternative and/or additional leadership'. 
He referred to the positive role that the CP shop stewards had played 
in the Hawker strike by keeping the officials out. 
3 This last point 
is obviously where Downton came most clearly into conflict with 'PJ' 
but it is also where his argument ends. He did not expand on his 
point and say why alternative leadership might be necessary. Alter- 
native leadership was obviously seen by 'PJ' as part of 'splitting 
activities', and Downton would have had to confront the argument head 
on to provide a satisfactory reply to his adversary's contention that 
simply working within the union was a waste of time and energy. As it 
was, Downton had only argued that the rank and file movements provided 
a more efficient way of campaigning inside the trade union than just 
gaining trade union posts. 
. 
ý6 
A. Downton= 'On Rank and File Movements', Discussion, January 1936, p"11" 
2Ibid., 
p. 12. 
3mý, id.,, P" 13. 
J/ 
The issue was clearly considered an important one by Party members 
outside engineering, . because- the next two issues of Discussion carried 
articles along very similar lines, 'but dealing with the Railwaymen's 
Vigilance Movement. 1 In the fifth issue of'the journal, the debate 
returned to the engineering industry with an article by George 
Fredericks entitled "The Metalworkers end°the Government's Arms Proposals". 
Fredericks completely dodged the main issue of whether rank and file 
movements would have to take independent initiatives, but came down on 
Downton's side of the argument, ýlargely on the basis of the success 
already achieved by the New Propellor. 
2 Some issues later, a further 
contribution was made by Alec Brown, who took the 'PJ' line because he 
thought that it was essential to adhere closely to trade union legality 
both in the interests of unity and because in this way workers would 
gain a fuller understanding of their existing trade union rights. These 
two benefits would help workers to fight fascism more effectively. 
3 
The opposition to the rank and file movements had spoken the first 
word, and they also had the last. Soon after an article on rank and file 
movements in relation to the Welsh miners by Lew Thomas, arguing against 
them in that context, Discussion ceased publication. 
4 It is clear that a 
considerable consensus existed amongst the protagonists in the debate, in 
that even Downton believed that the main objective was to campaign 
within the existing unions. Downton and Fredericks 
1'Sandrey' (pseud. )s 'These Rank and File Movements'. G. Renshaws 
'Reply to Sandrey'. Anons 'The Railway Vigilance Movement-Rejoinder'. 
All in Discussion, March 1936. 
2Discussion, June 1936, p. 24. 
3Alec Browns 'Rank and File Movements, Trade Unions and the United 
Front', Discussion, p. 28. 
4Lew Thomas: 'Rank and File Movements', Discussion, July 1936. 
I '; 4 
defended the aircraft shop stewards, but they drew back from 
advocating independent action. When 'PJ's article was published, they 
seemed to accept his terms of reference and to agree that 'splitting' 
was undesirable. Indeed, they found themselves merely arguing in 
favour of the continued existence of the movements. 
I 
There was also a more general tendency in the CP during the 
'Popular Front' period to move away from the discussion of trade union 
questions as a topic worthy of discussion. Perhaps this was partly 
due to a feeling that these questions had been settled when Discussion 
was wound up. Another partial explanation may be the emphasis laid on 
international questions during this period, with the Abyssinian War 
and the Spanish Civil War being seen as dress rehearsals for a Second 
World War. Whatever the reason trade union affairs were never discussed 
so openly again. Discussion of trade union work must have shifted away 
from Party publications and into meeting halls, pubs and workshops. 
The English language editions of Communist International and Inter- 
national Press Correspondence became almost totally devoid of anything 
of interest to the trade union militant. Even the Party Organiser 
became far less useful in this aspect of Party work. 
2 The trend can be 
1J. R. Campbell spelt out the difference between the rank and file 
movements of the 1920s and those of the 19309 when speaking at 
the Seventh Congress of the Communist International: 
"(The Minority Movement had) an apparatus outside of 
the trade union movement and appeared as an alternative 
apparatus to that of the unions... it appeared as a 
body outside the trade unions, dictating to the unions 
what they had to do... The new rank and file movement, 
on the other hand, (is) growing as part of the unions 
themselves". (J. Degras, OP-cit., vol. 3, P. 352") 
. 
a1 
2Party Organiser shows the trend most clearly. Its early editions, 
following the January Resolution of 1932, were packed with information 
and guidance on trade union matters. Many editions of the journal 
were almost entirely devoted to trade union matters. In the eighth 
edition (December 1932), there were four articles directly relating 
to factory work after an introduction entitled "Every Factory a 
Fortress". By 1938 and 1939, it is difficult to find any articles 
at all dealing with detailed industrial questions. Even the cover 
of the journal changed. ýThe original one, showing a locomotive, a 
ship and a factory was dropped in favour of a plain jacket. 
ý3 
stun most clearly at CY Corºgresses. At the 1938 Congress, no report was 
given on trade unwor, fsrtd industrial work, raid the report of the Central 
conuuittee to the 1939, Congress (which was never held) complained plaintively 
of the fact that there had been no real mass movements amongst ýha mass of 
workers in the previous year, and of the neglect of trade uuion,, work, by 
Party members in the factories arid' localities. 
During the summer of 1937, the Aircraft tihop tewards' National. Council 
and the Ivew Pro llor experienced serious; disaypointment, for the first time, 
when it became apparent that a separate aircraft agreement . would not 
be 
negotiated in the near future. The New Propellor had always streeaecL the 
demand for a separate agreement, and the demand was one of the, two reasons 
given by the =ZC themselves for their continued existence after thqend of 
the Hawker atri. ke. The first sizeable national meeting of the A, 4UNC, wjth 
thirty-nine elected representatives from sixteen firma, endorsed this idea, 
and decidod to call shop and factory meotings to explain the AäüNC's 
objectives in detail. 
' 
From March 1936 to June 1937, the New Propellor devoted much of its 
editorial space to this demand, whilst the Council worked, consiraently 
towardu building up support for it in the factories. The mothod of 
agitation wary always two-prongeds the oditorialu, backed up by ASLi C 
preauure in the br uiohus and on the ABU National Committee, tried to force 
the AEU Executive to adopt the demand, whilst preeuure wao, aluo guilt up on 
the executive by ort; auising unofficial national strike action to the same end, 
The INC ýSwau remarkably successful in building up support around 
the 1smue within the aircraft industry itself, but the Campaign was, 
1 ; L1.1, March 1 y3c,. ' 
always strictly limited to this sector of engineering. This was a 
serious weakness because the AEU Executive could portray the demand as 
an essentially selfish and divisive one which ignored the interests of 
the majority of union members. There is no doubt that the Executive 
could base itself on a real feeling amongst the rank and file in this 
respect, but the ASSNC did not answer the obvious objection. This was 
partly because it could not; there were no other rank and file organ- 
isations in other branches of engineering until the publication of 
The Conveyor in January 1937. Nevertheless, some effort in this 
direction might have been made through the columns of the New Propeller. 
Clearly, the paper was attracting a wide readership, and many of these 
readers must have held positions in their unions. These shop stewards 
and branch officials would have benefitted greatly by gleaning important 
arguments. In this way, they could have been armed for effective 
intervention in branches, District Committees and shop stewards' 
quarterly meetings. The remarkable fact is that these were never 
rehearsed in the columns of the paper. Would the proposed agreement 
help workers in the rest of the engineering industry to secure better 
wages and conditions, and how would it? The questions were never posed, 
and the campaign's supporters were left to answer such awkward (but 
predictable) questions as best they could. 
The campaign for the agreement was, then, a limited and sectoral 
one, but it soon became important for a large body of workers within 
the aircraft industry. The March 1936 ASSNC meeting decided to get the 
campaign under way by asking all shop stewards' committees to submit 
individual claims for the New Propellor demands. 
1 At the May meeting, 
1 IvP, April, 1936. 
ý 
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forty-six representatives from fifteen factories met to discuss the 
next step. Many delegates were of the opinion that only a national 
strike would be successful. Some even thought that the Handley- 
Page strike, (for the skilled rate on a certain machine), which was 
being supported by the paper, should be extended into a national stoppage 
for the full programme. It was decided that mass meetings would be 
held in all factories, to obtain a mandate for national-strike action. 
Wert month, the results of these meetings were announced: a number of 
factories had agreed to strike, but a few had not yet had time to 
organise meetings. None had actually voted against striking. 
2 
At this point (June 1936), the National Committee of the AEU 
met and adopted the separate aircraft demand, following the lead 
of the Executive of the National Society of Brass and Metal Mechanics. 
However, the Committee also rejected a motion for a national ballot 
for strike action. 
3 The demand was now official policy, but there was 
no prospect of the DC moving towards a national stoppage to secure it. 
The ASSNC decided to carry out an aircraft ballot themselves, 
through affiliated shop stewards' committees. At the August' 1936 
meeting of the Council, the result was announced% 6,258 were in favour, 
and 2,527 were against, in nineteen factories. The votes cast 
showed a large majority for a strike, then, but the delegates decided 
that the poll was too low and the results too uneven for them to lead 
1NP, June 1936. 
2Ibid., July 1936. 
31bid. 
41 ýt 
a national strike. Many aircraft workers had not voted, and in some 
factories the opposition had been too sizeable. They therefore decided 
to postpone striking until a 'broader unity' was achieved. More time, 
they thought, would bring a higher circulation for the paper and a 
wider consensus in their favour. 
l 
During the winter of 1936-7, the New Propellor continued to push 
for the separate aircraft agreement, although the Executive of the AEU 
progressed no further in their informal negotiations for one. The 
February 1937 issue of the paper bore the headline: "Stop Mucking 
Around", and again suggested national strike action as a way of 
accelerating the proceedings. 
2 But the AEU Executive publicly argued 
against this tactic for the first time in a press statement of March 9, 
1937" In the statement, the EC 'deplored' the strike threat, pointed 
out that there was an-established national grievance procedure, and 
reminded the shop stewards that. they were formally subject to the 
discipline of the District Committees. Finally, the EC said that its 
"... dissociates itself from any action in ' 
consequence of the meetings of the unofficial 
shop stewards council.... " 3 
The EC was now clearly scared of the power of the ASSNC, and trying to 
bring it into line. 
At first, it seemed unlikely that the EC would be able to tame 
the Council. The May 1937 issue of the New Propellor was headed 
"Now For Aircraft Agreement", and was the second special issue of the 
paper. Inside was a report of the April meeting of the Council, which 
1NP, September 1936. 
. 
2Ibid., February 1937. 
3The Times, March 9,1937" 
had decided, on the basis of reports from mass meetings held in 
aircraft factories all over the country, that a national strike should 
start on May 25th. The delegates seemed quite confident that they 
could carry the rank and file behind thems mass meetings had backed 
them in almost every case. 
l The Coventry District Committee of the AEU 
noted that the strike had been prepared for, and that Armstrong Whitworth 
Aircraft's Baginton and Smith St. factories (representing the vast 
majority of aircraft workers in the town) had agreed to strike, 
although the Whitley factory had decided to 'remain constitutional'. 
2 
However, the strike was averted at the eleventh hour. A special 
meeting of the National Council held on May 23rd, two days before the 
strike was due to start, heard that the employers had agreed to meet 
the trade union officials concerned on May 26th. This was the first 
time that the employers had agreed to formal talks with the unions on 
the separate aircraft agreement, and therefore represented a real step 
forward. Nevertheless, the employers had still not conceded the 
principle; they had only agreed to discuss it. This was sufficient 
for the ASSNC, however, who explained in the next edition of their 
papers 
"(it was decided that) nothing should be done to 
impede the meeting on May 26th, and it was therefore 
decided to adjourn the meeting and to recommend to 
aircraft workers that no strike action should be 
taken at this stage". 3 
(emphasis original) 
The repercussions of the decision to defer to the Executive's negotiations 
1NP, May 1937" 
2AEU DC, May 11,1937. 
3rrp, May 1937" 
ýý 
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can be seen in the columns of the New Propellor itself. In the May 
edition, the point of view had to be argued for the first time that 
a breakaway union for aircraft workers was not the answer to their 
problems. 
1 An article in the July 1937 edition headed "What Next - 
Change of Line" thought that a change of emphasis was required in the 
way the ASSNC operated. It put the point of view that pressure should 
be put on the ED to take the aircraft negotiations seriously, but that 
in the meantime, the ASSNC should throw its weight behind the national 
negotiations for the entire engineering industry. 
2 This last article 
definitely broke with the tradition of the paper up to that point, 
which had always concentrated on the sectional demand for the air- 
craft industry, leaving the rest of engineering to its sister paper, 
Conveyor, launched in January 1937. 
The problem of how best to deploy the forces of the ASSNC, and, 
more generally, of the aircraft industry, in the battle for higher 
wages and better conditions in the engineering industry as a whole, 
was a knotty one. It might be argued that the whole idea of the 
ASSNC as a body organised around the separate aircraft agreement was 
fundamentally a mistake, because it split off the best organised and 
most powerful section of the industry, leaving weaker sections to 
fend for themselves. The New Propellor had never really confronted 
this question, and one by-product of the 1937 debacle was a rather more 
self-questioning approach. 
More importantly, however, the need to argue against dual unionism 
and the tendency to drop the demand for an aircraft agreement were 
I NP, May 1937" 
2Ibid., July 1937" 
unmistakeable signs of the feeling amongst at least some aircraft 
workers that they had missed the boat. As time went on, and it became 
apparent that the employers had no intention of concluding an aircraft 
agreement, it seems to have come home to the ASSNC as a whole, and the 
demand was quietly dropped. 
The realisation gradually dawned on the ASSNC and the aircraft 
workers themselves that they had lost. The feeling had been there in 
the factories, and workers had been prepared to strike, but the 
Council had ultimately deferred to Executive negotiations by officials 
whom they distrusted. They could not influence the negotiations as 
they dragged on in the conference room; they had already decided to 
allow them to take their course, and the continual use of strike 
threats could only undermine the Council's credibility with the 
employers, the AEU Executive and the workers themselves. The moment 
had passed for decisive action, and the demand for a separate aircraft 
agreement had become a dead letter. 
The following year, 1938, saw a guerilla war break out in the 
aircraft industry. With the national campaign for an aircraft 
agreement lost, the factories applied separately for the wages and 
conditions demanded by the New Propellor. This year had, not sur- 
prisingly, the highest number of strikes over piece work and other 
wage grievances of any year in the decade 1935-45" These strikes 
ended, as most strikes do, in compromises which were more or less 
favourable to the workers, with none of them being won outright. This 
was not an unusual pattern with individual factory strikes, but the 
sheer size of the strike wave indicated a combativity which might 
have been harnessed to a national campaign. Perhaps such a campaign 
would have brought bigger and more general advances through the whole 
;?,. 60 
weight of the industry being thrown behind the demands, thereby 
developing a greater momentum than was possible in individual strikes. 
The members of the Council must have sensed what might have been, 
whilst rejoicing in the advances that were undoubtedly being made. 
It was the advances that were actually being made that impressed 
themselves most forcefully on contemporary trade unionists, of course. 
The workers and stewards inside the factories were interested in what 
was being done rather than by what might have happened. We can see 
their enthusiasm for the New Propellor reflected in the paper's 
increasing circulation. By August 1937, forty-nine factories were 
taking the paper, ordering between them fourteen thousand copies. 
l 
Nevertheless, the aircraft workers' movement had suffered a very real 
setback, which was none the less real for the fact that stewards 
could not afford to waste time crying over spilt milk. 
*** 
That aircraft stewards were not inclined to dwell on the failure 
of their campaign is perhaps less surprising than the fact that the 
CPers amongst them were not inclined to draw conclusions from their 
experience. At least, if they did so (as they must have done) they 
did not make them public even within the Party. Neither the New 
Propellor, Discussion, nor any other CP publication, dwelt on the 
question. In part, this was because it only gradually became apparent 
1NP, August 1937. 
,S <'. i 
that the employers would never concede the demand. 
Nevertheless, as this became evident with the passing months of 
futile DC negotiations, there must have been another reason for the 
lack of discussion on what had been a hotly fought issue. It must have 
been thought that the matter was closed; the consensus was clearly 
in favour of those who wanted to keep within the limits of 'trade 
union legality'. They had outnumbered the opposition and had written 
the last word. As the Popular Front spirit became increasingly 
prevalent and the CP's involvement in the trade unions became less and 
less a matter for discussion, it became clear that the Downtons of 
the CP had no wish to resharpen their pens. 
The May 1937 debacle might have provided a weapon in the hands 
of Downton, but an almost contemporaneous set of events, the apprentices' 
strikes, might equally well have served as a vindication of majority 
opinion. In these strikes, the apprentices and the adult workers 
on occasion acted as a powerful back-up force for the AEU EC, which 
had long been seeking the right to negotiate for apprentices. To a 
large extent, then, the Communists and officials were in agreement as 
to the basic task in hands to organise the youths into trade unions by 
helping to push their wage demand. This partly reflected a different 
outlook on the part of the officials, who had been caught so far behind 
the times by the Hawker strike of 1935 that they had actually opposed 
a strike for unionisation, largely because it was being run by Communists. 
Whatever the reason, the President of the AEU saw fit to thank the 
Clyde lads for their support in his address to the 1938 National 
Committees 
6/ 
"I believe that had that demonstration not taken 
place, we would have been exactly where we were 
" 24 
in connection with this matter. This is an 
achievement which I regard as an epic in the 
history of trade unionism.... " 1 
The strike had been conducted with the tacit support of the AEU 
Executive, but at the same time had not been brought under their 
control. Through their imaginative tactics, the lads had been able to 
help the Executive to obtain considerable improvements in their 
position. It might be argued with some plausibility that this showed 
that in this case at least there had been no need for a permanent 
rank and file movement because the strikers main aims had been 
secured. At the very least, such a major upheaval might have been 
expected to stimulate some comment; yet none was forthcoming. 
* *'* 
The apprentices' strikes were central to the development of trade 
union organisation in the engineering industry during the late 1930s, 
They marked a watershed in the mood of industrial relations between 
the dark years of the Depression and the growing strength and con- 
fidence of trade unionists on the factory floor in the months preceding 
the outbreak of war. By the very act of striking, the apprentices 
showed that the employers threatened use of the 'no-strike' clause 
in indentures was impracticable if challenged by large-scale collective 
action. Employers would never again have quite the same hold over 
apprentices. 
62 
1J. B. Jefferysl o . cit., p. 245" 
d 7r, 
However, there were even more wide-ranging consequences to these 
strikes. Previous stoppages in the 1930s had almost always been 
limited to the sectional and workshop levels, rarely becoming general 
even within the individual factory. The apprentices struck work in 
one district after another in a national movement, using their shared 
sectoral grievance to transcend the traditional inter-factory barriers. 
Such a movement, often employing highly imaginative tactics, could not 
leave the adult workers untouched. Levies, collections, deputations 
and even sympathetic strikes were organised in support of the younger 
members of the workshop community. It was with some justification, 
then, that the New Propellor's special issue covering the apprentices' 
first strikes carried the banner headlines "YOUPH MAKE HISTORY". 
1 
Table; 12- 
TABLE Showing the Number of Apprentices Eknployed in Federated Engineerin 
Establishments, 1928-1932. 
1928: 
1929: 
1930: 
1931: 
1932: 
74,415 
78,161 
71,990 
56,641 
52 , 741 
(Sources Engineering and Allied Trades National Federation: Forty 
Hours Week. Analysis by the Federation of the Case Presented by the 
Trade Unions. (April 1934), p. 7. 
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October. -1937, Young Aircraft Workers' Number. 
I ,, t- 
The apprentices' grievances were manifold, ranging from their 
being treated as children, through losing time served by changing 
, employer and 
being forced to make tea for the journeymen, to being 
cuffed and sworn at by chargehands and foremen. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that the 1931 strikes were only the first in a long 
line of similar stoppages stretching through the war and right up to 
the present day. 
The lads' most important grievance related to wages. Indeed, 
Challenge went so far as to claim that apprentices were worse off 
in 1937 than they had been fifty years previously, because increases 
in the cost of living had not been matched by wage advances. 
2 
anployera had always argued that they offered more than just a wage to 
apprentices, since they were under an obligation to train them and to 
accept the broken tools and scrapped work which went with that 
obligation. Therefore (since the apprentices had no trade union 
representation), lads were paid at the 'small rate' until they had 
served their time. In many districts, even when they had come out of 
their ,, they still had to work at a 'loosing rate' for one year, 
below the full journeyman's district rate. By the late 1930sß the 
1Resentment 
at their treatment as children came out on many 
occasions. This was often reflected in their leaflets. For 
example, one leaflet from Aberdeen was headed: "We Are Nobody's 
Baby". (Challenge, May 27,1937). 
0 
2Challenge, 
April 15,1937. 
': t 
disparity between apprentices' wages and those of the journeymen was 
very large. As we can see from tables 9 and10 I even after the 
advances won through the strikes, fifth year apprentices' rates 
rarely reached 50% of the adult rates, and were often much less. 
Moreover, the apprentices were usually denied special wage supplements 
like 'dirty money' for working in ships' holds which had contained 
cargoes like oil or phosphates. 
1 
From the mid-1930s, journeymen's wages left those of apprentices 
behind, as national negotiations yielded increases in which the 
apprentices did not share. The 1936 national pay claim brought the 
skilled adults an increase of three shillings per week, and the 
Executive Committee of the AEU presented the Engineering Employers' 
Federation with a case for some increase to apprentices. The EEF agreed 
to talks on a strictly informal basis, but these led nowhere, despite 
the later claims of the engineering employers that apprentices' 
wages were the subject of national negotiations. 
2 
The other main grievance was the lack of adequate training. 
This was related to the decline of the whole apprenticeship system 
in the Depression, when employers attempted to run apprenticeship 
3 
down as the main form of training for future skilled workers. 
Employers preferred to take on trainees rather than apprentices, 
teaching them a limited range of skills whilst paying them a`small 
rate plus piecework. The great advantage of this for employers was that 
the trainees did not have to be moved round the shops learning 
1Challenge, 
April 29,1937. Dirty money was not paid in 
Middlesborough (ibid. ) 
2J. 
B. Jefferys, op. cit., pp. 244. -5" 
^ý, s: 
different jobs and gaining experience, but could be used on a few 
repetition, jobs. They tried a similar technique with apprentices 
themselves,. denying them both a variety of work and the right to 
attend technical classes in the employer's time. 
The training grievance was important to the lads, and, ironically, 
brought the employers considerable problems of their own making. As 
far as the boys were concerned, apoor training was highly unsatis- 
factory. As Challenge put its 
"The Clyde boys are going to hit hard and obtain 
the chänce to become brilliant mechanics, a chance 
which their employers deny them by skimping their 
training and by conditions which make it impossible 
to develop. " I 
A poor training affected not only-the boys' collective craft self- 
respect, it also promised to hit their pockets when they became 
journeymen. They would be unable to work in other factories on a 
variety of work, and would therefore lose the opportunity of moving 
to where wages were highest. Yet the employers' anti-apprentice 
policy brought them their own difficulties, by the mid-1930s. There 
was by then a shortage-of skilled men created by the relatively low 
number of. apprenticeships given in the early 30s, so that the skilled 
adults had a better chance than they might have had to push up their 
own wages because of the favourable labour market. Alsot. as far as 
young workers were concerned, far fewer of them were bound by indentures 
at all, so that the 'no-strike' clause could not be used against them. 
Considered as a whole, the employers' policy had turned out to be 
entirely counter-productive. 
66 
1Challenge, 
April 8,1937. 
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Young workers in engineering saw trade unionism as the only 
possible vehicle for improving their situation. Subject not only to 
the grievances outlined above, but also to a whole number of petty 
indignities tolerated only because there was no means of redress, they 
wanted the same protection as their adult workmates. Thus, the central 
demand brought forward by the young workers was for full trade union 
representation. With this achieved, they reasoned, the other problems 
would be gradually eliminated. 
The strikes may be grouped into two waves. 
' One, which was 
limited to the Clyde, broke out in April and forced the employers to 
revive the hazy and ill-defined 'informal talks' which had ostensibly 
been going on before the stoppage. The second started in Salford in 
September, continuing in October, when it was realised that the 
national negotiations were still not bringing any tangible results. 
This wave spread to most of the main engineering centres in Lancashire 
and Yorkshire, Coventry, Birmingham and London, but almost entirely 
by-passed, the Clyde and the Tyne. Local employers' association 
made settlements as need dictated, and national negotiations were 
revived once again. In December, the AEU won through these protracted 
talks and the apprentices' action the right to negotiate for apprentices 
on a national and local basis (although the right to shop steward 
representation was not conceded). 
2 
The first wave of strikes, on the Clyde 'and throughout the West 
of Scotland and Edinburgh,. was led by the Communist apprentices, 
members of the Young Communist League and the CP itself. 
3 C mmmmüui(t 
1A total 173,552 workingidays were lost through apprentice action 
in engineering in 1937. 
2J. B. Jefferys, op. cit., pp. 244^. 5. 
3Stuart 
Watson, a keen member of the YCL, was chairman of the Clyde Apprentices' Committee. Jimmy Reid, later to lead the famous 
battles at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, was also on the committee. So, too, on the other hand, was John Boyd, now anti-Communist 
6.9 
organisational methöds äppeared, at every stage: adventurous picketing, 
the production of a strike bulletin, the setting up of sub-committees 
of the strike committee to deal with all aspects of the strike (finance, 
the bulletin, communications), and, most important of all, the strategy 
of drawing all the Clyde workers into the dispute. Challenge, the 
Daily Worker and the New Propellor all ran frequent articles and special 
issues to cover the youth's movement. 
During February and March 1937, the left-wing apprentices began 
their agitation for an advance in wages and improved training facilities. 
A committee was elected from most of the yards and engineering shops 
on the Clyde to present the demands to the employers, who refused to 
entertain them, causing a strike to break out on 24th March. 
1 At 
first the strike was only a partial one, with only a few hundred lads 
out, so the. problem was the extension of the stoppage. 
2 This problem 
was overcome by the technique of the 'flying picket': the apprentices 
moved up and down the adjacent Clyde yards in the mornings, trying to 
get more lads out. For example, having enlisted the active support 
of the young workers at Fairfield's. Govan, the picket moved along to 
Stephen's yard, and hammered on the huge steel entrance doors. The 
Stephen's lads soon started hammering back in reply, and they opened the 
doors to come streaming out to join the picket with a great cheer. 
3 
By the fifth of April, there were about 3,700 apprentices and trainees 
involved, and on the following day they were joined by the apprentices 
at John Brown's, the largest yard on the Clyde. 
4 By April 8th, the 
Greenock yards were involved, and the local officials approached the 
1Challenre, 
April 8,1937" 
2LAB 10/80. Report of Progress of Movement of Apprentices, March 24,1937" 
3Cha1_ lengel April 8,1937. 
4 LAB 10/76. April 5,6,1937. 
iss 
employers for a local conference on the matter. The employers replied 
that there would have to be a general resumption of work before any 
talks could be contemplated, and that in any case, there was a 
national application under consideration. 
1 The Conciliation Officer 
reported that the officials were "flabbergasted" at the employers' 
claim, and stated that they did not believe that there had been any 
intention on their part to negotiate nationally before the strike had 
occurred. 
2 
The apprentices, then, had already achieved something 
by forcing the employers to return to negotiations. 
However, the young strikers were not willing to let the matter 
rest there. Their demands had still not been met, and they continued 
to develop their organisation to ensure that they were. By the first 
week in April, they had elaborated their earlier structure so that 
the central strike"committee was elected by a general committee of 
160 shop and yard delegates. The central executive met daily, and 
issued a strike bulletin, distributed to all the lads by a cycle corps 
of about 150 boys. 
3 
By the beginning of the following week, the 
committee had formulated a set of demands which was designed to unify' 
and extend the strike. They demanded a uniform scale-for all trades, 
recognition of the right of apprentices to be represented by the trade 
unions, and (at the request of the Communist-dominated AEU District 
Committee), the setting of a definite quota for apprentice recruitment 
by each employer. 
4 
1LAB 10/76. April 8,9,1937. 
2Ibid., Apri1 15,1937" 
3Chal_lenge, April 8,1937" 
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4LAB 10/76, April 7,1937" 
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The programme was a clever and well thought-out one. It clarified 
the apprentices' attitude to trade union membership, something that 
had been rather vague before (it was not one of the original demands). 
More importantly, though, it unified all the different types of young 
workers, divided by many trade and skill lines through the demand for 
a uniform scale of wages. Finally, it enlisted the support of the 
adult workers by demanding a definite quota for apprentices. Skilled 
journeymen had always resented their role as unpaid instructors, and 
were further encouraged in their sympathy for the lads by the prospect 
of some bounds being fixed to the amount of time they would have to 
spend on instruction. 
. By the second week in April, there were well over eleven thousand 
apprentices out in the West of Scotland, 
1 
and this extension of the 
boundaries of the strike, together with the new programme of demands, 
laid the foundations for effective solidarity action on the part of 
the adult workers. The District Committee of the AEU and the Federation 
of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions came under some considerable 
pressure from their shop stewards to initiate strike action in support 
of the apprentices. A meeting of shop stewards from all unions on' 
April 11th set up a committee"to help the lads in every way possible, 
deciding to recommend an overtime embargo and a one day strike to the 
District Committees. 2 Meanwhile, the strike itself continued to spread, 
with the Daily Worker claiming that thirteen thousand youths were out 
3 
on April 12th. Three days later, the Communist shop stewards were 
LAB 1080. April 9,12,1937. Challenge, April 15,1937" 
2DW, 
April 12,1937. 
31bid., April 13,1937. 
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again active inbdngingaaut one of their strongest factories, Howden's, 
.- when a man was asked to touch apprentices' work. 
1 
The District Committees approved the motion put to them by the 
shop stewards, and announced an overtime embargo and a one day strike 
throughout the district, to take place on April 17th. 
2 The day before 
the strike was due, chalked slogans appeared on the walls of many 
shipyards and engineering shops along the Clyde. Among them were: 
"Don't Let Us Down! ", "Don't Scab Today! "t and, with a touch of 
apprentice humour: "Don't Work Today, Daddy! ". 
3 
By April 16th, there was some suspicion that the officials were 
dragging their feet on the district strike, because strike instructions 
were received very late by some shop stewards' committees, so that at 
John Brown's the stewards had to put a proposal to the men themselves 
on the morning of the 17th. The men passed the picketing lads, held 
their meeting, and walked out again,,, to the tumultuous cheering of the 
pickets. 
4 
Overall, the strike was quite solid, with about 150,000 
workers out in all. 
5 
The one day strike was very successful in itself, but it was not 
followed up. It may be seen, in retrospect, as the high-water mark 
of the campaign. The overtime ban was unfortunately less well observed 
1DW, 
April 16,1937. 
2LAB 10/76, April 14,1937. 
3DW, April 17,1937. 
41bid. 
7/ 
5LAB 10/76. April 17,1937. 
I 3-LA. 
than the strike. Plain time workers in the shipyards always looked 
to summer overtime work to make up their wages, and the still patchy 
coverage which the shop stewards had in some yards and shops meant 
that the ban 'was far from watertight. On the lower reaches of the 
river, it was hardly being observed at all, whilst the Boilermakers 
Society had never tried to apply it. 
1 
At the very end of April, there was an apparent strengthening of 
the strike, when the unions agreed to pay dispute benefit to those 
lads who were members of a union before the strike began (about 10f)ß 
but this turned out to be a concession with a catch. 
2 
The following 
day, the local officials decided to call a meeting of the boys to which 
they would put a motion for a return to work on the basis of an 
immediate national approach to the employers for the Clyde demands 
(now generally known as the Apprentices' Charter, as it had been 
christened by the YCL and Challenge). The Conciliation Officer thought 
it unlikely that the boys would accept the recommendations 
It is very doubtful if the boys will return to 
work on the somewhat vague guarantees which are 
proposed. After all, they began this strike without 
the trade unions and there is a mood amongst them 
to carry it on without the trade unions until their 
full demands are obtained. " 3 
The representatives of the apprentices were ready for the officials'? 
initiative, and the meeting was a stormy one. The officials threatened 
to withdraw the offer of financial assistance unless the lads agreed to 
their proposal. The apprentices' committee proposed that a return 
1La 10/76, April 239 1937. 
2Ibid., April 29,1937. 
77 
3lbid., April 30,1937. 
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should only be agreed upon if no individual firms were negotiated with, 
if a national approach was made immediately, and that the Charter 
should be the basis for negotiation. The meeting agreed to return to 
work on these terms. 
I 
The summer of 1937 saw a lull in strike activity which was 
paralleled by the refusal of the employers to concede anything in 
negotiation. Frustration built up amongst the apprentices nationally 
in this period, whilst the YCL and CP agitated and prepared for a 
second explosion of militancy. 
2 Those young militants who had worked 
for a revival of the apprentices' movement in response to the continued 
refusal of the employers to budge from their obdurate refusal to make 
any concessions were rewarded when some apprentices stopped work at a 
small shop in Salford during the second week in September. The lads 
were asking for an increase of three shillings per week, and from 
these small beginnings the stoppage spread rapidly. By the 14th 
September, lads were out at Gardner's Peel Green, A. V. Roe, Crossley 
Motors and Mather and Platt. By the following day, there were about 
1 Dw, May 4,1937. 
2Cf. Challenge, May 6,1937: "... it is our opinion that the 
union leaders' advice was unwise. Instead of advising a return, 
they should have called for an extension of the strike all over 
the country for the Charter, and this would have been the best 
method of forcing the employers to give in. " 
The YCL was also active on the ground in the summer months. At 
the beginning of June, the Clyde apprentices adopted a green, 
red and blue badge: green for the Catholics, blue for the 
Protestants, red for the Communists. At the beginning of. July, 
they demanded an end to secret negotiations, and in the middle 
of that month, they launched a Clyde apprentices' paper. 
(Challenge, June 3, July 8,15). 
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a thousand more lads out, from Fairey Aviation (Stockport), Beyer, 
Peacock's Locomotive works and other factories. That day, Wednesday 
15th, a committee was set up along the Clyde lines, with two delegates 
from every striking shop, and a delegation was elected to visit the 
Manchester and Salford Trades Council. 
1 
Here they were heard with 
great sympathy, and the delegates unanimously instructed the Secretary, 
W. J. Munro, to seek financial aid from all affiliated branches. 
2 
The strikers were led, as they had been on the Clyde, by the YCL 
and the CP. These were the dominant lads on the strike committee, 
but in the Manchester case, there was rather less astute and thorough 
organisation. As the Manchester Guardian commented: 
"The strike does not yet show any of the 
smooth organisation nor any of the clarity 
about objects that distinguished the 
Glasgow youthalk strike. " 3 
The strike committee's regular bulletins, their distribution by 
cyclists, the 'flying picket', were missing in Manchester, facts which 
are difficult to explain, since there had been plenty of time for 
preparation, and the YCL had been growing in the area. Perhaps the key 
was the attitude of the AEU District Committees and the relationship 
with the adult workers which the DC led. On the Clyde, the DC was 
dominated by the Communists, and the shop stewards were able (because 
of their rather better coverage) to persuade the DCs to call a sympathy 
'Manchester Guardian, September 15,1937" 
2lbid., September 16,1937. Challenge, September 16,1937" 
w 
Manchester 
Guardian, September 16,1937. 
1 37 
strike, and then to organise it. In Manchester, these factors were 
not present: the lads went straight to the Trades Council, and the shop 
stewards did not seem to be able to organise to the same extent as 
their Scottish counterparts. 
The Manchester officials seemed to have the dispute well in hand. 
Although some more apprentices struck on the Friday, those at Switchgear 
and Cowans agreed to return when the management agreed to meet the 
trade union officials. By this time, the strike committee itself 
was arguing for a "ten day armistice", under which they would agree to 
a return to work pending the outcome of local negotiations between 
the employers and the officials. By Wednesday 22nd, the strikers at 
Ferguson, Pailin, A. V. Roe, Mather and Platt and Ferranti's Hollinwood 
had agreed to return on this basis. 
1 The day before the "armistice" was 
due to end, the employers conceded a two shilling increase, and although 
this was received with mixed feelings by the apprentices, there were 
no further strikes. 
2 
The Manchester strikes sparked off similar action in the rest of 
the country in support of similar demands. Coventry was one of the 
towns affected, and is interesting from the point of view of the number 
of firms affected, the strength of the shop stewards' support, and the 
overall dominance of the officials. The initiative was taken by the 
apprentices at Armstrong Whitworth's Baginton factory. where a large 
body of lads worked together on detail fitting, and where the CP was 
strong amongst the shop stewards. 
3 
On 27th September, the AWA 
1Manchester 
Guardian, September 23,1937- 
2 Ibid., October 21 DWG October 2,3,1937. 
3AEU 
DC, July 13,1937. 
7i 
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apprentices struck for an increase of three shillings and trade union 
recognition. On the following day, apprentices at AWA's Whitley 
factory stopped work. 
I That Wednesday, there were mass meetings at 
all the AWA factories and they decided to black all apprentices' 
work, to levy themselves two shillings per head, and to have an hour' 
and a half's down tools on Thursday in support of the strikers. 
2 
Meanwhile, the strike spread, with the Armstrong Siddeley lads coming 
out. The District Committee announced its support for the strike, 
and that Sunday a demonstration and meeting was held in Broadgate at 
which Billy Stokes, the ALU Divisional Organiser spoke. 
3 On the 
Monday, the apprentices spread the strike still further by adopting the 
Clyde lads' technique, and marching from the Standard at Canley through 
the town to Herbert's and Webster and Bennett's factories in Edgwick, 
gathering support along the way. 
4 
At the same time, the district's 
shop stewards met and decided to levy the entire membership and to an 
all overtime. 
5 
Soon after the shop stewards had applied this pressure, the 
employers conceded negotiations, in which they offered increases 
ranging from one shilling to three shillings, and allowed in principle 
the right of trade unions to represent apprentices. 
6 The DC called 
IAEU 
DC, September 28,1937" 
2 P, October 1937. 
31bid. 
4Interview 
with Eric Harrison, 5 November, 1974. See also NP9 
October 1937. 
SNP, October 1937" 
76 
6AEU 
DC, October 10,1937. 
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a meeting of apprentices at which Billy Stokes argued in favour of 
acceptance of the offer, which was accepted by the meeting despite 
the opposition of Ernie Roberts and a District Committeeman, Horton. 
I 
Whilst the Coventry apprentices were on strike, the first serious 
moves were being made to set up a national federation of apprentices' 
committees. In the first week in October, the Clyde and Manchester 
lads met and decided to take the initiative in setting up such a 
body. Accordingly, they circularised the other districts, attracting 
fifty-six delegates to a conference held during the second week of 
October. The conference heard that the employers were still not 
conducting meaningful national negotiations, and decided on immediate 
strike action on a national scale to force them to take the demands 
seriously. 
2 In the event, the strike threat proved quite sufficient 
to bring the employers back to the negotiating table, with the result 
that the AEU secured an agreement by the end of December. 
3 The 
agreement gave the union the right to negotiate for young workers, 
although shop steward representation was not granted. In addition, the 
wages of young male workers were to vary in a fixed proportion to those 
received by the adults. 
4 
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1NP, October 1937. 
2Challenge, October 14,1937" 
31bid., October 21,1937. J. B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 245- 
4 Ibid. 
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and the opposition (est. blished t: irou; h the , mutes and personal 
interviews)when the criterion of undertaking the initial organisation 
of a factory was applied. 3leven of the twenty-seven had made the 
breakthrough in at least one factory and only two of these were 
definitely opposed to the CP on the District Committee. 
The general picture to emerge from this survey is that 
M 
the left earned their places on the District Committee through a wider 
range of organising activity than their political opponents.: Jhether 
this would hold good for other towns and-other unions is difficult to 
know without a good deal more information than we have at present. 
However, it seems likely that the TGWU built up trade 
union organisation on the same type of political basis. Jack Jones 
( a. Close associate of the CP at this time) was District Secretary, and 
Jock Gibson (CP. convenor at the Daimler) was Secretary of the CSEU 
District Committee; these two influential men held training meetings at. 
TGWU headquarters for shop stewards These meetings were by invitation, 
and it was therefore possible to informally ensure that a body 
of stewards of left-wine; leanings was creatediThe way in which the 
CP established. itself in the TG'ilU was different in Coventry, but the 
net rssult was similar, because the CP very soon became strong among 
TGWU stewards. 
*** 
1 Interview with Jack ldilliams, 6: 2: 73. 
Having dealt with both the theoretical debates going on within the 
CP in 1928 and in "1936, an_d with some of the 
developments in engineering 
trade unionism between 1928 and 1937, we are in a position to examine 
the relationship between the CP's theory and its trade union practice. 
Our examination cannot, at this stage, say anything about the activities 
of the CP shop stewards at a local or factory level, because it has 
not been possible to follow their work sufficiently closely in this 
period. Some general statements can, however, be made on the basis of the 
information already presented. 
At-least one historian of the Communist Party, Brian Pearce, 
has seen the political relationship between the Communist International, 
the CPGB leadership'and Communist trade unionists in terns o+ an 
unmediated 'command structure'. Thus, changes in line determined by the 
CI were accepted and implemented by 'the CPG3 leadership, who communicated 
them to their trade unionisti,: rho accepted and implemented then in 
their turn. Pearce explains the increasingly accomodating attitude of 
CP trade unionists to the official trade union machinery from the mid- 
1930s onward3 as a consequence of the 'Popular Front'; 
"..... the Stalini$ts headed these movements only 
to behead them at ac crucial stage, because in 
accordance with Stalin's disastrous diplomacy 
they assumed the task of seeking alliances with 
'progressive capitalists' and holding back the 
workin3-class struggle within strict-and 
strangling limits. "l 
That there was, in the most general sense, such a relationship, would be 
hard to deny; indeed, we have already seen it in operation whilst looking 
at the Discussion articles(especially Alec Brown's), uhich all linked 
the need to create a Popular Front vith their shared view of a rank 
and file movement kept within fairly strict bounds in terms of what it 
. could 
do and for how long. The relationship between the consensusreached 
in this debate and the last-minuted refusal of the ASS NC to call a 
national aircraft strike in support of its campaign for a separate 
aircraft agreement is clear; the atmosphere within the CP was not conduciv 
to such action. 
1 Wearce:. ome Past Rank and rile iiovenlent3(I. eDrinted Cardiff. 1973). D. 22. 
f/ 
Yet ir. Pearces' a. -Sent is over-sinplif'ied, ia that the relationships 
were not as direct. * as he sugpests. Serious -tr., 3u=ents and disagreements 
occurred at all levels, and Pearce(althounh he sometimes refers to these) 
tends to underestimate their importance and to mislead us as to their 
origin. Mr. Pearce tends to suggest that opposition to the Third Period 
trade union tactics did not occur until Horner spoke out, and that 
those who criticised were denounced as "Trotskyist yellow-bsllies"1. 
In fact, as we have seen in the Coventry M's debates, oany CPers were 
speaking out during 1926, and if the charge of "Trotskyism" had been 
levelled, then it was so wildly inaccurate as to throw the accuser into 
disrepute. Those Communists who objected to the new line did so because 
of their experience as shop stewards, which suggested to them that dual 
unions would fail. 
Similarly in 1936, whilst the Discussion polemic was carried 
on within the limits imposed by 'Popular Front' orthodoxy, it also 
reflected at least some disquiet in the ranks of the Party over the 
consequences of the new tactics. This last debate reflected(an=it in a 
distorted forn)s deeper tension within the CP: that between the 'Party 
line' and the day to day experience of shop steward activity-: t was 
noticeable in the discussion. how-Downton and the shop steward George 
Prederic'_cs referred to the Hawker strike and the Naar Proaellor, using 
this experience as their touchstone and assuming its key importance, 
a feature . which was absent from the arguments of their 'antagonists. 
14 . or 
the aircraft shop stewards themselves, there never 
saemed to*ha7e been any question of the need for the ASSNC and the 
1! ew Propellor as permanent weapons. They corresponded to a specific need 
felt by aircraft shop stewards; they were born out of the need for 
widespread support for the Hawker strikers-if they were to succeed 
a3ainst a large aircraft conpany, and they continued to exist because 
other aircraft stewards anticipated a similar need themselves in an 
_ndusttry in which the employers were ver; ' closely linked. in other 
:: ords, airc: aft shop stewards used these or; anisational tools because 
: Z.: =? +C3I o-,. a its lp. 17. 
57z 
they related wsll to their needs, and this extent trey acted 
Independen tly of CP theory. 
In any case, it would be quite wrong to su, &, Test that the 
AS3NC and. its paper were simply the tools of the Communist Party; the 
claimed size of the Council and the suggested le7el of the paper's 
circulation both suggest that a considerable number of non-? arty 
shop stewards and workers were involved. Altbou3h the aim of a rank and 
file movement from the CP's point of view was to create a means for 
communicating its politics to a section of the working class, it i3 
apparent that this process was not just in one di rection, and that 
a section of the working class also influenced the Party. It was this 
influence which prompted the often repeated contemporary statement 
that the paper was 'close to the workshop' and which prevented any 
hint of the Discussion debates from filtering through to the columns 
of the siew Propellor itself. 
In stzr ary, ", rhilst it is evident that '., o: ý^uni3t theory and 
the '? a_ty line' did strongly influence the direction of Co=unist 
trade union workshop stewards of all political shades a13o 'cad a 
trade union role to play which ca"zld itself affect the direction and 
content of Communist trade union iiork. At this point, tha tension.. may 
not appear to have been of great importance, but nevertheless it 
existed, beconing : such more pronounced in the war years.. 
.1 
The Shop Stewards in Wartime 
"J i äl? 
Before looking closely at the local histories of the shop stewards 
in our four main engineering districts, we need to stand back and 
observe the movement as a whole in order to try and see some of the 
broad outlines. Some of the statements will have to be modified in 
the light of the local studies, but the exercise is valuable if we are 
to see the wood, as well as the trees. We begin by noting the growth 
of trade union membership and the development of shop steward rep- 
resentation during the war. This section is followed by one which 
describes a number of small incidents and facts which are felt to be 
indicative of the growing confidence of the shop stewards' movement. 
This new assertiveness found its expression in a whole number of ways, 
but our third section picks out one especially important ones the 
tendency for stewards to become unofficial social workers, advisors 
and confidants as well as negotiators. 
The development of the shop stewards' movement both in terms of 
its collective and individual confidence and the scope of its activities 
flowed at least in part from the strength of the mass of engineering 
workers. This is the subject of the fourth section of the chapter, 
which describes the precise pattern of strike activity during the war. 
Finally, two particularly strike-prone groups with their own specific 
grievances are dealt with. These groups, apprentices and women, are 
dealt with separately and in some detail, partly because of the intrinsic 
interest attaching to them, and partly because they were both largely 
non-unionised sectors of the workforce. Their history is, therefore, 
rather different to that of the-mass of engineering workers and deserves 
particular attention. 
During the Second World War engineering trade unionism reached 
the highest membership it had ever achieved. The main engineering 
union, the AEU, had over 900,000 members by 1944.1 Especially 
significant was the tremendous growth of membership amongst semi- 
skilled and women workers. The AEU sections catering for this type of 
member (V, Va and V, T. R. A. ) increased from 145,577 in September 1939 
to 376,144 in January 1945. During 1943 alone, the AEU also recruited 
132,010 women to its women's section-opened at the beginning of that 
year. 
2 All the other unions in the industry recorded growth rates of 
a similar order, the largest gains being made by the T&GWU and the 
NUGMW. 3 
Partly because the rate of growth was so high and trade union 
life so hectic during the war, we have even less precise indication 
of the rate of growth of the shop stewards' movement in this period 
than we had for the late 1930s. Officials simply could not keep pace 
with the increasing number of stewards and their need for credentials 
and facilities. There are some indications, however. It is possible 
to measure the growth of the shop'stewards in one locality, namely 
Coventry. The number of AEU shop stewards recognised by the District 
12 
Committee is given in table .. 
It would be quite unrealistic to 
pretend that it is possible to match this against the number of insured 
workers to give an accurate indication of shop steward coverage, because 
it is impossible to measure shop steward turnover. As a very rough 
guide, however, dividing the number of insured workers in the engineering 
sector (estimated at 100,000)4 by the number of shop stewards recognised 
ýJ. B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 260. 
2Ibid. 
35. T. Le-_Qanhaks "Trade Union Membership among Women and Girls in 
the United Kingdom, 1920-1965" (Unpublished Ph. D thesis, 
University of London,. 1971). 
4Coventry Trades Council: Covent Industrial Analysis. An 
Analysis of the Labour Force Statistics. (An unpublished 
document written in the immediate post-war years by an author 
with access to Labour Exchange and Ministry of Labour records. Copy in my possession - RC). 
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from the beginning of 1941 (1940 and previous years have been omitted 
because of the likelihood of a high rate of turnover) at 745, then we 
reach a density figure of the order of one steward to every one hundred 
and twenty-five workers. It is certain, however, that the actual shop 
steward coverage was in the region of twice as good as this, because 
our figures take no account of the T&GWU, NUVB, BTU and other smaller 
unions' shop stewards. 
These density speculations must necessarily be approached with 
some caution, but there can be no doubt that in Coventry at least, 
shop steward growth had been given a tremendous boost by wartime 'boom' 
conditions. Shop steward recognition, as we can see from the AEU 
records, was running at a level varying between about two and a half 
and four times as high as it had been in 1938-1939. Since this was 
considerably greater than the rate of increase in the working population 
of the town, 
1 therO must have been a distinct improvement in shop 
steward coverage during the war years. 
Table : 13 
Table Showing the number of shop stewards recognised by the Covent 
District Committee of the AEU. 1941-1945. (For figures for earlier 
years, see p4 , 
1941: 426 
1942: 319 
1943: 441 
1944: 336 
1945: . 236 
Sources Coventry AEU DC Minutes). 
Fý A. 
1According 
to the document cited in (4) above: the townb working 
population expanded as follows: 1938: 120000 ;. 1943: 
_ 
1421000 
4 r" A 0- 4r nr%n 
iG 
Shop stewards not only became more numerous in those areas where 
they had'long operated. They were also appointed in districts where 
the engineering industry had previously been small or non-existent 
before the war. The growth of the industry all over the country brought 
production engineering to many new areas, and workshop organisation 
quickly followed. This geographical extension of the shop stewards' 
movement was to have important consequences for the motor industry 
employers in the post-war period, when they incorrectly thought it 
possible to improve plant industrial relations by building new plant 
outside of Coventry. By the end of the war, groups of workers who had 
been through a training as a shop steward existed'in practically every 
part of Britain. 
South Wales is a case in point. Prior to 1939, the engineering 
industry there had largely been limited to small workshops and maintenance 
work for the steel, tinplate and coal concerns. The wartime demand for 
armaments production, and the considerable profits available ensured 
that this did not remain the case. The gigantic coal company Powell- 
Duffryn (known as 'P--D, Poverty and Death' in South Wales) spread 
their tentacles into engineering when they set up a factory at Tredowen, 
and several smaller firms followed suit. 
The Tredowen factory was run along well-established P-D lines. 
The foremen ruled. Until well into 1941, there was little that workers 
could do to break the back of their power, which relied on the persistence 
of a high rate of unemployment because of the collapse of the French 
export market for coal. During this period, a large number of young 
workers were taken on, but not as apprentices. They could only become 
apprentices if the foreman thought them 'good enough'. Nationally 
negotiated wages and conditions did not apply there, nor at any of the 
+f'ýJ'i ý. "ý 
other local factories, because the employers had not joined the 
Engineering Employers Federation. There was therefore no recognised 
procedure for grievances, and no shop stewards. 
Despite this last fact, unofficial 'shop stewards' were elected 
at Powell-Duffryn, and these men gradually prepared, through guerilla 
skirmishes, for a pitched battle with the company. The issue was 
initially victimisation, when an apprentice was sacked for 'indiscipline' 
at the end of October 1942. The factory struck work, -and the shop 
stewards contacted their counterparts in other South Wales factories. 
Together, they formulated a demand that the local engineering employers 
should recognise the existing district rate (as they were supposed to 
do under the Essential Works Order). The employers were determined to 
resist the demand, because the existing district rate was a skilled, 
maintenance engineers' rate, which was set at a higher level than that 
normally paid to production workers. The local stewards were equally 
determined, however, and fixed a date for a strike of engineering 
workers throughout South Wales. 
2 
Powell-Duffryn tried at this point to convene a Works Conference, 
but the Divisional Organiser, Armstrong, refused to meet in a formally 
constituted conference because P-D were not federated. The company, 
along with the other South Wales engineering firms, had therefore to 
federate and to agree to be bound by procedure. The : district strike 
3 
was averted by the intervention of the F&ATSSNC, who printed and 
distributed a leaflet entitled Welsh Wages which called for no extension 
LAB 10/212. Letter from Powell-Duffryn shop stewards to the 
Ministry of Labour, 6 July, 1942. 
2Ministry 
of Labour memo. (n. d. ), LAB 10/212. 
31bid. 
c7 
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to the strike, and for the employers to recognise the district rate. 
The Welsh employers were eventually compelled (largely through Government 
pressure) to establish a district rate. In the longer term, the 
point was not so much the rate, however, as the establishment of the 
principle that the employers had to recognise the national procedure 
and, with it, shop stewards. 
I 
The shop stewards made considerable progress outside of the major 
engineering areas by organising two types of factory which tended to 
be located in country areas and small towns. These were the Royal 
Ordnance Factories and the dispersal factories established by the major 
contractors in 1940 and 1941. The ROFs, and especially the filling 
factories, tended to be sited'in the country for safety reasons, whilst 
the dispersal factories had been established as such to avoid con- 
centration of production in major centres like Coventry. For a long 
time, the Ministry of Supply tried to fend off trade unionism in the 
ROFs by setting up Whitley machinery in all the new factories which 
sprung up at the beginning of the war, refusing meanwhile to recognise 
shop stewards. 
2 Gradually, however, the Whitley shop, department and 
factory committees were pushed out as bona fide shop stewards asserted 
themselves. In February 1943, the Ministries met the. AEU to discuss 
full shop steward recognition. By this time, some shop stewards' 
committees were already functioning quite effectively on an unofficial 
basis- and at least one, ROF Cardonald, 
already had a formal shop steward agreement. In 1946, the Ministry of 
1Ministry 
of Labour memo., 10 November, 1942, LAB 10/2129 
U 
2P. Inmans op. oit. v p. 416. 
LC. '`- 
Supply formally recognised shop stewards in the engineering ROFs. 
I 
One of the problems which the Ministry of Supply encountered in 
maintaining its policy of using Whitleyism against the engineering 
trade unions in the ROPs was the fact that Woolwich had a long-standing 
tradition of active shop stewards, and the new factories all had nucleus 
staffs from Woolwich before they recruited labour. 
2 A similar problem 
afflicted private employers concerned to keep workers from their main 
factories (often unionised) out of their dispersal factories. These 
men often formed the nucleus of nascent trade unionism as well as of the 
labour force. The Senior Technical Officer of the Ministry of Labour, 
filed a report in mid-1941 in which he wrotes 
"N. B. The old aircraft firms when manning their 
new dispersal units will not take their own 
transferee men from their old works. Apart from 
a nucleus staff they prefer to build up a new 
labour force on the basis of 50% women. " 3 
Unfortunately for the old aircraft firms, the nucleus staff which 
was absolutely indispensable was comprised almost entirely of skilled 
men, who were invariably trade unionists. Thus, they found similar 
problems occurring at the new factories to those they had hoped to 
leave behind at the old. At the Bristol Aircraft Co.! s dispersal 
factory at Accrington, the workers demanded a system of payment similar 
to the group bonus worked in Bristol, in 1943. Nor did the other 
4 
companies find the new workforces much more pliables the Humber Co. 
had dispersal plants at Pontefract and Tipton, Staffordshire. At the 
1P. Inman, o . cit. v pp. 416-7. 
2Ibid., 
p. 66. 
'3Report by Senior Technical Officer, S. J. Egerton-Banksilgrcraf 
Factories and ManpowAel(9 June, 1941) LAB 8/374- r 
97 
4LAB 10/380.22 October, 1943. 
former, a number of difficulties arose requiring the intervention of 
the Conciliation Office in January 1943, whilst the latter took sympathy 
action with the Coventry workers during the big strike of 1946 (see 
244 
P". . 
)" 
Similarly, anti-trade union employers in the traditional engin- 
eering areas were also gradually forced to recognise trade unions, and, 
with them, shop stewards. Ford's, who tried very hard to avoid 
concluding a formal agreement with the unions, did so in 1944 through 
the mediation of the TUC. Their Manchester and London factories were 
thereby finally gained for trade unionism. Morris Motors at Cowley 
and Singers, Clydebank had already been slowly forced into recognition 
during the first three years of war. 
2 
Morris and Singer were large and well-known engineering employers, 
yet it was the unionisation of Ford's that was experienced as the 
great victory. When Ford's fell to the beseiging armies of trade 
unionism, it had a significance which went beyond the large enough 
fact that tens of thousands of workers had won full workshop represent- 
ation; it was considered by many to be a symbolic and irreversible 
victory over the great 'big-stick' and paternalist employers of the 
1930s. There were now very few large factories left where the bad old 
days of untramelled managerial rule were not considered over by all 
concerned. Not even Henry Ford could bring them back. 
*ýw 
1LAB 10/387.16 January, 1943. 
2Talk 
given by Arthur Affleck at Ruskin College History Workshop, 
June 1975. LAB 10/363,16 May, 1942. 
L_I 
The growth of shop stewards both in terms of numbers, and in terms 
of the depth and scope of their influence in the factories during the 
war years cannot be seen in isolation from developments amongst the mass 
of engineering workers. Their growing strength developed out of a 
workshop community that was becoming increasingly socially cohesive. 
Shop stewards had originally sprung from the collective consciousness 
of the engineering craftsmen, and, although the nature of workshop 
society was becoming less and less like that of the pre-1914 years, the 
need for workshop representation was still as keenly felt as ever by 
engineering workers. Shop stewards neglected or ignored their members 
at their peril; they were frequently reminded that they were the 
servants of the shop floor workers. But most shop stewards could not 
forget that fact for very long, for the simple reason that they, too, 
had to work. Unlike full-time officials, almost all shop stewards and 
convenors were in daily and hourly contact with their members. In 
order to fully understand their role, then, it is important that some 
effort should be made to understand the way in which workers in the 
factories referred to their traditions, delineated areas of control, 
and affirmed their solidarity. 
, One of the effects of the new atmosphere in the factories was 
the revival of old customs. During August 1940, for example, when 
the Royal family visited a Coventry munitions factory, theys 
".... travelled from section to section of the 
works (and) were greeted by long and prolonged 
cheers to the accompaniment of hammer blows on metal, 
and other signs of loyal enthusiasm. " 1 
This, of course, was the old habit of 'ringing in' described by the 
journeyman engineer, Thomas Wright, in the mid-Nineteenth Century. 
2 
1Coventry 
Standard, 10 August, 1940. 
2T. Wrights some Habits and Customs of the Working Classes (1867), PP- 99-100" 'Ringing in' is also mentioned by Williams in his Life in a Railway Factory (1915), pp. 256-7. 
I/ 
The old custom was still remembered and had been revived for the 
special occasion. Its appearance reminds us that, although a large 
number of new customs were evolved during the war period, these were 
not by any means imposed on a tabula rasa. On the contrary, many of 
the 'new' customs were extensions of, or variations on, workshop 
practice which had an historical pedigree stretching back for over a 
century. 
The changed atmosphere in the factories arose partly out of the 
conviction that workers involved in making considerable sacrifices 
for the war effort should be compensated, as far as possible, by 
improved wages and conditions. This was a conviction held not only 
by workers, but also by Bevin, Ministry of Labour Officials and even 
some managers. It was also partly the result of the fact that working 
class life became increasingly factory-centred during the war, with 
long working hours and a steadily increasing proportion of the population 
becoming involved in factory work. Encouraged by both their ideas 
and facts of wartime life, engineering workers concerned themselves 
more and more with the quality of their working lives. 
Many of the ways which workers found to make life in factories 
tolerable were encouraged by Government officials and sometimes by 
managers. Singing, both at work and in formally organised troupes, 
became a regular feature, and companies were encouraged to install 
loudspeaker equipment to relay radio broadcasts. Sports clubs also 
became common, with factory teams forming works leagues with fixtures 
on Sundays. Film shows were often given by the Entertainments 
National Service Association, as well as by other organisations when 
they were allowed to use the newly built canteens. 
I 
lH. 14. D. Parkerl op-cit., pp. 392-423" 
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These practices did not really annoy managers. On the contrary, 
many of the more enlightened ones could see them as a method of 
increasing production. On the other hand, many habits developed in 
the factories which definitely did not meet with managerial approval. 
Indeed, some of them, brought up in the Taylor school, were outraged. 
Yet there was little they could do to ebop them. Stopwatches were 
not a great deal of use under the circumstances. 
Admittedly, some of the 'slackness' arose in the first place 
because of poor rate fixing. Some piece workers were able to make 
their money sufficiently easily to have time to develop their working 
social lives. At the Standard Motor Co. 's main Coventry factory, for 
example, the management tried for almost two years to get the workers 
in the Bristol shop to agree to a piece work reduction, since the high 
rates were giving rise to a 'fantastic' state of affairs with regard to 
discipline in the shop. 
' Piece work was not the only problem, however. 
Even where their wages were relatively low, workers did not want to 
work for the whole of the long working hours of the war. Drinking at 
work, black marketeering, starting work after the bell and finishing 
before, card schools, crosswords, gambling, listening to the radio, 
"getting stuck into some war work" by knitting socks, were all noted 
iii a Government survey of three Clydeside factories in 1942.2 
Sometimes, shortages of work caused workers to have large amounts 
of free time on their hands. Electricians stewards at the Walker 
Naval Yard complained in 1943 that their members were having to play 
3 
darts and cards and read books to occupy themselves. Some of the 
1Minutes 
of a Works Conference held at the Standard Motor Co., 
Coventry, 15 June, 1942. 
2INF 1/673 1Workers' Complaints About Production in Certain 
Factories (1942). 
S3 
3LAB 8/476. Appendix: 'Samples of Statements'. 
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practices mentioned in the Clydeside factories were clearly not, on 
the other hand, simply products of the shortage of work. 
On occasion, managements would make a stand and try to push 
back the 'frontiers of control', but most examples of this sort of 
rearguard action after 1940 relate to what they thought of as quite 
flagrant breaches of the accepted norms of workshop behaviour. In 
1940, when the poltical situation had been unusually favourable, some 
firms had prosecuted men like the Scotsman who was fined £20 for 
operating a 'crown and anchor sheet and dice' in a Coventry factory, 
but they later became much more hesitant in this direction* 
1 In 
mid-1943, the Scottish Conciliation Officer reported that employers 
were becoming increasingly reluctant to rely on prosecution under the 
defence regulations, because of the consequences of failure. 
2 
There were times, however, when managers found themselves on 
quite firm ground, and felt the need to 'stop the rot'. When this 
happened, shop stewards would often pick up the gauntlet, and would 
try to defend the accused, thereby encroaching on the employer's bng- 
cherished prerogatives. Thus, when a large number of men were sacked 
from Morris Motors in Coventry for drinking at the Sports Club during 
working hours in 1943, the shop stewards argued that the men were 
working on a hot job, and it was customary to allow them to take some 
liquid refreshment during the summer. 
3 A whole range of incidents 
1Coventry Standard, 7 December, 1940. 
2LAB 10/364.5 June, 1943. 
3Minutes 
of a Works Conference held at Morris Engines, Coventry, 
6 July, 1943. 
54 
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related to hostility directed at the immediate representatives of 
management on the shop floor, ratefixers and foremen. In April 1944, 
an operator at Beardmore Parkhead struck a ratefixer whilst arguing 
over a piece work time. Initially, both men were sacked, but the 
stewards had this reduced to suspension in both cases, pending a full 
investigation. At the investigation, they argued that the operator 
should be paid for the time lost, since the ratefixer was not losing 
money. 
1 On another occasion, violence was directed against a police 
spy. This incident occurred at John Brown's shipyard in 1940, where a 
man described by the Conciliation Officer as a detective was 'spying' 
on a boy. The boy, who was a rivet heater, took a red-hot rivet from 
the brazier and threw it at the detective. He was dismissed, but only 
after the stewards had called a stoppage throughout the yard and engine 
works, 
2 
Both collectively and individually, shop stewards grew more 
certain of themselves. At Nuffield Mechanizations and Aero in Coventry 
in May 1940, shop stewards, when refused permission to move around the 
works on union bsuiness applied to the company for telephones for 
their use in every shop. 
3 
At another Coventry factory sixteen months 
later, the shop stewards passed a motion censuring the firm's senior 
officials, calling for the removal of the works manager, and demanding 
shop steward representation on the management. The Managing Director 
threatened to sack the two shop stewards he thought responsible, but 
was dissuaded by the Conciliation Officer. 
4 
1LAB 10/363.22 August, 1942. 
2LAB 10/360.20 Aprilg 1940. 
3COV24PS, May 1940. 
41-AB 10/351.25 October, 1941. 
S; 
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Individual stewards of an abrasive disposition were now prepared 
to go much further than they could ever have dared in the pre-war 
years. On Clydeside, one convenor stunned the managing director of 
his firm by informing him one day that they were of equal status. 
I 
At the Humber, Coventryl. 'Major' Worrod earned his nickname by strutting 
round the shop with a bowler hat on1 holding a swagger stick under one 
arm, and adopting a 'military air' towards foremen. 
2 
It was hard for 
the Humber management to restrain this man's flamboyance. On the other 
hand, there were things that no management could afford to tolerate, 
as some shop stewards found out rather too late. ; Such flam- 
boyance could still prove hazardous. Some shop stewards transferred 
from the ROF Linwood to Rolls-Royce Hillington in 1944 alarmed their 
new supervisors by their ostentatious lack of respect for authority. 
3 
An opportunity soon came the firm's way for getting rid of one of them 
when he refused to do his normal job. The steward succeeded in leading 
a sectional strike in his own support, claiming victimisation, but 
found the ground cut from beneath his feet when the other stewards 
supported the management's action and called on the strikers to return. 
They did so, leaving the steward outside the factory gates. 
4 
The 'total war' meant that shop stewards had to deal with a 
plethora of problems which afflicted their members, both inside and 
outside of the workshop. Many of these did not impinge on managerial 
prerogatives at all. Transport from home to work and back again, the 
transference of workers from factory to factory and district to 
1LAB 10/364.9 January, 1943. 
2Interview 
with Bill Wellings, 19 May, 1973" 
3i. AS 10/445" 17 March, 1944. 
41bid., 24 March, 1944. 
district was one range of problem. Workers in isolated areas often 
had difficulty getting home, especially in Royal Ordnance Factories 
which tended to be located in isolated areas. 
1 Stewards therefore 
often had to try to persuade 'bus companies to co-ordinate their 
schedules with shift starting and finishing times. With transferred 
workers, those leaving had to be informed of the allowances available 
to them and those arriving to be shown 'the ropes' in the factory and 
the town. Pay as You Earn Income Tax was another innovation of the 
war years which often called for a knowledgeable steward. 
2 When 
workers were off sick, or their relatives were killed or injured in 
action, then the stewards would often take collections for them or 
pay them out of the shop stewards' fund. These were just some of the 
new jobs which shop stewards took on in this period. 
One of the most impressive features of the new functions was the 
fact that they did not stop at the factory gates. Here, the expansion 
of their horizons was an entirely new departure for the shop stewards' 
movement in a broader historical sense. During the First World War, 
even the Clyde Workers' Committee does not appear to have involved 
itself in the 1915 Rent Strike, for example. 4 But perhaps the best 
way to capture the preoccupations of the new type of steward who was 
emerging is to quote directly from one of them. Jock Gibson, a 
Communist convenor at the Daimler factory in Coventry spoke about 
1P. Inman, op. cit., p. 217- 
2 J. B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 261. 
31nterview 
with Bill Wellings, 19 May, 1973. 
4J. S. Hinton, op. cit., p. 127. 
9, 
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his experience as follows: 
"... the shop stewards then were taking part in the 
fire-watching, they were organising fire-watch 
rotas with the people, they were seeing that the 
employers were doing as much as the workers were 
doing. They were also checking that no-one got 
any more petrol than any one else... and a tremendous 
number of women were coming into the industry 
and there was the whole question of whether the 
hostels were right for the people who were coming 
in. The shop stewards in whatever factory, you 
know, Standards boys would probably have the hostels 
close to them. They would get people coming in 
from Scotland, Ireland, Wales or whatever, North 
East Coast, London actresses, students, you name 
them, we had them coming into the city. The villains, 
the rogues, the vagabonds, the prostitutes, the 
whole bloody lot. They were all sent in and you'd 
got to find them some place. " 1 
The shop steward, then, became considerably more than just a rep- 
resentative of the trade union, or even just a workshop figure. He 
became an advisor and unofficial social worker as well. 
One of the new functions, safety, can be dealt with in more detail 
and in more quantifiable terms. Taking the crude gross number. of non- 
fatal accidents in 1938, the Chief Inspector of Factories estimated 
that there was an increase for all industries of the following proportions 
in the war years: 
Table 14 1939: plus 7% 
1940: " 20% 
1941: it 17% 
1942: It 16% 
1943: minus 1.9% 
1944: " 9.1% (2) 
Unfortunately, there are no global figures for accidents in engineering 
as a whole during the war years, but the Chief Inspector did quote 
the accident rate for the most accident prone operations in engineering, 
1Transcript 
of interview between Peter Caldwell and Jock Gibson 
on 22nd February, 1972. I am grateful to Peter Caldwell for 
lending me a copy of this transcript. 
2Chief Inspector of Factoriess Annual Report, 1944, P" 5" 
sg 
which show a broadly similar trends 
Table I. 
Milling machines Power presses 
1942: 1706 1044 
1943: 1535 1096 1 
Clearly, the accident problem was beginning to be overcome by 1943. 
Bearing in mind that the last two sets of figures have not taken into 
account the tremendous expansion of the industry, it is obvious that 
by 1943, there were real improvements in safety in absolute terms. 
Part of the improvement can be put down to the increased activity of 
the Factory Inspectorate, and part can be attributed to the increasing 
familiarity of the new entrants to the industry with machinery, but 
the Chief Inspector himself was careful to point out that the shop 
stewards had played their part. In his report for 1942, he cited the 
example of a Scottish steel foundry with an active accident committee, 
whose shop steward members arranged for the local Inspector to visit 
the plant to speak to their members on safety. 
Moreover, Joint Production Committee representatives were, mainly 
concerned with raising welfare and safety questions. Ministry of 
Aircraft Production surveys showed that over a quarter of total dis- 
cussion time on these committees was taken up with these two matters, 
and that they were the main preoccupation of the workers' side. 
2 
1Chief Inspector of Factoriess Annual Report, 1945, P" 11. 
2AVIA 15/2539. A. V. Roe to MAP, 10 April, 1942; Midland Regional 
Controller to MAP, 30 June, 1944. 
AVIA 9/57. Report on JPCs, 7 January, 1943. 
I /oo 
However, dissent on JPCs was probably as far as arguments on safety 
questions went. shop floor arguments must have taken place on safety 
matters, but these never reached the level at which strike action 
became necessary. No strikes on safety (as distinct from working 
conditions such as heat in paintshops, cold in shipyards, etc. ) were 
found in the Ministry of Labour Disputes Books. 
Apart from safety, the shop stewards had to concern themselves 
with many other aspects of workers' comfort and well-being in the 
factories, some of which could cause disputes. One of the most important 
of these was the matter of the provision of canteens. The Ministry of 
Labour had made it quite clear that it expected employers to provide 
adequate canteens, and workers came to expect such facilities as a 
right. There were two strikes on this matter in the four districts 
studied, causing the loss of eight hundred working days. Canteen and 
food provision was the cause of other forms of shop steward action, as 
well as strikes. Manual workers were entitled to supplementary supplies, 
which were delivered to the factories by the local Food Control 
Officer and distributed by the management. At Vickers, Barrow, the 
shop stewards decided that they should take over the administration 
of the supplementary food, and approached the Food Control Officer, 
demanding that they be given the job. He agreed, and-the stewards 
purchased food from the local Co-op and distributed it themselves. 
I 
Shift working was another bone of contention that stewards had 
to take up both with companies and within the workforce itself. At 
Vickers Barrow, the stewards led a strike against proposed new shift 
1SA, June 1941. 
/0) 
working arrangements in 1941 that caused the loss of sixteen thousand 
working days. 
l The proliferation of shift working could cause 
difficulties between workers as well as between management and worker. 
One dispute at John Brown's engine department on the Clyde concerned 
the refusal of the day shift to alternate with the night shift, causing 
a four-night strike by the aggrieved night-shift men, and the inter- 
vention of the O as w District Committee to disentangle the problem. 
2 
This was unusual, however, as stewards usually tried to maintain a shift 
rota to see fair play in this respect. 
Given the tremendous demand for labour, and the increasing strength 
of the shop stewards' movement, it would have been surprising if the 
/6 
strike rate had not increased during the war years. Both Tables' -end /7 
showing the trends in engineering and shipbuilding generally, and 
strikes in our four major engineering areas respectively, confirm that 
this was in fact the case. 
Since strikes will occupy a prominent position in the local studies, 
only a few general and introductory remarks need be made at this point. 
These remarks are grouped in the following order: initially, the nature 
of the strikes will be dealt with, followed by their causation. Finally, 
some political determinants of strike causation and development will be 
suggested. 
As Table_ 
, _shows, 
the typical wartime strike was short, usually 
lasting less than one week. This was largely because the issue involved 
was normally a domestic wage question without any particularly wide 
1This 
strike lasted from 16th to 21st June, 1941 (LAB 34/56). 
2The 
strike was from 21st to 24th June, 1943 (LAB 34/58). 
TABLE: ' /b Principal Causes of Stoppages of Work, 1941-44, in 
Engineering. Shipbuilding and Iron and Steel and other Metal Industries. 
Percentage of Stoppages beginning in the 
Year. 
1941 1942 1943 1944 _ 
Wage increase questions 35.4 33.8 28.8 20.8 
Wage decrease questions 3.6 5.5 8.3 7.0 
Other wage. questions 
(including piece work). 
24.1 25.6 23.4 30.7 
OPAL: All wage questions (63.1) (64.9) (60.5) (58.5) 
urs of labour 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 
ployment of particular 
lasses or persons. 
19.1 16.4 16.7 17.7 
Other working arrange- 
ents, rules and discipli ell. 2 13.2 16.5 16.4 
rade Unionism 4.0 2.3 3.3 4.4 
ympathetic action 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.5 
10 ther questions - 0.9 0.8 0.2 
TOTAL: 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 
(Sources Inman, p. 398)" 
,rý. 
TABLE: 17 Stoppages of Work in the Metal, Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Industries, 1935-45. 
Year Number of strikes Number of workers 
directly involved. 
Number of working 
days lost. (thousands) 
1935 73 17 93 
1936 148 47 206 
1937 220 107 778 
1938 138 44 243 
1939 181 56 
r 
332 
1940 229 40 163 
1941 472 154 556 
1942 476 141 526 
1943 612 170 635 
1944 610 194 1,048 
1945 591 123 528 
16 3 
(Sources Inman, p. 393) 
^r 
TABLE:: dProportion of Strikes Lasting Under One Week, 1941-45. 
Year Number of strikes lasting 
under one week. 
Percentage of total 
1941 1,082 86.5 
1942 1,147 88.0 
1943 1,621 90.8 
1944 1,993 90.8 
1945 1,980 86.3 
16 4 
Sources Inman, p. 394), 
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implications for workers outside of those directly concerned. As 
/6 
Table shows, wage issues accounted for around 6C of strikes in 
/0) 
engineering and shipbuilding between 1941 and 1944" 
Demands for wage increases, particularly by piece workers, was 
clearly the most important cause of strikes. In the case of piece 
workers (who were steadily increasing in number), the working of 
the particular system involved, or the yield on a particular job 
or jobs often constituted the causes. Alternatively, the cause might 
be a straight demand for an increase on the basic rates of time or 
piece workers, or a demand by time workers to have their wages related 
to piece workers' earnings. 
The next most important cause of strikes in the engineering and 
shipbuilding industries as a whole (largely because of the inclusion 
of shipbuilding, which had a largely skilled workforce) was that 
of 'employment of particular classes or persons'. This category may 
also have included strikes over the continued employment of non- 
unionists, and would certainly have included strikes for the sacking 
of certain foremen. These strikes accounted for somewhere between 
sixteen and twenty percent of strikes in the period. The next most 
important category was that of 'other working arrangements, rules 
and discipline', accounting for between eleven and seventeen percent 
of stoppages. The last significant category was that of 'Trade Unionism', 
ý ý, ý 
with between two and five percent of strikes. 
In this last bloc of categories of causes, it is important to 
remember that some strikes (for example, over the victimisation of 
a shop steward) could be put in any pigeon-hole. As a team of authors 
recently wrote in an important study of the motor industry, classifying 
strikes is necessarily 'an exercise in arbitrariness'. This is 
particularly true of strikes outside of the wages category, and reminds 
us of the limitations of this sort of analysis. 
2 
1Some 
mention should also be made here of sabotage. Sabotage 
was rare, so it is difficult to generalise from the few examples 
which we have except to say that motives, methods and severity 
of the effects varied greatly from case to case. The Ministry 
of Information collated data on sabotage for 1941 only, and then 
appearsto have given up, probably in despair at the low rate of 
return for their efforts. The Ministry scoured the local papers 
and numerous other sources meticulously, and discovered eight 
clear cases of sabotage between October 1940 and October 1941. 
These cases involved twelve people, all of whom appear to have 
been quite young men: the oldest was only thirty-one, and five 
were under twenty-one. A 
, 
few examples will show the type of 
case involved. In October 1940, a fitter was fined X100 for 
deliberately scamping work on an aircraft in order to obtain 
his release from that firm to get a better paid job. Next 
month, a young engineer was bound over for two years for an 
unspecified act of sabotage, committed because he wanted to 
obtain his release to join the Army. In January 1941, a youth 
of seventeen "messed up" the fuse box at a Bristol factory 
because he wanted the night off; fifty workers lost power on 
their machines as a result. He was sentenced to three months. 
The very individualistic nature of these cases seems to confirm 
the suspicion that they were about as rare as the Ministry of 
Information's survey suggested. (n1F 1/336.12 October, 
'19 November, 1940; 4 February, 1941). 
to(- 
2H. 
A. Turner et. al., op. cit., p. 63. 
I" el- 
The trend towards a higher number of strikes over discipline 
questions was only a part of the more general tendency for the number 
of working days lost through strikes to increase during the war. The 
growing strength of the shop stewards' movement and their desire to 
extend their control was one major underlying cause of this tendency. 
There were other underlying causes: the slowness of the implementation 
of the Procedure for the Avoidance of Disputes, an irritation with 
'diluted' and inefficient managements,, and an increasing war-weariness 
amongst the working population. The overloading of the disputes 
procedure was perhaps the most important of these causes: the large 
in 1943 
strike at Rolls-Royce ßillingtonwas over a matter which had been in 
the procedure for fourteen months without resolution, and workers could 
grow tired of waiting rather than forget the issue at stake. 
1 
Expectations had been aroused and negotiations were proving fruitless, 
and it therefore proved impossible for the stewards to dissuade them 
from taking strike action. Inefficient management was another important 
cause; in a situation in which production was supposed'to be of paramount 
importance, workers could often become frustrated when their managements 
seemed to be inefficient and failing to keep their side of the bargain. 
2 Beaverbrook himself complained of this as being an important factor. 
In addition, war weariness undoubtedly built up from early 1943, as 
the cumulative strain of the blackout (often accompanied by poor factory 
ventilation), poor transport, rationing and all the other problems of 
wartime life began to tell. Perhaps this was why most strikes in the 
aircraft industry occurred during the winter months. 
3 
IP. 
Inman, op. cit., p. 364. 
2Beaverbrook 
wrote an article on this for the Manchester Guardian, 
27 June, 1942. 
/O f' 
3This 
paragraph relies on LAB 10/281. H. Emmerson: 'Causes of 
Industrial Unrest', 3 November, 1943. 
ýZ 
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TABLEs_. Average Weekly Earnings of Adult Males: Motor Vehicles, Cycles 
and Aircraft Compared to the Average of all Metal, Engineering and Ship- 
building Industries. 
Metal, eng., s'bldg. Motor vehicles, cycles, 
aircraft. 
Oct. 1938 75s. 
July 1940 102s. 5d. 
July 1941 112s. 2d. 
114s. 11d. 
127s. 5d. 
Jan. 1942 119a. 2d. 137s. 8d. 
July 1942 128s. 1d. 
Jan. 1943 131s. 6d. 
147s. 5d. 
148s. 7d. 
July 1943 138s. 3d. 155s. 10d. 
Jan. 1944 141s. 10d. 166s. 1d. 
July 1944 139s. 1d. 15913 . 11d. 
Jan- 1945 131s. 2d. 14813.6d. 
July 1945 133s. 143s. 4d. 
//0 
Sources: British Labour Statistics. Historical Abstract. (Table 40). 
Ministry of Labour Gazette) 
ý// 
2i 
TABLES', Average Hourly Earnings in the Metal, Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Industries, Compared to Manufacturing Industry as 
a whole. 
A) Men over 21. 
(in pence) 
Metal, eng. g s'bldg. All manufacturing inds. 
Oct. 1938 18.84 
July 1943 30.7d 
Jan. 1944 31.9d 
July 1944 32.54 
Jan. 1945 
_ 
32. oa 
July 1945 32.44 
B) Women over 18. 
(in pence) 
17.84 
29.14 
30.24 
30. ad 
30.34 
30.8d 
Metal, eng., sIbldg. Al]. manufacturing inds. 
Oct. 1938 9. Oa 
July 1943 17.94 
Jan. 1944 
9. oa 
16.2d 
18.6d 16.9d 
July 1944 18.94 
Jan- 1945 19"5d 
JulY 1945 19.1d 
17.34 
17.54 
17.4d 
(Source: British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract, Table 46). 
! (-z 
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TABLE: == Cost of Living Index. All Items. 
Sept. 1, 1939 155 
Aug. 31, 1940 187 
Sept. It 1941 199 
Sept. It 1942 200 
Sept. It 1943 198 
Sept. 1, 1944 202 
Sept. It 1945 203 
(Sources British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract Table 89). 
1/3 
These, then, were the major underlying causes. They were not 
always reflected in the immediate causes of disputes, of which an 
analysis is given for our major engineering areas in Table ,0 
Overall, it should be pointed out that the number of working days 
lost was considerably below the number lost during the First World 
War. The opposition of the political element in the shop stewards' 
movement to strikes after the entry of Russia into the War, and the 
Government's experience of handling strikes during the First World 
War were two major reasons for this. 
But there was another reason for the lower strike rate of the 
Second S4orld War: rising real earnings. This applied to many sections 
of the working class, and especially to engineering workers. A 
Ministry of Labour internal document estimated that the average increase 
in wage rates between September 1939 and November 1943 was 34% 
(excluding agriculture), as against an increase in the official cost of 
living index of 30%. The corresponding figures for the First'World 
War were that wage rates had increased by 55% compared to 85%, in the 
cost of living index. 
1 The earnings of metal, engineering and ship- 
building workers were rather higher than average, and, within this 
group, the aircraft industry was the highest paid (see tables -... 
2t) 0 
On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true, as was pointed out by many 
contemporary trade unionists, that much of the increase was due to 
longer hours. 
Statistics covering the number of hours worked in industry were 
not collected by the Ministry of Labour between July 1940 and 
January 1943 inclusive, and hours must have been extremely high during 
1LAB 10/281. H. Znmersons "Causes of Industrial Unrest", p. 2. 
2 34 /14 
1940; Nevertheless, hourly earnings in the metal engineering and 
shipbuilding group of industries were considerably higher than average 
both before and after July 1943. These averages are given in table' ý-J 
Moreover, the grouping of the metal industries together undoubtedly 
obscures the particularly high level of hourly earnings in the motor 
vehicle, cycles and aircraft group. There was, of course, rather less 
for them to spend their earnings on, but they were at least earning the 
money, and in full employment. 
1 They enjoyed an absolute increase in 
their earnings, and regular work; these were very real gains for men 
and women who had been through the experience of the Depression years. 
*ýý 
The problems faced by workers in the engineering industry described 
so far were more or less shared by all of them, although the response 
might differ between different districts and even between factories in 
the same district. But there were also large groups of workers who 
had what might be called sectoral problems which transcended factories 
and districts. The main groups with such problems were apprentices 
and women; how did the shop stewards' movement relate to them? 
Women will be dealt with below, in a separate section. Here, the 
major grievances held by the apprentices will be sketched. 
1 11 These issues are discussed at length by J. L. Nicholsons Unployment 
and Vati-opal-Income-During the War ; in Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, 7, (1945)t and D. Seerss 
Changes in the Cost of Living and the Distribution of Income 
Since 1938. (Oxford, 1949)- 
Young workers in general and apprentices in particular had a 
large number of grievances, but discontent may normally be put down to 
two major causess inadequate training and low wages. These had been 
the underlying causes of the 1937 eruptions, and they remained key 
questions throughout the war. One of the largest apprentices' strikes 
outside of the upheavals of 1937,1941 and 1944 involved shipyard 
fitters at Yarrows yard on the Clyde in February 1941. The managing 
director wrote to the Ministry of Labour explaining that the strike 
had started because a lad had been sacked for refusing to carry material 
from the dockside into the stokehold, since this was labouring work 
and was preventing him from being long enough on a fitting job to 
learn anything. 
I 
The main grievance giving rise to strike action was not training, 
however, but wages. Apprentices' wage rates were scandalously low. 
During the 1937 strikes, Challenge had claimed that apprentices had 
enjoyed higher wages fifty years earlierl2 The piecemeal local 
advances of 1937 still left a huge gap between the apprentices' 
earnings and the full journeyman's rate, a gap which was felt all the 
more acutely because of the rapid inflation of the first year of war. 
Rates varied according to district, but the Ministry of Labour's 
'average' fifth year apprentice was earning 31s. 3d. per week at, the 
beginning of 1941, compared to the adult plain time rate of £3.11s. 6d, 
after the 3/6d award of January 1941.3 Some apprentices were on 
piece work, and would earn more, but the fact that they were on payment 
'LAB 10138. Managing Director of Yarrows to Ministry of Labour, 
25 February, 1941. 
2Challenge, 15 April, 1937. 
3P. Inman, op-cit., p. 334, J. B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 255. 
3t. 
by results at all leads us full circle back to the training question. 
It is difficult to see how an apprentice could learn very much on piece 
work, which would have to be reasonably uniform work for him to earn 
much bonus. After the 1941 strike, the fifth year rate was raised to 
46/- and a definite percentage of the adult advances laid down for 
each year of apprenticeship. 
' Thus, first year apprentices were 
awarded 10id per week, whilst fifth years were given 1/7d., so that 
even the fifth years received less than half of the adult increase. 
2, 
This proportion was improved in the national negotiations of July 1942 
and April 1943" In these latter negotiations, increases were also 
obtained for fourteen and fifteen year olds, who had been excluded from 
the earlier agreements. 
3 
The 1941 gains were regarded as insufficient by the lads them- 
selves. " ý, AApprentt. gfks ol, delegates from all over Britain 
met in Manchester on May 11th 1941 and agreed that the deficiencies of 
the settlement were that it did not include boys under sixteen, that 
it did not keep pace with the cost of living, that there was no 
apprentice representation on price-fixing committees, and that the 
increases had not yet been paid in some areas. 
4 The next conference 
(which never met, possibly because of the CP's change in line on the 
war) was set for August 10th 1941. There can be little doubt that these 
delegates (Socialist Appeal reported that the vast majority of them 
were members of the YCL)5had the backing of the apprentices themselves 
1P. Inman, op-cit., p. 334" 
2LAB 10/138. 'Seoond and Final Report by a Court of Eaquiry 
Concerning Stoppages of Work by Apprentices etc... ' 
3J. B. Jefferys, 2 cit., p. 256. 
4SA, June 1941. 
51bid. 
116 
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when they decided to press further demands on the employers. Perhaps 
the best way of illustrating this is to quote at length from a Liverpool 
apprentice's letter to a friend in Canada intercepted by the censor 
just after the 1941 strike had been settled: 
"The apprentices all over the Clyde, Belfast and 
Edinburgh were out on strike for higher wages. 
They are bringing in girls who are getting big 
wages and trainees (boys who serve six months 
training and then come in and get the man's pay 
while we have to work - serve - five years at the small rate. ) To make a long story short we 
got a rise but not to suit me yet. As you know 
first year have a standard pay and when you enter 
your second year you get a little more etc. etc. 
for each year until your time is out, well now they 
are going by your ages - so that a boy who works beside me and has less time served than me is 
getting 32/6d a week simply because this boy is 
eighteen and I am only seventeen. A boy of twenty 
whether he is just starting or not will get 46/ 
so don't be saying Canada is the only one who does 
things wrong. " I 
The low level of apprentices' wages in absolute terms stimulated 
comparisons with the trainees and girls and women coming into the 
factories. Apprentices felt that they were worth more than either 
of these other two groups of young workers, by virtue of their 
training. Yet they received less. This is the background to their 
militancy in the 1941 and 1944 strikes. 
Even these grievances, though substantial enough, were not the 
only motive forces behind the apprentices' discontent. Long hours 
was another problem for them, especially during 1940.. The restrictions 
on hours for juveniles had been supposedly governed by the Young 
Persons (F}nployment) Act of 1938, under which nobody between the ages 
LAB 10/138. Extract from Ministry of Information From Postal 
Censorship, Terminal Mails (Private Branch) LLIV/2067) 41; 
16 April, 1941. 
2 3a3 
of sixteen and eighteen was allowed to work more than forty-eight 
hours per week, plus six hours overtime in any one week and fifty 
hours in a year. The restrictions were more stringent for younger 
people. 
1 In the rush for production of 1940, the 1938 Act was swept 
aside and hours worked which were reminiscent of the Industrial Revolution. 
In Coventry, as late as 1942 the average hours were from seven or 
seven-thirty in the morning to six-thirty or seven in the evening. 
Saturday mornings were invariably worked, roughly half of the young 
workers worked alternate Saturday afternoons, and 'a considerable 
number' worked every Saturday afternoon. A few boys worked alternate 
Sundays. 2 In nearby Rugby, a survey was carried out of three hundred 
young workers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. This revealed 
that one hundred and eighty-five were working over fifty hours per 
week. 
3 That year, a more general national survey showed that many of 
these young people working long hours were employed in the engineering- 
industry, although no industrial breakdown was attempted by the 
researchers. 
4 
One detailed local survey of excessive hours was carried 
out where the workers' jobs and employers were stated. This was in 
East Ham, and showed that of sixty-five extreme cases, thirty-eight 
occurred in engineering. Incidentally, the worst offender, with six 
cases, was the Woolwich Arsenal. 
5 
1 LAB 19/46. Memo. on Legislation (n. d. ). 
2lbid. 7 to W. Taylor, J. V. 180/5/1942. 
31bid. 'Evidence Resulting from the Follow-up of over-long 
Working Hours. ' Rugby document attached. 
4lbid. 
51bid. County Boroo of East Ham Education Committee. 'Ages 
116-18s Cases in which Hours of Work Appear to Exceed 50 Hours 
per Week'. 
1/fi 
ýi 9 
Very few prosecutions were undertaken in this connection. 
The Emergency Powers Act had suspended most of the corpus of legislation 
to deal with excessive hours, the Factory Inspectorate was too busy to 
tackle all but the worst cases, and magistrates were reluctant to find 
against employers under the circumstances. In Coventry, the Education 
Authority was especially interested in the problem, and one hundred and 
seventy cases were referred to the Factory Inspectorate up to 1942, 
who definitely established illegality in nineteen cases. How many of 
these were taken to court is unknown. 
' These figures were broadly 
confirmed by similar statistics for some other areas. 
2 
The general realisation in industry that long hours were counter- 
productive, coupled with the introduction of women on a large scale 
reduced the burden of long hours on the young. Nevertheless, while these 
hours lasted, they must have contributed to the general sense of 
grievance of apprentices and other young engineering workers. Tiredness 
was bad enough1 but to come out with a small pay packet after working 
so many hours must have been even worse. This is the background to 
the apprentices' largest and most extensive wartime strike, that of 
1941. 
These grievances fuelled the discontent of the apprentices, which 
carne out in the strikes of 1937,1941 and 1944" These strikes are 
dealt with elsewhere in the thesis, but two general points should be 
made here about the apprentices' strikes. Firstly, it is interesting 
to note that the 1937 strike taught apprentices the lesson that they 
23 
could strike, despite their indentures. Table. shows that they were 
1LAB 19/46. F. Taylor to Mr. John, 26 October, 1942. 
2 Ibid. 
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striking as a separate group (as opposed to becoming involved in more 
general strikes) from 1939 onwards, after an initial period of quies- 
cence in 1938. There was, then, a small but significant tendency to 
strike on day to day issues. Secondly, it is noticeable that the issue 
that caused most strikes was wages. Apprentices were becoming less 
amenable to accepting 'the small rate' in return for training; they 
were increasingly being used on production work, for which they would 
often demand the full rate. 
These facts alone ensured that the shop stewards had to take more 
and more of an interest in apprentices' problems. In July 1942, shop 
stewards became formally empowered to take up matters concerning junior 
workers by a modification to the national agreement of 1941.1 The 
stewards, encouraged by the AEU Regional officers appointed by the AEU 
(partly for this purpose) in 1943, began to take the matter seriously 
(in a continuous sense) for the first time ever. 
2 Youth representatives 
236 
were elected to some shop stewards' committees (see p..: tor the 
Standard Motor Co., Coventry). Junior male workers' committees were 
set up in the districts in 1942, and two years later, girls were included 
in their constitutions. In July 1944, the first national youth 
conference was held, at which problems were discussed and recommendations 
made to the AEU Executive. 
3 
This increasing incorporation of the apprentices and young workers 
into the AEU structure was a reflection of the union's concern with 
I P. Inman, OP-cit., p. 334- 
2 J. B. Jefferys, o . cit., p. 262. 
31bid., 
p. 263. 
rZz 
their problems, but it was not always seen as entirely beneficial by 
all of the young workers themselves. In 1944, during the apprentices, 
strike on ! ^i: -Tyneside, the apprentices set up their own committee. 
This committee was opposed by the Young Workers Committee, which was 
detezzined to end the strike, and eventually succeeded in doing so. 
The Young Workers Committees and the rest of the bodies set up within 
the union undoubtedly represented a step forward for the young workers 
in the long run, since they offered a better opportunity of influencing 
AEU policy. On the other hand, they could in the short run appear 
(as in 1944), as little more than a strike-breakers organisation. 
Thus, despite the fact that some shop stewards' committees were 
listening to the boys' representatives and were involved in taking up 
their grievances, the lads largely remained outside of the shop steward 
and union structure. As we shall see, the indications are that very 
few of them joined the AEU,, and their strikes were entirely conducted 
without the sort of supportive strike action they had received from 
the Cl, ydeside workers in 1937. The AEU's local committees and national 
conferences did not substantially alter this picture. 
In conclusion, the growth of-the shop stewards' movement during 
the War was a result not only of the full employment of the war years 
but also of the growing sense of community which grew out of this 
security of employment and the sense of fighting for a common cause. 
The stewards had to defend and attack along the workshop 'frontiers 
of control' as these were gradually pushed forward in the workers' 
favour. In the process, they acquired a whole new range of functions 
both inside and outside of the factory. The slowness of a clogged up 
Procedure for the Avoidance of Disputes and a sense of war-weariness 
,. 
combined with the general feeling of confidence in their ability to 
win disputes led to a steadily rising strike rate. The stewards had 
to adjust to this situation; precisely how they did so will be dealt 
with in some detail later. Finally, the stewards had to relate to the 
categories of workers who had special problems: young workers and women. 
The former have been dealt with, but women, as a more'important group 
in terms of their size and distinctive identity deserve separate and 
more detailed treatment. 
ýýý 
No discussion of the social upheavals going on inside the 
factories during the Second World War would be complete without 
considering the important changes brought about by the sizeable influx 
of women. Large numbers of women voluntarily started work in the 
munitions industries during 1940 and 1941, and this process was 
speeded up by the conscription of women for war work in December 1941. 
By the middle of 1943, twice as high a proportion of, the total female 
population between the ages of fifteen and sixty was working in 
munitions as had been in 1918.1 By 1943, men outnumbered women by 
24 
less than two to one in the metal industries (see table- ). About 
three-quarters of these women had worked before, althougi; only about 
one quarter had previous experience in the engineering industries. 
For a large group, domestic service and office work had provided their 
only pre-War work experience. 
/Z- 
'A. Calder, o . cit. i p. 382. 
In general, these women, despite their lack of experience in the 
industry, fitted in well in the day-to-day social life of the factories. 
This has been remarked on by both of the engineering workers, J. T. 
Murphy and Mark Benney, who wrote contemporary accounts.. Despite 
the fact that both of these commentators were men, there'seems little 
reason to doubt their judgement that, after some initial misgivings 
about training the women, even the skilled men came to accept them. 
Table Showing the Proportion of Women to Men in the Metal Industries 
Table -: 24 1939-45" 
Thousands 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Men, 14-64 2379 2628 2862 2989 3025 2916 2643 
KoIDen, 14-59 433 570 892 1383 1635 1257 
(source: Inman, PP- 481-2). 
The women themselves seemed to enjoy working with men. A survey 
carried out in September 1943 asked a cross-section of working women 
whether they worked in close contact with men. 61% replied that they 
did, and a large proportion of the remainder had worked with men 
previously. Of the 61%, 44% thought that men and women 'got on alright', 
and only 4% thought they did not get on well. 
2 
1J. T. ldurpYyg o . cit. 9 p. 52. M. Bonney, o . cit. 9 pp. 105-6. 
2C. Thomas Women at Work (Wartime Social Survey, June 1944), 
p. 28. 
ý 
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A survey carried out by Mass Observation during late 1942 
showed that women working in war factories were also well satisfied 
with their jobs. 75% of women-either 'really liked' their jobs 
(39%) or were 'satisfied without being very enthusiastic' (36%). 
11% were 'unenthusiastic, ranging through to definitely hostile', 
whilst only 4% 'condemned their jobs emphatically'. Mass Observation 
implied that these results showed a difference between male and female 
attitudes, though they did not measure the former in the same way. 
1 
Women's overall satisfaction with their wartime work is less surprising 
if we consider the jobs which the women in engineering had worked at 
previous to the war. The 1943 survey carried out for the Ministry of 
Reconstruction quoted above found that only 22% of them had worked in 
engineering before, that 51% of them came from another job, and that 
24% came from the home. Of those coming from another job, the most 
common categories of pre-war work were 'distributive work (including 
waitresses)' or 'labourers and domestic servants'. Over half of the 
women in engineering had therefore come from the home or from relatively 
poorly paid and non-industrial jobs. The only category of women war 
workers for whom this was not true was the supervisory group of women, 
who were mainly drawn from professional and clerical workers rather 
than from the ranks of women who had previous engineering experience. 
2 
Mass Observation found this last fact to be a major cause of grievance 
among the mass of women workers. 
3 During the first half of the war, 
1Mass Observations People in Production. (1942), p. 117. 
2G. Thomasg o . cit. 9 p. 11. 
3Mass Observation, op. cit., p. 117ff. 
%Zi- 
it is difficult to find many examples of working women responding to 
any of their undoubtedly very real problems in a collective fashion. 
The provision of day nurseries for munition workers' children is a 
case in point. 
Government interest in nurseries began not with any initiative 
from working women themselves, but with a letter from Lady Allen of 
Hurtwood, the Right Honourable the Marchioness of Reading, to the 
Ministry of Labour at the end of March 1940.1 Lady Allen enquired 
about the number of nurseries available, and questioned whether it 
was sufficient. The Ministry of Labour completed a survey of one 
problematic town, Chorley in Lancashire, made a rough estimate of the 
position in Coventry, and wrote to Malcolm Macdonald, the Minister of 
Health, in the fortnight after Bevin's appointment as Minister. 
2 
The situation at Chorley was unsatisfactory to the women questioned. 
Six hundred and twelve women were interviewed, of whom two hundred 
and forty-one had children under school age. Of these, arrangements 
for the care of the children were called 'unsatisfactory''by one 
hundred and six women. Most of these women were leaving their 
children with older women in the family, next-door neighbours or paid 
1LAB 26/57. Lady Allen to the Minister of Labour, 20 March, 1940. 
Lady Allen was not by any means a typical 'Lady Bountiful'. She 
was a member of the ILP and a lifelong campaigner for the rights 
of women and children, being prominent in the battle for the 
1948 Children Act. (Cr. M. Allen and M. Nicholsons Memoirs of an 
Uneducated Lady. Lady Allen of Hurtwood. (1976). ) 
2lbid. 'District Analysis, Form 2'. Memo. to Malcolm Macdonald, 
25 May, 1940, P. 2. 
IZ--) 
child-minders. A similar situation was thought to obtain in Coventry. 
I 
Thus, although Governmental opinion appeared to be that the problem was 
a localised one, quite large numbers of women were affected by it, for 
whom it constituted a continual worry. 
Yet the women themselves appear to have done practically nothing 
at all about it. It was Bevin and the Marc*ioness of Reading who took 
the initiative in overcoming the problem for the women. In June 1940, 
Bevin made a speech to the Conference of Women's Voluntary Organisations 
in which he stated that he was sending letters to local authorities 
proposing plans for nursery facilities, and encouraging them to take 
the matter up. Nurseries attached to the factories were not, on the 
other hand, being"encouraged, because of the possibility of enemy 
air attack. 
2 In December 1941, the Labour Party's Standing Joint 
Committee of Working Women's Organisations raised its voice to suggest 
to Bevin that the onus was being put on working women to find their 
own form of child care, and that the Ministry of Labour was perpetuating 
the situation. 
3 This was apparently the first and last time that any 
body with the remotest claim to representing working women took the 
matter up. In June 1942, Bevin was still mainly concerned with 
'LAB 2657. 'District Analysis, Form 2'. Angus Calder reproduces 
one of the excuses often used at the time for the inadequate 
nursery provision when he questions whether the women would have 
used them had they existed (p.. The fantastic growth of 
the nursery provision in the latter years of the war itself shows 
how marginal this consideration was. Where they were set up they 
were extensively used. 
2Ibid. 
$ Extract from Minister's speech, 18 June, 1940. 
3ffi 
3Standing Joint Committee of Working Women's Organisations to 
Bevin, 18 December, 1941. 
IZý 
keeping the Marchioness of Reading up to date. Bevin had in any 
case both a desire and a need to expand the provision of nurseries, 
as the pressure on war production increased. Thus, by mid-1942, six 
months after the conscription of women was first announced, nurseries 
were being opened at the rate of three per day to supplement the 
existing five hundred and forty. 
1 Once again, our source is a letter 
to the Marchioness of Reading. 
At first sight, then, from the writings of male engineers, from 
the Mass Observation surveys carried out in 1942, and from looking at 
the Ministry of Labour's involvement in nursery care, it might seem that 
women were a singularly quiescent part of the workforce. If this was 
more or less true up to the end of 1942, it becomes less adequate 
as a total description of women's collective activity after that point 
in time. Women, it is true, remained largely, outside of the trade 
unions, even in engineering, They continued to have a high rate of 
absenteeism. Many commentators were struck by the women's apparent 
passivity and pliability as workers. Yet a closer examination of the 
situation in the industry reveals a rather more complex and contradictory 
situation than these bare facts might seem to suggest. 
On an individual level, the women were generally quite capable of 
responding effectively to supervisory badgering and threats. One 
girl, for example, laughed at the manager of an engineering firm when 
he told her that she would be sent to prison if her 'indiscipline' 
continued. 
2 But it is in the collective sense that women's activity 
'Minister to Lady Allen, ? June, 1942. 
A. Calder!. OP-cit., p. 463. 
! 25 
was most interesting in the second half of the war, when they erupted 
into large-scale strikes over wages. A Ministry of Labour memorandum 
of 1943 complained that: 
"Disputes relating exclusively to the wages of women 
and girls are proportionately more prone to result 
in strike action than where men are concerned. This 
no doubt reflects the lower degree of organisation 
amongst women or less experience of trade unionism 
and factory discipline. " I 
one Coventry ex-shop steward interviewed recalled his amazement and 
embarrassment when a foreman asked what his women members were doing 
putting their coats ons 
"I was in the office, and these girls were putting 
their coats on - they were going home, so the foreman 
asked me what was going on. But I didn't even know, 
because they hadn't told me mate, they were pissing 
off home. They thought this was what trade unionists 
did, if you didn't get what you wanted, you stopped 
work". 2 
Obviously, this was what the Ministry of Labour was referring to when 
it lamented women's lack of 'factory discipline'. From mid-1943 
to the spring of 1944, there were three major strikes involving womens 
the Rolls-Royce Hillington disputes of August and November 1943, and 
the Barr and Stroud strike of February 1944. All of these stoppages 
involved a majority of women, and they were also the most important 
stoppages of the war prior to the apprentices' strike of 1944" Indeed, 
the Scottish Conciliation Officer thought that the Barr and Stroud 
strike might spread to the rest of Britain. 
3 In addition, the women 
1LAB 10/281. H. A. Bnmersons 'Causes of Industrial Unrest', 
3 Novemberg 1943. 
2Interview 
with Bill Wellings, 18 June, 1973. 
3LAB 10/445.14 January, 1944. 
/, jo 
involved in the Barrow dispute of 1943, the Swan Hunter dispute of the 
same year, and a number of smaller stoppages in Coventry were picked out 
by numerous commentators as being especially militant in prosecuting 
their strikes. 
I 
Clearly, there is a considerable gap here between the Mass 
Observation findings and the behaviour of women workers over the next 
eighteen months or so. Women, and especially married women, had always 
had a high rate of absenteeism, but their highly individualised response 
was supplemented by a more collective one in the latter years of the 
war. The trend should not be exaggerated; it was limited to more or 
less isolated explosions of militancy which rarely occurred twice in 
the same place. Nevertheless, it is important to look into the causes 
of this unrest. 
Firstly, and in fairness to Mass Observation, the women who had 
entered industry prior to their survey had done so voluntarily. MO 
themselves thought that it was likely that young women conscripted 
into the war industries would respond in a more rebellious manner 
than their sisters who were already working of their own free will. 
2 
SA, March, 1943. 
Ibid., October, mid-October, November, mid-November 1943. 
There is also some evidence to suggest considerable militancy 
among women aircraft workers in the London area. The London 
Conciliation Officer reported difficulties at two factories in 
January 1942; at one, the problem was caused by a 'very bad 
choice' of women stewards, whilst at the other the dismissal of 
34 women, including the senior woman steward, was giving rise to 
difficulties. By the summer of 1942, he was reporting the 
beginnings of agitation throughout the London area over women's 
rates of pay. (LAB 10358,10 January, 25 July, 1942). 
Nass Observations People In Production, pp. 118,138. 
/ ?/ 
:1 
This analysis was confirmed by the 1943 survey of women's attitudes, 
which found that two-thirds of the women over thirty-five said that 
they had entered war industry out of 'Duty to the Country', compared 
to one sixth of women under thirty-five. There was a slightly higher 
proportion of conscripts among the younger women, who had been the 
first to be conscripted, but by September 1943, women up to the age of 
forty-four had been registered for employment. 
1 It seems likely that 
there was also another factor at work, and that women who had reached 
adolescence in the post-First World War years had rather different 
attitudes to their country than the older women. 
2 Wages were the 
main motive given by younger women for entering industry, and, in this 
respect, they had ample cause for complaint. They were paid considerably 
less than men for training in the Government Training Centress during 
training, they received 22/64. less than men over twenty, and, after 
passing their proficiency tests, they earned 28/6d. less than their 
male counterparts. 3 
Once inside the factories, women found that the wages gap persisted 
and in some cases widened even further. Women's earnings in relation 
z, 
to those of men are given in table X' . In . table, , we can 
see that women's earnings as a proportion of men's improved considerably 
during the war period, but that they remained at less than two-thirds 
of the male level. This was despite the official Temporary Relaxation 
Agreement concluded at the beginning of the war, which provided that 
women replacing men should receive the full male rate. 
I H. H. D. Parker, o . cit. l p. 491. 
2G. Thomas, o . cit., p. 12. 
31bid. 
l p. 100. 
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Earnings and the application of the Relaxation Agreement were 
major women's grievances, then. But the Mass Observation survey showed 
that the main cause for complaint amongst women was not the wages 
problem, but working arrangements, which was literally twice as 
important to them as any other single issue. 
1 Lavatory and washing 
facilities, hours of work, canteen facilities, day nurseries for their 
children, were the main issues that concerned them. The most important 
problem of this type was the matter of release from work to go shopping. 
Wartime hours of work meant that women were unable to shop, and many 
managements (especially in Coventry) were unwilling to allow them any 
time off for this purpose. 
2 
All these grievances contributed to discontent, but there were 
additional reasons for the women's particular brand of militancy. 
Often (as at Barr and Stroud's and in the Coventry factories) only a 
minority of them were trade union members. They tended, therefore, to 
slip well behind the better-organised male-dominated sections, to 
'explode' into unpredictable strikes, to ignore the advice of trade 
union officials and sometimes even of shop stewards, and then to 
return to work as unpredictably as they had left it. This pattern 
of women's militancy will be investigated and documented more 
thoroughly in the local studies. Here, only the general national 
background in terms of trade union membership need be outlined. The 
broad outline of the number of women employed and the percentage of 
these who were members of their respective unions throughout our period 
1Mass Observations People in Production, p. 109. 
2Ibid., 
p. 183. 
25.4 
is given for the engineering industry in table 27 . During 1943 
alone, following the decision of the AEU to admit women, 132,010 
women joined that union, although the total women's membership fell off 
during 1944, as table 26 shows. 
' 
The former table seriously underestimates the density of women's 
trade union membership in the engineering industries because it omits 
the general unions. The main problem here is that it is impossible 
to establish, even in the most general terms, what proportion of the 
female membership of these unions was employed in the engineering 
industry. It is certain that many of these women members did work in 
this sector, however. All that can be done is to quote the global 
female membership totals of these unions. By 1942, the T&GWU and the 
DiUGMW had over 500,000 women members. 
2 
By the end of 1943, the T&GWU 
alone had 306,707 women members. 
3 
J. B. Jefferyss op. cit., p. 260. 
2S. T. LeYenhak, op. cit., p. 31. 
An additional problem here is posed by the high rate of membership 
turnover in the general unions. The average annual turnover 
rate in the TGWU for the period 1936-47 inclusive was 33% . 
(V. L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 242. ) 
31nternational Labour Organisations The War and Women's Employment 
(Montreal, 1946), P. 90. 
By the end of 1945, the NUGMW had 45,000 women members, compared 
to only 19,000 at the end of 1944 (B. Drake: 'Women in Trade 
Unions', in G. D. U. Cole (ed. ) Trade Unionism Today (1945), P. 249)" 
By the beginning of 1944, the 11U had a female membership of 
9,077, of which the biggest single section worked in the ROFs. ' 
They had created a special women's section at the end of 1943. 
(Electrical Trades Journal, January 1944). 
/, ý4 
2. s 
Table is Male and Female Membership of the AEU, 1943-65. 
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A realistic estimate of the trade union density amongst women workers 
27 
would therefore be considerably higher than table suggests. Even 
if we double the figure in this table, however, we still only arrive 
at a proportion of less than one quarter of the female workforce being 
in their trade union at the peak of organisation. It is also likely 
that the comparison with the male density remains at about the same 
as given in the table, since the general union figures'are not included 
in calculating their totals. 
One of the major obstacles (besides craftist male hostility) to 
the recruitment of women into the trade unions was the fact that the 
women themselves regarded their status as industrial workers as 
strictly temporary. They had 'come to do their bit' because of the 
war emergency, to help support themselves whilst their husbands were 
in the services, or, more commonly, because they had to. Although 
the war brought many women into the factories, it did not fundamentally 
change the accepted view of women's role in society in the respect 
that their place was still thought of as being in the home. With the 
return of the servicemen, their domestic services would again be 
required. 
It is against this background that we should see women's expressions 
of preference as to whether or not they would like to work after the 
war. Wartime surveys tended to ask them what they would like to do 
after the war, rather than what they thought they would have to do. 
Nevertheless, the results of a Ministry of Information survey carried 
out in 1943 give some insights into their preferences. The engineering 
industry had the highest proportion of women workers who wanted to stay 
on at work after the war, with 44%. On the other hand, engineering 
had easily the highest proportion of women who wanted to leave the 
i ý9 
industry they were at present employed in, with 26f of those who wished 
to continue work wanting to leave engineering. 
1 By combining these 
two figures, we can see that over two-thirds of the women employed 
in engineering wanted to leave at the end of the war. This fact is 
crucial when the matter of redundancies at the end of the war is 
considered; two thirds of the women, who were normally the first to 
be sacked, did not wish to keep their jobs even to the extent of 
saying that they did in response to a questionnaire. It also helps 
us to explain how it was that women's militancy reached a peak in 
1943, but did not spread into the summer of 1944, because redundancy, 
and the fear of redundancy, was already weakening their bargaining 
position before -it seriously affected the men. 1944 saw the largest 
number of days lost through strikes in engineering of any of the war 
years, yet there were no equivalents to the strikes in which women 
had played'such a major role during the previous year. 
When considering women from the point of view of militancy 
there is a danger that a rather distorted impression of their conscious- 
ness is implied. The vast majority of women workers did not strike 
during the war; more of them thought their job important than their 
male equivalents; more of them were satisfied with wage rates; less 
of them were critical of employers' profits; less of them cared about 
a say in management; less of them complained about long hours. 
2 This 
was the other, numerically more important (and traditionally more 
strongly emphasised) aspect of women workers' understanding. It is 
1114F 1/289. 'Survey on Attitudes of Women to post-War F}nployment'. 
2Mass Observations People in Production, p. 38. 
i 7S 
against this background that the militant strikes occurred, when it 
seems as if the act of striking transformed the women's attitude. 
Unfortunately, there are a number of obstacles to the study of 
women in this period, not least of which is the absence of previous 
historical studies. Perhaps the most significant of these is the fact 
that the Ministry of Labour's Disputes Books made no distinction 
between male and female strikers. It is therefore impossible to 
quantify the proportions of strikers by sex, and literary evidence has 
instead to be relied upon. Any attempt to look at women's history in 
this period has to be especially tentative until more work is done. 
Some of the questions raised in this section will be taken up in the 
local studies as a small contribution to this process which will 
hopefully be taken further. 
*ý* 
To summarise the arguments of the chapter. The trade unions, and 
the shop stewards along with them, achieved a wider and deeper coverage 
in the engineering factories during the war. The workers, and the 
stewards with them, became increasingly confident in their relations 
with managements. This led, on the one hand, to the shop stewards 
taking on a whole range of new functions, ands on the other, to a steady 
upward trend in the strike rate. Two of the most strike-prone groups 
were largely unionised groups of workers with their own particularly 
pressing problemss apprentices and women. Women particularly, with their 
lack of trade union traditions, constituted a group which remained 
largely untouched by the shop stewards' movement despite the increased 
trade union membership of the war years. This was one reason for their 
tendency to combine generalised passivity with volatile aggression 
when provoked beyond endurance. 
*ý* 
The Communist Party in 
the Engineering Industry (2) 1939-1946. 
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ýt -wa3 In a sense fortunate for the L'P that the political --7ood ?n 3r? ý; 31'II 
was one of expectancy rather than jingoism Burin- the first few months 
of war, because it afforded the Political Bureau a breathing space to 
carry on an intense debate on the nature of, the war. The story of these 
discussions has been told in several places, and we need not enter the 
realms of detail here. SV. fice it to say that Harry Pollitt and John 
Campbell misread the Coiintern's. strategy, and argued that the war was 
an anti-fascist one. Palme Dutt and William Rust argued strongly against. 
this point of view, claiming that it was an imperialist war. After nine days 
of wrangling, with the Comintern supporting Palme Dutt and Rust, Pollitt 
and Campbell had to admit defeat and its corollary in such a serious matter, 
Party discipline. Both were removed from the Political Bureau. 
There can be no doubt 'that the CP could. not have taken a stand 
more certain to alienate them from public opinion, especially during the 
desperate months of , -e sum, -,. er of 1940. _he Ira. iatic satbac 
ks suffered 
by the British Ex-Peditior_ary Force were the occasion for the new 
feeling of desperation, tiýhich reached a climax in tha last week o Duns 
as the : rithdrawal from Dunkirk was carried out. 
The apparently 'pro-Nazi' appearance of. the CP's politics 
led to tremendous popular hostility. Douglas Hyde described the situation: 
, ý. 
1 
Accounts of these events are given by J. Degras, on. ct., - 
vol. 3, p. 44';, H. Pellinil, on. cit., pp. 110-113, D. Hyde, on. cit., 
p. 70. H. Palcie Dutt disagreed with Hyde's version of the 
events in a review of the latter's book published in the 
Daily 'gorker, March 1,1951, and I have followed Dutt here. 
Dutt's account, which stresses the length and sharpness of 
the discussion, and the fact that the Central Committee 
itself had riot finalised any theses on the war prior to 
the arrival of the Comintern's emi: sary, is'preferable both 
because Dutt was present at the proceedings(which Hyde was 
. not), and 
because it is consonant with Pelling's version. 
/¢/ 
"Sellers of-the Daily Worker, women as well as 
nen, were spat upon and assaulted in the streets; 
canvassinG, they had door;, slammed in their faces, 
oven chamber pots emptied on their heads from upstairs- 
windowwrs. Often, out selling, papers or pamphlets, we 
would have housewives shouting vituperations at us 
until. we disappeared from their street. " 1 
21ic; UP'S industrial member chip felt the force of a managerial offensive 
inside the factor3. en almost as st. ronCty as their comrades outcide the 
Cates felt the force of popular hosti. lity. Generally speaking, employers 
took advantage of the prevailing political wind to get rid of known 
'troub'! ecnwl-ers', as tie shall see in the local studies. Shop stewards were 
alto interned under Defence Regulation 18B. One such steward, Nason, a 
Communist froz. i Sheffield, had his case vi ; ourously(but unsuccessfully) 
taken tip by the Pew 1'ropellorz 
Ho; revor, manaüements and Government officials alike were not 
unduly worried by Communist activities on the shop floor. In general, the 
feelin& seems to have been that the CP was ruled 'out of court'(as the 
Scottioh Conciliation Officer put it)b;; its politics3The only type of 
activity that certainly did cause some concern at this stage was 
sabata, je. A series of documents from the full-time security officer at 
Woolwich Arsenal shows this clearly. Scven(named) Communists working there 
had been suspected of putting sand in grinding machines and other acts 
of sabotage. T'hree were dismissed instantly and the other four were 
earriarked for a similar fate; The official concerned was not especially 
worried, on the other hand, because: 
'D. Fiyäe, oT). cit " qp971 . 
2nW, 3,7,12,22 Auüust, 1940. NP, November 1940. 
'SLAB 10/360.2 December 1939. 
4AVIA 
22/1030-Note mmrked'July 1940', and document 
marked '21 June, 1940'. 
7 
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"At present we have a good deal of information 
to suggest that they are hanging themselves by 
pursuing a policy that the bulk of the working 
people abominate. "1 
Three wee'. s later, he was confirmed in his opinion, because the skilled 
shop stewards' committee informed him that they were themselves in favour 
of the men's dismissal, and that in fact: 
"... '. if they are not removed it may well be that 
their colleagues will take the law into their own 
hands. "2 
All of the men concerned were sacked. We shall probably never know whether 
or not the charge of sabotage was a just one, but it clearly arose in the 
context of a'good deal of hostility to the Communists themselves both on 
the part of management and on the part of the shop stewards themselves*. 
* 
How were the New propellor and the shop stewards associated 
with it relating to the main problems confronting engineering workers? 
Their response was on two levels: firstly, to restructure the organisation 
of their work, in the unions, and secondly, to offer new policies to meet 
the chan3ed cicumstances. 
Of course, the two could not be entirely disentangled, since 
new policies entailed new tactics. The central political consideration 
was the position of the trade union officials, which J. R. Campbell 
outlined in Labour Monthly: 
"One-can advance to fascism on the basis of 
regimenting the working class for the carrying out 
of the imperialist war to the bitter end. This 
is the policy that the General Council of the 
British Trade Union Congress is helping to 
carry out. "3 
Wal Aannington, writing in the same journal come months later made a 
similar point and then drew the conclusion: 
"The more-the trade union leadership forsakes the 
class strua-le, the more does the responsiblitp 
1 AVIA 22/1030928 IlSay, 1940. 
2lbid., 21 June, 1940. 
-ýL*M, Qctober 1940. 
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for leadership fall upon the shop stewards and 
factory committees. " 1 
In these articles, and in Hannington's Industrial History in Wartime, 
published in the summer of 1940, Campbell and Hannington drew on the 
experience of the First World War to illustrate the need for strong 
shop steward organisation linked up on ä district basis. Both argued 
that the quarterly meetings of shop stewards held under rule in the AEU 
were not enough, and that there was a need for regular meetings of all 
stewards in every district, as well as leaflets and pamphlets on 
district problems. All this was not, on the other hand, to distract 
Party members from being active in the trade union branches and on 
District Committees. Campbell and Hannington had set difficult tasks, 
but the members had already risen to them, (as the War Cabinet noted 
with disquiet), increasing their influence on all the major AEU District 
Committees. 2 
Nevertheless, the new interpretation of the role of the officials 
offered by the CP's leadership was not reflected in the pages of the 
New Propellor. Partly, no doubt, because of the extreme difficulty 
of agitating for strikes on the shop floor at that time, the New 
Propellor did not revive the idea of strike action independent of the 
1 LM, February 1941, p. 
2CAB 
98.18. Note by the Lord President of the Councils 'CPGB: 
An Estimate of the Effect of the Present Campaign and Recommendations 
for Action... ' (n. d. ) This document noted that Communist 
representation on district committees was growing, that this 
was undermining the position of the union officials, "and the help 
they can give the Government will correspondingly diminish". 
See also the front page article in the Daily Worker for 6 July, 
1940, stating that the Birmingham, Manchester and London AEU 
district committees had all passed resolutions calling for the 
removal of the '24en of Munich'. 
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officials which it had abandoned in 1937. This stance was consonant 
with feeling amongst the mass of workers, and allowed the circulation 
of the paper to expand considerably despite the CP's political isolation 
outside of industry. 
Another important reason for the growth of Communist influence 
on the District Committees noted above was the fact that branch life 
had been hard hit by the effects of war. Prodigious overtime, bombing, 
the blackout and the difficulty of transport all contributed to a 
lower average attendance at branch meetings. 
1 
Only the determined 
were willing to attend come what may. 
However, it would be manifestly unfair to put the expansion of 
the CP on trade union bodies down simply to their dogged attendance 
at branch meetings. The New Propellor also played an important part 
in this process. In December 1939, the paper's circulation was 31,000 
(on a sale or return basis), but in April 1940, it reported receipts 
of over £825.2 These receipts must have included donations from-a 
number of sources other than sales, since the paper still cost only 
a penny, and a circulation of nearly 200,000 would have been needed for 
the readers to have accounted for it. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
both circulation and finances were in a very healthy state by pre-war 
standards. In February 1940, the New Propellor expanded to take in the 
whole of the engineering and shipbuilding industry, a decision formalised 
by a delegate conference of April 1940, attended by 283 stewards from 
107 works. The ASSrKC, renamed 
itself the Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards National 
P. Kerrigan, loc. cit. 
-NPD December 1939, April 1940. 
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Council (E&ATSSNC). ' 
The New Propellor and the Communist stewards continued to make 
a considerable contribution to the shop stewards' movement, largely 
through their policies on and activities around ARP. The shop stewards 
took up the demands suggested in a number of CP pamphlets, 
2 
and 
pressed for precautions to be taken against air-raids. In July, 
stewards "at an important engineering establishment in the West of 
Scotland" (probably Beardmore's Parkhead Forge) complained to the 
management that sirens were not being sounded until bombs were actually 
being dropped. They added that the matter would be reported to the 
authorities and to their respective trade union district committees. 
3 
In September, stewards at a South East London factory advised their 
members to take shelter as soon as sirens were sounded and not when told 
4 to by the spotters. These are just two examples of what was a widespread 
reaction to air-raids: in the November 1940 issue of the New Propellor, 
there were seven similar reports from factories all over the country. 
5 
There can be little doubt that the CP, who had been in the fore- 
front of the movement for better ARP from the start (they opposed 
the Anderson shelters, and led Londoners into the Tube stations instead), 
INP, April, May 1940. 
2See, 
for example: ARP Safety Now (id. ) 10,000 of these were 
printed in August 1940. Bombers Over London and A Programme of 
Protection for Glasgow (Id. 25,000 of these were printed in 
October 1940.1I S. 
3Dw, 22 July, 1940. 
41bid., 16 September, 1940. 
SNP, Plovernber 1940. 
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were setting the pace through the New Propellor. Of course, they were 
swimming with the stream; it is difficult to imagine any shop steward 
being indifferent as to the physical safety of his members. At the 
same time, however, the CP's attitude on this and similar questions 
helped shop stewards as a body to respond. By formulating a policy 
and pursuing it in an organised and determined way, they helped the 
mainstream of the movement. 
In taking up the question of ARP especially with respect to the 
aircraft factories, the shop stewards were responding to what was 
recognised by Beaverbrook as a major problem. They were, therefore, 
able to give Beaverbrook some support in his battle with Sir Archibald 
Sinclair to secure more protection for their Factories. The Minister 
of Aircraft Production first took the matter up with Sinclair immed- 
iately after his appointment, during May and June of 1940, but admitted 
himself 'defeated' by the end of June. 
' 
He continued to agitate around 
this for the rest of his period of office at the MAP,, pointing out how 
these factories were extremely susceptible to air attack and how 
important they were to the war effort. 
2 He seized on any opportunity 
to force the problem home, and the shop stewards' complaints provided 
him with additional arguments. In January 1941, for example, he 
relayed the complaints of the stewards at Rolls-Royce Derby to Sinclair, 
adding: 
"It will be necessary for me to give an answer... 
to these 3,000 employees. I must let them 
know what the Air Ministry have to say about it. "3 
(Beaverbrook D/94), 
Beaverbrook to Sinclair, 28 June, 1 August 1940. Sinclair to 
Beaverbrook, 13 June 1940. 
2(Beaverbrook D/94), 
'Beaverbrook to Sinclair, 9t 10 October, 20,26 November, 6,8 
December., 
3(Beaverbrook D/94), 
Beaverbrook to Sinclair, 5 January 1941., 
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It is difficult to measure precisely how much success Beaverbrook had 
in tackling this undoubtedly serious problem. Some extra protection 
was provided, but in April 1941, he drafted and then cancelled a 
memorandum to the War Cabinet complaining bitterlys 
"... (in obtaining) the modest degree of defence 
asked for we have been subjected to constant 
delays and endless disappointments. " 1 
Whether Beaverbrook did not present his paper for tactical reasons or 
because he was uncertain of his ground is not clear, but some progress 
had been made in increasing factory defences. 
2 In this progress, the 
shop stewards had undoubtedly played their part in strengthening the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production's hand in its discussions with the 
Air Ministry. 
ý** 
The CP had made appreciable progress in the engineering industry 
during the 'Capitalist War' period. Finding themselves in a difficult 
position on the shop floor through victimisation, they began to take 
up issues like ARP which offered a route towards broader support, whilst 
extending their influence on all the major District Committees. Some 
explanations of how they were able to do this have already been offered, 
but there is another deeper and more fundamental level of explanation 
relating to their politics generally. 
1(Beaverbrook D/94), 
Memo of 14 April, 1941. 
2(Beaverbrook D/94), 
'Beaverbrook noted, for example, that the Lockheed factory at 
Leamington had been given additional protection in December 1940. 
(Note of 6 December, 1940) 
/4C- 
The Security Officer at the Woolwich Arsenal quoted earlier 
thought that the Communists were 'hanging themselves' by putting, 
the 'Capitalist War' views and he may have been right in July 1940. 
But around that time, there seems to have been something of a trimming 
of CP sails to the prevailing wind of popular opinion. The shift is 
perhaps best shown by juxtaposing two quotations from the Daily Worker. 
The first is from the edition of October 4th, 1939: 
"We are against the continuance of the War. We 
demand that negotiations be immediately opened 
for the establishment of peace in Europe. " I 
The editorial of July 39 1940 had a slightly different emphasis: 
"The interests of the people require the speediest 
ending of the war, not by surrender to Fascism at 
home and abroad, but by the strength of a free 
people organising their own defence and leading the 
way to peace and unity with the working people of 
all countries. " 2 
The demand was no longer for an immediate peace, and the need for 
workers to organise their own defence was positively stressed. The 
majority of workers thought that this was exactly what they were doing, 
through the Local Defence Volunteers, so where was the difference? 
After the suppression of the Daily Worker and the withdrawal from 
Greece, Douglas Hyde has suggested that this tendency went further as, 
unofficially and secretly, it was suggested in Party circles that the 
war was now 'just' in parts. 
3 
The Daily Worker took great care to position its political line 
so that it always fell in a narrow area of overlap between working 
1DW, 4 October, 1940. 
2Ibid., 
3 July, 1940. 
3D. Kyde, o . cit. 9 p. 111. 
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class consciousness and the Comintern line. Thus, it was frequently 
pointed out by Jack Owen in his column 'A Worker's Notebook' that 
large profits were being made by munitions firms: 
I 
no moral was drawn, 
so the fact could appear as all things to all men. To the CPer, it 
was additional evidence that the war was being fought for profit, but 
to most people it simply meant that an Excess Profits Tax was indeed 
necessary. It appears that this variety of studied ambiguity character- 
ised Communist politics as they were put into practice. Five important 
Communist rallies were held in London immediately after Dunkirk under 
the slogans: 
"Bring the Guilty to Account. 
Down With the Men of Munich: 
Save the People of Britain: " 2 
Those who had a mind to could agree with these demands without 
disagreeing fundamentally with Churchill and his colleagues. 
The War Cabinet itself noted a similar reticence on the part of 
ordinary CPers. The Home Office, in a memorandum to the Cabinet of 
July 1940, informed the latter thats 
"Although the CP is opposed to the War, its 
members are normally careful to refrain at the 
present time from Anti-War propaganda. " 3 
The memorandum went on to state that there was "no evidence" to 
I 
suggest that the CP was organising to "cause trouble" in industry. 
4 
As the Home Office realised, the CP was groping towards making 
its politics as acceptable as possible to the majority of people, 
who were in favour of the war. Before long, they found a useful 
organisational vehicle, the People's Convention. 
1See for example, DW, June 8,1940. 
2DWI 4 July, 1940. 
3CAB 98.18. Home Office memo. of 27 July, 1940. 
41bid. 
I 
In July 1940, a 'People's Vigilance Committee' had been set up by 
the CP, centring its demands on a 'people's peace' and a 'truly 
representative government'. The Committee was headed by D. N. Pritt, 
the MP and lawyer who had recently been expelled from the Labour 
Party for his attitude to the war. The Vigilance Committee was the 
forerunner of the People's Convention, for which a campaign began to 
develop in September. 1 The Convention was conceived of as an ongoing 
movement, organised through regional 'Conventions', and culminating 
in a National Convention (originally to be held in October, but 
postponed to January 1941 because of the success of the campaign). In 
fact, however, the Convention only had one national meeting, which 
took place in three halls in London on January 12th, 1941.2 There 
were 2,324 delegates, 'representing' 1,200,000 people, the largest 
single body of trade unionists being drawn from the aircraft factories. 
3 
The New Propellor was harnessed to draw trade unionists into the 
Convention movement, The September edition printed the call from the 
People's Vigilance Committee for the Convention, with a number of 
signatures from leading trade unionists in the aircraft industry. 
4 
The November editorial stressed the support that the Convention was 
attracting from the shop stewards, 
5 
and in December, the, paper voiced 
the Shop Stewards' National Co inEj1+ ;, concerns 
1DW, 
14 September, 1940. 
2Ibid., 18 September, 1940. 
o !> 
3Maw Observation file 543, The People's Convention (13 January, 1941). 
'11P, September 1940. 
51bid., November 1940. 
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"... that every factory will not only send 
delegates to the Convention but will also consult 
with their members in the respective factories and 
departments on the six points to be discussed at 
the Convention". I 
It later became apparent that some shop stewards had not heeded this 
sound advice, and had come without the full consent of their members. 
The Convention was a typically 'Popular Front' operation, in 
that it drew support from a large number of personalities, many of 
whom were not in full agreement with the programme. George Orwell 
quoted the 'Red' Dean of Canterbury, who wrote in a private letters 
"I want you to understand that I am wholeheartedly 
for winning the war, and that I believe Wins ton 
Churchill to be the only possible leader for us 
until the war is over (or words to that effect)". 2 
Orwell added that the Dean "nevertheless supported the People's 
Convention. It appears that there are thousands like this. " Klass 
Observers mingling with the crowds confirmed his view: they reported 
that some delegates even remarked that it was 'a pity it was so left 
wing'. 
3 
Despite the broad basis of the People's Convention's support, 
and its limited success as a 'Popular Front' operation, it was less 
of a success as far as some of the CP shop stewards were concerned. 
The largest single group of workers amongst the two million or so 
supposedly represented at the Convention were aircraft workers. 
Probably because they feared that the programme of the Convention 
would not meet with the approval of their members, some shop stewards 
1NP, December 1940- 
2 S. Orwell and I. Angus, op. cit., pp. 381-2. 
3A. 
Calder, o . cit., p. 283. 
1 C. I; 
ignored the New Propellor's advice and attended the meeting without 
previously making it plain to the shop floor workers precisely what 
they intended to do. At Napiers in London, one of the CP's 'show- 
piece' factories, two thousand workers repudiated the delegates who 
had attended in their name. They claimed that they had not elected 
them, nor had they given permission to the shop committees to do so. 
Similarly at De Havillands Edgware, four hundred workers repudiated 
their 'delegates'. 1 The stewards involved must have sorely regretted 
their mistake; there was already (as the Cabinet noted), "... great 
activity in trade union circles in dealing with delegates to the 
'People's Conventiorp. Far from helping them, the Convention had 2 
helped only to erect a barrier between some stewards and their 
members. Yet another blow, the suppression of the Daily Worker, was 
soon to follow. 
Why did the Government suppress the Daily Worker? Herbert Morrison 
expressed the view that the 'main objection' to the paper was the fact 
that it was identified with the 'Imperialist War' line because the 
CPGB was affiliated to the Comintern. 
3 Since the latter was assumed 
to have a revolutionary defeatist line, the CPGB was guilty by 
association. In general, the War Cabinet Committee on Communist. 
Activities, meeting for the first time a few days after the suppression 
of the Daily Worker, was inclined to accept the verdict of a Home 
Office memorandum of July 1940 which they had before them, which 
1Workers' 
International News, February 1941. 
2CAB 
98.18. Production Executive memo., 29 January, 1941. 
3CAB 
98.18.20 January, 1941. 
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concluded that: 
"Although the CP is opposed to the War, its 
members are normally careful to refrain at the 
-present time from Anti-War propaganda". I 
Bevin, although he was at pains to point out that he realised the 
strength of the CP in the aircraft industry, said that he was 'not 
impressed by allegations of Communist activity in industry'. 
2 The 
atmosphere of the Committee was far from one of alarm at the CP's 
success through the People's Convention, but it was felt that the paper 
played a pernicious role. The reason for the suppression was, the 
chairman stated, that it: 
"... continually tried to create a state of mind 
in which people will refrain from co-operating in 
the war effort and will hinder it. " 3 
It was the generally demoralising effect of the Daily Worker rather 
than the trade union support for the Convention that caused the 
suppression of the paper. For this reason, it was decided to leave 
the hew Propellor untouched. 
4 Further action in the form of detaining 
/ý ý 
more Communist workers under Regulation 18B was also rejected when 
Bevin argued strongly against it. World News and Views was to be 
allowed to oontinue to publish, but the internment of Party intellectuals 
remained a possibility. 
5 
1CAB 98.18. Home Office memo. 2,7, July 1940. 
2lbid., 5 February 1941. 
31bid., 'Note by Chairman', 25 January 1941. 
a 
41'he 
New Propellor had not been suppressed because it was 
"devoted entirely to the exploitation of industrial grievances 
and contained no direct references to the War". (CAB 98.18. 
Memo. by Home Secretary, 17 January, 1941. ) 
ý 
5CAB 98.18.20,25 January, 5 February, 1941. 
The suppression of the Daily Worker was a serious blow for the CP. 
After a few illegal editions, it was forced to close down completely. 
The ban had effects which went beyond the simple fact of depriving the 
CP of its main organ; the party adopted a highly cautious approach. 
Thus, the New Propellor continued to be published, but it was circulated 
in a clandestine manner which necessarily restricted its circulation 
and influence. Moreover, suspicion was immediately aroused about the 
motives of workers who had previously sold a new illegal paper. By 
June 1941, CP membership had slumped to 12,000, compared to 17,756 
in July 1939.1 
Needless to say, the CP did not stop political work altogether, 
and used a number of alternative channels for the dissemination of 
its politics. To help to overcome the lack of a national daily 
newspaper, an agency called Industrial and General Information was 
set up to distribute suitable information to the rest of the press. 
2 
In addition, there were the well-established Party journals, World 
News and Views and Labour Monthly, both of which were used to some 
effect. The former was used as something of an alternative to the 
Daily Worker, in that it conveyed general political analysis to the 
Party members and their periphery. In one respect, it was a little 
inadequate to the task, because it usually had very little of any 
trade union interest. 
1H. Pelling, o . cit. 2 pp. 120,192. 
2Beaverbrook 
toyed with the idea of trying to have IGI suppressed, 
either by direct means or by cutting off its aper su ply, in 
December 1941. (Memo. of 25 December 1941, TAUP 16/, in 
Beaverbrook D/100),. 
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Labour Monthly was useful because it tended to carry rather more 
material of this kind and had a network of discussion circles where it 
could be chewed over. Labour Monthly readers' groups had been set up 
in January 1940. Each group had a maximum of twelve members, and 
collected a fixed minimum each week for the magazine. 
1 By mid-1941, 
there were groups in virtually every part of the country, including 
several in some towns (there were three in Manchester for example). 
2 
Meanwhile, the remnants of the People's Convention crawled on, 
issuing a pamphlet as late as June 1941. In the industrial arena, 
these weapons were supplemented by pamphlets and duplicated bulletins. 
As early as 5th February 1941, the War Cabinet Committee on Communist 
Activities noted the increased distribution of this type of literature. 
As in the months before the suppression of the Daily Worker, 
CP trade unionists were able to achieve rather more than their comrades 
outside the factories. Nevertheless, political work was still 
difficult. On Clydeside, the Ministry of Information was told by its 
informants that the 'extremicts' were generally "very quiet indeed". 
4 
As one ex-CP shop steward put it: 
"It was very hard to get a hearing at all at that 
time, very hard. Everybody thought you were 
fifth columnists, defeatists and suchlike.... 
after the Daily Worker was banned, the police were 
round our houses, standing on the factory gates 
watching you go in... the lot. " 5 
1 Ltd, January 1940. 
2See the complete list of groups in LM, June 1941, p. 291. 
3CAB 98.18.5 February, 1941. See also the references to the 
distribution of a CP district bulletin in the Maltby area. 
(H. Beer to F. S. Leggett, 17 April, 1942 CLAB 10/43),. 
41NF 1/673. "Industrial Situation", 3 April, 1941. 
5Haxold Taylor, 3 May, 1976. 
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J'urie'1941, there were signs that the CP was actually beginning to 
eering industry again. The P: ational 
favour ; "of `A People's Government and a People's Peace' 
1 Meanwhile, 
Committee of the AEU, against the advice of the Executive, voted in 
the"YCL, '-which had played a leading part in the apprentices' strikes 
..,. "i 
of Narch, was finalising its preparations for the first ever national 
... 
meeting of'apprentice delegates to discuss common problems and united 
action. These were considerable achievements given the circumstances, 
and'"went beyond anything which had been done in 1940. 
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Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union at the and of June 1941 
rescued the CP from the isolation of the previous six ionths, because 
it brought about a fundamental chance in the party's view of the nature 
of the war. iTow, the overriding necessity to defend the only socialist 
state against iiazi aggression demanded the most vigourous prosecution 
of the war on the militari and industrial fronts. There was therefore. 
a change in industrial perspectives: strikes had to be opposed, Joint 
Production Committees set up to push 'inefficient' managements, and a 
Stakhanovite enthusiasm for production whipped up on the shop floor. 
The new line dovetailed neatly into popular views about 
the nature of the war. The result was a large growth in Party membership. 
It may be that immediately'after the entry of Russia into the war, there 
was a slight drop in. membership with 'hard liners' leaving, but there 
are no figures specifically for that period. By the end of 1942, there was 
a definite increase i= ; ýý_1ý3arship: CF strength was claimed as 56,000. 
However, this : membership proved difficult to retain. By the end of 1943, 
there were 55,138 members, and .: arch 1945 saw a slump to 45,435.1 
Engineering workers constituted a high proportion of the nemberslip: one 
in three of the delegates to the CP Congresses of 1942 and 1944 worked 
in engineering, and the AMU was easily the best represented union. In 1942, 
there were 260 delegates from the AE'J compared to 142 from its nearest 
rival, the TGWU; in 1944, the AEU provided 193 to the TGWU's, 81.2 
1% 1 H. Pe11in oa. cit., p 192. 
? 
CP: The CP on the '; ay to Win(May 1942)(11/3) Details of 
delegates. 
CP: Victory, Peace, Security(October 1944)(M/S). Details 
of delegates* 
No conParable figures were given for the'1943 Congress. 
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_. nrý t: ýý reaýpaara: Zc'e Of the Jai3ý Torkar in . 3aptemöer 1942 to early 
19! 4+, the Communist paper opposed str i es in a clear and unequivocal 
: ay, but, during 1944, it began to adopt a slightly different attitude. 
ß:: i3 31iý1t shift of emphasis is important because it giv3S U3 an 
in3iLht into the :, ray in which the CP was able to gradually re-establish 
itself as the leader of. industrial militancy after a period in which 
the ärou5s of the extreme 
% left had been able to exercise a good deal 
of influence on strikes. 
By-the beginning of 1944, there was already a change in 
the national political clinate, and Churchill's statement that "This is 
no time to talk about demobilisation" betrayed the way people were 
thinkino. 1 The Communist Party, hesrtened by the news from Teheran that 
the Second Front was about to be o, -)ened, was as much affected by the 
new rood as everyone else; as William Rust wrote in the New Year's Day 
edition of the Daily '. Iorlcer: '".... tae doom of Fascism approache3. OnlY now 
can these words be written with certainty. "it was not long before this 
assessment of the war led to a slight softening of the Daily .; orIor's 
treatment of striite action. 
During the last two months of the year, there were two 
examples of the paper covering stoppages of work without condemning, 
therm or suggesting in any way that there was anything wrong in stopping 
work under the circumstances. At the beginning of November, a demonstration 
against redundancies during working hours at London Nircraft Productions 
was reported, and two days later it was added that the action had been 
3. 
3uccassful. On December 18th, it was reported that ,. 4orkers in all North 
1A. Calder, op. cit., p. 641. 
2D'd, 1 January, 1944. 
3w, 1,3, Novertb er 1944. 
/. )-S 
London sr.. -ineering factories were to stop work from 3 P. M. on the 
following '. dadnasday 
. 
in protest at "the Gover. ant's actions in Grace. 
By the beginning of 1945, the Daily Jorker was reproducing an important 
aröu: aent used by sours strikers: that they were willing to work on : gar 
work, but that managements were bringing in private work and attempting 
to reduce wages and working conditions in the process. These lines were 
followed by strikers at 'umber (Coventry) and A. V. Zoe (Manchester), and 
reproduced in the Worker. 
This slight but discernible shift in the Communist paper's 
-attitude to strikes reflected a slight change in the climate within 
the CP which had important effects on the balance of forces between the 
I 
CP and the extreme laft-wing groups operating amongst shop stewards. 
As we shall see in the local studies, these latter groups were the leaders 
of industrial. nilitancy in the winter of 1943-44: The CP's role had 
been a ne ative one, in that all they could do under the circumstances 
was to argue against ýhe strikes. '. he relaxation in the paper's line 
allowed the CP stewards to shift their own position to at least as 
equal(but probably greater)axtent. They were now in a much better 
position to use their strength in the important battles which were 
soon to be fought on the i3suas of redundancy and erosion of : yartime 
standards in the factories. "This was a key factor in allowing them 
the leeway to manoeuvre in order to regain the initiative from the 
small groups of the extreme left. 
*ii 
1DW, 24,25,31 January; 7 April 1945. 
By tae besinnino of 1945, the Cor-iunist Party as probably stronger than 
it had ever been in the trade unions. Ät the Daily '. or: -. er conference 
held on : ay 12 th of that year, there were delegates from no less than 
twelve trade union executives, thirty-five Trades Councils and twenty- 
seven district conmittees, as well as numerous branches and shop stewards' 
committees. 
b 
As twenty-seven district committees sent dele , ates, and 
the district committee was a body almost exclusively used within the 
union structure of the*ÄEU, we may infer that the main engineering 
union was well represented at this conference. The Communists were 
undoubtedly strong amongst engineering shop stewards by this time. 
Party membership taken as a whole had dropped, it is true, from the 
peak attained at the end of 1943, but it seems unlikely that this 
decline had more than a marginal effect on even the numerical strength 
1 
of the CP shop stewards., '-! any of those who left tended to be the 
newer menbers, and especially wocien, rather than the adult =ale trade 
unionists? The Daily Worker was now firmly Astablishzd as one of 
the main -? a; ers read on the shop floor; one indication of the CP's 
. 
strength among trade union workers was the fact that the Daily : p'or'ker 
had easily the highest proportion of union members as readers that year 
when cocnoared to the other national dailies. A survey showed that 
69% 
of its readership was made. up of this type of worker, which was 24% 
higher than its nearest rival, the Daily Harald3Its industrial circulation 
would therefore have been in the region of 75,000. 
the C? 's strength on the shop floor and in the trade unions 
was indisp;; table and widely accepted by contemporaries, but as the Party 
members t'_h3cselves apprediated, success in Parliamentary political 
1W1. 
Ru4t(°dited and completed by r. Rutt): The Story of 
the Daily ; Iorker(1949), p. 115. 
2See Sharpen Our ': laaoons(1943)for a detailed discussion 
of these nroblens. 
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`h? ^. lain t : ere of this ciapter ray be summarised as being that the 
CP e:: tan: ad its influence in the AETJ fairly steadily from the 
beginnin,; of 1,940 onwards. ihis was despite its unpopular interpretation 
of the nature of the war up intil mid-1941, and its potentially 
unpopular line on strikes after the invasion of the Soviet Union. The 
reasons offered to ex? lain this fact related to the way that Party 
members trimmed their sails to the prevailing political wind in 1940, and 
the way that they used JPCs and. related to strikes in the second-part 
of the war. This considerable influence amongst shop stewards was then 
turned to parliamentary political ends in'the General Election of 1945. 
**** 
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Government Labour Policy and the 
Trade Union Officials during the Kar. 
16 2 
We now turn our attention towards one of the major limiting factors 
on shop steward activity, the trade union officials. With Bevin at 
the Ministry of Labour, Government labour policy was centred on the 
officials. They were taken into Government confidence to an unprece- 
dented extent, but at the same time they were called on to resist any 
elements amongst their membership who might be tempted to use the 
strike weapon. In general, it will be argued, Executives were quite 
satisfied with this arrangement, although local officials sometimes 
tended to be somewhat more sympathetic to strikers. Basically, the 
policy was successful, as the strike rate was kept below the unacceptable 
level reached during the First World War. At the beginning of 1944i 
the situation had changed slightly, as a large strike wave occurred with 
Trotakyists and other extreme left-wingers prominent in their leader- 
ship. Accordingly, a new regulation, Regulation IAA, was passed, further 
strengthening the officials. 
Our concern here is not with Government labour policy in general, but 
only with its effects on the official trade union movement. A. wider 
view has already been taken by Bevin's biographers, who have made it 
unnecessary for us to show, for example, the great improvements brought 
about in a wide range of welfare, advice, recreation and health matters 
for the mass of working people by the Ministry of Labour. The picture 
that emerges of the Ministry's work is therefore inevitably rather one- 
aided. 
r 
Even before the outbreak of war, the Executive Committee of the 
AEU showed itself far more willing than its predecessor of 1914 to 
co-operate in the war effort by allowing the employers to introduce 
dilutees. A week before war was declared, they signed the Agreement 
for the Temporary Relaxation of Existing Customs. The Agreement allowed 
for 'alternative' or 'supplementary' labour to be put onto skilled 
work, so that skilled men could work at alternative jobs within their 
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capacity, and semi-skilled men could be upgraded. 
' At the end of May, 
1940, they went further and signed the Extended F}nployment of Women 
Agreement. This allowed women to perform work previously done by men 
or boys, provided that they received the women's nationally agreed rate 
for a, probationary eight weeks, followed by a rising percentage of the 
men's rate. After a total of thirty-two weeks, they were entitled to 
2 the full men's rate for the particular job. 
Only three days after this second agreement had been concluded, Bevin, 
the first trade union leader in British history to be directly appointed 
to the Cabinet, addressed a specially convened meeting of trade union 
executives to tell them what was required of them by the new Coalition 
Governments 
"I have to ask you virtually to place yourselves 
at the disposal of the state. We are Socialists 
and this is the test of our Socialism... 3 
Ernest Bevin was well-known to the delegates as the General Secretary 
of the Transport and General Workers'' Union, which he had built into 
a huge amalgamation in the inter-war years. Bevin was not only well- 
known, howevers he. was the epitome-of the trade union leadership of 
the period. Starting off-as an SDI revolutionary before the First 
World War, he led the Bristol dockers before becoming the apostle of 
amalgamation in the 1920s, The failure of the General Strike pushed 
him in the: direction of Hondism, and in 1937, he showed himself willing 
to deal vigorously with dissident elements in his union by his handling 
of the busmen's Coronation Strike. Bevin, then, was a trade union 
leader who, like many others of his generation, had abandoned his early 
1 Jefferys, op. cit., p. 352. 
2 Ibid. 9 pp. 352-3. 
A. Bullocks The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 2., Minister of 
Labour, 1940-45 , p. 20. 
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radicalism for a'strictly reformist perspective under what he saw as the 
pressure of reality. His visit to America in the 1930s had shown him 
that capitalism was capable of riding a severe depression, and must 
have reinforced-his earlier espousal of the cause of industrial peace. 
If, at the'one extreme, his philosophy could embrace worker-employer 
co-operation, then it could even more easily include active co-operation 
with the state in a time of dire emergency like May 1940. At the same 
time, Bevin was concerned to establish certain minimum standards as 
the necessary corollary of workers subjecting themselves to state 
direction. At first, in mid-1940, this simply emerged as sound indust- 
rial common sense, when he insisted that there were limits to the en- 
durance of the human machine. Nevertheless, even this point of view 
had to be fought for against the opposition of Beaverbrook, and some 
of his later causes (like the Catering Wages Act) had to be fought 
for even harder. Even in the period immediately after Dunkirk, he did 
not think that industrial conscription was the answer; as he often 
pointed out, he wanted to be a leader and not a dictator. 
As an ex-trade union leader himself, Ernie Bevin clearly recognised 
the crucial role of the trade union officials in securing the active 
co-operation of workers in the war effort, and especially in avoiding 
disputes. His confidence in their wish to remove traditional restrict- 
ions was well placed, as we have seen in the case of the AFJ Executive, 
and it was later confirmed by their attitude to strikes. Bevin's labour 
policy rested upon the officials (and especially the TUC General Council 
and the national executives) from the start. Although Regulation 
IAA of 1944 sought to deal with strike agitators more vigourously, there 
was never any suggestion that the Ministry lost its faith in even local 
officials as a group. 
1 For Bevin's career see, besides Bullock's volumes, F. Williams: 
Ernest Bevin. Portrait of a Great Englishman. (1952). Chapter 19 
deals with Bevin as Minister of Labour. T. EWanss Bevin (1946), 
especially chapter 7. 
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However,. the first priority in May 1940 was to frame the necessary 
Regulations and Bills to give the Minister of Labour power to achieve 
the maximum mobilisation of productive resources in the shortest possible 
time. 'On 22nd May, Attlee introduced a new Emergency Powers Bill to 
replace the Act of the same title passed in September 1939, which had 
specifically precluded industrial conscription. The next day, The Times 
said of the new Act (the Bill had been passed in one day) that: 
"It is doubtful whether such powers have ever been in 
the hands of the Executive since the Seventeenth Century. " I 
Attlee explained to the House of Commons precisely what the Act was 
intended to dos it was to give the Minister of Labour the power to 
direct any person to perform any service required of him. Workers 
could be moved, and the Minister could prescribe wages, hours and 
conditions. Excess Profits Tax was to be at a rate of 100% over the 
pre-war 'standard' years, so that employers could not (formally, at 
least) enjoy larger profits than before the war. In addition, the 
Minister was to control key establishments immediately, with others to 
follow as soon as practicable. 1 
The Emergency Powers Act spawned an important new Regulation immed- 
iately after its own birth, Regulation 58A, which delegated the Minister's 
powers of direction to National Service Officers. Inspectors of Labour 
Supply were to inspect firms to ensure that wages and conditions were 
sufficiently high for workers to be compelled to work for them. But 
Regulation 58A was a 'rush job' itself, reflecting the pressure on 
the legislature of these months, in that it had an explicitly political 
side as well as an industrial one. The Home Secretary was empowered 
to suppress organisations "which have had associations with the enemy 
1 The Times, 23 May, 1940. 
/6.1ý 
2 LR, No. 29, p. 82. 
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or are subject to foreign influence or control and which may be used 
for, purposes prejudicial to the national security. "1 Members of the 
British Union of Fascists, Pacifists and Communists were all to find 
themselves imprisoned eider the Regulation's political clauses. 
,, The Emergency Powers Act and Regulation 58A gave the Minister of 
Labour, and, the Home, Secretary sweeping powers to deal with the pressing 
problems facing them, but they did no more-than create a framework 
(and,, perhaps equally, importantly, an atmosphere) in which Bevin could 
give effect to his distinctive ideas on labour policy. Within the 
space of. six weeks,. the situation was radically altered with the intro- 
duction of-the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order. 
This Order,. promulgated in July 1940, was known by its numbers Order 
1305.; --The-purpose of the Order was basically the prevention of indust- 
rial disputes through the strengthening of existing procedure backed 
up by, compulsory arbitration. If a dispute occurred, then either party 
was entitled to, refer it to,. the Minister of Labour, who would in turn- 
refer it to the existing joint, machinery for settlement by negotiation.. - 
If there was still failure to agree, then the Minister was to refer the 
dispute to the National. Arbitration Tribunal for settlement, which would 
be binding on both parties.., Only . if the Minister, failed , to refer 
the 
dispute to the National Arbitration Tribunal (NAT) within twenty-one 
days was a strike or lockout legal. - Also, the Order empowered the 
Minister to enforce "recognised terms and conditions" for each district 
on-any employer. 
2 
r:, -In practice, as Wal Hannington pointed out, shop stewards came to 
think that the process of giving twenty-one days notice of strike action 
ý Ibid. 9 p. 101. 
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2 Utt No. 40v pp. 4-5. 
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was sufficient to ensure the legality of a strike, but in fact it was 
impossible after the Order for there to be a legal strike in the engin- 
eering industry, which'had a well established disputes procedure. 
The shop stewards' legal interpretation was interesting, but it did 
not derive from any haziness on the part of the Order, which quite 
clearly insisted that procedure had to be followed and strike action 
eschewed. The emphasis of the Order was on the preservation of the 
existing negotiating machinery, but its total impact went rather further 
than this. The Order did not simply prescribe compulsory arbitration 
when procedure was exhausted; it also had the effect indirectly of 
shifting the balance between the shop stewards and the officials within 
the existing procedure. Shop stewards were inclined to think that when 
negotiations had yielded nothing, it was time to take direct action. 
The officials were now able to point out that there were other methods 
available. The Scottish Conciliation Officer, who was an acute observer 
of industrial affairs, noted a tendency on the part of prominent trade 
union officials to argue in favour of compulsory arbitration even before 
the Order was introduced, for precisely this reason. 
2 
At the same time, the Order 1305 had a very positive aspect as far 
as shop stewards and trade unionists generally were concerned. It laid 
down that'all employers scheduled under its terms had to observe the 
normal district conditions of employment. 
3 The 1asential Works order 
of March 1941 continued this tendency to impinge on what had traditionally 
been regarded as managerial prerogatives in the interests of industrial 
peace. 
1Wal Hanningtont The Rights of Engineers (1944), p. 67. Hannington's 
booklet contains a lucid exposition of the legislation produced 
for shop stewards. 
2LAB 10/361; 24 Feb. 1940. 
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The next major piece of'labour legislation was the Essential Works 
Order (EWO). This Order was concerned not so muck with strikes, as 
with the mobility of labour. Workers were no longer allowed to leave 
their employment if they worked ina scheduled establishment (all the 
major engineering and aircraft factories were so scheduled) without 
giving seven days' notice to both the employer and the National Service 
Officer (NSO) stating their reasons. Also, the employer was not allowed 
to sack a worker (although he was allowed to suspend him) without going 
through the same procedure, and unless the worker was guilty of 'serious 
misconduct'. - In addition, the worker might be prosecuted for failing 
to carry out a 'reasonable order' from his employer. In this case, the 
employer had to refer the case to the NSO1 who would then either dismiss 
the case or instruct the worker to carry the order out. If the worker 
still-disagreed, he could appealcto a Local Appeal Board (comprising 
one trade union-official, one employer, and a Ministry chairman). 
Finally, employers had to pay a guaranteed week to their workers (the 
time rate without piece work bonus in engineering) if there was any 
stoppage of work through causes outside the worker's control. 
l 
The Essential Works', Order, taken as a'whole, was much more favourable 
to workers than the, Munitions of War Act had been in-the First World 
War, 'since the Munitions Act had prevented engineers from leaving their 
jobs without'a leaving-certificate from their'employer. 
2 Thus, although 
the Government drew on the experience of the First World War, it did 
not do so uncritically; Bevin's presence alone ensured that. 
Order 1305 and the Essential Works Order constituted the two main 
juridice,, 3,, pillars of Government labour policy, but simply erecting 
ýHanningtong 
op. cit., pp. 67-72.. 
/6Q 
2Jefferyal 
o . cit. v p. 177. 
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them-. was not, of course, enough. They had also to be applied. In any 
cane, . the. important problem of wages. had to be dealt with as it gave 
rise-to difficulties. General rules could be laid down, but they had 
still tobe applied in every particular situation. The burden of 
making weekly'reports"on: the industrial situation in every region of 
Britain fell on the Conciliation Officers of the Ministry of Labour, 
and it was on the, basis'of their reports and-recommendations that central 
decisions were.. taken. The officers were instructed not to interfere 
too much themselves in industrial relations (although this rule was 
broken 'by the Scottish officer), but to ensure that the normal pro- 
cedure -was adhered to. a>. If, but only if, established procedure broke 
down, -he was empowered to intervene to achieve a settlement, and, in 
the case of a' stoppage, of. work, to persuade the trade union officials 
to use their influence with their members to secure a return to work. 
Quite-apart:, from playing an important part in oiling the wheels of the 
Procedure for-, the Avoidance of Disputes (and established machinery in 
other- industries), 'the Conciliation Officers had to decide on whether 
and when to intervene, and, rather-more` importantly, 'on whether and when 
to recommend prosecution of strikers. The-type of decisions they had 
to make necessitated the fullest possible reports, especially with 
regard to"the. 'involvement of-political-militants and the mood and organ- 
isation of the rank and file, and they will therefore be drawn on heavily 
in the local studies. 
The prosecution of strikers was by no means undertaken as a matter 
of course, even though no strike in engineering could be legal. 
2 
, -wl Inman, o . ait. q - pp. 403-6. 
2There 
were three'thousand stoppages in industry between 1941 and 
1943, but prosecutions had been undertaken in less than fifty of 
these. LAB 10/248e"Minister! s°Proposalaofor: Post-War. Development", 
/69 
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A number of considerations had to be taken into account, including the 
politics of: the strike leaders, the possibilities of their being 
supported by the rank and file if prosecuted, and whether, on the other 
hand, the threat of prosecution would be sufficient. 
I The Betteshanger 
colliery strike in January 1942 confirmed that it was impossible to 
enforce the payment of fines on a large number of strikers. If it was 
impossible to enforce the fines, then it only brought the law into 
disrepute to impose them in the first place. At Betteshanger, over one- 
thousand men had struck work over the rate to be paid for working a 
difficult face. The Canterbury bench sentenced the branch chairman to 
two months in prison, and two other men to a month each, whilst the rest 
of the strikers were fined. In February, the imprisoned men were 
released by the intervention of the Home Secretary, but the fines were 
not remitted. Eventually, Bevin decided not to remit the fines, but 
to hold. warrants. for non payment-in abeyance. This episode was often 
held up by Bevin as an object lesson in how not to deal with a strike. 
Very few strikers were actually prosecuteds by January-.. 1944, out of a 
total of one and a quarter million strikers, only five thousand had been 
prosecuted and less than two thousand convicted. 
2 
Bevin's overriding desire not to undermine the position of the trade 
union officials also influenced Government wages policy. In July 1941, 
an important Government White Paper outlined some proposals on the wages 
and prices issues. It took as its point of departure the need to avoid 
the inflation of the First World War, with all its consequences in terms 
of large wage claims. Accordingly, it argued that wages should be kept 
/ 70 
at 'a reasonable level', but that the low paid could be`granted-above-average 
\, 
1Bullock, 
op. cit., p. 267. 
2 Ibid. 
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pay awards'to bring them closer to the average. 
1 
The White Paper's recommendations were important in so far as they 
must have influenced the thinking of important Ministry of Labour offic- 
ials'like the Chairman of the National Arbitration Tribunal and the 
Conciliation Officers, but they could not be expected to moderate 
trade iüiion demands. The only way this could have been done would have 
been by ignoring the existing procedural machinery and establishing a 
periodical and compulsory wage review. Bevin was a strong opponent 
of this point of view, put by the Treasury, The Economist and Sir 
William Beveridge. He argued that the Government might have to back 
down as they had been forced to in the First World War, and that this 
would clearly be detrimental to the Government. The trade union offic- 
ials were'the key to the problem, the crucial 'moderating influence'. 
If they were by-passed, then either their credibility with their members 
would be destroyed, or they would be forced into taking a stiffer 
attitude towards the Government. Both possibilities represented un- 
acceptable risks, the Lord President's Committee decided, and Bevin's 
general point of view was accepted. 
2 
In all matters, Bevin was concerned to ensure that'the authority 
of the officials'was not undermined by the direct intervention of the 
Government in industrial relations. The logical corollary of this 
position was that the trade unions should be consulted on all industrial 
1Statement by His Majesty's Government on Price Stabilisation and 
'Industrial Policy Cmnd. 6249, July 1941)4p 
`2Bullock, op. cit., p. 88ff. 
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matters.. The result of this policy of joint consultation was that-trade 
union officials (especially at national executive level) were drawn into 
Governmental-committees to an extent unprecedented in Britain and 
perhaps in the world. National officials served on a large number of 
advisory and joint committees, including the National Joint Consultative 
Committee (set up toladvise the Minister on legislation after Regulation 
58A had been-passed), the National Production Advisory Council, the 
Factory and-Welfare Advisory Board, -the Hostels Advisory' Committee, the 
Industrial Health Advisory Committee, the Women's Consultative Committee, 
and, "in engineering, ' the Engineering Advisory Panel. Local officials 
sat-on the Local Appeal Boards set up under the Essential Works Order, 
the local-. Labour Supply Committees and Regional Production Committees. 
In all'these areas, ýthe-trade`unions were able to make'their views felt, 
but, at the same 'time, to retain their distinct identity as trade union- 
ists. When they felt that=their independence as trade unionists was-- 
at"all; threatened, they could ensure that the particular-committee'' 
became unworkable: ' They did this in the case of the-Area'Boards, which 
were initially=set up to deal with problems ýof labour supply. ' These 
boards were supposed to consider all questions related to labour supply, 
including dilution and training, but, the officials refused to work in 
them, because the latter would not discuss-dilution or any other question 
which they considered came within the scope of existing negotiating 
machinery. Consequently, these boards were'replaced by"the Labour 
Supply Committees. 2 
Thus, although the trade union officials played a crucial role in 
the Ministry of Labour's policy on matters like strikes and wages, `they 
did not simply become Bevin's lieutenants. All officials, especially 
district and regional' officials, were subject to'the pressure of their 
'Inman, o . cit., PP- 95t 375" Parker, OP-cit., pp. 
121,288,375, 
400,41 
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members as well as that of the Ministry. Finally, of course, there 
was the not unimportant consideration of their own political point of 
view to be taken into account. In any given situation, the attitudes 
of both national and district officials reflected all of these 
influences. It is necessary to investigate their different responses, 
and the limits of these, if we are to understand their attitudes to 
shop stewards. 
This is not the place to describe the evolution of official policy 
in the major engineering unions, nor to relate the course of the annual 
pay claims. In so far as these matters affected the shop stewards, they 
will be dealt with from the stewards' point of view in later chapters. 
It would in any case be impossible to write an adequate account from 
the official point of view without recourse to the Minutes of the AEU 
Executive Committee, which are at present closed to-researchers. 
Consequently, we have to rely on J. B. Jefferys' account in The Storrof 
the Fhgineers (London, 1945) for a general overview of official policy. 
Nevertheless, an assessment of the role of the trade union officials 
during strikes, has to be attempted in order to show the determinants 
of-the officials'-behaviour. - The strike provides us with a useful 
historical laboratory for doing this, both because strikes were well 
documented by the Conciliation Officers and because they magnified the 
existing pressures on officials. 
In the ABU, District Secretaries and Divisional Organisers were 
perhaps rather more responsive to the pressures put on them by the rank 
and file during strikes than were their counterparts in the T& OW 
and NUGMW, who were not elected by the division or district, but appointed 
from headquarters in London. For a similar reason, the National 
Organisers tended to be less responsive than the district officials. 
Thus, most examples of officials below national level supporting or 
condoning strikes refer to AEU district officials. 
/1 
In general,. even these officers did not dare to openly support strikes 
in the face of Executive opposition. Only once did this occur during 
the war, and the specificity of the case explains its occurrence. In 
September 1943, the nine thousand workers at Vickers, Barrow, came out 
on strike for the abolition of the Premium Bonus system. The strikers 
had widespread sympathy on AEU District Committees, but they had also 
to contend with the hostility of the press. The national officials, 
urged on by Bevin, ordered the Barrow District Committee to enforce a 
return to workq but the Committee (which had been suspended in 1937) 
refused to do so, and was suspended by the DC. The District Secretary 
was also suspended for supporting the strike. 
1 The fact was that in 
an isolated community like Barrow, with only one industry of any size, 
and where the District Committee was solidly composed of strikers, the 
District Secretary would have completely destroyed his credibility by 
opposing the strike, even supposing he had wanted to. He was restored 
to his position, along with the District Committee, after the strLke. 
2 
The Barrow situation was a peculiar one. Normally, even District 
Secretaries did not go so far as to openly support strikes; the most 
they did was to-condone them under certain circumstances. Sometimes, 
the District Secretary. could simply slip up by associating-himself 
with a demand that. the employers solidly refused to concede. William 
Fyfe, the Glasgow District Secretary did this in November 1942 when 
he agreed with the shop stewards at the North British Locomotive Co., 
Queen's Park, that they should demand payment for time lost through 
a stay-in strike. The Conciliation Officer implied that Fýfe had not 
1LAB 10/380.3,10,17,24 September, 1943. 
2SA, October, 1943" 
i'`ýJ 
advocated strike action, but that the shop stewards had been encouraged 
by his approval of the demand. He concluded by saying that the District 
Committee had experienced some difficulty in obtaining a resumption of 
work. The Conciliation Officer had, in fact, to initiate a prosecution 
against the strikers' shop steward before the men would return. 
I 
There were occasions, on the other hand, when District Secretaries and 
even Divisional Organisers tacitly supported strikers because of the 
attitude of the firm involved. During July, 1943, for example, one 
of the Manchester officials disclaimed responsibility for a strike 
at Salford Electrical Instruments over a wage claim, because the firm 
had disregarded the established custom of granting a Works Conference 
. without 
insisting on a resumption of work beforehand. 
2 The next week, 
the Divisional Organiser, whom the Conciliation Officer referred to as 
"normally one of the most reasonable and helpful officials in this 
area", still refused to argue for a resumption because of the firm's 
attitude. 
3 
These two examples are representative of the two types of circum- 
stance that led local officials to 'hold the ring' for strikers$ the 
militancy of the workers, or managerial obstinacy. In the first case, 
the workers involved (or at least their steward) made an aggressive 
demand which they were clearly prepared to fight for. The District 
Secretary, probably sensing this militancy, agreed with their demand 
and therefore found it difficult to oppose action to secure it. Even 
1LAB 10/363,19 December, 1942. 
2LAB 10/380,24 July, 1943. 
31bid., 30 July, 1945" 
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in this case, however, it is possible that the District Secretary connived 
at the strike. We have only the outline of events, and what went on 
behind the scenes in such cases is always difficult to establish, 
dealing as we are with an. individual who had reason to obscure his 
motives from the Conciliation Officer. In the second case, it is clear 
that the official or officials involved were not opposing the stoppage 
because they thought the management obstinate. Here again, we have 
to be circumspect, because in fact the company was simply insisting that 
procedure be followed. It may have been the case that Salford Electrical 
Instruments had followed an arrangement that was rather more favourable 
to the trade union side than other firms, but the Divisional Organiser 
was clearly concerned that they should stay out of line. To negotiate 
whilst workers were on strike obviously gave him a-good deal more pur- 
chase in negotiations than he would have had otherwise. In general, 
although workers' militancy and managerial obstinacy were related to 
local officials' attitudes, it also has to be allowed that officials 
could be helped by strikes and that they were not always averse to being 
assisted in this way. 
When we come to consider the attitudes. of=the Executive Committee 
of the AEU, we are in much less ambiguous territory. The Executive was 
far from uncritical of the wartime running of industry at both company 
and Government levels, but it was strongly-opposed to strike action. 
The TGWU Executive was prepared to make a strike official even after 
Order 1305 had been passed, when it supported the strike at Lincoln 
Electrical in October-November 1940 to organise the factory. 
I 
This 
was exceptional for the T&GWU, but no equivalent example was found for 
the AEU Executive. Small strikes (and there were an increasing number 
'NP, November, 1940. 
t? T 
of; these) were normally left to the district officials, and many probably 
never even-reached Executive ears. In most of the important strikes 
of 1943-44, the Executive sent either one of their own number or one 
of. the National Organisers to the strike to call for a return. At 
Barrow, it was Hannington and the DivisionalýOrganiser George Crane; 
1 
at°Rolls-Royce Hillington it was Hannington again, this time with 
Maloney and_Dalgleish`from the AEU and T&GWU'Executives; 
2 
at Barr and 
Stroud's, -itýwas, Armstrong,, a National Organiser. 
3 During the Albion 
Motors strike, on the other hand, the DC did not send an DC member to 
Scotland,: but concentrated onýpressurising the District Committee. 
The. Conciliation officer thought that this was because the election of 
the Scottishrepresentative on the DC was under way, and presumably 
that the'sitting-memb er. would-have his chances of re-election prejudiced. 
Once the election had been concluded, the'Conciliation Officer thought 
thaVthe I7C-would take a more. direct interest in ending the stoppage. 
4 
In the months-immediately following the end of the'-war; 'the DC's attitude 
towards strikes softened somewhat. -During the Humber strike of early 
1946, as. we shall see, the Executive only'intervened when the dispute 
was certain, to spread to the rest of the Coventry district. ' 
The DC's attitudes have so far only been considered with respect to 
strikes, -partly because this is, the aspect which is most-germane to our 
later concerns, and partly because--it has-been impossible to consult 
the Executive Minutes, It would be wrong to leave the subject without 
1SA, October, ' 1943. 
2lbid. 
j November, 1943" 
3WCI December, 1943. 
4LAB 10/445.20 October, 1944. 
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stating that the resultant impression of the EC was certainly not as 
one-sided as might be inferred from isolating this one aspect. Even 
during strikes, as we have shown, the Executive itself was by no means 
over-anxious to be seen to be opposing them; the Divisional and National 
Organisers were sent wherever possible. Shop stewards were often grate- 
ful for the pressure that, the EC could put on Government departments, 
especially with regard to victimisations. At the beginning of 1944, 
Bevin was persuaded to 'deschedule' Desoutters under the EWO, because 
they refused to reinstate-a sacked shop steward. 
' There were many 
other examples of similar pressure being brought to bear by the Executive, 
some of which will be dealt with later. This type of pressure politics, 
and the success which could often result with Bevin at the Ministry of 
Labour, helped the Executive maintain its reputation whilst it opposed 
strikes and negotiated what many members thought were inadequate amounts. 
The AEU Executive and district officials had a distinctively positive 
attitude towards shop stewards when compared with other unions. This 
can be shown quite clearly by looking at the official discussions con- 
ducted by the TUG team negotiating for the introduction of trade union- 
ism at Fords in early 1944. Duri ng 1941, Fords had agreed, under 
pressure from the Ministry of Labour that as their factories were 
scheduled under the EWO, they would deal with trade union officials as 
and when the need arose. This formulation fell far short of full 
trade union organisation, of course, and the unrecognised shop stewards 
at the Dagenham factory were particularly displeased with the arrange- 
ment as it worked in practice. Accordingly, they sat in the works 
manager's office in January 1944 and refused to leave until they had 
been recognised. They were eased out by Vic Feather, who informed them 
r? K 
1NP, 
Januaryp 1944. 
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that the TUC was'in fact negotiating with Fords for a more satisfactory 
arrangement. 
Between January and April 1944, the TUC negotiated with Fordh. 
Understandably, given Fords reputation, the TUC team pointed to the 
benefits which the company would receive from unionisation. As Arthur 
Deakin of the T&GWU pointed out, the tyre manufacturing industry had 
had industrial disturbance 'reduced to a minimum' by unionisation. 
Ford., on the'other hand, wanted more concrete signs that this would 
be the case in their factories. As A. E. Smith, one of their team, said: 
"The biggest fear the company had was that 
shop stewards were not handled in the right 
way by the unions and he had the impression 
that not only were the unions unable to 
handle the shop stewards but that the shop 
stewards themselves were endeavouring to 
gain control and defy the union in every 
direction. " 2 
Feather had a broadly similar view of some of the shop stewards. 
There were, he wrote: 
"Five or six people of whom ,I have had 
personal experience 'who I think are totally 
unsuitable from any point of view, either 
the unions point of view or the management, 
for appointment as shop stewards. Every 
issue they raise is a political one, or 
inspired by political motives, and they 
appear to be satisfied not to get things 
put right but to be able to point to 
further iniquities of Ford's. The remainder 
of the stewards are good chaps, who are 
sound trade unionists, who are themselves of 
the opinion that the proper way to deal with 
Ford's is as trade unionists and not politicans. 
To a certain extent, Ford's are right 
when they suggest that the unions have no 
control over the stewards, and that the 
stewards act in an irresponsible way. 
1LAB 10/443,7,14, January; 4 February, 1944. See also 
TUCs T. 602.57.4. 
2T. 602.57.4. Minutes of Negotiations. 
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Ford's would accept the decision as 
to the suitability of a steward from 
. the general secretary of a union, or 
the National President, or the National 
Executive, or an independent arbitrator, 
or the TUC, but not from the district 
officer appointed by popular vote like 
the AEU officials, and whose political 
affiliations are common to those affilia- 
tions held by the shop stewards to whom 
Ford's object. " 1 
The whole document is extremely interesting in its agreement with 
Ford's as to the undesirability of the political shop stewards, in its 
view of the AEU District Officials and for what it reveals of the TUC's 
general attitudes. However, it is crucial that Feather's views are 
not confused with those of the AEU Executive. Feather himself 
realised that his views would be opposed by some of the TUC team, and 
writing to Walter Citrine, 2 suggested an argument in support of his 
positions 
"Selection of shop stewards is likely to 
be the biggest difficulty, although even from, a union's point of view the suggestion 
of Ford's that there might need to be 
stricter control over the shop stewards 
may not be unhelpful. " 3 
The AEU representatives were not persuaded by Feather's argument. In 
the final agreement drawn up with Ford's, only full-time officials 
were allowed to negotiate with the company. The AEU dissented from the 
majority point of view, pointing out that Ford's neighbour and supplier 
Briggs Bodies had an agreement which included shop stewards. 
4 
IT. 602.57.4. Memo. by V. Feather. 
2Fbr Citrine's attitude to shop stewards (which was less than 
enthusiastic), see two articles he wrote for the Western Mail, 
November 23rd and 26th, 1942. In these articles he argued that 
"shop stewards were usurping executive functions. 
T. 602.57.4., 
Feather to Citrine, nd. _ 
Note2i ým41 I1 DC to TUC, 16 September 1945. 
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In conclusion, the attitude of the AEU Executive towards shop stewards 
was considerably more favourable than that of the rest of the TUC 
negotiating team at Ford's, but this did not mean that they were any 
more prepared to tolerate strikes than any other Executive. They 
opposed all strikes during the war. Their local officials were not so 
comprehensive in their denunciation of strikes; they did not usually 
actually support them, but they were on occasion prepared to adopt an 
attitude of 'benevolent neutrality'. 
*ý 
Generally speaking, the Ministry of Labour was quite well pleased 
with the impact of Order 1305 on industrial relations. Strikes had 
remained relatively small and short, the legislation had usually been 
effective in ensuring that they remained so. A memorandum written by 
Bevin in June 1943, stated that the Order had strengthened the trade 
unions' hands in dealing with 'sporadic troubles'. Bevin had to admit, 
however, that the situation was not as one-sided and simple as this 
statement might suggest. The penal clauses of the Order could sometimes 
put executives in difficult positions; when they pointed out to strikers 
the legal consequences of their action, they could be seen as threaten- 
ing the strikers with imprisonment. Bevin suggested that this could 
lead to a 'Weakening of trade union executive authority and control. '' 
The memorandum did not spell out where this latter tendency had shown 
if/ 
1LAB 10/248- 'Minister's Proposals; June 81 1943. 
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itnolf, but it : item, likely that Bevin had the most strike-prone 
industries (coal ninin and en;; ineerinj) in mind when he qualified his 
original staternent. Only a few months after drafting this memorandum, 
Bevin began to consider taking further steps to strengthen the Trade 
Union i, xecutives. 
During 1944, a neu and important Order in Council was 
0 
prorlulCated, desiGned to shore up the by then slightly suspect edifice 
of the Executives' authority over their memberc, A large wave of stoppages 
in the raining and engineering industries precipitated the new Order. 'T'ho 
wave was of tidal proportions. Between 24th January and 11 th April, 
1,650,000 working days were lost in the coal mining industry. At the 
beginning of April, 12,000 apprentices struck work for nearly a fortnight, 
and 30,000 engineers and shipyard workers were out in Belfast over the 
imprisonment of five shop stewards by the northern Ireland Government. 
This was the largest conCloc; cration of strikes in these two industries 
since the beginning of the war. The mining strikes in particular threatened 
to throws what had always been the most problematic industry for the 
Government, into further productive chaos when the invasion of uropo was 
immincnt.; loreover, there was evidence that Trotskyists were involved in 
leading the disputes. 
These Trotskyists were only organised in tiny Groups, but. 
they directed themselves towards the very centre of the 1-linistry's most 
sensitive area: inthwtrial disputes. The Scottish Conciliation Officer had 
been concerned with their activities since the and of 191E2, rnd he asked 
Bevin for support in dcalinG with them in November 1913. In support of 
his roquost, he st4ated: 
"(The Militant ¶Iorkers& Federation)seems to be 
acquiring increasing influence and because of this to 
be able more readily to undermine official Tradc 
Union authority" 1 
The Scottish Conciliation Officer was not the only senior Ministry of 
Labour official to be, concerned at the influence of the Trotskyist3 in 
strikes. iJhen the Deputy Secretary-at the Ministry of Labour, Loo; ett, 
learned that the Trotskyist. -, were active amongst the Tyneside apprentices, 
he pointed out the extent of their influence and suggested a remcay: 
"I thin! -, it is quite clear from this that the militant 
socialist movement is playing an exceedingly active 
part not only in the apprentices' agitation but also 
in the mine workers i troubles........ it is likely 
that the t. inister will be a sled to take steps to 
intern these agitators. " 2 
In later chapters, the history of these remarks will be cleglt with in so 
far as they relate to the engineering industry. At this point'it is- 
sufficient to note that some officials in the Ministry of Labour were 
becoming worried about the influence of these agitators* 
The Regulation was a logical extension of the Ministry's 
labour policy. It was published immediately after the strikes, endcd, aftor 
1LAB 
10/281. Galbraith to He-, i, 10 Novembdr 1943. 
2LAB 
10/451. Note of 22 February 19411. 
3Some 
historians have tended to underostiriato -the importance of the Trot s. LJistn. Aflan Bullock di^r issed 
the as "The insignificant British Trotskyite 
Party"(it's precise nme soe: as to have evaded him). 
Bullock also mis--spells Jock Ha nton's name("Jock Halston"). 
A. x ullock, o. ci_t., p. 302, note 2. 
iI. Foot describes B4vin's assertions that Trotskyistc; were 
involved in these strikes as "fantasies". 
}I. Foot: Äneurin Bevan, vol. 1(1962), p. 1149. 
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being discussed'with the TUC'and employers' representatives. It was 
made quite clear against whom it was directed. A memorandum stated 
that: 
"(The Regulation) should strengthen'the hands 
of Trade Unions in dealing with irresponsible 
elements". 1 
As Bevin had earlier remarkeds 
"..... I will not be a party while I am in 
office to doing anything at all, under any 
circumstances, which will weaken the legitimate 
trade unions in any way - rather I want to 
strengthen them -I feel that steps must be 
taken to see that the war effort is not 
impeded by these activities. " 2 
In'its'original form, "äs shown to the TUC at the Trade Union 
Consultative Committee; -the Regulation provided for the prosecution 
of any'person`who decläred; "instigated, made anyone take part ins or 
otherwise acted in furtherance Iof, a strike amongst anyone engaged in 
essential services. -This included any'strike which was otherwise legal 
under the Order 1305, The penalties provided for were five'years penal 
servitude or a fine of f5001 or both. '"Essential Services" was to mean 
any factory, mine, dock, etc:, scheduled under the Essential Works 
,ý 
OrderF. -"'In"shorts it provided stiff penalties for'anyone instigating 
or trying to-extend a strike in4a scheduled factory, under any'circum- 
stances. "' It therefore'made"picketing illegal. 3 
The TUC'made'several'suggestions, 'one°of which caused some argument 
at. the-meeting"of,. the Trade Union Consultative Committee when it was 
discussed. Dukes of, the TUC pointed out that a trade union official 
LAB "10/467- Industrial Relations Dept. "General Memos Defence 
Regulation 1AA. Scope of the Regulation"(n. d. ), p. 5" 
2Bullock, 
op. cit., p. 269. 
3LAB 10/467. Industrial Relations Department. "General Memos 
Defence Regulation 1AA. " 
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could be prosecuted if he inadvertently said something at a meeting 
which might be taken out of context and construed as instigating a 
strike. 
1. Bevin replied that the Regulations 
"Should not normally affect union officials as 
a local official trying to act in accordance 
with the Arbitration Order would not incite a 
strike. On the other-hand, some members-of 
unions did instigate strikes against the advice 
of the responsible Executives, and, such: persons 
would be prosecuted under the new Regulation. " 2 
Bevin thereby tried to sidestep an amendment exempting speakers at 
meetings called in accordance with trade union rules. He was 
unsuccessful, however (possibly because he was unwise enough to leave. 
the room during the debatezin, persuading the TUC to drop their proposal, 
and the amendment was accepted., "Bevin had-shown that he did not want 
to exempt, local officials from-the scope of the order; he clearly did 
not. regard them as being as reliable as the National Executives* 
3 It 
was later realised by the Ministry that under this particular clause 
shop stewards had the right to call ; for. strike action, since , 
they, were 
allowed, under AEU rule% to call a shop meeting for any purpose. 
4 
In fact, then,, at least. part of the sting, had been taken out, of 
the, Regulation by the TUC's amendment , although, it-remained 
illegal_to 
picket, administer unofficial-strike funds, or to do, anything else-'in 
furtherance of'. a strike. However, it was not generally. realised that 
this was the case at-the-time, and the Regulation was violently, opposed 
1LAE 10467. 'Minutes of the Forty-Second Meeting of the Consultative 
Committee held at the Ministry of Idbour'" 11 April, 1944, ' p. 2. 
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., 
, p. 
3. 
4' LAB 10/467. Industrial, Relations Department. "General Memo. 
Defence Regulation IAA, "p. 3. 
by a minority in the House of Commons led by Aneurin Bevan. Bevan 
proposed a 'prayer' to annul the new Regulation, arguing that the latter 
was designed to prop up the trade union officials: 
"It is the trade union officials who are 
invoking the law against their own members. 
Do not let anybody on this side of the House 
think that he is defending the trade unions; 
he is defending the trade union official who 
has arterio-sclerosis and who cannot readjust 
himself to his membership. He is defending 
an official who had become so unpopular among 
his own membership that the only way he can 
keep them in order is to threaten them with 
five years gaol. " I 
Bevin replied that Bevan was advocating an unfettered right to strike, 
and that what was being objected to was the Order 1305 rather than 
Regulation 1AA. 2 Many of the Labour members decided to abstain on the 
vote, so that although the 'prayer' was defeated by the overwhelming 
majority of 314 to 23, only 56 Labour MPs voted in favour, whilst 
109 abstained. 
3 
The Parliamentary furore over the Regulation was one reason why it 
was never actually used. More important, it was hardly necessary to use 
it, because the wave of strikes of early 1944 was not extended, and 
the influence of the extreme left in the shop stewards' movement declined 
rapidly in the following months. It is impossible to say precisely 
what part the Regulation played in damping down the strike rate and 
in diminishing the extreme left's influence, because this cannot be 
measured with any precision. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the 
Regulation has been criticised by historians as unnecessary, the desired 
results were in fact forthcoming. 
ýý 
1M. Foot, op-cit., p. 453. 
2lbid., 
p. 453-55" 
3lbid., 
p. 456. 
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In äunimary, Bevin centred his policy on the Trade Union Executives, 
whom he regarded as entirely reliable in the crucial natter of opposing; 
strikes. The first and most important Order in Council dealing with 
labour matters, the Order 1305, strengthened the officials en bloc by 
the imposition of what was in effect compulsory arbitration. The second 
C 
vital order, the Essential Works Order, was not basically concerned with 
disputes, but rather with severely restricting the mobility of labour. 
Iiowever, both orders had some positive aspects as far as workeru were 
concerned`The Order 1305 empowered the Minister to require any person, 
including any cmploycr, to do anything he decried TZ-40 also 
compelled employers to observe district rates and conditions. 
In general, Bevin's faith in the Trade Union Executives proved 
to be well-founded. They provided practically no support for strikers at 
all during; the entire war. The district officials were rather different, 
in that they were much more open to shop steward pressure; they therefore 
tended to have a more ambiguous attitude towards strikers. At the beginning 
of 19414, a massive outburst of strikes in the mining and engineering 
industries prompted Bevin to further stiffen the attitude of the union 
officials against strikes through the promulgation of Regulation 1AA. 
The Regulation made it an offence to instigate or act in furtherance of 
a strike in an essential servico. It was a draconian measure, and met with 
some forceful opposition, but it played a part in damping down the wave 
of unrest then sweeping the two key industries for the war effort. 
**** 
Introduction to the 
Local Studies 
. 1e2 
These local studies are divisible into two distinct halvess 
Coventry and Manchester form one half, and the Clyde and the Tyne 
the other. Because of the detailed nature-of the histories of industrial 
relations in the localities, the main comparative strands are to be 
found within and between the two groups, rather than from district to 
district at random. The four areas have been grouped in his war because 
of their industrial structures, the type of workforce and method of 
wage payment, which are basically similar within the groups, but 
different between them. Thus, in Coventry, a relatively high level of 
dilution obtained, combined with a large semi-skilled and female work- 
force, and piece work as the main method of wage payment. In Glasgow, 
on the other hand, there was a larger proportion of skilled men, and 
therefore lase piece work. By comparing Coventry with the Clyde, it 
will be possible to see how these differences created different relation- 
ships between political militants and the engineering workers on the shop 
floor. The comparison will then be developed a stage further by comparing 
Coventry and the Clyde with districts of a similar industrial structure, 
so that the weight of. other factors can be assessed. 
Before undertaking the local studies, the two most important sets 
of consideration for considering the relationship between the left wing 
and the rank and file will have to be dealt with. One of these subjects, 
skill mixes and trade union organisation, has already been dealt with 
but will be quickly recalled here. The other matter of. implrtance, the 
state of the CP and its left wing rivals in the localities at the outbreak 
of war, will be outlined for the first time. 
It was stated earlier that the varying levels of trade union member- 
ship in the different districts could be accounted for by reference to 
/(r74 
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unemployment and the proportion of skilled engineers in the local 
workforce. In Coventry and Manchester, AEU membership was similar at 
about twenty percent of the possible membership, whilst it was rather 
higher in Newcastle, where there was both a higher proportion of skilled 
men and a higher rate of unemployment. In Glasgow, which also had a 
high proportion of skilled men, there was a still higher rats of unemploy- 
ment, and consequently a very small group of unionised engineers (roughly 
10%). On the other hand, further investigation showed that the Clydeside 
had a degree of shop steward organisation which was higher than that 
existing in, for example, Coventry. Overall, the figures showed that 
there was considerable scope for recruitment to the AEU (and there was 
even more for recruitment to the semi-skilled unions) in every area, 
with the partial exception of Newcastle. 
If a good deal of caution has to be exercised'in the interpretation 
of the available data on skill and trade unionism, 'the same is equally 
true when looking at the state of the'left wing in these areas. It 
, 
has continually to be borne in mind that political groupings have a' 
tendency to exaggerate their size, and that it is not possible to 
corroborate the claims from other sources. Nevertheless, it can be. 
asserted without fear of contradiction that the CP grew considerably 
during the late 1930s. The Central Committee's report to the 1935 
Congress stated that the CP's increased influence had not been refleoted 
in increased membership, but three years later the situation was quits 
different. 1 Between 1935 and 1938, the CP grew from 6,500 to 15,750.2 
r 
Draft Resolution on Building a Kass Communist, 13th Party 
Congress, Manchester, February 25,1935, P- 1" 
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ort of the Central Committee to the 15th Party Congress, 
September 1938, p. 39. 
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The YCL expanded from lees than 700 in 1934 to 4,602 at the beginning 
of June 1938.1 
Party membership was very unevenly distributed. The main con- 
oentration was in London, which had 40% of the total members by 1939.2 
Outside of London, Scotland, and especially '. 1- Clydeside, was an 
important area for the CP. Estimates of membership in the four areas 
under consideration are bound to be rough, since they rely on oral 
evidence, but-, - 
Clydeeide certainly had the largest body of members. 
This group of branches probably contained at least a thousand Communists. 
Manchester's branches were the next most important, with about four 
hundred members. 4, 
Tyneside was the next strongest area, with between 
a hundred and two hundred. The Midlands branches had never been strong, 
however, and Coventry was especially weak, with only about fifty to a 
hundred members. These estimates are only tentative, but they are 
broadly consonant with the figures which we have for the YCL. - About 
one third of the League's membership came from the London branches,. 
followed by Scotland, with 830 and Lancashire with 292. -The North East 
Coast as a whole had only 155 members,, and whilst it is impossible to- 
find figures for Coventry, the Midlands region came under the Central 
Committee's category of "weak or non-existent". 
3 Recruitment to the CP 
in the year leading up to September 1938 further accentuated these . 
imbalances, with London and Scotland leading the way, the other districts 
1Report 
of the Central Committee to the 15th Party Congress, 
September 1938, p. 37- 
%, Palling, op. cit. , p. 104. 
3Repo t of the Central Committee to the 15th Party Congress, 
September 1938, p. 37" 
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well behind and the North Midlands registering a decline in membership. 
I 
In the following year, little change occurred, as recruitment in the 
industrial areas was 'sluggish'. 
2 
The other left wing groups had a similar regional pattern of 
strength and weakness. For the Independent Labour Party, Scotland had 
been the great area during the 1920sß with London and Lancashire the 
most important English regions. - Soon after disaffiliation, the ILP 
on-tared a period of extremely rapid decline. Between July and November 
1932,128 branches were lost in Scotland, and in mid-1934, the Lancashire 
ILP 'almost collapsed'. London, on the other hand, lost only one of 
eighty-nine branches. By the beginning of the wacr, the Clydeside ILP 
contained no more than a handful of activists, whilst in the rest of 
the country outside of London there seem to have been hardly any 
activists at all. 
3 The Trotskyist grouplete, which were partly parasitic 
on the ILP, had a similar pattern of membership. Material for Youth 
For Socialism came almost exclusively from London and the Clydeside, 
but there were probably no more than a dozen WIL members on the Clyde, 
by 1939" The Anarchists of the Anarchist Federation was also strongest 
in these two areas. 
All the left-wing groups had a similar regional membership 
distribution, with a strong concentration in London and a rather less 
1Rert 
of, the Central Committee to the 15th Party Congress, 
September 1938, p. 40. 
H. Polling, op-cit. p. 104. 
l6'f 
3R. E. Dowles Left in the Centre (1966), p. 185. 
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strong agglomeration on the Clydeside. These areas were followed, in 
descending order of importance, by Manchester, the Tyne and Coventry. 
To discuss membership solely in'terms of numbers is, of course, rather 
misleading. In Coventry, for instance, the aircraft industry was 
important, and the CPers were able to use the New Propellor as a lever 
to increase their influence, an opportunity denie* their Clydeside 
comrades. This, in turn, leads on to the question of left wing strengths 
within the districts, a subject which will be dealt with in detail in 
the local studies. 
ýýý 
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COVENTRY 
"Something over twenty years ago I worked 
in Coventry. It does not seem that the 
people of Coventry have altered much since. 
In those days the aborigines of Coventry 
were the most self-satisfied, self- 
opinionated, self-conceited, self-centred, 
pig-headed and muddle-headed people of even 
Saxon England. Whatever Coventry did or 
thought was right in Coventry's eyes just 
because Coventry thought so..... Today, 
in the hour of the Empire's greatest need, 
... 9 we have tens of thousands of its 
workpeople on strike about nothing at all... 
but for.... what they call a principle. 
The idea of Coventry having any principles, 
except money-grubbing, is really funny. " (The Aeroplane, 5 December 1917, on 
the Midlands strike for the recognition 
of shop stewards. ) 
191 
After the First World War, when Coventry had been one of the major 
munitions centres, the town developed into a centre of the motor 
industry. A comprehensive list of the many small car firms with their 
factories there in'1920 would be very long indeed, but by the mid- 
1930s, a considerable number had gone out of business. Nevertheless 
the relatively prosperous car industry dominated the town, with Standard, 
Daimler, ' Humber, Riley, Triumph, Alvis, Armstrong Siddeley and Morris 
all having at least one factory there. The remainder of the engin- 
eering industry in Coventry was at least as buoyant as the motor branch, 
with Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft manufacturing aircraft at Baginton and 
the General Electrical Co. and British Thompson Houston making electrical 
apparatus of all kinds. 
I 
With this type of industrial structure, it is hardly surprising that 
unemployment in Coventry was never less than 2% below the national 
average throughout the inter-war years. The only problem with the 
motor industry as far as workers were concerned was the seasonal°lay-off, 
which tended to come in the spring and summer. Even this problem was 
less important than it might have been, given the importance of the 
building industry in the town at this time. The building industry was 
second only to engineering as an employer of labour, and had its highest 
labour requirements in the summer. Thus, it was often possible for 
workers to leave the car factories to find work building the new housing 
estates which were springing up to house incoming workers. 
2 
Coventry had a reputation as a boom town, and large numbers of workers 
flocked to it during the Depression years, to find semi-skilled work 
in the car factories. By 1938, the estimated population was 213,000, 
1Coventry Directory of Manufactures, 1936. 
2P. S. Florence and A. Shenfields"Economies and Diseconomies of 
Concentration: The Wartime Experience of Coventry; "in Revisifof 
Economic btudies, vol. 12, (1944-45), P" 81. 
1) 
and by the following year, it was 229,000.1 The immigrants were not to 
be disappointed in their expectations; high wages and steady work were 
available to a large number over the next thirty years. 
During the First World War, Coventry had been the most militant of 
the major engineering districts, with more working days lost through 
strikes than the Clyde. 
2 In the Second War, the Clyde took its place 
as the most strike-prone district, losing 337,662 days compared to 
Coventry's 82,764, between 1941 and 1945.3 During 1940, it is very 
difficult to measure the preoccupations of shop stewards through strike 
figures, since there were so very few strikes, but the first ten months 
of the year saw the stewards and the District Committees discussing the 
problems caused by victimisations. In the rest of the country, victim- 
isation through the transference provisions of the March 1941 Essential 
Works Order, continued as a serious question for the rest of the War. 
Transference was a skilled man's bete noir in the main, and in Coventry, 
where the body of skilled men were covered by the Coventry Toolroom 
Agreement, of January 1941, the problem was much less pressing. 
Piece work bargaining, the traditional concern of the Coventry shop 
stewards, was pushed even more into the centre of the industrial arena 
by the Toolroom Agreement, which provided the semi-skilled with a unique 
opportunity to increase their earnings. Shop stewards were able to 
return to the daily battles with the already hard pressed rate fixers 
armed with a new weapon, a mutually agreed statement of earnings in the 
1 M. P. Fogarty: Prospects of the Industrial Areas of Great Britain 
(1945), p. 26. 
2J. S. Hintonj op. cit., p. 234. 
33trike figures are only quoted for 1941-1945 in order to achieve 
comparability. Before 1941, "mixed" engineering and shipbuilding 
strikes were recorded under either shipbuilding or engineering. 
From 1941, each set of strikers was recorded separately. Post-1941 
figures are therefore much more reliable for comparisons between 
districts. Fortunately, the strike rate in 1940 was so low that 
the omission is unimportant. 
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major local factories. Piece work earnings, which had been a pre- 
occupation, became an obsession over the next three or four years. A 
sort of 'Klondyke fever' developed among the semi-skilled. The oppor- 
tunity of making piece work 'killings' by pulling the wool over the rate 
fixers eyes, and of ameliorating the rigours of wartime life by buying 
ý`'iý 
on the thriving local Black Market was not to be passed by. Many workers 
felt that the boot was now. on their collective foot, and the strike 
figures on piece work show that they used it. However, the shop stewards 
were preoccupied with the problem of victimisation rather than piece 
work earnings during 1940-41. The problem was probably considerably 
more acute in the Coventry district because of the unparalleled expansion 
of local industry between 1936 and 1940, and because of the importance 
of the aircraft and aero-engine industries. By 1940-41, the aircraft 
industry had labour requirements which would expand it by almost 50% 
of its strength of the spring of 1940, and more than double it by the 
summer of 1941.1 
This expansion was on an unprecedented scale, but the growth of the 
town's engineering industry had already posed its problems for would-be 
trade union organisers. The award of aero-engine contracts to three 
of the town's motor manufacturers in 1936 led to the construction of new 
'shadow' factories to cope with the demand; such was the atmosphere 
among the town's industrialists at this time that the Alvis Co. built 
a shadow factory without any government contracts, so confident was it 
that they would arrive in due course. Their confidence was rewarded 
with a contract for Gnome-Rhßne aero-engines in 1937.2 During 1939-40, 
IP. Inman, op-cit., p. 38, Table 2. 
2K. Richardsons Twentieth Century Coventry (1972), p. 70. 
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a new set of contracts was awarded to these companies, and three new 
shadow factories built. 
1 
These seven new factories were built to the most modern specifica- 
tions, -to allow'the maximum use of semi-skilled labour. At the Rootes 
No. 2-shadow factory at Ryton, for example, automatic machinery was 
used in every possible operation; on one job, the use of bar automatics 
instead of capstans reduced, a machining time from forty minutes to four 
and a half. 
2 With unemployment in the town well below the national 
3 
average already, much of the new labour required could be taken from 
the immigrants flooding into the town, who could be employed without 
any'need for previous engineering experience. 
` Consequently, the-town expanded tremendously between 1931 and 1939, 
growing by an extra 62,454 persons. Of these 62,454, eleven thousand 
have, to be discounted because of a boundary change, and the natural 
increase was 9,306, but`thisýstill leaves 42,148 migrants in a total 
population (in 1939) of 229,50o. 4 The immigrants came'from'the-area 
around Cardiff and Newport, the Lancashire cotton townst Clydeside, ' 
'Greater London, the coalmining'districts of Northumberland and Durham, 
and. Tyneside (in descending order). 
5 The'proportion of these immigrants 
entering the engineering industry varied depending'on where they came 
from., Those from the'mining districts showed , a. clear-preference for 
I 
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engineering (and a marked aversion to the Warwickshire pits), with 
80% of them entering engineering, compared to 50% of those from the 
other areas. 
1 
These immigrants inundated the town during 1938 and 1939: fully a 
quarter of the total number of immigrants entering Coventry between 
1920 and 1939 arrived in the twelve months prior to July 1939. Not 
surprisingly, most of them were young, single men, who created something 
of a housing problem in the town despite the fact that they brought 
2 few dependants. 
Since the immigrants who entered engineering were predominantly from 
mining areas, it might be supposed that they had some previous exper- 
ience of trade unionism. On the other hand, many of them had been 
recruited as trainees by the local employers precisely because of their 
age, and may never have worked in the mines. 
3 In any event, they still 
presented, in terms of their numbers, a considerable organising task 
for local trade unionists. It was further exacerbated by the fact 
that the immigrants who arrived in the town in the two years immediately 
prior to July 1939 showed a marked tendency to change jobs more fre- 
quently than earlier immigrants or native Coventrianss 56% of them 
changed jobs in the year after July 1939 compared to 25% of pre-1937 
immigrants. 4 This made it difficult to track them down, to check their 
cards and to transfer them between trade union branches. 
1G. L. Maroon, p. 143. 
2P. S. Florence and A. Shenfield1 ibid., p. 41. 
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These immigrants certainly did not lack militancy; they were frequently 
noted for their combativity inside the factories (and sometimes inside 
the pubs. Just after the war started, the Rootes Co. complained to 
their colleagues in the Coventry Engineering Employers Association that 
one particular gang was causing continual trouble in the polishing 
shop of their Number One shadow factory in Stoke Aldermoor. The gang 
comprised one hundred and thirty three men, of whom forty-eight were 
trainees from the-depressed areas, who had, as Rootes' Mr. Booth 
remarked, "not even as much engineering knowledge as a labourer in the 
shop",, They did, however, have the audacity to refuse to man certain 
jobs, and this proved the final straw for Mr. Booth, who decided to 
break the gang up. 
1 
It may be significant that the workers in question were from the 
*depressed-areas'. Their willingness to assert themselves in their 
new jobs made them amenable to joining a trade union if they were 
encouraged-to do so by a shop steward. However, during 1940, the type 
of'immigrant coming into the town and particularly into the shadow 
factories changed somewhat. London, the South East Coast, Leicestershire 
and Northamptonshire entered the list of'major areas of origin behind 
Lancashire, the Clyde and, the Cardiff Newport area. In addition, the 
proportion of women immigrants entering employment in the town increased 
dramatically; Coventry had a below-average widow and spinster population, 
soon absorbed by the shadow factories. By 1941, approximately five 
immigrants in every fourteen entering the factories were women, bring- 
ing the total proportion of women in the Coventry factories as a whole 
to 25%. 
2 
COMPS, November 1939. The polishing shop had struck for two days 
in June. (Ibid., July 1939). 
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2 P. Se Florence and A. Shenfield, ibid., pp. 38 and 41. 
These new'and more recent immigrants probably posed a greater threat 
to trade union organisation than their pre-war counterparts. The 
Coventry employers were estimating their labour requirements at five 
thousand per month for every month-of 1940, to expand the engineering 
labour'force by about fifty percent in that year. 
1 If the earlier 
immigrants presented a daunting prospect to the trade union organiser, 
this scale ofýabsorption was even more frightening. Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that these newcomers had the same kind of experience of 
trade unionism, as their predecessors. Some of the women may have had 
experience in the Northamptonshire boot and shoe industry, or the 
Lancashire cotton mills, but this was an experience of trade unionism 
that was qualitatively' different to that of the miners. The whole 
problem merits further investigation, but it seems reasonable to assert 
that the'people coming into the town in 1940 must have proved rather 
more'difficult to recruit than their predecessors. 
In any event, it was in the'recently built and worst-organised"' 
factories that most victimisation occurreds the shadow factories, a 
small car firm and an°electrical engineering firm were, the main places 
at which'AEU stewards were=sacked during 1940 and early 1941. The 
Coventry, District Committee of the`AXJ discussed, the victimisation of 
shop stewards on eleven occasions during'the-thirteen months between 
January 1940 and February 1941.2 The circumstance of the shadow factories' 
libia., 
p. 33. 
216 Jan. '403 convenor Standard Aero shadow factory sacked; 5 March: 
Nine men suspended from SS Care; 30'Julys two stewards sacked at 
the Alvis Aero shadow factory. These cases were further discussed 
at the meetings of 21 May, 27 August, 8 September, 13 October 1940. 
On 8 February 1940, Fxrnie Roberts' sacking from Alvis and from 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft was discussed, and his previous 
sacking from Armstrong Siddeley raised. On January 1941, a steward 
was sacked from the British Thompson Houston, and on 17th February, 
another was sacked at Nuffield Mechanic tion and Aero. (All dates refer to the AEU DC Minutes*) 
/97 
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poor organisation was to prove an important weakness as far as 
organising support in the district for sectional strikes over victim- 
isation was concerned. When a strike occurred over the sacking of a 
convenor, it proved difficult to spread it to the rest of the factory, 
and therefore harder to stimulate support from other factories in the 
area. Another major difficulty, compared to the Clyde, was that the 
District Committee of the AEU was not controlled by the CP9 and it was 
more concerned with nipping in the bud any rival to its control, rather 
than with stimulating shop steward activities outside of their own 
factories. 
The first stirrings on the part of the stewards themselves towards 
district activity over victimisation occurred in mid-1940, and the 
episode showed that the District Committee of the AEU was definitely 
not prepared to encourage them. In July 1940, Ernie Roberts was 
sacked from his job as a fitter at Armstrong Siddeley for calling a 
strike in the absence of the convenor. These were bizarre grounds for 
sacking a steward. The matter of whether or not he should have consulted 
his convenor before recommending strike action was normally considered 
an internal question of trade union procedure, and not-one which directly 
concerned management. Roberts took this up with the District Committee, 
which decided to call a meeting of Roberts's shop, the Aero Fitting 
shop, and to ask Stokes, the Divisional Organiser, to send a report 
to the EO. Meanwhile, Roberts had not been inactive, because motions 
from two branches calling for a special district meeting of stewards 
were received by the District Committee. Consideration of these was 
deferred until the EC had replied to Stokes's report, and the Committee 
had itself reported to the six-monthly meeting of shop stewards, which 
/9, 
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was not due for nearly a month. 
1 
The AEU DC had shown itself reluctant to take action via the shop 
stewards. over victimisations. The attitude of the DC was to be markedly 
different on the next occasion'that the problem reared its head. This 
may-have been partly due to the fact that the district's shop stewards 
had already been approached on the difficulties at the particular, 
factory. concerned, and there'was therefore a general' understanding 
and sympathy with the workers here amongst Coventry workers. The 
convenor of, the. Standard Aero 2, Rogers, had been sacked in January 
1940, and the management had refused to agree to a Works Conference on 
the subject. 
2 
No further action seems to have been taken, but in April 
/99 
there was a strike of inspectors at the factory, which received financial 
support from all over the district. 3. At the DC meeting of 22 September, 
Wilcocks, the new convenor, reported that the company was challenging 
his right to act as such by dictating where and when shop meetings were 
to be held. 4 Soon afterwards, Wilcocks was sacked, and a strike of 
250 workers started on 26th September. 5 Stokes and Taylor appealed to 
the strikers to return, but only a few did so. The rest remained out, and 
z 
a meeting of these remaining strikers was held, attended by about 120.6 
1AM DC, 23 July, 30 July, 8 September, 1940. 
2AExJ DC, 16 January, 1940. 
May 1940. 
4AEU'DCý 22"Sept ember 1940. 
5LAB 10/350,28 September 1940. 
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DCq 29 September 1940. 
The following day, the District Committee called Wilcocks before it to 
explain the circumstances-leading to his dismissal. 
' The DC voted at 
this'meeting'to support the strike, to call for full financial support 
from all local factories, to draw up and distribute a local bulletin 
describing the strike, to draft a press statement and to elect represent- 
atives from the DC to sit on the strike Committee. A deputation was 
also elected, to visit the EC'in London to demand action on the victim- 
ised stewards, failing which a ballot was to be taken for strike action 
in the district. 2 A week later an aggregate meeting of stewards was 
held which passed a motions 
"This meeting..... views with alarm the general 
victimisation of shop stewards and militant trade 
unionists and considers that the root cause of 
it is the collaboration of the trade union leader- 
ship with the employers. Therefore it demands the 
cessation of such collaboration and an immediate 
fight for the restoration of the right to strike 
as the only weapon to stop intimidation. " 3 
The District Committee of the TGWU and the Trades Council were also 
supporting the strike. The Conciliation Officer remarked on the "serious 
position", and added that "the union", by which he seems to have meant 
the officials, was "much embarrassed". 
4 It was argued by the officials 
that the AEU DC meeting which had taken such decisive action in support 
of the strikers was an unusually small one, and this was in fact correct. 
Eight of the DC of 22 were present. The meeting had been dominated by 
the CP, and the deputation to London contained two Communists, Wilcocks 
himself and Joe Steele, from the Standard parent factory, of three 
1 id., 6 October 1940- 
2 Ibid. 9 29 September 1940. 
3AEU DC, 29 September 1940- 
4 LAB 10350,10 October 1940. 
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delegates. One of the two elected to sit on the strike committee, 
Lewis,, was also in the CP. 
1 Although the CP had used the meeting to 
24/ 
the fullest extent, they had still had to persuade the other members of 
the DC present that their policies were the most appropriate; there 
were only four CPers on the DC. Moreover, this success was built on 
at the next meeting of the DC, when. a motion of censure was passed 
on Taylor, the District Secretary, for not having implemented the policy 
of the previous meeting. . Z. 
The CP-was. definitely behind, this motion of censure. An article in 
the Daily Worker on the. strike stated that one of the officials concerned 
(presumably Taylor) was "not only not pulling his weight", but was 
actually "obstructive". 
2 They were obviously concerned to discredit 
Taylor, who was a , renegade from their own ranks, because of the way that 
he was behaving over the protection of stewards from victimisation. 
This was soon to be shown to be the case by another sacking. 
Nevertheless, there was little that could be done to actually remove 
Taylor or any other. official immediately, and the CP was primarily 
concerned with winning>the strike. They were able to achieve this 
by threatening the employers. and the district officials more directly. 
Using the prestige-of the Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft shop stewards 
committee, they called an aggregate meeting of shop stewards, irres- 
pective of union, to. discuss "matters of vital importance to all workers". 
3 
The meeting discussed the Standard Aero dispute, although what it decided 
is unknown. 
4 In any event, it seems to have had an effect on the Works 
1AEZT DC,. 29 Septemberl 1940. 
2D-Ws 3 October 1940. 
3DW9 5 October 1940" 
41 P, October 1940. 
Conference then taking place, because the management agreed to rein- 
state Wilcocks. 
I 
The CP9 working through the AWA shop steward's committee, had been 
able to suggest the possibility of district action taking place, and the 
strike had been won. Since the meeting of 4th October had elected no 
permanent committee, that was the end of the matter. 
In other areas, the CP had set up permanent committees of shop 
stewards on less impressive bases; why had they not done so in Coventry? 
The 4 October meeting, and a similar one called by the AWA shop stewards 
in March 1941 provide two strong clues, since they both considered the 
question of trade union organisation. The strikers at the Standard 
Aero had included fifty non-unionists, i. e. the strikers themselves 
were only about 60% organised. 
2 Nor could the other Standard factories 
be looked to as potential supporters, since they too were as yet only 
semi-organised. 
3 The district's shop stewards must have felt that their 
first and most important task was to organise the droves of new recruits 
coming into the shops. Unorganised workers could not be called on to 
take sympathetic action with any very real prospects of success on a 
factory level, let alone beyond that. 1940 saw a tremendous develop- 
ment in shop steward organisation in the town. The leading trade 
unionists worked incessantly to organise the flood of workers pouring 
into Coventrys they met them at the railway station, spoke to them at 
hostels, visited their lodgings and even continued to use the old method 
of factory gate meetings where possible., The Minutes of the AEU District 
Committee show that there was a great increase in the number of shop 
1DW, 9 October, 1940. 
2AM 
DC9 25 March, 1941. 
31n November 1941, the standard shop stewards had their first meeting 
to attempt to obtain 100% trade unionism (AEU DC, 7 November, 1941. ) 
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stewards recognised at this time. In 1938, fifty new shop stewards were 
recognised; in 1939, one hundred and twelve; the first three months of 
1938 saw the 1939 total equalled1 Moreover, taking the AEU alone certainly 
leads to an underestimation of the rate of election of stewards. The 23 1,11 
and the IWUVB were at least equally active, cnd had the additional 
advantage of being able to recruit women. The machine shops and assembly 
areas were open fields for the enthusiastic new shop stewards. "There were 
very few existing members among the new entrants to the factories, and. they 
were all fair garle. Consoquently, a variegated trade union membership 
pattern arose in the scramble, from which only skilled areas like toolroom3 
and sheet metq. l shops were exempt. 'The TGWU in particular began to re- 
expand ". long st the semi-skilled, carryinr- on the work started by the 
corker's Union in the, First ',: ar. Led by the already experienced and 
tireless Jack Jones, they expanded their membership until, by the end of the 
war, it rivalled that of the r+EU. 
The considerable induotrial expansion of Coventry, the 
concentration of the local engineering industry and the relatively high 
waÜes being paid to the semi-skilled led to problems in the local 
labour market for the employers.; 1kslled men were beinL; attracted out of 
the toolrooms and on to production, where they could earn more without 
,o of 
toolrooin labour. 'PhiR.. wv. u ing their . sktill. `'he result was a short-, %, - 
not a now problem for Coventry ersplcyerE;, but the solution agreed after 
the intervention of the Ministry of Latour was tolerated . rather 
than 
welcomed by '; hem. 
During the early 111)"Os, there had been a continual feud 
between individual employers to secure the services of toolmnkers. In 
the employers association agreed on one way out of the difficulty: 
to intensify work, in the toolroowz by introaiuciil: piece work where 
1, 
A: X DC, 9ApriJ. 1940. 
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possible, combined with the strict enforcement of a district rate for 
those remaining on time work. 
1 By late 1936, eight toolrooms were 
on piece work, including those at Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft and 
the Standard Motor Co., but the problem had not been solved. 
2 On 
the contrary, it had been exacerbated, because by the end of 1935, 
the scarcity of skilled labour was such that seven of the eight 
firms were paying above the district rate, and were therefore 
attracting more skilled workers. 
3 
The increased-tempo of production which occurred in the early 
months of the war brought an already precarious situation in the supply 
of skilled labour to the point of collapse. Toolmakers were "moving 
down the line", leaving the toolrooms half empty. Without toolmakers, 
who supplied the large numbers of jigs, tools and fixtures for the semi- 
skilled, war production would rapidly grind to a halt. Nationally, the 
problem was less acute, and was solved by an agreement which ensured 
that toolmakers enjoyed a fixed percentage differential over the 
earnings of skilled piece workers in-their factory. In Coventry, the 
concentration of engineering firms was so great,, and the type of labour 
required so specialised, that such-a solution would not work. F}nployers 
would continue to "poach labour from one another. Therefore, an agree- 
ment was needed which ensured that the workers would have nothing to 
gain through moving, i. e., the earnings of skilled piece workers in 
the district had to be taken as the basis for the toolmakers' 
differential. The actual agreement, signed in January 1941, stated 
1COV MPS, April, 1934. 
2Ibid., October 1936. 
31bid. 
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that the basis for the calculation was'to be the earnings of these 
skilled piece workers: in all the main engineering factories in Coventry, 
calculated'monthly, 'andhmutually agreed by the employers association 
and the'Aß1 District Office. An outside auditor was to check the 
figures. 1 
The agreement was a very favourable one for all the local engineering 
workers. For the'skilled men, the guarantee=of a uniform district rate 
based onapiece'work earnings had two major benefits. Firstly, -'although 
they did not know-it'at the time, it was to give them a steadily'*rising 
rate over the-next'thirty years. Secondly, and more important for 
our purposes, it'removed'the financial sting from transfers within 
the district, since the rate was the same in all the major factories, 
and, even'small factories had to observe the rate in practice. For 
the semi-skilled, the agreement had a different significance, although 
the end result, unusually high earnings, was the same. Shop stewards 
were'now able to refer to a mutually. recognised statement of skilled 
piece'workersI earnings in-, every" major factory in Coventry. In their 
negotiations with"-rate fixers' and'foremen, they-were able to constantly 
assess the comparability of'earnings at-their factory. Even-the 
leading factories in terms of earnings were able-to-capitalise in this 
wary'=since they were able to 'leapfrog' as the highest earning' factories 
changed places at°the'top'-of the'"earnings league month by month. 
During 1941, the''loose' rates that were being fixed on unfamiliar 
munitions work gave the'shop stewards an additional boost in pushing 
up piece'rates. k The'net effect-can be seen in the figures themselves, 
which show"a very steep rise in'earnings during 1941 compared to our 
1Coventry Toolroom Agreement, 7 January, 1941. 
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earlier wage figures. By September 1941, one leading member of the 
Coventry Engineering Employers Association went so far as to say that 
the "problem" of piece work prices was entirely attributable to the 
Toolroom Agreement. 1 By mid-1941, when the CP's position on the war 
changed, the CP nationally was in a difficult position in the shop 
stewards'movement. What was their situation in Coventry? 
-The shop stewards themselves were, by this time, less concerned 
with victimisations and more interested in pushing piece work earnings 
up. Trade union organisation, although by no means complete, was 
definitely spreading, and the worst 'black spots', the shadow factories, 
were being eliminated. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, Communists 
were very much to the fore in bringing Coventry workers into the trade 
unions, and their involvement in piece work bargaining will soon be 
dealt with. 
At this point, some kind of balance sheet of the CP's activities 
around victimisations can`be drawn up. The CP had never been strong 
in Coventry engineering, but such strength as they had was concentrated 
in the aircraft factories where trade union organisation was relatively 
good. - This had been true in the late 1920s, and it was still the case 
in 1940. A survey of the Daily Worker fighting fund at its peak, in 
August and September 1940 inclusive shows that the most regular 
contributions came from the Armstrong Siddeley and Armstrong Whitworth 
Aircraft factories (both Whitley and Baginton). During these two 
months, there were eight contributions from the Armstrong Whitworth 
and Armstrong Siddeley factories, three from the Standard Aero No. 2, 
and one each from the Coventry Gauge and Tool and the British Thompson- 
Houston. 2 
, 
During the winter of 1940-41, the CP was able to begin to 
1COVE PSOMin te_ of a meeting between the Coventry &igineering 
T1nployers Association and the IIigineering &ployers Federation, 
22 September, 1941. 
2DW, 1, 
_ 
5,16,17,20 August; 6, 
_26,27 
September 1940. One of these 
contributions (on September 6th) was of £25.10so from one section at 
strong Whitworth Airnra 
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expand from its limited base in the aircraft factories into the rest 
of the engineering industry in the town. Assuming that all the con- 
tributions to the fighting fund cited above were from factory groups, 
there were five such groups in the autumn of 1940. Before long, 
there were two morel and in early October, fifty-four new readers of 
the Daily Worker were claimed, of which twenty-five had come from 
the factory groups. 
1 These gains were small but significant in a town 
like Coventry, but they do not fully reflect the increased prestige 
of the Communists amongst the local shop stewards. By using the 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft shop stewards committee to call a district 
meeting, they had brought the Standard Aero strike to a successful 
conclusion. A Communist convenor had kept his job, but more importantly, 
the AWA shop stewards had further enhanced their reputation, and could 
be relied on to take the lead in district affairs in the future. Using 
a shop stewards' committee rather than setting up a permanent unoffi- 
cial committee had another distinct advantage for the CP: they were., 
sheltered from disciplinary action from the local officials and the 
District Committee. It would have been difficult for either, the 
officials or the District Committee to attack the best organised 
factory's shop stewards for calling a meeting for the ostensible 
purpose of improving trade unionism in the town, and they did not 
attempt to do so. At the meeting of the AEU District Committee held 
immediately after the second district shop stewards aggregate called 
by the AWA stewards, the point was minuted that "if our stewards were 
making themselves responsible to an unofficial body, that they would 
cease to come under the DC control". Considerable discussion followed, 
2A 7 
1Party 
Organisation - Weapon for Victory (1943), pp. 8-9. (M/S) 
DWG 9 October '110. 
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but no motion was put. 
1 
It would be entirely misleading to give the impression that most 
of Coventry' s' engineering workers were primarily concerned with the 
victimisation of shop stewards or the negotiation of the Toolroom 
Agreement in this period. These matters only concerned sections of 
workers 1and-the shop` stewards. In fact, it was difficult for even the 
stewards and officials to keep their minds on negotiating when a 
been 
German bomb destroyed'the room in which they bad. meeting the employers 
on November 14th, 1940.2 The main concerns of engineering workers 
besides finding enough hours in the day to rest'after the exhaustingly 
long hours of work were whether or not to stop working when air-raid 
sirens were sounded, how to force employers to take adequate air-raid 
precautions and last but definitely not least, where to live when they 
were bombed out of their homes, 
The impact of bombing was the main and massive problem. Historians 
have traditionally 'concentrated on underlining the devastation caused 
by the terribleý'raid. of November 14th, but the full impact of the 
bombing cannot beRappreciated unless it is seen against the backdrop of 
the battering received'during the-'previous month. In the month leading 
up'to November 14th, there were no'less than"eighteen raids of varying 
intensity'onCoventry, including some'daring spot attacks on selected 
crucial industrial targets. 3 One raider was sent, for example, to 
bomb (in daylight) the Hobson. Carburettor shop at the Standard which 
he only narrowly missed, hitting the paint shop instead. 
4 
1ANJ DC, 25 March, 1941. 
2V. Hannas"Coventrys City Faces Shutdown; in Sunday Times, 30 May, 1971. 
3Midland Daily Telegraph, 14,15,16,17,19,21-23,25,26,28,29, 
30 October, 1,2,5,6,13 November, 1940. 
:ý 
4K. 
Richardson, op. cit., p. 81. 
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The November 14th raid was fantastically destructive, with industrial 
targets hit hardest of all. 1,600 people were killed or injured during 
the raid, many of them at work. At Morris Engines, the roof was blown 
off almost completely, leaving workers exposed to snow and rain whilst 
at their machines. A large number of people were made homeless, gas 
and water supplies were completely disrupted, food became extremely 
scarce, and there was a danger of typhoid. 
I 
How did the Communist Party respond to the situation in Coventry? 
It is difficult to answer this question satisfactorily because November 
was an extremely hectic month in the town, and many things must have 
gone unnoticed which would otherwise have been recorded. On the surface. 
it seems as if the CP deployed their resources quite well. They had 
already pointed out the inadequacy of the town's ARP arrangements 
during October. On 11th October, the Communist shop steward Bill Warman 
had chaired a meeting of the Moat's House Residents' Association called 
to criticise the town's ARP provision. The meeting was indeed justified, 
because only one local factory (the Coventry Gauge and Tool) had a deep 
shelter. 
2 
The arrangements were defended by George Hodgkinson of the 
National Emergency Committee. 3 These warnings proved a basis on which 
further action could be built after the November 14th raid. The Trades 
Council passed a motion at an emergency conference calling on Bevin 
'Coventry Standard, 30 November, 1940; 13,000 workers were unemployed in the first week after the raid. At work, many workers were 
employed clearing. up the debris, or transferred to other factories. 
[Lessons of Heavy Air Raids, December 140, pp. 3-4; 
'After the Raids 30 December 1940. (LAB 8/362 Twenty-one important 
factories, including twelve directly involved in aircraft production,, 
were "severely affected'by fire or direct hits, but the shadow 
factories were unaffected (Calder, o . cit., p. 236, Sunday Times, 
30 May, 1971 ") 
2 K. Richardson, o . cit., p. 77, note 8. 
Zaý 
3Coventrnr 
Standardl 12 October, 1940. 
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(who. was visiting-Coventry) to take a whole number of emergency measures 
for . the defence and welfare of, the town. 
1 Shortly afterwards, the CP 
published a short pamphlet entitled Coventry - What Now? It has 
proved impossible to, find a copy of this pamphlet, but it was certainly 
produced at speed , appearing, on December 4th, only a week after the 
Trades Council meeting. 
2 
There can be little doubt, that the CP reaped considerable benefit 
from-their interventionssAthe People's Convention had strong contin- 
gents from the heavily blitzed areas of--London. and from Coventry. 
3 
It may also provide a. partial explanation of the CP's success in trade 
union terms. It, must be admitted that this may not have been because 
of the. specific initiatives taken by. the CP in Coventry, which had 
always been, ýrelatively small and ineffective in tenant's agitation 
(the basis of=the CP's ARP, work in London). 
4 It may have been at least 
equally to do with the general mood of'questioning of the war which 
followed the November raids, 
5 
and the-way which the Daily, Worker and 
the People's Convention fitted neatly.. into this.., In arty-event, the 
CP did make some considerable-, gains through. the bombing, so that 
Coventry, which. had only had one signatory of-the People's Convention 
manifesto, was able to send ,a sizeable contingent to the convention 
itself. 
6 
1 LAB. 10/350.30 November, 1940. 
2DWv 5 Decemb erg 1940. 
3Home Front, February, 1941 WS). 
4S. Schifferes: "Ten, ants"Struggles-in'the1 1930's", (Unpublished 
M. A. dissertation, University of Warwick, 1973), pp. 88-89. 
5Calder, 
o . cit., pp. 246-259" 
6Home 
-Frontý February, 1941. 
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The Coventry branches of the CP benefitted greatly, as did the CP 
as a whole, from the wave of enthusiasm for the Russian entry into 
the war. Naturally, the figures quoted by the CP themselves must be 
treated with some caution, but there seems little doubt that the 
organization in the area expanded tremendously. One estimate states 
that the CP expanded from about seventy to about one thousand, five 
hundred. 1 In the first three months of 1942, the Midlands membership 
quadrupled, according to a contemporary CP publication, which added 
that a large proportion of these were industrial workers. 
2 In 
January 1943, the branch had what its secretary, Jack Cohen, called its 
"first real Annual General Meeting" at which the outgoing city 
Committee presented a report and a new City Committee was elected. It 
was announced that the CP in Coventry had grown from seven factory 
groups and one area group to thirty-three factory groups and five area 
groups. 
3 
At this time, one of the main difficulties faced by the CP 
nationally was the assimilation of newly-won membership, and was a 
problem in the Midlands to an even greater extent than in other areas. 
Between June and December 1943, for example, membership fell in the 
Midlands area from 4,323 to 3,678.4 The national problems of the CP 
factory groups in which only a small minority of the members were 
active, rapid turnover of members and so on, were, by their own admission, 
particularly acute in this area. 
5 Despite these problems, the CP 
1X. Richardson, op. cit., p. 96. 
2World News and Views, XXII, p. 206. 
3J. Cohens"Coventry's AGM" in Party Organisation - Weapon for 
Victory (1943), PP- 8-9, (M/S)- 
4Strengthen Our Organisation (March 1944), p. 10 (M/S). 
Z// 
5 
Cf. Joe Kars halls "Building a Factory Leadershili'in Organise to 
Mobilise Millions (n. d., probably 1943), P. 4. (M/S). 
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extended its influence in the local shop stewards' movement. Although 
the local factory groups had more than their fair share of the 
difficulties which troubled the CP nationally, their position was not 
affected by them. On the contrary, they transcended these difficulties. 
This unusual combination of circumstances must lead us away from an 
explanation of their developing strength relying on the relative 
position of local internal party organisation and morale. The two 
tendencies ran in different directions. 
The changed interpretation of the nature of the War offered by the 
CP after the Soviet Union's invasion had no more perceptible effect 
on the general tendency for the strike rate to rise in Coventry than 
it did in the rest of the country. Strikes increased both in number 
and in size. In 1941,2,345 working days were lost through eight 
strikes; in 1942,7,462 (19 strikes), in 1943,13,281 (17), in 1944, 
310 
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18,296 (28), and in 1945,41,380 (10). (See Clyde, p4 /for similar 
pattern). What were these strikes about? 
In general, the answer is that in Coventry more than in any other 
district, they were piece work disputes. The picture that we obtain 
from examining the causes of strikes"as recorded in the Ministry of 
Labour Disputes Books is quite graphic. In Coventry, piece work 
disputes were much more common than on the Clyde. (See'. table). 
In 1941,30% of strikes were on this issue, compared to 0.3% on the 
Clyde, and the preponderance of these disputes increased over the next 
two years: in 1942,40, % in Coventry and 0.5% on the Clyde; in 1943, 
67% in Coventry, compared to 3.6% on Clydeside. In 1944, the pattern 
begins to change slightly, in that disciplinary disputes become more 
important'in Coventry than they had before, but piece work still 
retains its dominance: 71% compared to 0.04% on the Clyde. Discipline 
Zit 
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questions accounted. for 3,580 days lost in 1944 in Coventry, compared 
to 1,800 the year'before, nil in 1942 and 630 days in 1941. 
TABLE i' 24 
Percentage of working days lost through disputes on -different 
types of wage disputes, Coventry and Clydeside, 1941-45. 
Wages other than p/wk. times p/wk. times 
Clyde Coventry Clyde Coventry 
1941 
. 
33 .,, 19 0.3 36 
1942 84 30 0.5 
1943 89 9 3.5 
40 
69 
1944 20 14 0.004 63 
In itself, this analysis of strike figures is of strictly limited use 
unless we know where they took place. Indeed, even when we know 
where they. occurred, it is necessary to relate the number of days lost 
to the number of workers in the factory (or, to put it another way, 
the number of potential strikers). For Coventry, we can approximate 
to such an equation (which we cannot for the other areas) by dividing 
the number of days lost through disputes between 1941 and 1945 by the 
number of skilled piece workers as given in the Toolroom Agreement's 
Minutes. The resultant table cannot serve as anything but a rough 
guide to strike-proneness because of its reliance on the number of 
skilled piece , workers. 
as an indicator of the size of the workforces, 
but it is probably most reliable at each extreme. The results emerge 
2 If 
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Rootee No. 1 
Standard I and 2s nil. 
Humber: 59 
Rootes No. 2s 20 
Daimler: 6 
Dunlop: 5 
Alvis: 3 
Daimler No. 2: 3 
Daimler No. 1: 2 
Herbert: I 
Wickman: I 
AWA: 0.5 
Standard: 0.3 
. 2g 
Table ', s Strike-proneness 
in the major Coventry 
factories, 1941-45. 
s3 
The great difference between the Humber and Rootes No. 2, and the 
other factories is largely accounted for by a long strike in 1945, but 
even without this strike, these factories still account for 15,245 of 
82,764 days lost in the district. The Humber-Rootes group of factories 
definitely supply the greatest number of days lost per head, and the 
AWA and Standard groups of factories the least. 
20 
TABLE : ; SHOWING THE AVERAGE HOURLY RATE CF SKILLED FIXE WORKERS AT 
THE SEVEN HIGHEST EARNING CCVE14TRY FACTORIES, From Septunber 1940 to 
September 1944. 
shillings 
Standard Motor Co. 5,34 
Rootes Securities No. 2 4.81 
Standard Aero Nos. 1 and 2 4.77 
Armstrong Whitworth A/C 4.42 
Daimler No. 1 4.39 
Rootes No. 1 4.35 
Daimler No. 2 3.97. 
(Toolroom Minutes) 
This relationship is interesting because of the way it correlates with 
the earnings of skilled piece workers as given in the Toolroom Minut_. 
Again, it is not claimed that these figures are a completely reliable 
ýý =. 
indicator of-the wages being earned throughout the factories, because 
they only relate-to one group of workers. However, they do represent 
a fair reflection of comparative piece work values. The gang system 
used in the Coventry factories cut across skill divisions, and piece 
work values were the same for all workers in the same gang, irrespective 
of skill. Their different basic rates would result in different 
earnings, but these were proportionate to the earnings of the skilled 
men. 
Unlike the. situation on the Clyde, the highest earning factories 
in Coventry were not the most strike-prone. The Standard group of 
factories, Rootes Securities No. 2 and the Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft 
Baginton factory had the highest piece work earnings for most of the 
War, although there was obviously a certain amount of fluctuation in 
earnings from month to month. With the exception of 
Rootes No. 2, they also had virtually no stoppages, as the above table 
shows. 
These less strike-prone factories had-two further common features. 
They were well known for their high levels of, trade union organisation; 
they had made drives for the closed shop on numerous occasions, 
suggesting that 100%, organisation was relatively close for them. Also, 
they had the most widespread use of the gang system in their production 
shops. 
These factories were also Communist strongholds. By April 1943, 
the convenors of the two main Standard factories were Communists, and 
the convenor of the AWA shop stewards declared himself a supporter of 
the Z&ATSSNC in 1944.1 The fact that these factories had the leading 
2/j 
1Bill Warman was factory convenor at Standard, Canley, and Harold Taylor 
was T&GWU convenor. Joe Steele was convenor at the Standard No. 2 
shadow factory (Banner Lane). All of these men were CP members. 
Bill Tattersall (convenor at AWA) declared his support for the 
F&: ATSSNC in February 1944 (NP, February 1944. ) 
_4... 
Communist shop stewards committees is confirmed by the AEJ DC Minutes. 
In 1943, for example, the Standard Joint shop stewards (which covered 
all of the Coventry factories) sent two motions to the District Committee: 
one dealt with the need for a three power conference and the other with 
the 'friends of German fascism' in Britain. 
I The AWA shop stewards 
sent a resolution to the District Committee supporting the call made by 
the Confederation District Committee for a district meeting on the 
attacks being made on earnings, and in November called a meeting of 
convenors-themselves to discuss the release of Oswald Mosley. 
2 There 
were only,. -two other occasions that year in which there were clear 
indications-of'Communist activitys two motions calling for the affilia- 
tion of the CP to the Labour Party from Armstrong Siddeley and British 
Thompson Houston shop stewards, committees. 
3 Between July 1941 and the 
end of 1945, the shop stewards from the Standard factories sent eight 
motions to the AEU DC, the ANA stewards sent four, whilst no other 
factory sent more than one each. 
" 
Clearly, it was in these factories that the Communists were most 
confident of their'support, amongst the-rank and file* one solid reason 
for their confidence was the-part they had'played in organising workers 
into trade unions. Another was the gang system. '-- 
The gang system was a form-of wage payment, 'and did not therefore 
originate. with the CP, but all the circumstances indicate that they 
looked on the system favourably, and trued to spread and develop it along 
certain lines. The gang system appears to have been introduced into 
Coventry by the management at the Standard Motor Co. at their new Canley 
1AEUDC, 11 May, 14 September, 1943. 
2lbid., 11 May, 23 November, 1943. 
3lbid., 2 March, 1943. 
4AEU DC, 22 July 1941; 10 March, 12 May, 23 June, 21 July, 11 August, 
29 September 1942 2 March, 11 May, 14 September 1943; 18 January, 
12 September, 10 October, 19 December, 1944; 2 January, 1945" 
2, /6 
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plant. in 1922.1 - It. was' both-, a, form of wage 'payment and a method of 
organising production. - A'group of men working on a particular job 
contracted to perform the job in a certain number of hours, and any 
time ! saved' was-credited to them in-theform of bonus. The bonus 
was divided-between the'workers according to the number of hours worked 
and the basic rate of each-man. 
2 The work was organised by a chargehand, 
or 'ganger', -who was appointed by the management (though the consent 
of the-gang was. usuallyýregarded as necessary) and paid out of the 
gang's earnings in the same way as any other member of that gang. 
The ganger negotiated times with the rate fixers. Thus, the system 
differed from some other forms of sub-contracting like the 'butty' 
system worked in some coal-mining districts in-that the'ganger was 
both work supervisor and worker. He stood to gain the same amount as 
everyone else - in' negotiating with'the management, and did not simply 
pay his 'buttymen'-as. much, or as little, as he wanted. 
During the'1920s, this system was.. used'at the, Standard Motor, Co.,, 
at Herberts,, -. and briefly.: at Armstrong, Whitworth"Aircraft (in. 1927), 
with some slight variations in'its, detailed workings. It may'also have 
been used in other Coventry factories. in'this period. - It had'some 
clear-attractions for management in-a coercive labour market, in that 
the gangýwas a self-disciplining work group requiring little external 
1This account of the gang system relies on a number of interviews 
(with. Bill Warman, Harold Taylor,, Bill Wellings and others), -and on two printed sources S. Melmans Decision Making and Productivity 
(Oxford, 1958), which is a study of the system at Standard written 
from a managerial point of view; Dwight Rayton (pseud. ): Shop 
Floor Democrat in Action. A Personal Account of the Coventry 
Gang System (1972)l the reminiscences of an old AWA worker. 
25. Melman, op. cit., points out that this led to the extensive use 
of young workers in the 20s and 30s because of their lower basic 
rate. (p. 34). 
supervision; if a man did not pull his weight, the gang insisted on 
his removal, he was sacked, and another man taken on. 
1 In this sort 
of atmosphere, gangers tended to be task-masters first and negotiators 
second, rather than vice-versa. Thus, the gangers tried to increase 
piece work earnings by intensifying work on the gang, rather than by 
negotiating better times for the jobs. Several old workers from 
Herberts (where the system was at its worst from the workers' point 
of view) told the writer that they remember being sworn at, threatened. 
with the sack and even struck by gangers trying to extract more 
production before the war. 
Under these circumstances, piece work earnings tended to remain 
fairly static, only moving upwards if more production could be extracted 
from the gangs. Where the system did not work in this way because the 
threat of unemployment was less real, the gangers were weaker, or for 
any other reason, managements quickly became disillusioned with it. 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft provides a case in point. In 1927, some 
boys there asked to be allowed to work in this way, but the management 
were only prepared to allow a brief trial. The trial resulted in 
higher piece work earnings, and was therefore declared a failure. 
2 
These boys had shown the potential of the gang system in a relatively 
favourable labour market (certain types of skilled labour were still 
in demand at the factory, as they were throughout the aircraft industry). 
The system could be made to work in the workers' favour by emphasising 
the solidarity of the work group so that piece work times could be 
1Melman 
also cites another advantages the elimination of craft 
barriers. (pp. 61-62). 
p. 9. D. Raytong op. cit., 
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irnproved. It was readily evident to all the Worker G in a Eyane that it 
was in everyone°s interestG to obtain the best deal possible on every 
job in the a. ng. In this respect, it was quite different to individual 
piece work, where each worker was on his owns 
AF. unemployment dropped and workers became more willing to take 
I 
collectivo'action, the whole weight of a ; gang could be thrown into a 
dispute. 73ehind every small and individually unimportant piece work 
argur,; ent, the rate fir-, -or and foreman could see the possibility of the 
whole gang taking action. Piece work earnings in these factories could 
therefore be pushed upwards as better times were negotiated. 
Better piece work earnings and the problem of discipline in the 
gangs were closely linked. A, trade unionism developed, the shop stewards 
tried to gush the ;, angers in the direction of negotiating better time, 
rather than simply using the whip on gang membors. One of their problei: s 
until the late 1930s was the fact that gangers were appointed by manoemcnt. 
By the beginning of the war, this obstacle had been overcome, and the ' n« 
system was be.., -inning to work very much in the shop floor's favour. In 
mid-1940, the IiAP's senior technical officer was shocked by the situation 
he found at Armstron- : Jhit:: orth Aircraft: 
shop "This shop is the 10.113 SCANDAL I have yet come 
across.! ialf the men are doing nothing and the other 
half are doing women's jobs... the shops are in 
scandalous disordor... lack of disciplino. The 
management is obviously week. "A 
These remarks, whilst they forrl part of a technical report ostensibly 
deelin7 with org; nnisational and productive que., tions, actunlly throw 
Iight on the effect of the g; an4; system on productive discipline. Ulangs 
were able to determine how much they rrorked("Il, alf the men are ekoing 
nothhin,;... "); snd what they did('tthe other half are doing women's work"). 
The co. n.: cquonce was a loss of m onager. ial control ("The rianA6-, ment is 
obviously wreak"), leading to a "lack of discipline". In 1938, the stewards 
'LAB $/374.1i""port by : 1: 1.11 Scnior Technical officer ýýý, ý", i"to: i- B: a. uksjr'. ýý toc. June 1 j1bU. 
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had succeeded in establishing the principle that gangers were to be 
elected by their gangs rather than appointed by management* 
1 By 
detaching the gangers from the managerial structure, the AWA shop 
stewards created-. the possibility of, bringing them increasingly into 
their own sphere of influence. - Shop stewards and gangers co-operated 
in negotiating piece work: times just as they had before, but the gang 
members and shop, stewards. were now in a better position to prevent 
gangers from exercising managerial powers over workers. As the system 
spread from AWA-into other, Coventry factories, the principle of the 
elected ganger spread as an integral part of it. 
2 
As we have seen, -the gang system had 
been reintroduced at Armstrong 
Whitworth by 1938. In fact, the workers there had succeeded in 
persuading the management. to readopt it during the early 1930s as the 
changeover from wood to metal aircraft created serious. problems in the 
organisation of production. -The, company was therefore temporarily 
receptive to the idea. 3 From-AWA, the system spread to other Coventry 
factories, as aircraft-work, was introduced and-AWA workers taken on. 
aa 
Managements could see that the-AWAmen knew their-job in terms of 
aircraft work, and allowed them some autonomy in organising'it. At 
the same time, many factories retained large numbers of individual 
piece workers, and Armstrong-Whitworth Aircraft, Standard and Herberte 
remained the factories with the most extensive use of the gang system. 
4 
1K. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 114. -5. 
2Ibid. 
`Raytonj Op. cit., p. 9. 
4Minutes*of a Local Conference held between Coventry Engineering 
Employers Association and the AEU and CSEU, 15 Mays 1945" 
The-gang system provided an excellent channel through which the 
shop stewards in the Coventry factories could keep their ears to the 
ground to hear any rumblings on the shop floor, and take them up before 
they became earthquakes. At the same time, it allowed them to bring 
a good deal of pressure to bear on managements without striking, and 
this was how they were able to resist demands for reductions in piece 
work prices in some areas, and drive earnings up in others. Both of 
these points'are stressed by Harold Taylor, T&GWU convenor at the 
Standard Motor Co. for most of the wars 
"I liked it (the gang system - RC) because it was a 
good way of communicating, because it isolated 
problems that you could have a go at dealing with 
before it spread, because you went to the gang, the 
shop steward would call you in. The shop steward 
would see the ganger, and if they couldn't sort it out 
they came to the senior shop steward or convenor 
and they would says 'Here's a problem. ' If I 
couldn't deal with its I'd get the committee and 
say 'Look, there's a problem with this gang here. ' 
And very often we could sort it out. Or if it was a 
genuine grievance of some importance and significance 
to the whole of the shop, we'd drag it out and say 
'We're having a shop meeting about this, because 
we're not having this kind of thing. ' About some- 
circumstance, even about some problem of rate fixing, 
or interference with established procedures or 
restrictions of rights or things like that, and 
we'd drag it out and then the management retreated 
and we returned to the status quo. " 1 
.1 
Shop stewards under the gang system were thus able to be very 
responsive to their members needs, and at the same time to use the 
solidarity generated as a result to successfully bring pressure to bear 
on their managements. As Taylor suggested in the last sentence of 
his statement quoted above, it was a form of pressure which companies 
recognised as particularly powerful. What need was there, then, for 
striking? 
z zl 
1Harold Taylorf 12 April, 1976. 
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To summarise the argument so far. Coventry had smaller strikes 
thanthe Clyde, "because most-of them were concerned with relatively 
minor piece work issues. These strikes did not-occur in the better 
organised factories, but were scattered through the rest of the town, 
and-"were most'-frequent in the Humber-Rootes group. The less strike 
prone factories'were the Standard and Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft, 
which shared some important characteristics. Most importantly, they 
were the backbone of the Communists in the local engineering industry; 
although not by` any , means the only factories with CP stewards, they 
were the only ones, in which the'CP'felt sufficiently confident to pass 
regular' political motions`organise meetings, and so on. These factories 
were well ' organised= in' a trade union sense, and had the most widespread 
use of the gang system. It was this relative strength in shop floor 
terms which'. mäde them less strike prone, ', 
The other side of the coin should now be looked at if we are to 
go beyond an analysis dependent on a small group of unusual plants 
(the less strike, prone). '«'What features marked-, off the more strike 
prone? Were they, less well organised, less'well-paid, "and`so on? 
Some' of these' questions" can be' answered immediately. " As'we can see 
by reference to the Toolroom Minutes, they were'inIgeneral less well 
paid, with- the single exception of Rootes No. 2. Like all of the main 
factories in'the area, they used the-gang system,. but less than the 
Standard or AWA; they'-were thus more` reliant' on more traditional piece 
work'methods. ' At the Humbert'--the-shop stewards were plagued by an 
. unusually large , number. of domestic basic rates, and a great variety of 
work (staff cars, armoured cars, aero engines). 
' As far as Communist 
1John McPhee, 3 February, 1972. 
'i N 
influence is concerned, they were, like most factories in the area, 
amenable environments for CPers. In January 1945, John McPhee, a 
young Scottish Communist, became convenor at the Humber, whilst the 
Bootes No. 2 shop stewards were sufficiently CP-influenced to send 
in a motion on the Greek situation at the end of 1944.1 It appears 
that it had taken the CP longer to arrive in the Humber-Rootes group, 
butt they had finally reached their objective. 
.A very similar observation could be passed with respect to their 
progress towards 100% trade unionism, and the two features are probably 
related since unorganised workers obviously could not elect Communist 
stewards.. At the end of 1941, it was still necessary to hold an organ- 
ising meeting of one of the largest sections at the Humber, the Aero 
Engine Test (about three hundred workers), this at a time when the 
AWA and Standard factories had about 100% and 90% organisation 
respectively. 
2 The Rootes No. 2 was also a black spot for trade 
22-? 
unionism$ as we shall see. 
This, then, was the main contrast between the two groups of factories, 
and indeed between the high-earning, factories and the otherss trade 
union organisation. Even the most persuasive CP shop stewards held 
no sway over the unorganised, and they were sometimes reminded of it 
quite forcefully. 
There were several occasions on which shop stewards complained that 
the unorganised and recently organised were fond of taking strike 
action. These shop stewards may have been influenced either by their 
1AEIJ DC, 19 December, 1944. 
2lbid.,; 4 November, 1941. 
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Communism or by their conception of trade unionism in making these 
complaints, but it seems quite likely that their claims had some basis 
in reality. The two most strike-prone factories in the Humber-Rootes 
group (the Humber and Rootes Securities No. 2) had no women AEU shop 
stewards at all during 1943 and 1944.1 Of course, they may have had 
a large number of T&GWU women stewards, but later complaints about the 
lack of organisation seem to point away from such a situation. The 
men stewards did not seem to be able to control the aggressiveness of 
the women, even where they were members of the trade union. When they 
were not, the task was clearly more difficult. 
In Coventry, a relatively high proportion of the women employed 
in the factories were young, single women 'exported' from the North- 
East and Scotland. - Living in the hostels scattered around the town, 
hundreds of miles away from their families, they tended to have a high 
rate of absenteeism. 
2 One case in particular was taken up by, the local 
bench, when two girls from Scotland (who became known as 'the two 
Janes') were sentenced to imprisonment for persistent absenteeism. 
The case aroused considerable anger in the local trade unions, and two 
of the magistrates (Sidney Stringer and George Hodgkinson, both out- 
of-trade AEU members), were summoned to the AEU District Committee 
to, explain their actions. 
3 
1AEU DC r 1943-44" 
-This was remarked. upon by a delegation from the Scottish TUC's 
Organisation of Women sub-committee sent to the Midlands to look 
into the circumstances, of transferred girls in the area. They 
reported that the main group of girls in financial difficulties 
was those under 21. They also remarked on the lack of trade 
union organisation among women in some factories (Organisation 
of Women Committee Report to the 1943 Women's Advisory Conference, 
p. 44, in 1943 STUC Report. ) (TUC). 
3AAt Dc, 14 July, 1942. 
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The women's response was not solely on the level of apathy, however: 
they also sought collective solutions to the drudgery of wartime work. 
Single women in particular were active as shop stewards; in 1943, 
seventeen single women were elected shop steward, only slightly less 
than the married stewards, with twenty-one. Even in Coventry, where 
the proportion of single women was high, this seems to suggest an 
imbalance in favour of the single, 'mobile' women, who were more 
prepared to take out cards. 
1 With such small numbers, the question 
must remain open, but the Conciliation Officer, 'i reports are quite 
definite in asserting that the women in general were 'irresponsible'. 
In September 1943, he referred to a strike by women transferred to the 
Dunlop over piece work times, and explained it in terms of the fact 
that they were unused to factory life. In December, he noted that 
'indiscipline' was on the increase in the district, and that this was 
due to the recruitment of people with little or no trade union 
experience. He went ons 
"These new members look to their new alliance with 
organised labour as a means for promoting quickly 
their ends regardless often of the merits of their 
demands or the provisions of the Order 1305 etc... " 2 
As we shall see in the case of two strikes at Rootes securities No. 21 
the women were not simply interested in gaining higher piece work 
earnings. They were also quite adamant that they were not going to 
be subjected to 'indiscreet remarks' from supervisors, or any other 
a 
form of managerial insults, particularly when they had sexual overtones. 
1The 
national ratio of married to single women amongst women who 
started work in wartime was, by January 1944, over 512. (P. Inman, OP-cit., P. 491). 
z 2; 
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Even in the piece work disputes, it is possible to see a strong element 
of intransigence as the women made their mark on the workshop community. 
Two strikes at Rootes Securities No. 2 provide typical examples of 
stoppages by, female 'green' and, largely unorganised workers. At the 
beginning of SeptemberA942, the heat treatment section stopped work 
on a piece work dispute. Heat treatment of components, it should be 
pointed out, is. unskilled, work, involving labouring in poor conditions 
due to the heat, and the fumes from the chemicals used. It is therefore 
quite likely that these workers were new to the factory and quite 
_ý--ý-----ý --r--. 
possibly unorganised, since 'old hands' would try as hard as possible 
. ____ý- 
to move on to less unpleasant jobs. For the same reason, there would 
1) 
7 
probably be high labour turnover on the job, as new entrants tried to 
move off the job and into the machine or assembly shops. It seems 
,. ___. _- 
likely that this was the background to their refusal to deal with their 
grievance via a shop steward. They also rejected the advice of other 
stewards to return to work, but-eventually did so after being addressed 
by a union official who promised them immediate negotiations. 
' In 
this case, some of the workers involved may have been trade unionists, 
since they accepted the advice of the official although they had re- 
jected that of the shop stewards. The second strike definitely 
involved non-unionists, as the convenor admitted to the AEU District 
Committee that the section (the clutch section) was poorly organised. 
The strike occurred in January 1943, over an 'indiscreet remark' 
passed by a supervisor, and spread to the whole of the rest of the 
day and. night shift, despite the claim of the convenor that he had 
Zz6 
1LAB 10/352,5 September, 1942. 
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done his "utmost to'secure a resumption. "' One reason for the strike, 
and possibly a reason for its extension, was low wages on the clutch 
section (the original strikers). 
2 
Rootes Securities No. 2 was something of a peculiar case, because 
it contained'some of the highest earning skilled piece workers in the 
district, according to the Toolroom Minutes. At the same time, there 
was considerable discontent there about piece1work earnings. When the 
Conciliation Officer asked workers there to put their complaints in 
writing, petitions were received bearing a thousand signatures, and 
the complaints were "almost entirely concerned with the operation of 
timing operations and rate fixing". 
3 It seems likely that the more 
poorly organised sections were falling behind the skilled piece workers, 
and that wide differentials were causing problems of comparability 
within the plant. 
4 
Another aspect of the advantages of the gang 
system is thus negatively brought to light. The gangs, which the 
stewards constantly sought to enlarge, encouraged the unity of the work 
group in arguing for better piece work values. On'the other hand, 
where there was'more'individual piece work, better organised sections 
could make Greater-gains (especially'if they were organised in gangs 
and the others were not). If these better organised'seotions were 
also skilled, which seems'quite likely, they would be an even more 
1AEUýDCj 12 Januaryg 1943. 
2Minutes 
of a Works Conference held at Bootes Securities No. 2, 
15 December, 1942. 
3LA8 10/351.1 Novembert 1941. 
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4P. Inman, op. oit., remarks on the tendency for exceptionally wide 
differentials of this sort to occur in Coventry, p. 324. 
3r0r, 
acute source of. grievance to the others, because their higher basic 
-: rates would bring them even greater rewards 
than the less skilled could 
gain.. from the same values. 
, _Rootes, Securities No. 2-was, an unusual 
factory in that it combined 
. high earnings amongst 
the skilled piece workers with poor trade union 
organisation. There were, however, a number of reasons why the new 
. entrants to factories 
(of whom a high proportion were, of course, women) 
and the poorly organised should be relatively combative. Most 
importantly, perhaps, they entered a situation in which there were 
great possibilities for piece work bargaining, some of which were 
inherent in the situation, and some of which had been built up by the 
shop, stewards. But, theey did so without a great deal of respect for 
the restraint being urged, by many shop stewards. Crudely (and slightly 
unkindly: to them), it could be said that they had. the privileges of 
Coventry piece work without recognising any responsibilities to the 
stewards who had helped buildup these privileges. 
During the War, ýa large number of. favourable working practices-had- 
become established as custom-and practice in the Coventry-engineering 
shops. Taken; individually, these changes did not amount to'very much, 
but in toto,, they represented a substantial infringement of managerial 
prerogatives as they existed elsewhere. It is very difficult to compare 
piece work custom and practice.: in one district with custom and practice 
in another. It would be rash, for example, to claim that a certain 
practice was used in Coventry, but was not accepted elsewhere, because 
our inevitably incomplete-knowledge does not allow such categorical 
statements. An additional problem is that, almost by definition, 
these practices arose on an-ad hoc basis, and-were not systematically 
recorded. Indeed, managers, -even among themselves, often had a vested 
interest in keeping quiet about them, lest the wrath of the local 
Employer's Association was vented on them. Any description must 
? 2k 
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therefore be more impressionistic-than is desirable, but the numerical 
wage data exists - to back up the` impressions. 
The'employers were fond of quoting the practices of other districts 
when-negotiating with'Coventry trade unionists, and the-customary reply 
was not usually to' deny that local conditions were better, but to 
reject the comparative method. ' At a Works Conference in August . 1940, 
Stokes, 'the Divisional Organiser asserted this quite firmly: 
"... in a sudden outburst Mr. Stokes said "I want 
you to understand quite definitely that we, as 
representing the workers, are not going to have 
Birmingham's or any other district's conditions 
introduced' into Coventry... we don't care what 
happens in the rest of the country so that you 
must understand that quite definitely. " 1 
The employers' contention that Coventry's conditions were better (and 
indeed they improved considerably after 1940), seems. correct. One 
important example was the custom of "putting a job 'on the floor". 
All that this`meant`was that'if a piece work job, was considered un- 
acceptable to the worker for'any reason, he could"simply put it to one 
side. 
2""He'might do the job when other work was slack-4n preference to 
waiting time, or alternatively, the'employer might try another worker 
or another section, or even, if pushed, sub-contract the work to a 
small outside-shop. Another practice relating to piece work was to 
calculate piece work times on the basis of a reduced 'hour'. At a 
local Conference at the beginning of 1942, the Chairman of the Enployers' 
Association stated that 50 minutes was the standard 'hour' in Coventry, 
1Ninutes'of 
a Works Conference held at Rootes Securities No. 2, 
15 August, 1940. 
2Beep for example, a Local Conference of 1945, at which it was 
contended by the union that "putting a job on the floor" was custom 
and practice when a worker's right to do this had been challenged 
in the sawmill at the Humber Co. (Minutes of a Local Conference, 
1 April, 1945)" 
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and therefore, the bonus percentages quoted for Coventry should be 
increased by one sixth to obtain a realistic comparison with the rest 
of the country. 
1 A further blow for the employers was the extension 
of the, Toolroom Agreement to workers who were not intended to be 
included in it. Within less than a year of the Agreement's formal 
inauguration, at least two quite large groups of workers bargained 
their way into the Agreements the whole of the Coventry Gauge and Tool 
works, and the machine tool fitters at the Humber. 
2 In 1943, they 
were joined by another sizeable group: 'all the skilled inspectors in 
the district. 3 As the Humber management plaintively noted, their 
fitters were 'strictly not entitled to it' under the Agreement 
4 
which 
defined the recipients of the rate as "skilled operators... in... 
Coventry Toolrooms or skilled men who are transferred from production 
to toolmaking work in Coventry Toolrooms". 
5 The extension of the 
agreement meant more than just more money for these men. It also 
meant freedom from piece working, and less intense work. The employers 
disliked these extensions of the-Agreement not so'much because of the 
extra wages, but more because they led to reduced output. 
6 
I Minutes of a Local Confereäcel January 1942. 
225 
2C_, 15 December 1941; Minutes of a Local Conference, 6 February, 1941. 
3 C& PS, 26 August, 1943. 
Minutes 
of a Local Conference, 6 February, 1941. 
5Coventry Toolroom Agreement, 7 January, 1941. 
6COVEMPS, 
July 1941. 
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In addition to these working customs, there was continual negotia- 
tion and renegotiation of factory agreements on waiting time, lieu 
bonuses, merit rates, tea breaks, shift arrangements and so on. 
Disputes arising out of attempts by managements to repudiate these 
customs or refusing to negotiate new ones twice led to the threat of 
district strike action in 1943 and 1944. The first case was when the 
Humber management refused to renegotiate on a factory basis the 
existing (1936) provisions for waiting time. A protracted overtime 
ban failed to move them, and the Conciliation Officer thought there 
was the chance of district action, but the dispute went to arbitration. 
I 
In 1944, he again thought it possible that there might be an extension 
of a strike at Rootes No. 2 over an attempt by the Rooter management 
to establish that piece work jobs would be worked at time rates if 
rates were not mutually agreed, but the strike did not take plaoe. 
2 
Both incidents showed how important custom and practice, especially 
in piece work matters, was to the local stewards. 
There is another conclusion that can be drawn from these incidents; 
that although the stewards were clearly concerned with the attacks of 
an aggressive management (Humber-Rootes) they were not prepared to 
actually take district strike action. One reasons and probably the 
most important one, for this limit to their concern, was the considerable 
growth in size and influence of the CP in the local engineering shops 
and trade union bodies. 
1LAB 10/353.5,12,19,26 June, 1943. 
2 LAB 10444.31, March, 7 April, 1944. 
27/ 
The Midlands district of the CP had the lryrg etit increase in me, rnborshir 
of any district during the months immediately following the entry of 
Russia into the wargand despite problems 
high turnover of membera, the area 
uationallyBy 1544, a considerable 
were sufficiently close to the CP 
shop stewards held at the Elastic 
noted in 1; x; 0: "The Ccnui unist chop 
became 
number 
of 'paper' m. eriber; hi. p and a 
an important one for the CP 
of convenor. - . -nd ollop - steward$ 
to attend their reular meetinza of 
Inn in Lower Ford Areet. As J. A. Yate: ' 
stewards captured much of the leader. 3hip;: 
In 1944, nost of the important plants had Communist senior stewards or 
convenors: Bill ': Warman was convenor at the Standard flotor. Co., John lice Ice. 
was convenor at liumber, Jock Gibson and Bill Wellin;; s were senior stewards 
for the TG! "N in the Daimler parent and Fo. 2 shadow factories, respectivelyt 
and Bill Tattersall(not a CPertbut a close supporter and keen seller 
of the New Prore1lor)was convenor at Al;! Beyond their actual rieral)er> and 
close supporters there were a number of shop steward's committees 
willing to support their initiatives. Thu:, in Iiarch 1941, the t1-; U District 
Committee acceded to the request, of the AWA stewards that they 
circularize the district with collection sheets for the rebuilding of the 
Stalingrad Telephone Lxchange; by the following weel., nine convenors and 
twelve branches had returned the sheetsýOf course, the level of activity 
asked for was not high, but the response is interesting. 
How successful was the CP in translating; its strength among 
the stewards into influence on the district trade union bodic,? The Trades 
Council, a favourite CP stamping ground in Coventry as in other aroasiv, as 
dominated by the Communists during the war. In January 191+1 Bill 
IJarman, zt thc:. fi time a shop steti. ard at AWAftiras elect ed. Treawdcnt; 
---...... _. _.,.. _... _.. _.., 
13ý. Tti"i, priný; 3 ýý1: 'ý'ifýy `_ý'liauýand Corr. murtist,, ý in Týt! }P: ay 1942. 
2 J'.,;. Yates: Pioneer to Pot"rer(Coventry, 1950)0.93 
':: eo bio; raphies, 
AEU DC, 'l'E, 21 ll: archs1ý)44, 
ý_ ., 1 
, dirýý os Ltirý Ccývýýrýtxy '! 'rtýde,:, council, , yan. 1941. 
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and the President was a CPer for the rest of the War. 
1 The Coventry 
Trades Council did not, however, play a large part in shop floor 
affairs; compared with Manchester or Glasgow, it was strictly a talking- 
shop. Much more important were the District Committees, and especially 
the AEU District Committee, which was a more authoritative body in 
its union structure than the T&GWU or CSEU District Committees. During C' 
1942, the CP built on its earlier gains, and succeeded in getting a 
motion passed calling for the ban on the Daily Worker to be lifted. 
Of course, calling for the ban to be lifted was quite different from. 
ýV1ý' 
supporting the paper, but nevertheless, it represented a step forward*2 
By 1943, the District Committee had expanded to its maximum size during 
the War, with a membership of thirty, and it is possible to identify 
at least five CPers among them. In addition, Ernie Roberts returned 
to the Committee in September 1943, after a successful appeal against 
his suspension from office for twelve months. 
3 In 1944 and 1945, the 
left scored a considerable victory when Roberts was elected to the 
Presidency of the District. 4 
It was far from plain sailing for the CP however. In February 
1943, the DC asked the DC to deal severely with anyone involved in 
unofficial activity, naming the E&ATSSNC. 
5 Also at this time, a 
General Purposes Committee was set ups which strengthened the hand of 
1List 
of Presidents in Trades Council papers. 
2ABU DC, 3 February, 1942. 
31bid. 
f 8 September$ 1943. 
41bid. 
v 4 January, 19449 2 January9 1945" 
Slbid. 
j 9 Februaryp 1943. 
. 
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the local anti-Communist officials. Formally speaking, the function 
of the Committee was to sift business for the plenary committee. It 
comprised six members of the District Committee, plus the District 
Secretary, ex-officio. The CP never succeeded in having more than 
three members on the Committee, and the District Secretary was therefore 
continually able to determine what went before the District Committee 
and what was ignored. 
I The net result was that the District Committee 
was never decisively wrested from the control of the anti-Communist 
group. A gap was beginning to develop between the strength of the 
CP among the shop stewards and their rather weaker position on the 
AEU DC. One reason, the setting up of the General Purposes Committee, 
has already been mentioned. But perhaps the most important. cause of 
this disjuncture was the fact that the right wing was organised against 
the CP. Both Stokes and Taylor had been members of the CP, but had 
turned away from sympathy for the general aims of the Party. Armed 
with an intimate knowledge of the local 'left', they set out to combat 
its influence in the branches and on the DC. This came out in the 
open during 1945,. when a member was brought before the DC for having 
said that the Committee was "rotten" because it was divided between 
the Communist and anti-Communist groups. In discussion, the Committee- 
men had to admit that there was some truth in what he said, but that 
the groups should be re-named the "Roberts and Stokes-Taylor groups". 
Incidentally, they also heard that Roberts had been discussing a 
meeting of convenors to combat the influence of the right wing, an 
interesting tactic in that it showed where he thought his main support 
would come from. 
2 
1Ibid., 23 February, 1943. 
2AM DC, 18 January, 1944. 
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The situation'on the T&GWU DC seems to have been slightly different, 
reflecting the rather different relationship which the District 
Secretary, ` Jack Jones, had with the CP. Jones had been instrumental 
in reviving the District Committee in the early months of the War, 
along with his right hand man, the CPer, Jock Gibson. The T&GWU 
District Committee was thus revived by the left in a way that the AEU 
DC was not. The same applied to the CSEU District Committee, which was 
again set up by"Jones (who was President) and Gibson (T&GWU represent- 
ative)', who could set the tone of a Committee which comprised the local 
officials of all the small engineering unions. 
I The CP was thus able 
to establish its influence on the T&CWU DC more effectively than they 
were in the ALT. For example, the T&GWU DC passed a motion supporting 
I the CP's request'for affiliation to the Labour Party in February 1943, 
whereas two motions from branches to the same effect but to the AEU DC 
during February and March were rejected by°a motion of 'next business' 
on the first occasion and ruled out of order, the next. 
3 
The CP, although contained on the AEU DC by the right wing, consolidated 
and extended its control of important'shop stewards' committees. They 
used traditional CP methods to strengthen their position and that of 
the shop stewards, and similar techniques were used elsewhere, but 
Coventry saw their most extensive and effective application. The 
left wing had developed considerable strength in the Coventry shop 
stewards' movement by the end of the war. What methods had they used 
to build this strength up? Our answer to this question is divided 
into partss the first deals with the shop stewards' committees themselves, 
and the second with links between shop stewards in different factories 
under the same ownership. 
1J. 
rGibsonf 7 November, 1973. 
2DW, 11 February, 1943. 
3AEU DC, 23 February, 30 March, 1943. 
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The shop stewards of the Standard Motor Co. 's main factory at 
Canley became a model for Communists locally and nationally by their 
imaginative and effective tactics. Bill Warman, at that time a tough 
Sheet Metal Workers' shop steward in his early thirties and Communist 
convenor at the Standard, stresses today that the shop stewards took 
every, care to ensure the involvement of the rank and file in the business 
of the shop stewards' committee. He described one incident in which 
the company doctor refused to treat him because he was wearing a 
hammer and sickle badge on his overall. Warman left the room and 
reported the matter to the shop stewards' committee, who decided that 
the doctor must be sacked. The individual shop stewards took their 
collective decision back to sectional meetings, which endorsed it, and 
the doctor was sacked by the managing director, Sir John Black. 
I 
The Standard shop stewards sought to make their modus operandi well 
known in, the district, and they were able to build up a considerable 
reputation. At the beginning of 1944, an NUVB steward'at the Standard 
reported to his branch committee on the business there, and "gave a 
very interesting account of the methods-the Standard shop stewards 
and committee have for carrying out their business. " 
2_ 
The shop stewards at the Standard were slightly exceptional in that 
they combined all the new features of the shop stewards' committees. 
They had a convenor elected irrespective of union (something the AEU 
DC tried to avoid, insisting that only their stewards had the right 
to be elected convenor), a shop stewards' paper and regular meetings 
between the three main factories. In addition, they had the largest 
number of women shop stewards recognised by the AEU District Committee, 
1W. Warman, 3 April, 1974. 
2Minutes 
of the NUVB Branch Committee, 7 January, 1944. 
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with thirteen= elected during 1943 and 1944.1 Of course, other 
factories may have had more thorough T&GWU organisation amongst the 
women, but it is quite clear that the Standard had the best AEU 
shop steward coverage. Also, the shop stewards' committee was one of 
the few to have"a separate youth representative sitting with the shop 
stewards when matters of special interest to young workers were dis- 
cussed. 
;. Many other factories had at least some of these features. Several 
factories had 'shop" rather than union convenors, and at least four 
had regular factory papers (Daimler No. 21 Rootes No. 2, and the 
Humber Bulletin, which later became the Humber Clarion, and Armstrong 
Whitworth Aircraft). 3 Very few of these papers. have survived, but it 
is possible to gain some idea of what they were like from the few 
extant'copies`of the Humber-Clarion. Printed on glossy paper, it 
pröjected'a very professional image. Many-of the articles were of 
general political interest (on Russian engineers, for example) and 
were criticised freely in the letters column. 
4 Special editions were 
producedý(a May Day-1946-copy-was brought out in conjunction with the 
Trades Council) in addition to the fairly regular monthly editions. 
It`-seems quite likely that the papers produced for the shadow factories 
were also intended to cover the main factories, or that these had their 
AEU DC, 1943-44. 
2lbid., 8 February, 14 March, 1944. 
3AEU DC, 18 Januaryg 27 June, 29 Augustq 1944. 
I- 
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4Humber Clarion, Julyt 1945" 
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own papers, since. they were regarded by stewards as extensions of 
the main ("parent") factories. If this was in fact the case, then 
the majority of factories in the district had their own papers, a 
distinctive feature of Coventry. In any event, there were certainly 
strong links between the factories through the combine committees. 
The combine committees are the most important grouping of shop 
stewards by the end of'the War, and it is'worth looking at them a little 
more closely. They usually represented shop stewards' production 
objectives 
committees which had undergone a change in towards the end of 
the War. In November 1942, we can see one in action, when the Napier 
group of.. shop stewards wrote to the JPC at Sterling metals to protest 
against the large amount of scrap castings being sent them. 
' Several 
groups of factories in Coventry. had-this type of committee: the Daimler 
and Dunlop factories were two others apart from those mentioned above. 
2 
These committees had other possible uses, which were quite distinct 
from their ostensible function of improving production. The state of 
production itself could be used, for instance, ' to ascertain the chances 
of success in a piece work dispute, or to find out whether work was 
being moved from one factory'to another. Ultimately, they could be 
used for the co-ordination of strike activity, as the Daimler combine 
was in the strike there. By 1945, we can see the shop stewards 
beginning to feel the need to coordinate with their brothers at other 
factories under the same management quite keenly. At the Humber, 
the management complained that some shop stewards from the Stoke 
1COVEIPS, 30 November, 1942. 
2LAB 10/444,7 July, 1944" 
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factory had "commandeered" a staff car (they were made there) to drive 
up to Ryton to see the stewards on a matter of common interest. 
Before concluding the discussion of Coventry by describing two 
important strikes over redundancies, it is worth taking a mental tea- 
break to look back and forwards in the analysis. It has been argued 
that the political leadership in Coventry, in industrial terms, was 
invested in the group of factories dominated by the CP, which were 
also the best paid, and best organised in both piece work bargaining 
and trade-union terms. These factories were therefore crucial in 
orchestrating a unified response to the new problems posed by the arrival 
of peace. As it happened, the major attacks on jobs and conditions 
were concentrated on the weaker bodies of workers, and they had to 
defend themselves with the weapons at their disposal. The strikes 
showed that these weapons were quite sharp; the combine committees 
functioned well in exchanging information and co-ordinating action. 
But even these bodies were inadequate to the Herculean tasks which 
faced them. The local employers were determined that the wartime in- 
roads on their prerogatives should be wiped off the slate, and that wages 
should be reduced. They were helped in this by the continuation of 
wartime legislation which was used in the Humber strike by the newly- 
elected Labour Government to "hold the ring" for the employers, and 
by the fact that Coventry's conditions were unusually good. They hoped, 
with the aid of the Government, to isolate Coventry. They succeeded in 
this partly because the response in Coventry itself was less than 
wholehearted. In the end, the Standard factories were cut off from 
1Minutes 
of a Local Conference, 1 February, 1945" 
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the district, -and whilst-the AWA shop stewards strove manfully to perform 
. 
their traditional role, they were hamstrung by the defection of the 
Standard. 
The narrative has been anticipated slightly, but the second strike, 
at the. Humber,. took-. up where the Daimler strike left off, and the two 
, should therefore. 
be taken together. But first the Daimler strike. 
The strike was started because of information received by the shop 
stewards at the. Daimler factories in Radford that machinery was being 
moved from, the No. ,1 factory and installed at the No. 2 factory, which 
wasathen being taken over by-the Daimler Co. from the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production. The work involved, bus engine building, had been 
developed at the No. 1 factory, and there was now a disagreement over 
the rates to be-paid for the work. Clearly, the management was moving 
some of-the work in, the-hope-of weakening the bargaining position of 
workers - in the -No. ; 1-, factory and= of , imposing lower rates in the ' Na. 2 
factory-if-it-proved necessary-to move the work completely. Both 
factories demanded the full wartime'piece work'times and conditions, which 
the company refused, insisting on a downward revision of times. 
1 
A joint strike committee was'set up to conduct the strike, including 
delegates. -from all three factories. The strikers refused to see 
the 
management except through-the medium of 'their`committee. 
2 In other 
words, the issue had immediately broadened into the recognition of 
the committee as. the bargaining agent for the Daimler- workers. Had 
1CIIP, 8 January, 1946.. 
2Ibid. 
, 
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this been conceded, it would have represented a massive gain for the 
shop stewards' movement nationally, because no such committees were 
recognised by employers anywhere at this time. 
This strike had been more or less by way of a protest and only 
lasted just'over a day, 
I but it was only a dress rehearsal for a more 
serious stoppage just under a fortnight later. Demands were drawn 
up clearly: the men should be transferred with the work from the No. I 
factory to the No. 29 there should be a "fatigue allowance" of ten 
minutes in every hour when'fixing piece work times, war rates should 
be restored for inspectors, and the joint committee recognised. 
2 
At the beginning of the strike, the No. 2 factory was still working, 
but a mass meeting was held there and two days later they came out in 
support of these demands. On the AEU DCl a motion was carried calling 
a meeting of shop stewards to express their solidarity with the Daimler 
strikers. 
3 Incidentally, it is interesting to note how the balance 
of forces on the DC stood at this point: for the first time, a motion 
supporting the affiliation of the'CP to the Labour party was carried 
at the same meeting. 
4 
The 'joint strike committee ran an extremely active strike, calling 
frequent mass meetings to explain the developments in the situation 
to the rank and file: there were meetings on the 24th, the 28th and 
the lot of February. 
5 By this time, it seems that the strike committee 
had agreed to settle for something less than the original demands: 
no machines were to be moved until after a Local Conference, and piece 
1lbid., 10 January, 1946.. 
2lbid. 
j 22 January, 1946. 
3C IIr, 25 January, 1946. 
4AEU DC, 29 January, 1946. 
SCEr, 24,28 January, 1 February, 1946. 
290 
Z91 
rý: 
work times were to be calculated on the basis of a fifty minute hour 
at the parent factory only. 
1 These new conditions for a return seem 
to have been railroaded through the strike committee by Taylor and 
Stokes (who attended the strike committee) with the assistance of 
Barratt, the right-wing convenor of the main factory. 
2 
Neititer the mass of Daimler workers nor many of their stewards were 
willing to accept the terms. 
3 A mass meeting rejected them, and soon 
afterwards, the Daimler stewards decided to call a district meeting 
of stewards to put their case. 
4 By this time, the Humber was also 
in dispute over a piece work question, and a speaker from the Humber 
at the mass meeting had already suggested liaison. 
5 
The district meeting of stewards decided to go one better than 
the steward from the Humber and to call a one-day strike throughout 
the town in support. 
6 
Meanwhile, the Daimler strikers stood firm, 
refusing a proposed settlement little different from the formula 
previously rejected by them.? Their persistence was rewarded when the 
district strike took place on February 6th, and a mass meeting of 
6,000 workers heard a number of left-wing speakers. Andy Newman, 
CP District Committeeman was in the chair, and Bill Tattersall and 
1CET, 26 January, 1946. 
2Derek Cox, 18 April, 1973. 
3CEr, 30 January, 1946. 
41bid., 4 February, 1946. 
SIbid., 30 January, 1946. 
61bid. 
v 5 February, 1946. 
? Ibid. 
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Ernie Roberts among the well-known speakers. A motion was put for a 
further one-day strike, and was passed. 
1 
On February 10th, before the second district strike was due, the 
employers made a settlement with the strikers. The terms represented 
a considerable improvement on the original ones. Pre-strike 
conditions were to"obtain-at the parent factory, no machines were 
to be moved-and no redundancies announced pending a local conference, 
together with some alight piece work concessions at the No. 2 
factory. Joint negotiations were not conceded. 
2 Ultimately, the 
Local-Conference did not accede to the union's request for no move- 
ment of machinery, but piece prices were to be based on fifty 
minutes per, hour. 
3 
The Daimler strike showed the value of combine organisation, 
even though the committee was not recognised by the company. If 
the committee had not existed, then it seems possible that the strike 
would not have started at all. It was the effective exchange of 
information that led, to-, the'problem being spotted. More importantly, 
when the problem had been discovered, the committee was able to 
initiate action to solve it. 
On a district level, the CP gained a good deal of prestige from 
their role in the dispute. They had been the initiators of the 
combine committee, and they were also the leaders of the district 
strike. Finally, it seemed to give them a new lease of life on the 
1CET, 11 February, '1946. 
2Ibid. 
3AEU DC, 19 February, 1946. 
AESJ DC, where they had been able to have a motion passed calling 
a district meeting of shop stewards. 
We have already seen how the Daimler was by no means alone in 
having to cope with aggressive managerial tactics. The Humber had 
been on strike at"the same time as them, and over similar issues. 
But-there was an additional element of frustration on the part of 
theiHumber shop stewards, - who felt that their management had been 
especially obstreperous in their dealings with both stewards and 
officials. The high strike rate at the Humber-Rootes group of 
factories has already been noted, and from 1943 onwards industrial 
relations in these factories acquired a particularly abrasive tone. 
The-Works Manager's job went to a Mr. Pryor, who declared that he 
was not interested in domestic custom and practice, but only in 
observing the national'agreements. Accordingly, he attempted to 
destroy a large number of these customs, and to, encourage the foremen 
to follow suit. He replied to shop stewards'-protests with the, 
remark that-if"he had°wantedFhis foremen to act as wet nurses, then 
he would have equipped them with udders. Ultimately,: an unsuccess- 
ful strike-took place for his removal. 
1 
This, then, was the background-to the'Humber dispute, but the 
primary cause of the big strike of 1946 was-that-hardy Coventry 
perennial, piecework times, combined with a more recent problem, 
redundancy. ",.. The conjuncture of the two causes is important, because 
the connection between them was transparently clear to the Humber 
workers, in,. a way which it was not to the Daimler strikers (for whom 
'Minutes 
of a Local Conference, 1 February, 1945" 
redundancy was less of a pressing problem). Also, the strike was 
the first large dispute under the Labour Government, which gave it 
a national significance. The leaders of the strike in the district 
realised that the nature of the dispute and its timing made it an 
important test case. 
The Humber-Rootes management wanted to time all piece-work, jobs 
as laid down in the national agreement, i. e. to enable a man of 
"average ability" to earn 27.5% of his basic rate. They were 
therefore seeking to impose a wage cut of about 100% in most individ- 
ual cases. During January, a 'go-slow' started in protest. In 
retaliation, the company announced 1,300 redundancies at their main 
Stoke factory in February, announcing that this was the prelude to 
the dismissal of a total of 4,000 of 5,000 workers there. The 
Humber Stoke factory stopped work, followed by the Rootes shadow 
factories and the dispersal factory at Tipton, Staffordshire. 
The Essential Works Order was still in force, so the Ministry 
of Labour was able, if it wished, to suspend the notices through 
the Manpower Board, whilst negotiations went on. The shop stewards 
also instructed the 1,300 sacked to fill in appeal forms against 
their dismissal and to send them to the Ministry immediately. 
2 
Meanwhile, a "Coventry Workers' Dispute Committee" issued a statement 
declaring that there was no redundancy, and that "the declaration of 
redundancy by the firm is designed as retaliatory and provocative 
action. "3 The Dispute Committee met as required, and comprised 
1DWI 26, February, 1946. 
22bid. 
31bid. 
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representatives from all the main factories. It was chaired by the 
much-respected Bill Tattersall, convenor at AWA Baginton. 
I 
On February 25th, it became apparent that the strikers would need 
the support of this committee, because the Manpower Board announced 
that the redundancies would not be withdrawn for the one week 
that the trade union officials had requested to allow negotiations 
to-take place. 
2 The officials decided: to'contact the Conciliation 
Officers, who telephoned the Employers' Association. Through his 
mediation, the employers made an offer of sorts: redundancies 
announced on-, or before 23rd'February would stand, but those announced 
after this date-were to be suspended, provided that there was a full 
3 
resumption of work. As the Daily Worker correctly pointed out, this 
did'. not amount to very much, because about 750 redundancies had been 
announced after 23rd February. 
4 The stewards rejected the proposed 
settlement unanimously, stating that all sacked workers would have 
to be reinstated before work - would be-resumed. A further: meeting-,,, 
of Humber stewards held on: March 1 confirmed this resolution and 
requested the--AEU and. TGWU Executives. to meet: the Ministries of 
Labour and Supply. 5 They also decided to call a meeting of the Dispute 
John McPhee, 14 May, 1972. 
e- 
,. 2DWI 27 Februaryt. 
, 
1946. 
3u DC, 3 March, 1946. 
4DW, 27 February, 1946. 
5AEU DC, 3. March, 1946. 
Committee to=obtain solidarity action in the district. The Committee 
called a mass meeting of all Coventry engineering workers for 
March 3rd. 1 
The effective leadership of the strike was passing more and more 
into the hands of the unofficial committee, and away from the local 
and national officials. Locally, the AEU and Confederation DCs 
met two of the local-Labour MPs, Maurice Edelman and Frank Bowles 
to discuss "political aspects of the motor industry". In London, 
the Ws visited the Ministries. 
2 Neither meeting had any material 
effect on the strike. They may have raised false hopes among a 
section of the strikers, but they certainly did not deter the Humber 
stewards or the Dispute Committee from taking militant action. 
The Dispute Committee met immediately before the mass meeting of 
March 3rd, and was attended by representatives from fifteen factories, 
who pledged their 'full support'. 
3 Unfortunately, however, the 
support was not as full as it might have been, because the represent- 
atives from the Standard explained that they could not take action 
in a dispute which did not concern them, because they had reached a 
very, favourableýagreement with their management on the questions at 
issue in the Humber dispute. 4 The defection of the Standard was a 
devastating blow to, the strikers; to lose the support of perhaps the 
most respected and well organised'shop stewards in the town at this 
point can only be described as a disaster. 
1DW, 1 March, 1946. 
2CF7r, 2 March, 1946. 
3W, 4 March, 1946. 
4John. McPhee, 15 May, 1972; CET, 12 March, 1946. 
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- The'mass meeting of March 3rd took place in the worst imaginable 
circumstances, since the weather was truly appalling. There was a 
good, deal of'snow on the ground, and, it was still snowing. This did 
not deter between six and seven hundred workers (according to the 
Coventry Evening Telegraph) or three thousand (according-to the Daily 
Worker) from attending the meeting. 
1 On the following day, the 
Dispute Committee met with the. Humber'shop stewards, heard that the 
Ministry of Labour refused`, to intervene on the redundancies, and passed 
the following motions 
1) That the Bootes-Group acting through the Humber 
management is leading a general attack on Coventry 
wage standards, their insistence on 27.5% as a basis 
for fixing piece work prices is the first attempt to 
depress Coventry wages to national level. 
2) That the Ministry of Labour is declaring 1,300 
workers redundant at the instance of the Humber 
employers and have actively and unjustifiably 
interfered in a Trade Dispute. It declares that 
this position is of real and immediate danger to 
all igineers'in the District and can only be 
combatted by united and determined action by all 
. workers in the District. It further resolves that 
decisive action is necessary and calls for Strike 
Action. To that end, it demands that a meeting 
of all shop stewards in the District be convened 
to endorse this resolution. ". 2 
The DC of the AEU supported this meeting'of shop stewards, and 
called on the DC'to make, the strike official. 
3 On March 11th, the 
district's shop stewards heard. that the Executives had reached a 
solution that they werewprepared'to recommend: that those redundant 
men who had appealed to the Ministry would be reinstated. 
4 This was 
1Dw, CEP, 4 March, 1946. 
2AAJ. DC, 5 March, 1946. 
31bid. 
4lbid., 11 March, 1946. 
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rejected by the stewards, who reaffirmed that the only basis for a 
return to work was the unconditional withdrawal of all notices, and 
a "reasonable" basis for piece work negotiation. Thqyºcalled for an 
all-out, district-wide strike in support of their demands. 
I There 
seemed little doubt that they could carry this out, since there were 
four hundred stewards from eighty-three factories present, according 
to the Coventry Evening Telegraph, not generally a great user of 
hyperbole on such' occasions. 
2 
The date settled'on for the strike was Wednesday, 13th of March. 
On the 11th, the officials attended a meeting of convenors, chairmen 
and secretaries of shop stewards' committees, and persuaded them to 
accept the Executive's proposals as the basis for a return to work. 
3 
The next day, the Evening Telegraph went back on its earlier state- 
ment that the stewards accepted the Executive's settlement. 
4 The 
strike was obviously poised on a knife edge, and the Evening Telegraph 
was doing all that it could to tip the balance away from the strikers. 
The day before the strike was due to start, the paper again sowed 
the seed of doubt in the strikers' minds, when they pointed out that 
the Standard was unlikely to take part in the strike. 
5 
The AEU Executive, when it heard of the stewards' decision to 
escalate the strike, wired the District Committee instructing the 
Humber strikers to return, and the rest of the district to stay at 
work on Wednesday 13th. 
6 The pressure of the EC on the Committee 
AEU DC, 11 March, 1946. 
2CEP, 11 March, 1946. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., 12 March, 1946. 
51bid. 
6AEU DC, 12 March, 1946. 
allowed-the opponents"of the CP to regroup. The Committee passed a 
resolution that the Executive's decision be communicated to all 
stewards.! On Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, when shop 
meetings were being held to decide on whether or not to support the 
strike, the local officials worked "feverishly" to instruct the 
stewards to keep their members at work. 
2 
Consequently, the mass meeting was attended by only four thousand, 
and the Coventry Evening Telegraph gleefully displayed the banner 
headlines"80% IGNORE STRIKE CALL". The Humber shop stewards had the 
humiliating experience of conducting a "district" meeting attended by 
less workers than there were Humber strikers. 
3 
The Daily Worker tried to turn the debacle into a success; their 
first edition the next day called the E's intervention "timely" and 
went on to says 
"Had the all-city stoppage taken place as originally 
planned, in these new circumstances, it could only 
have complicated the Humber dispute which it was 
desiRned to help. " 4 
In fact, there were no "new circumstances" which justified the 
intervention of the ESC. The district's shop stewards had already 
rejected the Executive's proposed settlement. What was true was 
that the CP was unwilling to carry through the strike decision in the 
face of determined opposition from the national officials. 
It is perhaps a measure of the strike's momentum that it continued 
despite the setback. It was fortunate that it; did, because the 
1 
AEU DC 9 12 March, 1946. 
2CEI', 
13 March, 
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31bid. 
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strike had a fairy tale ending, complete with 1,400 knights in 
shining sheet metal. A mass meeting of the tightly organised Sheet 
Metal Workers decided to call a district strike unless the Humber 
dispute was-settled satisfactorily in the next few days. 
I At this 
poipt, the number shop'stewards saw their chance to move towards an 
acceptablefcompromise. They called a city stewards meeting, attended 
by 112lstewards, who passed a motion asking the District Committees 
to request their Executives to intervene in the cases of the original 
550 workers made redundant to see which of them wanted reinstatement. 
254rof them stated that they did, and the employers agreed to reinstate 
them.. The other workers, sacked after the original 550, were to be 
reabsorbed within three weeks. Negotiations reopened on piece work. 
2 
The Daily Worker; carried the Headlines"Humber Diapute aids with 
Workers', Victory""when the settlement was announced, and there was a 
good deal of justification for their characterisation of the outcome. 
The company had b eenýforced to=climb-down completely on redundancyt 
and piece work earnings amongst the-skilled did not show any decline 
immediately after 'the strike.. 
To the strikers, -of-courses the-way, in-which the strike had been 
won was-immaterial, and there is no doubt that their dogged defence 
of established conditions contributed to Coventry's post-War prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the strike had been won in a curious way. The strike 
threat; by the small-but vital group of Sheet Metal Workers undoubtedly 
swayed the balance of forces decisively towards the Humber strikersq 
but it was only after the threat of action by the mass of engineering 
1DW, 15 March, 1946 (first ed. ). 
2AEU DC, 19 March, 1946. 
3DW, 20 March, 1946. (first ed. ). 
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workers had been averted. In a sense, although a victory, the settle- 
ment was almost gained by sleight of hand, because only the Sheet 
Metal Workers had the ability to decide the strike apart from the 
districtts workers as a whole. Their intervention was as unexpected 
as it was effective. Neither the Daily Worker nor the Evening 
Telegraph-anticipated it; all eyes had been on the body of engineering 
workers. 
Finally, it is necessary to summarise the salient features of the 
Coventry shop stewards' movement during the War before going on to 
develop comparisons with the Clyde. Coventry had experienced a 
huge expansion in industrial capacity during the rearmament period, 
which created a pool of unorganised labour in the town, thus making 
the national problem of victimisation even more pressing there than 
elsewhere during 1940. To a large extent, this problem faded into 
the background during 1941, as trade union organisation improved. 
The concerns of the shop stewards shifted from being primarily 
connected with victimisation to being associated with piece work. 
Comparatively good pre-War. conditions were built on via a proportion- 
ately large number of small strikes and sanctions taken to improve 
piece work earnings and conditions. There were two main devices 
used to power this dynamic: the gang system and the Toolroom Agree- 
ment of 1941. These devices were used throughout the district, but 
their most extensive and effective utilisation was to be found at 
the leading Communist factories (Standard and AWA). These factories 
were the best paid and the best organised in trade union terms; they 
were also the least strike prone. Communist shop stewards had been 
able to argue against strikes very effectively, because they could 
demonstrate that the tactic was not needed. In fact, these factories 
appeared to be proof of the CP contention after July 1941 that strikes 
were unnecessary in the fight for improved conditions. Strikes 
ýýo 
mainly occurred alonst unorganised and poorly organised workers in 
the latter period of the War, who did not have the respect for the 
shop stewards who had organised large sections of the workforce 
previously. 
The continual process of trade union organisation during the War 
gradually reduced the number of unorganised workers, but the arrival 
of peace stimulated the employers to new attacks on established 
working conditions through redundancies. Coventry was the only town 
under consideration here to resist these attacks effectively. Led 
by a district organisation of shop stewards and by strong combine 
committees, a large part of the gains made during the liar was 
preserved. 
The Communists had been to the fore in all these events at least 
as much as in any other district, and it is worth looking forward 
to the history of the Clyde stewards here to say that the oppositional 
elements were very small and ineffective in Coventry. The CP had 
led the stewards in the successful defence of an important convenor 
in 1940 by using a prestigious shop stewards' committee, and this 
committee was to lead their anti-strike policy in the second half of 
the War, as it did the redundancy strikes in 1946. This was, of 
course, one reason for the CP's success. But just as much as this 
positive explanation resting on their actual achievements, there was 
also a negative one: the CP factories were almost completely isolated 
from industrial discontent. Unorganised workers, as the CP had 
themselves discovered during the 'Third Period', were not the best 
foundation for building a militant industrial opposition to the 
existing leadership. Still, the Humber strike put a serious dent in 
the bodywork of the previously immaculate reputation of the CP.. dominated 
Standard factories. Over the next ten years, rust entered the dent, 
and the district became a stronghold of the right wing. 
* *0 
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°_' Unlike the three other districts under consideration, Manchester 
was not dominated by the engineering industry. The various branches of 
the engineering-industry employed less workers in the town than did the 
textile industries taken as a whole. 
1 The cotton mills were extensive 
employers-of female labour in particular, and it is this that accounts 
for Lancashire's relatively high proportion of working women (44% in 
1931, compared to 39.8% in Warwickshire, the next highest), 'and 
relatively low=share of domestic servants (11.1% compared to the next 
lowest, Warwickshire's 14.4%). 2- This is an important factor when 
considering the social impact of unemployment in the area; many families 
could-fallback on one of the women's earnings in times of male 
unemployment, and hope to avoid the. Household Means Test. 
Diversity°of industrial structure probably helped Manchester to 
avoid the levels of unemployment reached in the North East and, 
Scotland; -the, monthly. average in 1932 was 18.7% compared to Newcastle's 
26.7% and-Coventry's 15.1%. 3 The internal structure of the, engineering 
industry in the town 'was 'very diverses locomotive building (Beyer 
Peacock and Ferguson Pailin), -the. motorindustry'(Fords and Crossley 
Motors), electricalý. engineering-(Metropolitan Vickers, Ferranti, 
Salford Electrical'Instruments), textile machinery (Mather and Platt, 
Ddbson and Barlow), wire-drawing-, (Richard Johnson's), and machine 
tools (Churchill Machine Tools) were all well represented. 
4 The town 
was therefore much less reliant on the more depressed branches of the 
2a'1 
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engineering industry than the North East and Scottish toms, then, 
although it was-not as prosperous as Coventry, 
aWorking people, perhaps partly because of the poor housing position 
in the town as`well as unemployment, seem'to have b een'quite willing 
to leave'for'the South. " As we have'seen, they provided Coventry with 
its largest`' source of immigrants after Wales, and the town's population 
decreased by 3: 4% between`1931 and 1938 to a total of 766,311.1 
During the late 1930s, 'Manchester'benefitted from several Government 
contracts, and the local engineering industry'began to revive. The 
main'beneficiaryhý; of this revival was the aircraft'firm A. V. Roe, 
who Banded into several old mills around the town as their existing 
plant at Newton, Heath became inadequate. 
2 They were'already laying 
the foundations of their wartime importance in aircraft manufacture 
when they were to employ over-35,000 workers. 
3 The Vulcan Foundry 
Co. ýwas rescued from likely bankruptcy by a tank contract, 
4 
and Fords 
given an important)aero-engine contract. 
5 
-Metro-Vickers'alsor extended 
their Trafford Park factory for aircraft manufacture: 
6 
The, Manchestsr, district's"engineering factories were', very quiet 
in'terms, of strike; action between the *outbreak of 'War and` the beginning 
of 1941. ">a It was. almost as if the ''Phoney War' atmosphere"had' pene- 
trated into' the class war, -and become so firmly implanted there that 
I 
'Fogarty, 
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it could only. be removed by°a major explosion of militancy like the 
apprentices' strike of March 1941. Very few working days were lost 
through strikes, 516 in four disputes, compared to Coventry's 10,646 
in six. So struck was the local Conciliation Officer with this state 
of affairs that he remarked on it four times in only five months, and 
refrained from tempting fate by proferring an explanation of the 
emptiness of"his 'In' tray.. It is difficult to find'an adequate 
explanation of. why virtually nothing happened, but there was an air of 
expectancy in the town during the early months of 1940, which almost 
turned to relief in the autumn when it was seen that Coventry was to 
be the object. of Goering's fury rather than Manchester, as had been 
widely expected. 
' Of course, Manchester was bombed from November 1940, 
but by April 1941, the Southern centres of the aircraft industry had 
received a much heavier battering than those in the North. 
2 In that 
month, two-girls from the Blackburn Telephone Exchange, Doreen Atkinson 
(19) and Dorothy Cresswell (20) volunteered to change places with two 
girls in London for three months,. sayings "It's not fair that they should 
have to suffer all, that while we're=safe up here". 
3 Needless to say, 
they were not followed by masses"of. engineering workers, but engineers 
seem. to. have been willing enough to°temporarily suppress their 
grievances in the, interests of the War effort, partly because it 
seemed that workers in other parts of the country were experiencing what 
1William Rust, in his CP pamphlet "What's Wrong With Lancashire? " 
(nd., but late 1930s) had expressed this sort of anxiety',,; 
during the period in which the bombing of the Basque town of 
Guernica by the rebels in the Spanish Civil War had attracted a 
good deal of attention. 
2Caldsr, 
op. cit., p. 236-238. 
'Xanchest 
er; en inR News, 9 April, 1941. 
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they had themselves expected. The strikes which did occur were not 
primarily on specifically wartime issues (unless we include the high 
rate of inflation-of the first year of the war in this category). 
Three of the four were on wages issues, whilst one was over the sacking 
of a fitter at A. V. Roe. The strike at A. Y. Roe only lasted one day 
and was ended by the district officials. It is true that on the 
fringes of Manchester, at Brockhouse IIigineering, Stockport, and at 
Forthern Aircraft at Ashton-under-Tyne, there had been much larger 
strikes over the victimisation of shop stewards, but these had not 
been taken up by the Manchester stewards as a body. 
1 
In this situation, the Manchester CP seemed to develop a temporary 
industrial blindspot. go immersed were they in other matters, that 
they failed to send in any reports on the strikes that did take place. 
This included the biggest strike in Manchester in 1940, a sectional 
strike over piece work at Metro-clickers lasting nine working days in late 
0otober`early November. -W y did they pass over this opportunity to 
help publicise (and thereby gain support for) a strike? 
One possible explanation may be discarded from the start. It was 
certainly not because they did not have the human resources to contact 
the strikers and to interview them for the paper. Metro-Vickers was 
in fact one of the strongest CP factories in the district. There were 
a number of other factories in which the CP was strongs A. V. Roe, 
which had sent the largest single donation of any aircraft factory 
to the Rolls-Royce grinders' strike of 1937,2 Gardner's Peel Green, 
where the Communist Arthur Walmsley had fought as AEU convenor for 
ILO 34/55 " 
2c7 
2P April-Kay 1937" 
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full trade union organisation for six years, 
' 
and Crossley Gas ngines, 
Openshaw, which sent regular donations to the Worker's Fighting Fund. 
2 
There were also several groups of members and sympathisers in other 
factories, and among the professional middle class. The Daily Worker's 
Fighting Fluid acknowledged contributions from the staff of the Manchester 
Guardian, a group of medical students, and some workers at the English 
Steel Corporation. 3 
Indeed, 'Manchester was something of, an Bhglish equivalent of the 
Clyde as'far as Communist culture and activity was concerned. It was 
at the Free Trade Hall, Manchester in March 1933 that Oswald Koeley had 
been forced for the first time to close a meeting at the request of 
the-police because of the crowd's hostility towards the Blackshirt 
4 
stewards. The Manchester Communists and the humanitarian left 
generally were later very active in their support of the Spanish 
Republic. Large meetings. were held with prominent Liberals-like 
P. K. Oliver on the platform, engineers worked overtime to send much- 
needed machine-tools and munitions to Spain, money was collected to' 
fill a foodship, and a large body of volunteers travelled to Paris 
to join the British Batall'ion5In the evenings, . the meetings' of 
the 
Left Book Club flourished, with over six hundred registered members. 
'See biography of 'A. Walmsleyq p. 588. 
2DWt 19,26,30 November, 1940- 
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Mary of these'people retained an interest in Marxist ideas despite 
Gollanca's sharp disagreement with the CP over the nature of the war, 
and could still be seen browsing through the extensive stock at Collett's 
Hanging Ditch Bookshop during 1940.1 At the and of July, 1940, the 
OP was able to hold an impressive meeting to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the foundation of the CP. It was attended by three 
thousand people, who donated L327 to Party funds. 
2 
It was this high level of support for the CP in Manchester that 
led the'CP to decide to hold'the People's Convention at the Free'Trade 
Hall. Their plans were thwarted at the last minute by the Luftwaffe, 
who first damaged and-then destroyed the Free Trade Hall during the 
mid-November raids. Either an alternative venue had to be found in 
Manchester, or the host town changed. 
Up until late November, when it was decided to switch the Convention 
to London, Bill Whittaker, the District Organiser, worked frantically 
to co-ordinate the Party's work on the council and in the trade unions. 
3 
The Labour councillors-and other left-wing dignitaries could be mobilised 
comparatively easily, since they only had to sign the manifesto, but 
the shop stewards had to be persuaded'of the importance of enlisting 
workers' support'. D. N. Pritt, the leading figure in the Convention 
campaign, visited Manchester to stress the importance of the Convention 
and to explain precisely what was required. A small room was hired, 
'E. Prows 3 Deaember$ 1974. 
2DW, 30 duly, 1940. 
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but it soon became clear that the stewards were eager to help, because 
Pritt. was hardly able to find any room to stand by the end of. his speech. 
All this helps to provide us with the answer to the question 
posed earlier in relation to the Party's inactivity in the industrial 
field. Jack Owen, the Councillor, engineer and Daily Worker reporter, 
was working at Vickers-Armstrong and organising support from four other 
councillors in Manchester and Salford. 
2 Nor could the Metro-Vickers 
stewards themselves do, very -much 
in this directions whilst the dispute 
was going on, the leading trade unionists in the plant were organising 
support for a mass meeting to elect delegates to the Convention.. The 
Worker praised their activities, and the praise was well-deserveds 
six hundred engineers attended the meeting, heard Jack Oxen, Bill Rust 
and the Reverend Etienne Watts speak, and elected twenty-five delegates- 
Meanwhile, shop stewards at Gardner's and A. V. Roe followed suit. 
4 
If they had been disappointed that. the Convention had to be moved to 
London, it did not show. 
These activities may have distracted the CP shop stewards from 
publicising a strike in their own, back yard, but they did not prevent 
them from continuing their. tradition of organising in the trade union 
branches.. They had not yet succeeded in taking over the AEU DC, but 
they were soon able to obtain much better results than they had done 
only just over a year previously. In March 1939, the DC had refused 
to support a strike at Gardner's Peel Green works. The strike was the 
1D. N. Pritts Autobiography, vol. 1, From Right to Left (1941), 
pp. 247-8. 
2IJtj Novemberl 1940. 
3Diiq 12p 17, December, 1940. 
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culmination of a long drawn out battle to organise the factory, and 
focussed-on a`'demand for the removal of a non-trade unionist on the 
drilling section. The shop stewards pledged their support to the 
strikers, but the DC said that it could "neither condemn nor condone" 
the strike. 
I 
At this time, Eddie Frow, already an experienced trade unionist, 
was shop stewards' delegate to the District Committee, and he was 
joined by a'young intransigeit='of a shop steward from Metro-Vickers, 
Hugh Scanlon. They were'the-only two members of the Manchester DC of 
the AMU to support the People's Convention, but they were able to 
push a resolution through calling for the removal of Chamberlain, the 
formation: of, -a 'People's; Covernment', the conscription of wealth and 
the nationalisation of key industries, and one calling on the EC to 
see that the Factory Acts and adequate rest periods were observed. 
2 
By December, they were able to go beyond resolutions and to get the DC 
to support the mass meeting called by the ETU Committee-(prompted by 
the left-wing District Secretary, ' Jenkins)'in protest-against the 
refusal, of the Engineering Employers to grant the national pay claim. 
3 
The CP was no less active on. the Trades Councils but it came under 
some heavy'fire from the Labour Party delegates which all but sunk it 
without trace. The defeat was all the more heavy for the fact that 
the Manchester and Salford Trades Council was a body of some influence 
and prestige. It had been involved in an engineers' strike in 1931, 
1Eccles 
and Patricroft Journal, 24 February, 3 March, 1939. 
2D-Wt 8 August 1940. 
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had organised substantial financial help for the wiredrawers' strike 
at Richard Johnsosds between 1935 and 1937,1 supported the 1937 
apprentices' strike, and was later involved in engineering strikes in 
1942 and 1943.2 The continuous involvement of the Council in 
. r. engineering disputes was a reflection of the relative immaturity of 
shop floor organisation. In Coventry, where the shop stewards were 
stronger, the Trades Council played little part in any strike during 
the 3083 (although it did support the apprentices in 1937) and when an 
inter-union problem was raised by a delegate from Armstrong Whitworth's 
in 1942, he was told to refer it to the shop stewards' committee. 
4 
During the last months of 1940, the CP made strenuous efforts to 
secure the support'of the Trades Council for the People's Convention. 
In December, matters came to a head when it appeared likely that they 
would succeed. 
5 The General Secretary of the TUC attended and managed 
to persuade the delegates against such a course. Trouble then arose 
over the nomination of Tom Brown of the National Union of Clerks as 
President for 1941 because it was pointed out that Brown was a member 
1Nick Jenkinss Time and Motion Strike, Manchester 1939-3. (Our 
History seripsý Autumn-1974, p. 23. 
2Reports 
of the Manchester and Salford Trades Council, for 1931, 
1937,1940,1942,1943" 
3See 
also the list of affiliated branches in the Report for 1930. 
No less than twenty AEU branches were affiliated. In 1930, the 
Coventry Tradsa Council hardly existed, because it was split 
between a CP "Provisional Industrial Council" and the rump of 
the Council proper. (Minutes of the Midland Bureau of the Minority 
Movement, 21 December 1929,22 February 1930). 
'Minutes of the Coventry Trades Council, 2 April, 1942. 
SDY9 23 December, 1940. 
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of the Society for Democratic Aid, a proscribed organisation under the 
'black: circular'. His nomination was refused on the casting vote of 
the President. - The TUC-then decided to suspend the Trades Council, and 
a meeting between the non-CP delegates and the TUC decided to expel 
eleven members. 
' 
`. Of course, some of these delegates later reappeared, 
but-the-anti-C? , faction did not take this lying down, and they 
threatened to. aecede in 1943, when motions for the opening of a Second 
Front were being, proposed. 
2 
' 
Up-to this point, the tempo of strike activity in the local factories 
had been very slow, and'served only to reinforce the already established 
pattern of left-wing'activists working through their branches and 
district bodies rather than on the: shop floor. The CP shop stewards 
had used-their influence on the shop floor to the full in support of 
the People's Convention, but in the process had done less than they 
might have'done to publicise the strikes which did take place in 1940. 
They continued their work on the-, district bodies, and"on balance-made 
headway, since. their successes on the`ETU`and AEU DCa must outweigh 
the defeat on the Trades Council. Even-the Trades Council setback, 
which was admittedly quite comprehensive, had occurred because of the 
apparent imminence of their carrying-the day, and only then through the 
intervention of the-TUC itself. 
The Manchester apprentices' strike of Rarch-April 1941 changed the 
whole atmosphere of non-militancy which had characterised industrial 
relations in. Manchester_up to that point. The strike was remarkably 
1L. Bather, "A History of Manchester and Salford Trades Council" 
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Manchester, 1956), pp. 210-212. 
2Labour's Northern Voice, January, 1943. 
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solid, and over seventy thousand working days were lost (twice as many 
as in all the other wartime strikes in the district added together). 
The apprentices showed how district action could bring results, and 
how difficult it was for the trade union officials to bring them 
under control in the face of such militancy. It required the first 
prosecutions under the Order 1305 to end the strike. 
The apprentices"grievances were initially the same as those of 
apprentices all over the countrys an inadequate share of an already 
small national pay award to the adult workers. The Clyde apprentices 
had taken the lead in recognising the need for a national response, and 
had travelled south to call for strike action in support of their 
demands. Barrow struck almost immediately, and the Scottish lads 
went on to Manchester, where they met apprentices from Metropolitan- 
Vickers. It was agreed that they would stop work on the 19th March, for 
the Clyde demands. I - 
The Metropolitan-Vickers apprentices stopped work as they had 
promised on the 19th, but. they returned-the following afternoon on 
the advice of the local-officials, who told them that a national 
application'for an. advance was. under way. 
2 By 26th March, it appeared 
as if the strike would peter out in Lancashire, as. the Barrow lads 
returned to work that day, and there were just seven hundred strikers 
left, in Rochdale. The Rochdale lads had waited for the outcome-of 
the national negotiations, and when they heard it realised that it was 
1LAB 10/379" 22 ýarch, 1941. 
2W 
2lbid. 
inadequate in one important senses Lancashire apprentices in their first 
year would lose money if they were paid at 25% of the adult rate. 
The Rochdale apprentices travelled to Manchester to point this 
out to their Manchester counterparts and, in the words of the 
Conciliation Officer, to 'stir up trouble'. 
2 They certainly succeeded 
in stirring up some trouble, too, because they managed to persuade the 
apprentices at A. V. Roe to come out, and to hold a mass meeting to 
decide on further action. The meeting heard the Rochdale lads, and 
decided onstriking. The rest of that day and the morning of the next, 
the apprentices worked hard to bring the other lads out as quickly 
as they could. Shouting in to their friends at work, visiting them 
at home on the evening of the 27th, and meeting them at the gates 
during. the dinner break the next day, they asked them to attend 
another mass meeting. 
3 The meeting was attended by three thousand, 
and beard Kenneth Warburton, secretary of the strike committee, 
explain fully the reasons for the strike and urge them to only 
listen to their committee... Several other lads spoke, including 
one Fred Withers, who proposed that the employers be allowed a 
week to "think it over", but the meeting rejected his proposal. 
4 
By that evening there were nine thousand lads on strike, and the 
local officials were concerned. They held a meeting at which they 
tried with the backing of the AM DC to get the strike called off, 
1LAB 10/379,29 March g- 1941. 
2Ibid. 
4Trial 
report in Manchester Evening News, 8 April, 1941. 
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but they were howled down. Since the officials had failed, the 
Conciliation Officer saw no other way of ending the strike than by 
prosecuting the strike committee under Order 1305. Gaining the approval 
of the Ministry, he had them charged on the Friday night. 
I 
The strike 
was ended, and on the following Wednesday, the local employers agreed 
to negotiate locally on any apprentices inadequately covered by the 
national-agreement. 
2 Probably because the strike had already ended, 
the six members of the strike committee were bound over. 
3 
The keen activism of the apprentices and their willingness to use 
the district strike weapon threw into sharp relief the passivity of 
Manchester's adult engineers. Although the adults had not played 
any great part in the dispute, the lessons in terms of the effectiveness 
of district action were certainly taken to heart by a significant group 
of stewards. 
Within days of the apprentices' strike ending, we have the first 
indication of the Conciliation Officer's concern with an unofficial 
district body of shop stewards, 'the Manchester Shop Stewards' Council. 
The cause of the activity was the sacking of some sheet metal workers 
from Northern Aircraft, Ashton-under-Lyne, who could not find work in 
the Manchester district because they had previously struck work, and 
had earned themselves a collective reputation as 'troublemakers'. 
The shop stewards' council-called a meeting, where it was decided that 
the sheet metal workers should withdraw all dilutees in the sheet 
metal shops until the men were found work in the Manchester district 
1LAB 10/379,29 Karch, -1941. XW, 4 April, 1941. 
21gNq 8 April, 1941. 
SLAB 10/379.12 April, 1941. 
(and they were adamant that this did not include Barrow, to which 
isolated town the Conciliation Officer had already kindly offered them 
a one way ticket). If withdrawal of dilutees, did not have the desired 
effect, then all the sheet metal workers in Manchester would have to 
strike. In fact, -the threat was, quite sufficient, as all the men were 
placed. 
1 
- 
The incident is interesting because it shows that the district's 
shop stewards-did-not feel themselves able to offer any practical 
assistance at all to the Northern Aircraft men, let alone a sympathetic 
strike. The sheet, metal workers were advised to work through their 
own, tight-knit craft organisation. The Shop Stewards' Council could 
see clearly what was required, but was not able to put it into practice. 
The Conciliation Officer was still able-to write in November 1941 that: 
"We have not so. far heard very much of the 
unofficial shop steward movement in this 
area. " 2 
The Shop Stewards' Council had obviously not acquired much of. a. _. 
reputation in the 'Imperialist War' period. 
The Manchester shop stewards had,. been troubled by victimisations 
like their opposite numbers in Coventry, as the small A. V. Roe strike 
and the Northern Aircraft affair had shown. However, they had been 
much lees successful in defending themselves. Why was this? It was 
probably not because of the AEU DC's attitude towards unofficial bodies; 
the committee did not (unlike the CSEU DC) publicly oppose the apprentices' 
strike. Part of the reason must be the low level of domestic strike 
1LAB 10/379.12,19. Apri1,1941. 
2lbid. 
1 1 Novembert 1941. 
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activity, which can in turn be related to the very poor state of trade 
W- 
union membership in the engineering factories in Manchester. 
Manchester's-state of organisation contrasted starkly with that 
obtaining in Coventry. By the end of 1940, there was not one single 
Coventry factory=without a shop stewards' committee. Before the first 
group of shadow factories had-been built in 1937, the Midland stewards 
had: been'steadily-eating-into non-unionism in every major factory, and 
had-passed the stage of using the Trades-Council to set the ball 
rolling. In Manchester, on the other hand, the Trades Council was 
still initiating organising drives. In the autumn of 1937, -the Secretary 
of=the Manchester and Salford Trades Council, Jack Munro, told the 
Manchester Guardian=thats 
"There was certainly good ground for such an 
effort, as there was an enormous number of 
workers... outside the unions. " 1 
Nor was Munro referring only to textile factories and the like; 
sizeable engineering works like Salford Electrical Instruments and 
the internationally infamous Fords were hardly touched-by trade ,` 
unionism at this time, - As;, -Royal OrdnancwFactories', sprung up at the 
beginning of the war, the overall situation deteriorated: " At-the 
beginning of °1943 (when Fords had at least agreed to negotiate with 
union officials and was not therefore strictly an 'open shop'}, 
2 
the 
Conciliation Officer reporteds ` 
"Another surprising feature of our work just 
now is the number of quite large establish- 
ments where the workpeople are unorganised. 
1lQanahester Cuardiang 11 Septemberl 1937. 
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2This 
was as a result of pressure exerted by the Ministry of 
Labour in late 1941 (LAB 10/379: 11l 27 October). 
The reason offered very often is that the 
employers will not allow trade union-membership. 
We had a deputation this week from one factory 
making shells where there are various skilled 
workers in addition to the women operators and 
we are told that there are no trade unionists 
in the whole establishment. " I 
This situation persisted throughout the war, despite the gradual 
improvement in trade union membership which undoubtedly took place. 
In mid-1947, a trade union questionnaire circulated to all the 
sizeable engineering factories in the area revealed that only eighteen 
of the fifty-eight factories had shop stewards' committees. 
2 It 
is clear that shop steward organisation was in a parlous condition 
throughout the war, and that it was not a matter of weak shop stewards' 
committees, but of entire factories remaining untouched by trade 
unionism. The reaction of Coventry or Glasgow shop stewards to the 
Daily Worker's revelation must have been a mixture of amazement, horror 
and gratitude for not having to work there. Why did such a situation 
exist? 
One set-of explanations derives from the industrial geography of 
the area. Manchester was-a sprawling conurbation then as now, 
stretching about twelve miles from Eccles to. Ashton-under-Lyme and 
about fifteen from Heywood to Altrincham. About sixty large 
engineering factories and a much greater number of smaller ones were 
scattered all over Manchester in a quite'different pattern to that 
obtaining in districts of comparable size like the Tyne and the Clyde. 
1LAB 10/380. -27 February, 1943. 
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On the Clyde, for example, it was possible to travel along the river and 
to pass the gates of the main yards and marine engineering shops 
almost without turning a corner. It is hard to imagine the skilled 
trade unionists of-the nearby factories and yards like Beardmore's 
(Dalmuir) or John Brown's (Clydebank) allowing a trade union blackspot 
like Singer's at Clydebank to remain unorganised throughout the War. 
Men from the yards mixed with-their fellow workers in the pubs at dinner 
and along the road home at night. On the other hand, it was quite 
possible for an isolated-Ordnance factory to remain under the shadow 
of non-tradeunionism inManchester. Active trade unionists were 
obviously concerned, but for the majority of workers it was a matter of 
less urgency; out, of sight could often mean out of mind. 
'The geographical difficulties were compounded by the large number 
of medium and small factories in the district. Firms like A. Y. Roe, 
for example, -took over several old mill buildings and used them to 
disperse their manufacturing capacity to avoid the dual risks of 
extensive damage-from-Gorman bombs and-the hardly less 'restrictive' 
inroads of militant'shop stewards. A. V. Roe's. acute management had 
taken special care to isolate the well organised sheet metal workers 
from'theýothers. l 
Another reason relates to the diversity of Manchester engineering 
when compared to Coventry. '. <Different types of engineering meant 
different relationships within workshop communities, and different 
methods of wage payment. These circumstances could obviously pose 
I EPp Septeiuberl 1937" 
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problems, for the. semi-skilled, as they could for even the skilled men 
who formed the-largest group of organisers. For example, a toolsetter 
from Metro-Vickers might move or find himself transferred to one of the 
Royal Ordnance Factories which mushroomed in the area during the first 
year of war. In his old factoryr. he could establish himself as his 
operators' guide through the workshop jungle, and initiate new entrants 
to-trade unionism quite easily. He could help them with the piece 
work system by arguing with rate fixers from a thorough knowledge of 
the jobs, machines. and individual piece work. At the Ordnance Factory, 
his experience would not be very relevant. Piece work was on a group 
basis, with 'lead rates' fixed before a final rate was assessed to 
eliminate'looseýrates'. Machinery was extremely modern, and dilution 
therefore very well advanced, so that he would find himself the odd 
man out even when amongst the men. At one North-Western ROF, for 
example, two-thirds of the workers were women, a high proportion, but 
of the one third men,, only one in fifty was skilled. The factory in 
question was unorganised. 
I Alternatively, -he might have to contend with 
work. at one of the Ford factories, where the old recipe of day rate-and 
intensive supervision was still being used by the management to stave 
off the. advent of complete unionisation. Work there was very intense. 
It was no wonder that the Ministry of Aircraft Production was pleased 
with Ford. Not only had they broken all production records (on Rolls- 
Royce enginesl), they had also avoided 'bribing' their woi&ers with 
high piece work earnings. 
2 There was little scope for the would-be 
1Us 9 'March, 1943. 
2AVIA, 9.145/107. Internal memo, dated 24 July, 1944. 
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shop steward hers. 
Diversity, then, was the hallmark of Manchester engineering, and 
It was a considerable obstacle to overcome. In Coventry, a relatively 
small group of trade unionists could move from factory to factory 
organising workers, but Manchester reminds us that it was not as 
simple as that even for the Coventry men. Workers are not simply 
'organised'; the trade unionist has to establish himself with the 
other workers, and he has to master the job and the system of wage 
payment if he is to be able to choose his moment for drawing workers 
into the union. Moreover, the process had to be as rapid as possible. 
New entrants to the factory could be organised without great difficulty, 
but once they had spent some time there, and become used to being 
'none', the problems associated with recruitment were raised to a 
much higher level. In short, workers had to be shown the value of 
trade unionism, and quickly. In Manchester, this proved rather more 
difficult than in Coventry. 
At this point it is perhaps worthwhile making a slight digression 
to consider the special difficulties which the Royal ordnance Factories 
posed for trade unionists, since the North-West had more than its 
fair share of these new plants. In fact, thirteen of the twenty-one 
engineering ROFs were located in the North-West and the North-Test, 
and within these regions, Manchester had more than the Tyne. 
I 
In 
addition, the filling factories also employed engineering workers on 
a wide range of manufacturing and maintenance tasks. 
Several of the ROW. peculiar features have already been noteds 
they were often isolated (especially in the case of filling factories), 
employed a very low proportion of skilled men, and they had their own 
M 
IV. Hornbyt o . oit. i p. 133. 
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very 'tight' system of piece ! orking. There were other aspect; 'uhich made 
RCP's poor environments for trade unionisto. Probably the most important 
of these was the fact that as soon as they were set up, the management 
held elections for ,, hitley -dorks Council representatives, 
for which all 
workers, unionists and 'nons' alike, were eligible. Those Whitley men were 
primarily messenger boys for managemcnt. The Daily Worker gave one example 
from a North-'; Western T^OF, The representatives reported to a nectinL of 
? 00 t,, Driers that canteen arranüements were to be altered, and that "It did 
not matter whether the men agreed to the hours or not, the scheme would be 
carried through". Only three nen voted in favour, and four voted egainst, 
with the majority abstn. ining in disgust. The result of the new arran;; Fiment 
(at least, as the Daily ,,! orker told the story)w, Tas that some uorkors : ere 
completely unable to üet home from the isolated factory after hav nC 
. eaten in the canteen, anci had to shelter in the local police st. ttion1 
There were other a., p^cts which roust have made life difficult for 
trade unioniots. The atmosphere iu ide the ROFs was one of "Go To It". . 
The great majority of the ROFs were built in a crash programme in the first 
eiGhteen months of war, and they did not have, any established workforce 
at all. Therefore, there could not be any traditions of trade union militancy 
in the factory. Of course, the same, applied to the Coventry shadow factories, 
which soon developed a distinctive form of militancy of their own. But these 
factories were even more dominated by women labour than the shadow 
factories, and the skilled m, en in a much smaller ninority. The ROF 
managements wero thus able to establish the tone of industrial relations 
1DG? 
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better than'the-Coventry employers could. Moreover, the private 
companies were felt to be manufacturing for profit, whereas the ROFs 
were-in existence to provide munitions. A general sentiment that 
companies were 'on the fiddle' whilst wanting a 'war on-the cheap' 
fuelled the fires of militancy in the private sector, but were absent 
in the ROFs. Perhaps this was why they provided the Daily Worker with 
many of its`more genuinely sensational articles on Stakhanovite feats 
of production, like one praising workers at a North-Western ROF for 
trebling their output in a management-inspired campaign. 
I 
*, *w*_. 
Nazi Germany's invasion of the'Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 
soon led to a wave of enthusiasm for the resistance of the'Red Army 
amongst Lancashire workers, just as, it did in the rest of Britain. 
Recruitment into the CP branches and factory groups was not quite as 
large as it was in the Midlands, but neither were the difficulties 
they had to face in the form of strike action so acute. It will be 
argued that Communist-influence inside the factories was rather less 
solidly based than it was, in Coventry, but that skillful handling of 
the few important strikes which did take place ensured. that no 
opposition to the CP developed. 
The second half of the war saw an increase in the strike rate in 
Manchester engineering factories, on about the same scale as in 
Coventry. Between, July 1941 and the end of 1945,68,643 working days 
were lost, compared to 64; 453 in Coventry. A slightly lower proportion 
of-these strikes than-in Coventry were on piece work issues: 20,953" 
Most of these-(16,500)-were lost through one"strike at A. V. Roe in 1944, 
1DW, 9 March, 1943. 
but the majority of the rest of the strikes were concerned not with the 
timing of operations as in Coventry, but over the implementation of 
bonus schemes of one kind or another. Schemes were introduced during 
1942 to enable time workers to approach piece workers' earnings, and 
for the piece workers themselves, to ensure that they were not able to 
capitalise on 'loose' rates and so on. During 1942, six of the seven 
piece work strikes were over these systems, but difficulties were 
quickly ironed out and there were only three more strikes on this type 
of issue for the rest of the war. If we subtract these strikes from 
the total together with the A. V. Roe strike (which was over the 
Award No. 326, i. e., not really a piece work issue) then we find that 
only three of the piece work disputes were over times, amounting for 
less than 10% of the total number of days lost in the district. 
With the possible exception of A. V. Roe, strikes did not cause 
the CP stewards to lose any sleep at night; they were either short, 
well-contained protest affairs as at Metro-Vickers, easily solved like 
those for the introduction of bonus systems, or isolated domestic 
strikes of little importance to the rest of Manchester. It was only 
at A. Y. Roe that there could be any suspicion that strikes were 
running at a high enough level to take them out of the control of the 
CP shop stewards. If this were true, then the A. V. Roe group might 
provide the soil in which an opposition to the CP would grow. These 
factories, particularly the Woodford one, were citadels of Communist 
power amongst the shop stewards, and they contained some of the best 
paid workers in the Manchester district. 
kanchester was nothing like as well paid as Coventry, and piece 
workers would have been better off in the best of the Clyde piece 
working factories. Consequently, Manchester's engineering workers 
were less than enthusiastic about reports in the newspaper that to be 
Rf" 
a munitions worker was to be the holder of an especially well-paid 
sinecure. One aircraft worker, who signed himself OWPI was sufficiently 
annoyed by, the publication of the Report of the National Committee on 
Public, mcpenditure in the local press in 1941 that he wrote a letter 
to the Manchester 'Evening News on-the subject. The Committee found 
that the average weekly earnings of the highest paid men in an aero- 
engine factory that they had visited were L7, whilst about one hundred 
men-earned £11-112 and twenty earned £12-&13. 'WP' replied that "It is 
all piffle. " 'He said that where he worked, skilled men were earning 
13/14/- per week of 47 hours, plus piece work bonus of between 5 and 
30/-&, He went ons "Where the £7-to £14 per week comes from I personally 
- along with thousands more - would be delighted to know. " He speculated 
that the committee had been so far out because they had accidentally 
examined the managerial-staffle-weekly salaries. 
l There is some 
evidence that, 'WP's'view was rather closer to reality for most 
engineering workers than that of the Committee on Public Etipenditure. 
By 1945, toolmakers at A. Y. Hoe's Newton, Heath factory were 
earning 109% bonus, which was based on . the' earnings of . the skilled 
piece-workers 'there under. the National Toolroom Agreement. 
2 
,- This 
simply bore no relationship to-the earnings of equivalent workers in 
Coventry, where the district average piece work bonus had been 225% 
over four years previously. 
3 There was a large number of examples of 
Manchester workers objecting to their low earnings when they came into 
1MINt 30 Mayo 1941. 
2XG. 6 Aprilg 1945" 
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3jIinutes 
of a work's conference hold at Rootes Securities (Coventry) 
No- '15 October, 1941" 
contact with their Coventry counterparts. Two interesting instances 
occurred--in early 1943. Several skilled men were transferred from 
Armstrong Siddeley's Coventry factory to their Manchester plant, where 
the men were amazed to hear of their visitorsl wages, which were, as 
the Conciliation Officer noted, "very much in excess of what is paid in 
this area". The Armstrong Siddeley men accordingly made a claim to 
bring their rates up to those obtaining in Coventry. 
1 
A second case 
involved one of the lowest paid factories in Coventry, George Wilson 
Gas Meters, where the management had offered their workers a 25% 
increase in wages, twice as much as they proposed for their Manchester 
equivalents. Understandably, the Manchester men were not amused, and 
applied for the same increase. 
2. 
Average wages in the ROFa had always been lower than in private 
industry, - although a small proportion of highly skilled men could earn 
more than they could outside. 
3 At the Chorley ROF, to the North-West 
of Manchester, for example, operators were earning 33 +i' ("and 
sometimes even more", as the historian of the ROFs put it), which was 
only equivalent toýthe national average of 193714 &Mings were 
successfully held down in these factories by a cunning system-of piece 
work payment under which provisional times were rigidly policed, and a 
certain production target reached before bonus was paid at all. 
5 
1LAB 10/380.6 March, 1943- 
2 Ibid., 27 March, 1943. 
3British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract (DEP 1971), Table 63. 
41. Hay: xOF, (1949), P" 94" W. L. Yates: Wages and Labour Conditions 
in British Engineering (1937), p. 138. 
5 
1. Hajr, op-cit., pp. 93-4. 
L'7 
--A comparative survey of piece work earnings would be incomplete 
without some mention of waiting time values. Waiting time (i. e. time 
spent waiting for materials, for toolsetters, millwrights and so on) 
was not covered by national or even district agreements, and was 
normally assessed on a custom and practice basis even during the war. 
The Essential Works Order introduced another element into domestic 
bargaining on waiting time, because employers considered themselves 
entitled to enforce-the payment of time rates only under the clause 
which guaranteed workers their time wages provided that they reported 
for work each shift. ` 
`-In Manchester, -this attempt by the employers to minimise waiting 
time payments was largely successful, mainly because of Clause ten 
of the 'Manchester Agreement' (see plI2), which stipulated that 
waiting time should be paid at time rates. In Coventry, on the other 
hand, waiting time seems to have been around 50% at the Daimler factories, 
the Alvis factories and the G. The difference that this made to 
earnings was considerable, as waiting time was quite common in the 
munitions factories throughout the war. 
11'' 
- 
In ldanchester, 
-"it isýmuch more difficult to establish precisely 
which factories were the highest earning in the district. This is 
partly because the general level of earnings was low, and there were 
therefore less articles in the local papers quoting the highest pay 
packets they could find. Another confusing element is introduced by 
the relatively low differentials between factories, which makes it 
difficult to separate one factory from another in terms of earnings. 
In addition, it only really makes sense to compare earnings at 
2 7ý1 
1Minutes 
of Works Conferences held at Daimler No. 2 (18 November, 
1941)9 Humber (18 November, 1941), OBC (15 June, 1943). 
approximately the same period, since hours, basic rates and piece work 
values were constantly changing. 
Taking 1944 as the basis for comparison, it appears that the 
highest earning factories were averaging about 100% over the basic 
rate. -The top factory was probably Vickers-Armstrongs, where 3/ 
per hour was paid for fire watching (which suggests that the piece 
workers were on well over 100%). 
1 Metro-Vickers was probably slightly 
less well-paid, as skilled men there claimed a rate of 3/- per hour in 
February 1944, when they changed from piece work to day rate. 
2 For an 
average male engineer's week of 53.3 hours, 
3 this would have given them 
P/ 14/8d, 4 equivalent to about 90% above the basic rate. At A. V. Roe, 
piece workers were earning slightly more, on 109% (equivalent to over 
3/- per hour or over g8 per week). 
4 These three factories, then, all 
had skilled piece workers earning around 3/- per hour or more, or about 
eight pounds a week for an average week of over fifty hours. 
The top skilled men in the ROFs-were probably paid more than this 
(they had traditionally had higher rates for their most highly skilled 
men), but the piece workers in these factories probably earned less. 
than their counterparts in private industry. The difficulty here is 
that, the ROFs had few skilled piece workers; they had been designed 
'Interview 
with Eidie Frown 3 December, 1974. 
2Ministry 
of Labour Gazette, July, 1943" 
3British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract, Table 84, 
LAB 34/599 February, 1944" 
'MG9 6 gpril# 1945" 
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with the maximum dilution in mind, with piece workers and highly skilled 
versatile setters. -It is therefore almost impossible to compare like 
with like in this case, but piece workers earned about 336%. 
1 
Skilled men in other factories earned slightly less than in other 
privately, run, factories. =, At Armstrong-Siddeley, the lieu rate for 
skilled men was 65% in 1943, -and, was therefore probably still slightly 
below the highest factories in 1944.2 The Ford factories were definitely 
lower paid than the rest, using flat day rate as they did. -. Top-tradesmen 
there were only earning C43/1id. -for a week of forty-five hours in 1949, 
five-years later. 3. 
-It is possible-to state from this evidence that the top three 
factories (Metro-Vickers, Avro and Vickers-Armstrong) were slightly 
ahead of at least-some of the other factories in the district. These 
factories (along with Gardners, for which no evidence is available) 
were the great CP strongholds, Vickers-Armstrong was especially prominent 
as a Communist factory, with a factory branch of about five hundred, and 
the first factory paper in-the-area. 
4_ But the correlation between high 
earnings and the strength of the CP which was so, clear in Coventry is 
rather less vivid in Manchester. 
See Pe 
2LAB 10/380.6 March, 19,43. 
3DW, 22, September, 1949" 
2b 
4Cf. two excerpts from an interview with Tddie Prow (3 December, 1974): 
"I always remember one evening, Norah Jeffery was coming, and I 
wanted to see Norah about something, and I went in to a meeting 
of the Vickers Armstrong factory branch that she was speaking at, 
-,. ra-, and, oh, there must have been a couple of hundred there, and that 
was just an ordinary factory branch meeting.... 
In Metro-Vicks, they had a bookshop in an air-raid shelter - 
not just books, I mean they had a whole array of stuff. They used 
to come from all over the factory there, at various times (they 
could do things in working hours then). I don't suppose every 
worker, but those who sold the lit. they'd come from their departments, 
and see what there was, and take stuff and take it back to their 
department.... " 
S 
Manchester's lox-earnings and relatively loose grip on the conditions 
of piece working contrast markedly with wages and controls in Coventry. 
It is worth pausing here to ask wiry this was the case, in order to 
understand'the: anatomy of'piece work militancy the better. In the 
smaller factories, and those shops to which extensive dilution had not 
yet, penetrated, 'there isa simple explanation for the lack of militancy: 
piecework was'a-relatively new phenomenon. None of the strikes over 
the implementation-of bonus'systems were in the semi-skilled sections 
of the-large factories (with the possible exception of one at Salford 
Electrical`Instruments'in'1945)" 'They were all in small factories or 
amongst groups°of skilled workers like patternmakers who were not 
accustomed to piece working at all. These workers were unable to 
acquire the"techniques of piece work-bargaining overnight, and although 
they were sure to make advances, they were well behind in the race. 
However, this'explanation is insuffioient'to account for the 
relatively low level of militancy which underlay the'low piece work 
values in the larger Manchester aircraft factories, where piece work was 
well established and known`by the°operators. The'main explanations lie 
in`the importance of°factors specific to Coventry: the gang system and'' 
the Toolroom Agreementl' but-to cite these%is still to beg the question. 
The gang system would never have spread so rapidly, the TRA would never 
have been necessary (and the possibility of a Manchester-type agreement 
never ruled out)tin the absence of'a wide stratum of workers who knew 
how to'exploit piece work to their advantage. An illustration of this 
point occurred-at a North-Western aircraft factory in 1943, when a group 
of men demanded a system of pooled bonus, but soon afterwards had to 
demand its withdrawal because they found that although the piece work 
values had not been reduced, they were earning less. These men did, - 
Lý/ 
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not appreciate that one important element in the gang system was the 
organisation of work, and that a number of men put together did not 
equal an effective gang. 
I 
ZG2 
What was it, then, that marked off Coventry's piece workers? It 
was a combination of their previous work experience, and the lease of 
life whinh the immigrants to the town gave the dormant tradition of semi- 
skilled-trade unionism. During the late 19308, and the first year of the 
War, there was a good deal of immigration into the Coventry district 
of miners and shipbuilding workers from the depressed areas. These men 
were accustomed to piece working and were able to adapt to the system 
with ease. These immigrants had some knowledge of piece work, but this 
did not in itself distinguish them from the native Coventry engineering 
workers. Their real contribution was a new spirit of aggression, 
largely exercised on the shop floor through the rapidly expanding 
T&GWU. These men contributed greatly to the underlying motive power 
behind Coventry's continual drive towards better piece work earnings 
and' conditions. 
Manchester'did not have any counterparts to these'Coventry immigrants. 
Immigration to Manchester in the late thirties had been roughly balanced 
by emigration, and in any case the munitions factories were not being 
built and taking on labour'at anything like the Coventry rate. In 
addition, semi-skilled trade'unionism was not solely the preserve of 
the T&GWU°as it was in Coventry, where the NUGMW was unknown in 
engineering. 
2 This was bound to have a stultifying effect on semi- 
1LAB 10/380.22 October, 1943. 
2An NUGMW pamphlet of 1923 shows that at that point, the union had 
no members in any Coventry factory. The pamphlet gives the rates 
it negotiated at various factories for machine operators where it 
had members, and quotes rates for factories in Glasgow, Manchester 
and Newcastle. (NUGMW: Engineering Industrys Types of Machines 
Operated and Wages Paid. 1923. Nuffield College, Oxford, Library),. 
41 
skilled shop stewards, because the NUGMW did not regard shop stewards as 
altogether an'unmixed blessing, and safeguarded themselves by appointing 
them. These stewards were not therefore solely accountable to their 
members, and this was a brake on the day-today battles on piece work 
prices. t 
.,, 
The second great wave of entrants to the munitions factories of the 
two towns, the women who began to inundate the factories from 1941 
onwards, wasi quite similar in, -the two areas. One remark from the 
Coventry Conciliation Officer referring to1heir indiscipline has 
already been quoted, and the opinion of his Manchester colleague was 
very similar. He referred in 1943 to the cause of strikes as being the 
influx into the industry of those with "no traditions, no background 
and no sense of discipline". 
1 
These workers were about as militant as 
2 Fý? 
their sisters in Coventry, but the direction of their militancy was 
different, being not so single-minded in their determination to push up 
piece work prices. This was because they came into a different workshop 
situation, and adapted themselves to a different atmosphere. 
Finally, there was an important local agreement of long standing 
in the Manchester district which meant that the Coventry custom of 'putting 
a job on the floor!, which was an important tactic there, could not be 
evolved among the district's piece workers. This was the agreement 
commonly known as 'The Manchester Agreement', because it laid down 
peculiar conditions for piece work bargaining. This agreement was 
first signed in June 1918 and was slightly modified in April 1937. 
Its most important clause was clause five, which laid down that piece 
LAB 10/260. Reports of Proceedings of North-Western Conference 
of the Ministry of Labour, 6 September, 1943. 
work values should be determined by the individual worker concerned and 
the management, and then, failing agreement, by shop representatives 
and management.. If the second stage failed to agree, then "The work in 
question shall then be declared as and done as day work". In other 
words, either aide could 'declare' day rate was being worked. This 
provided managements with the ability to force a worker to accept day 
, rate if they-thought that pieesýwork prices were becoming too high. At 
the. same time,. if workers declared day rate in order to slow down 
production and coerce managements in that way, they were forcefully 
reminded<of the'large earnings difference which existed between day 
rate'and piecework however poor. - Thus, the general, frame of reference 
was'set by the day rate. ,r 
* ** 
The Manchester Communists were very. active in. their attempts to 
step up production in the middle, of. the war. Of course, they were 
playing their part in ,& national campaign, but they went about it with 
more-vigour than the Midlands district. On the first Sunday after 
the invasion of the Soviet-. Union, the Fairey shop stewards called a 
meeting of all shop stewards in the-district to discuss the implementation 
of a production campaign, and attracted seventy one delegates from 
2 forty factories. , From then on until the end of the war, a group of 
1LAE 10/257- a merson to I. R. Dept. (7 August, 1943). Memo of 
Agreement between the Manchester District Engineering Employers' 
Association and the Manchester District Joint Committee of 
Engineering and Kindred Trades (11 June, 1918; modified 26 April, 1937). 
2LR, September, 1941, p. 141. 
V4 
delegates from shop stewards' committees met once a month at the 
Thatched House pub in Piccadilly. 
I The pages of the Daily Worker 
bear witness to their zeal in carrying their campaign to the workshops. 
At the height of the production drive'during the first three months of 
1943, they sent in nine full-length reports on their work on the home 
front, compared to only one from the Midlands. 
2 
All kinds of. methods were used to boost production, but there was 
usually some attempt-to link the battle in the factories with the battle 
at the front. At one factory, the stewards held an 'Africa Week' in 
support of the Lancashire Fusiliers in North-Africa. During the week, 
red lights were fitted adjacent to every section, and a flashing red 
light went on when the production target for the shift (set by the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production) was not met. A women's section, 
light turning, failed to reach their target for two shifts, but 
achieved it on the third, and when the red light changed at the end of 
the shift, were applauded by a 'rousing cheer' from the heavy turners, 
all skilled men. 
3 
. At another factory, twenty meetings were held to 
devise slogans to b e. posted-up'to°help output. A good deal of poetic 
ability was thus, broughtfto lights 
"Your Time to Aid Russia is-from Buzzer to Buzzer" 
"Ten Xinutes for Tea, Not a Five O'Clock Spree" If 
"Wanted: Time and a Half, Not-Half Time. " ý 
But the winning slogan was "Absenoe makes the War Grow Longer". 
Simultaneously with these drives, and inextricably bound up with them, 
1E. Prow. 3 Decembers 1974" 
2Dii, 11 January; 2,3,10,11,15 February; 6,9,16 March, 1943 
(Ridlanda: 10 March, 1943). 
3_., 11 January, 1943. 
4Ibid., 16 March, 1943. 
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the continuous thrust. towards increasing Party membership and influence 
continued. The-beginning of 1943 saw a frenetic programme of CP 
propagandising around--the local factories. A tour of factory gates 
sold eight thousand copies of a new CP paper, the Bast Manchester 
Workshop Clarion (a four page paper carrying a cartoon from the Dai 
Worker on each page). The same burst of activity brought fifteen 
dinner-time meetings in eight. days, (eight in factories never contacted 
before, leading to the formation of two new factory groups) and 'kerb- 
stone classes' in Communist Philosophy, and a series of Sunday film 
shows with Russian films like 'Lenin in October'. 
1 At the same time, 
numerous campaigns were started on issues of local importances one in 
Moss Side concentrated on, the difficulties experienced by mothers when 
children at a local school had to start walking a long distance for 
their midday meal when the ARP took over one of their buildings. 
2 
Nevertheless, as every seasoned Party member would have recognised, 
it is important to see the limitations of the CP! s work in the district. 
These limitations 'were no-fault of the Party members themselves, 'but 
they>do remind us that-a high level of activity along the lines laid 
down did not always solve more deeply rooted problems. Production 
drives, for example, did'not seem to have any more impact on industrial 
relations than they did in the rest of the country. In early 1943, 
for example, the Conciliation Officer was exasperated to find that a 
production week, in which the stewards had "played a very active part" 
-A1 Dank Allaun«iSome Propaganda Ida", in Sharpen our Weapons 
ýoss Side Starts a Local. 
_CampaiRn; Weapon for Vio%ory 0943) kM/S). 
is: ýý'' 
(1943) (x/$). 
in Party Organisation. 
had; been'followed by a go-slow by thousands of workers, resulting in a 
"serious" loss of production. 
' The stewards at this factory 'had 
evidently-felt sufficiently confident to organise a production drive, 
but many Communists must have found themselves in much weaker positions. 
They might be'working in unorganised factories, or factories in which 
Party'groups had been -set up"relatively late and on a comparatively flimsy 
basis, -'auch'as those which Mere , formed from the-factory gate meetings 
mentioned earlier. 
There is some'evidence to suggest that although the CP expanded 
its influence in Manchester in'theýlatter years of the war, it did-not 
penetrate as deeply-into the workshops as it did in Coventry. One 
selling important indication comes from'a OP literatureýompetition held over 
a six-month , period during'1943. Lancashire failed to qualify for 
inclusion in the top'three districts, largely because of its poor 
faotorylsales, - whereas the Midlands did very well in this field, with 
AWL Baginton,. top of the national',,, league registering a, total, sale, of 
3,622 CP and non_CP publications. 
2 Manchester wasýalso much more thinly 
covered by factory, papers. Although it had the East Manchester workshop 
Clarion, it had only one other factory paper during 1943 (Vickers 
Armstrong's Factory News), which was joined by AC DC, the organ of the 
Laurence Scott $lectromotora shop stewards in 1944.3 Of course, this 
may not be an exhaustive survey (and one or two papers appeared right 
at the very end of the war), but it appears that the district was nowhere 
near as well&. covered as Coventry. The local CP compensated for their 
relative lack of success in the factories by their work in the localities 
1LAB 10/379.17g 23 April, 1943. 
2Strengthen Our Organisation (1944) (K/S)- 
3 I am grateful to Mr. Fddie Frow for showing me these papers. 
2; 9 1 
(the Moos Side campaign on children's dinners for example) and in 
the Labour Party (during 1942, they sold 12,500 copies of The Case for 
Affiliation, far more than any other district), 
' But this in not our 
central concern, although it is of course impossible to seal off their 
success in these fields from their relative failure in the other; a 
contact made in the Labour Party might well also be an important shop 
steward (like Bill Abbott, Vice-President of Newton Heath Labour Party 
and shop steward at A. V. Roo and later convenor at Vickers Armstrong). 
2 
The example of the Manchester CP reminds us quite forcefully that 
the growth of the CP during 1942 and'43 was not by any means solely or 
even mainly based on their industrial activity. The weakness of the 
local Party's work on the shop floor was apparent when compared to 
Coventry, yet their membership had expanded almost as much (and had 
stayed more stable at a time of high turnover). Many CPers remarked 
at the time that the basis of new members' recruitment was flimsy, 
because it revolved around enthusiasm for the role of the Red Army and 
the Soviet Union in the fight against fascism. Since industrial 
10rganise to Mobilise Millions (1943) (x/s). 
2In 
making these points, it is important not to allow the comparisons 
to obscure the general trend. The Manchester C3was large and 
influential inside the factories, just as Communists were all over 
the country, even though they had not been outstandingly successful 
when looked at under a microscope. Two quotations from an inter- 
view with Eddie Frow remind us of these facts: 
"Nell, it's true to say that after the attack on the Soviet Union, 
there were some fabulous size CP meetings. I'll tell you the most 
striking thing I remember* There was once a Communist Party rally, 
and I remember one of our shop stewards at Vickers-Armstrong:. 
I met him out in the street, and I said to him "Are you going this 
afternoon? ", and he said "aye, " and he pulled out a bloody great 
wad of notes. Now how much there was, I've no idea, but this was 
what he'd collected in the factory to be handed up at this meeting. 
It was certainly an astronomical sum of money.... a* 
"We once had this meeting at the King's Hall, it'd hold six or 
seven thousand, and they had these areas roped off to hold six or 
seven hundred, one for Vickers Armstrong's, one for Metro-Vicks. ione 
for this factory, one for that factory, and they'd organised 
contingents from these factories - they weren't coming from the 
factory obviously - but the 'd bought their tickets in these factories, 
and they were coming.... " 
(E. 
Frow, 3 December, 1974). 
militancy was no longer a prerequisite for a prospective Party'member, 
it was possible for the Manchester CP to compensate for their weakness 
on the shop floor by hyperactivity in the branches, Labour Party ward 
meetings and localities. 
During 1943, and444, that is, in the period. of comparatively good 
trade union arganisation and high demand for labour, the pattern of 
militancy in Manchester matched the Coventry model quite closely. 
Disputes over piece working arrangements and other questions drew, 
threats of district wide strike action by the shop stewards. The CPers 
in particular were forced into a 'brinkmanship' tactic of bringing a 
large amount of force to bear on a problem to ensure a satisfactory 
solution, whilst trying-to avoid having to actually take such action. 
By and large, -they successfully teetered along the tightrope, and 
thereby. avoided strikes breaking out which went beyond their control. 
Any atomic opposition which sprung up was not allowed to develop a 
molecular nature; oppositionists remained individuals rather than 
groups, as the CP remained firmly in control. 
-, Discontent amongst Manchester's engineering workers focusing on 
the terms of piece working reached a peak during these months, and was 
especially strong in the well-organised and well-paid aircraft factories. 
In mid-1943, an example occurred at A. V.. Roe's Woodford factory when the 
management invoked the Manchester Agreement and declared day rats on 
one section. The workers involved sat down at their machines, and they 
were backed by the shop stewards, the vast majority of whom were CPers. 
I 
1LAB 10/380.30 duly, 1943. 
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The AEU DC intervened at'this point, and called a special district 
meeting=of shop stewards, which recommended-a continuation of the 
strike, -and promised their support. Accordingly, the Woodford stewards 
told their management that-they could expect a district wide strike 
ifflthe matter was not resolved before the end of the annual week's 
holiday, which': was. just about to be taken. 
I 
. In the interim, the 
Conciliation Officer contacted the AEU Ececutive and asked them to agree 
to°a`Covernment'inquiry, binding on both sides. The DC accepted, and the 
inquiry found-in favour of the workers, who were allowed to continue 
2 
at their old times. 
2gb 
-=-{`The other dispute which was thought sufficiently important to draw 
another threatened district strike took place over the operation of the 
Relaxation Agreement. , -The cause of`the threat shows that Manchester's 
stewards were still interested in the problem of dilution, which certainly 
didýnot, arouse'similar interest in Coventry at this stage of the. War. 
The strike was caused by the introduction of two-unskilled men on to 
coremaking at: the'foundry ofýCraven-Bros. A meeting of shop stewards 
promised district action in support, but this was averted by the District 
Officials, who aftera rough passage at a mass meeting persuaded the men 
to return to work to allow negotiations to begin. " A-Works Conference 
decided toremove the two unskilled men. 
3 
The Conciliation Officer was understandably worried by the success 
of two-threatened Manchester-wide strikes in less than two months, 
4 but 
the Communist shop stewards had chanced their arm about as far as they 
Iý 
1LAB 10/380.6 August, 1943. 
2Ibid., 6 and 13 August, 1943. 
31bid., 20 August, 1943. 
41bid. 
'ý ,ý{, 
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thought they could. Up to a point, the threat of large-scale stoppages 
reflected the growing strength of the stewards on the factory floor; 
they had felt unable to make a similar threat in 1941. At the same 
time, even supposing that all the district's stewards supported big 
strikes in 1943, it might have been difficult for them to have kept 
any strike solid outside of the well-organised factories. In fact, 
they would not, of course, have had the full support of all the 
district's stewards even if only for the reason that the CP's leadership 
would have been forced to exert pressure in the opposite direction, 
much as they had done in the Tyneside shipyard strike only a few months 
earlier. 
The Communist shop stewards must have heaved a collective sigh of 
relief when their bluff-was not called on the Craven Bros* dispute. 
The employers had suffered one defeat at their hands already through 
this tactic, and a second was quite surprising so soon afterwards. 
The Manchester employers had a reputation for their solidarity, which 
had shown itself from 1851 through to 1922. It was unlikely that they 
would continue to tolerate these threats, even if the Ministry of Labour 
would. The obvious way of bringing the shop stewards to heel was by. 
calling their bluff. Thus far, the CP stewards had remained within the 
fold, but a large-scale stoppage would have meant the wrath of the 
Daily Worker and the New Propellor being vented upon them, not to 
mention that of Ernie Bevin and the Ministry apparatus. 
As in Coventry, an employer's attempt to revert to day rate 
brought the threat of a local strike. Piece work once again showed how 
potent a cause of disputes it could be in both areas. It was to become 
more and more the key issue in Manchester as the war continued, although 
it coexisted in the minds of the stewards with the old concern over 
dilution. 
zi> 
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, The last two large strikes of the-war were fought on piece work 
issues, and the stewards became more and more responsive to pressure 
from their members to resolve the whole, nexus of problems surrounding 
pieoe working.,. Both strikes verein A. Y. Roe's factories; as in 
Coventry and elsewhere, the aircraft industry's widespread use of 
piecework combined with a rapid rate of technological change stimulated 
frequent disputes. . 
The first episode occurred at the end of 1944, when war production 
was beginning to slacken. off slightly, and employers were seeking to 
contain any late advances, that workers might make before the return 
of peace time conditions. The strike started at the Woodford factory 
in October 1944, after well over'a year's negotiations concerning the 
National Arbitration Award no. 326. The strikers demanded the retro- 
spective payment of the'difference between the amount they had actually 
been paid on piece work bonus without the award's f1 consolidated, into 
the basic rate and what they should have been paid with the C1 consolidated. 
The company had conceded the principle with respect to jobs timed since 
the award, but refused to concede_: it. on times agreed before the award 
(which were presumably the majority). When the award had been made, 
the company had adjusted all piece work values downward, to compensate 
for the award's increase. The stewards demanded that the old times be 
restoredl and retrospective payment made. 
One thousand five hundred production workers at Woodford took the 
initiative in striking, and they were soon joined by eight hundred at 
Newton Heath. 2 The Conciliation Officer blamed the 'strong Communist 
1Socialist Appeal, December, 1944. 
2Ibid. LAB 34/59" 
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influence' at Woodford, and was soon confirmed in his view when the 
CP threatened to spread the dispute throughout the 30,000 workers 
employed by A. V. Roe in the North-West. 
' The strike continued to 
spread, despite the recommendation of the district officials and the 
AST DC that it should end. 
2 On the Friday night after the strike began, 
the officials addressed a mass meeting of strikers to try to secure a 
return, but their advice was rejected in favour of waiting to see 
the result of a meeting of the A. V. Roe combine committee which was 
taking place that night. 
3 At nine o'clock the next morning, the 
combine committee also recommended a return pending negotiations, which 
was accepted by the strikers. 
4 
On the following Monday, a Works conference was held, which 
reached an agreement on the basis of the company's acceptance of the 
consolidated rate and the union's agreement that times should be 
revised. The agreement did not cover the demand for retrospective 
payment. 
5' The Combine committee recommended this settlement to the 
strikers, factory by factory. 6 The Woodford men "harboured some 
feeling" against it, and rejected the recommendation, demanding that 
the old times should be allowed to stand.? 
1LAB 10/493.31 October, 1944. 
2Xancheater Guardian, 31 October, 1 November, 1944. 
31bid., 4 November, 1944" 
4LAB 10/493,6 November, 1944. M "C., 7 November, 1944. 
SSA, December, 1944. 
6LAB 
10/493. 6 November, 1944. 
Zsi 
71bid. 
1 9 November, 1944. 
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Under this new pressure, the combine committee reconsidered their 
position, and decided to back the Woodford men with a full combine 
strike if required. Siddall, the Divisional Organiser was confounded 
by their decision, but succeeded in wringing some further small 
concessions from the company* He then returned to the combine 
committee with the new settlement, and a letter from the EC, "couched 
in very strong language", which told the combine committee to accept 
the agreement or return to national negotiations. The whole committee, 
including the Woodford delegates, decided to accept Siddall's new 
deal. 2 
However, the strike was not yet quite concluded because the 
Woodford stewards had some difficulty in persuading their members to 
accept their settlement. The Conciliation Officer confirmed that they 
made "a very strong effort to secure acceptance", but it was in vain. 
One worker at the mass meeting spoke vehemently and successfully 
against the stewards, and a motion to accept. the offer was rejected. 
No decision was taken regarding strike action, because although the 
motion had been defeated, the stewards would not contemplate striking. 
3 
Ultimately, the dispute was referred to arbitration. 
4 
The strike provides several important insights into the relation- 
ship between the stewards and their members in Manchester. Once 
again, the stewards were pushed into threatening combine action, but 
they retreated (as the Coventry stewards did during the Humber strike) 
1LAB 10/493,109 18 November, 1944. 
2Ibid. 
1 24 Novemberp 1944. 
3lbid. 
41bid. 
1 29 November# 1944" 
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in the face of strong opposition from the Executive and district 
officials. The rank and file had shown a great deal of persistence 
in their militant stand against the management's interpretations of 
the award, and this had provided the motive force behind the combine 
committee's success in continually extracting better offers from the 
company. However, the CP stewards were eventually prepared to be pushed 
no further, and they refused to hear of strike action at the last mass 
meeting. One last point is worth makings the long process had given 
rise to at least one man who was prepared and able to swing the mass 
meeting'at Woodford behind him, despite the strong opposition of the 
stewards. Clearly, flexibility in the face of strike action had been 
the best policy for the CP stewards in the A. V. Roe group, because it 
was evident that the rank and file were rather disenchanted with their 
leadership as soon as this flexibility was seen to have quite finite 
limits. As the Communists themselves appreciated so well, if the, 
rank and file was behind a man, then that man could sway a meeting 
even though he was just an individual without a steward's card. 
The A. Y. Roe group of factories continued to be the storm centre 
in Manchester, with another important strike taking place throughout 
the combine in 1945 over the reductions in piece work earnings that 
were taking place as'a consequence of the general contraction of war 
industry. Once again, the shop stewards were propelled into an 
extension of the dispute through the militancy of the rank and file, 
but they had learned the lesson of the 1944 strike, and this time 
they remained firmly ensconced in the driving seat. The stewards had 
formulated a set of proposals which they thought would appeal to the 
company almost as much as to the workers, and which revolved around the 
central idea of the abolition of piece work and its replacement by a 
flat rate for all workers based on piece work bonus of 100%. These 
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proposals were rejected by the management, and between Friday, March 23rd 
and Tuesday 27th, workers at the No. I shadow factory began to walk out. 
On the Wednesday afternoon, a mass meeting was held, and Washington, 
the Oldham District Secretary, persuaded them to return. However, 
their return was very short-lived, and the next day the whole factory 
was on strike. The combine committee now seised the initiative, and 
decided to call. the rest of the factories out after the Easter holiday 
for two days only, the 5th and 6th April. 
The mass meeting on the 6th April has been touched on earlier, in 
chap. 6 p. 192, where the insistence of the strikers that war work was 
not being carried out at the factories was pointed out as an important 
argument used to defend their action. The steward who used this 
argument at the mass meeting in Piccadilly also used another argument 
which showed that the strikers were desperately concerned with the 
erosion of wartime standards. He reminded the strikers that "the sky 
was the limit" on piece work earnings at the time of Dunkirk, but that: 
"We have to-make some show now or we shall be 
right down at the bottom and living on a 
starvation wage as soon as peace is declared. " 2 
Another speaker rejected the whole idea of piece work, on-the basis 
that it was impossible to time a man down to the last second, adding 
that the men in the forces would want to return to much better 
conditions than those which were then being forced on workers. 
3 It is 
clear that the A. V. Roe shop stewards thought that there was a good 
deal at stake in their battle to abolish piece work and to maintain 
standards, and yet -they limited the duration of the strike to only 
two days, opting to return to work on day rate until their demands 
I§A, 
mid-April, 1945" 
zg6 
2i (-; t 7 April, 1945" 
31bid" 
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were conceded. It does not seem likely that they forced the management 
to accept their terms, since nothing more was heard of what would have 
constituted a unique agreement in the aircraft industry at that time. 
The redundancy question did not provoke any reaction in Manchester 
until 1947, which is outside our period, but it is clear that it took 
longer for the workers in the area to draw up the battle lines for a 
I $last ditch' stand against`räckings. During the last months of war, 
there were three strikes for 100% trade unionism, but two of these 
occurred in smaller factories and did not connect with the dispute 
at A. V. °Roe. In March, Mitchell Shackleton, Patricroft struck success- 
fully to enforce 100% trade unionism, and Metro-Vickers took similarly 
succeasfulýaction_that August. 1 In November, another strike at Francis 
Shaw, Openshaw failed to force the company to take on only full, -paid- 
up trade unionists (a unique precedent would have been created had 
they won). 
2 A lack of co-ordination was evident in the uneven timing 
and demands of these strikes when concerted action on one case (as 
occurred in Coventry over the Daimler-and-Humber disputes) might have 
yielded better results. 
There was definitely an atmosphere of passivity in the area in the 
face of redundancies-which has to be explained. The Manchester 
Guardian carried an interesting item towards tho, end of 1944, 
describing the. run-down of an aircraft factory in the Manchester area, 
where between 1000 and 1,500 workers were being made redundant. All 
contracts for the factory.. were to run out by March 1945, when it was 
to close. Complete closure represented an unusually serious blow to 
jobs; usually the great difficulty with organising, to resist redundancies 
1 LAB 34/60 
2'7 
2Ibid. 
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was the fact that some workers, usually a majority at any one time, 
would be assured of keeping their jobs, and would be less enthusiastic 
about striking than the potentially unemployed. In this case, the 
normal difficulty did not arise, yet their response was to "pull in 
their belts". 
_The 
Manchester Guardian noted that there was a consid- 
erable falling off in the demand for luxury goods, and drink in the 
local pubs. Pubs were now open at all the legal hours, whereas they 
had previously had to close early to conserve supplies. As the 
Guardian approvingly continueds "The provident workers have been 
preparing for a rainy day". Their only sign of rebelliousness was 
a declared intention to present a petition to the Lord Mayor, but it 
is not clear whether even that was carried out. 
1 
Z1ýf- 
It was pointed out earlier that Coventry's strikes against 
redundancy were exceptional, and it would not therefore be necessary 
to explain why other districts did not take similar action, but 
Manchester's combination of passivity in the late war years with 
militant district strikes in. 1947 requires some specific treatment. 
The combination cannot be'satisfaotorily explained in terms of the poor 
trade: union organisation inthe area, because we have seen that even 
well organised aircraft factories were not willing to set the ball 
rolling. It seems more likely that the key is to be found in the 
attitudes of the women-who had been sucked in to the factories, in the 
war years. If they did not want to stay in engineering after the 
war, then it would have been difficult for the male engineers to persuade 
them to make a. stand over redundancies simply to safeguard the latter's 
organisation and conditions. When the women had gone, it may have 
111Ct 3 Novemberg 1944" 
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proved possible and necessary for the men to fight alone. 
The wartime survey quoted earlier on the attitudes of women towards 
post-war employment seems to bear-out an interpretation along these 
lines. The survey showed that textile work was popular amongst 
Lancashire women. Textiles had the highest proportion of women 
nationally who wanted to stay on at work after the war (44%), together 
with engineering (also 44%). Where the women in the two industries 
differed was in what industry-they wanted to work after the war. 
Engineering had easily the highest proportion of any industry (26%) 
who wished to-leave their wartime employment, whereas textiles had 
one of the lowest (7%). The other main source of jobs in Lancashire 
was obviously considerably more popular with women than engineering. 
Textiles, where work was cleaner and the work community more congenial 
to women, created a positive pull away from the engineering factories. 
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Measured simply in terms of working days lost through strikes, 
Manchester was about as-militant as Coventry during the war, but if a 
few large strikes (those involving the apprentices and A. V. Roe - 
workers) are subtracted, - then only. a very few lost days remain. 
There 
was, no groundswell of sectional militancy covering a large number of 
factories as there was in Coventry. Industrial-disputes were -- 
especially conspicuous by. itheir absence-in the first eighteen months 
of war, when the district was almost completely strike-free. In these 
circumstances, the local CP turned its attention towards the preparations 
for the People's Convention, going so far as to neglect to report to 
the Daily Worker those small strikes that did take place, preferring 
to use their influence in the factories in the more overtly political 
direction. 
'1NP 1/289 Survey on Attitudes of Women to Post-War Employment (u. d. ) 
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The apprentices' strike transformed the industrial scene. The 
apprentices breathed new life into the local shop stewards' movement, 
and revived the idea of district action as a useful weapon. Soon after 
their impressive strike, an unofficial grouping of stewards recommended 
similar tactics to the sheet metal workers in their resistance to 
victimisation. 
The low level of strike-activity persisted throughout the war, but 
in a less extreme form as time went on and grievances accumulated. 
Stoppages began to occur over such issues as the introduction and 
operation of new bonus schemes as dilution sped up and the pressure 
on production increased. By and large, these disputes posed no great 
difficulties for the local stewards, because the problems involved 
were far from intractable. The low level of strike activity derived 
largely from poor trade union organisation, and although this was 
improved by the removal of the Ford factories from the list of trade 
union blackspots, the problem remained until well into the post war 
years. Strikes were concentrated in the largest group of factories 
in the country, "the Avro group, where the stewards' leaders were 
mainly Communists, but. the other CP factories (Metro-Vickers, Gardners) 
were much less strike prone. At A. V. Roe's factories, the stewards 
had developed a strong combine organisation, as well as good links 
with the stewards in the rest of Manchester, and they used these 
devices to bring outside force to bear to bring domestic disputes to 
a speedy conclusion. They were thus able to prevent the beginnings 
of any real opposition to their leadership. 
This generally low level of militancy underpinned low piece work 
earnings. The 'Manchester Agreement', the diversity of local 
engineering and the lack of background in piece work bargaining of the 
new entrants to the industry all contributed to this. These factors 
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also worked against the Manohester, CP implanting itself as firmly as 
Coventry comrades in the engineering factories. The combination 
of poor organisation, a female workforce that was-not particularly 
interested in staying in engineering, and relatively mediocre gains 
from wartime conditions, postponed the fight back against mass sackings 
until 1947" "--1 
How has Manchester! s history helped towards=an understanding. of 
Coventry's? The-outstanding difference between the two districts as 
far as the shop stewards' movement itself is concerned relates to 
the differing roles played by the semi-skilled. In Coventry, the., semi- 
skilled workers of. the middle and late 1930s had been recruited from 
immigrant workers from the depressed areas, with a background in 
piece work bargaining. These workers had been quickly organised into 
the trade unions andy-into, gangs on the shop floor in the late thirties 
and the early months of the war. - Their militancy made the piece work 
situation , so. acute in the city that the Ministry of Labour had to 
intervene with°the: Toolroom-Agreement,, which, was soon, turned into 
another weapon. in the shop stewards' armoury. 
In, Manohester, there had been muchrless,, immigration from-the 
depressed areas during the, 1930s,, for the,. simple reason, that, 
unemployment there remained high and rearmament factories far fewer 
than in Coventry. In addition, the Manchester Agreement limited the 
possibilities of increasing piece work earnings. 
- Consequently, the women who poured into the two cities' munitions 
factories from-1941 onwards came into two quite different types of 
workshop atmosphere. In Coventry, they were absorbed into the gangs 
and, often intoýthe only semi-skilled union, the T&GWU. They soon 
became adept at piece work bargaining, and where they remained outside 
of the unions, they caused the anti-strike shop stewards numerous 
, i1 
headaches in the latter part of the war by their unpredictable and 
'undisciplined' militancy. In Manchester, the women came into a 
situation in which individual piece working. twas the rule and they 
therefore had to learn the techniques of piece work bargaining more 
slowly. They often found themselves in completely unorganised factories 
(quite a different situation from being unorganised in a semi-organ- 
ised factory as in Coventry). When they were organised, it was either 
into the T&GWU or the C&MWU, a union which was not noted for its 
militancy. Another tentative explanation of the differences between 
the two bodies of women engineering workers may be advanced. Coventry 
drew women both from the surrounding area and from all over Britain, 
because it was an 'importing' area (to use the Ministry of Labour 
jargon), whereas Manchester was an 'exporting' area. In Lancashire, 
the women brought with them what may crudely be described as the passive 
shop floor tradition of the textile industries. Far from being a 
positive experience in terms of militancy, this may have actually been 
a tradition pulling in the opposite direction, but which did not 
exist among the Coventry women. 
The contrast' between the two bodies of semi-skilled workers runs 
throughout their wartime history with regard to strike propensity, 
wages and conditions gained during full wartime employment, and 
finally, in the level of the fight put up against sackings at the end 
of the war. These different experiences also generated different 
relationships with the political militants. 
The Coventry CP had been very uninfluential before the war, but 
had hauled itself up by its bootstraps as soon as the twin factors of 
industrial militancy and popular outrage over inadequate air raid 
.? a L 
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precautions allowed '. it: a foothold during 1940. They developed an 
unrivalled strength inside certain factories by a militancy which 
rested on piece work control rather than strike action. The strikes 
outside-of these factories, often occurring among the unorganised, 
did not help any real political opposition to develop. In Manchester, 
the CP had been a much more influential body prior to the outbreak 
of war, but it did not really-establish itself in the workshops as 
deeply or as extensively as in Coventry. The factory was not as 
central to the Manchester CPer as it was to his Coventry counterpart, 
who did not have (or create) such potent rival attractions as the 
Labour Party ward, local campaigns on community issues, or the trade 
union branch to distract him. Nevertheless, the Manchester CP was 
even less troubled by any political opposition from the left than was 
the Coventry-Party. In some respects, this was surprising, since 
Coventry's leading Communist 'showpiece' factories were practically 
strike free, whereas one of the equivalent groups of factories in 
Manchester, the-°AAHoe group, was the centre of strikes iW the district. 
There were common factors in the-behaviour of the two sets of Communists 
that explained their dominance within the left in the two areas. 
One 
was the good wages and conditions which had been built up in'these 
factories through a high level of, trade union organisation. High 
wages could be used to persuade workers that the strike weapon was 
unnecessary. Good trade union organisation was in itself important 
in that it created a situation in which this argument could be put 
with some hope of carrying the day. Where workers were unorganised in 
organised factories, the unorganised proved difficult to control. 
However, the case of A. V. Roe shows that neither of these two 
factors guaranteed by themselves the means for the CP to restrain 
strikes. Sections of workers were still willing to strike to improve 
J10 ý 
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the terms of piece working, and-take up important and fundamental 
issues affecting the-whole district. When they did this, and the 
Communist stewards were faced with a fait accompli, their sympathy with 
the nature of. the strikes ensured-that they'. adopted a helpful attitude. 
They threatened. to extend the strikes across-the district and through- 
out the combine and. brought them to a rapid and satisfactory conclusion, 
just as their, Coventry comrades had done. In this way, all the strikes 
were kept relatively trouble-free as far aas relations between the strikers 
and, the shop stewards were concerned. As soon as they were forced into 
a corner and had-little ohoice. but to actually oppose a strike, they 
had a rude-shook. An individual. stayed a mass meeting against them in 
one of their strongest factories. They never confronted the same 
embarrassing situation again, largely because they tried hard to avoid 
it, calling a 'safety valve' strike in 1945 to let off some steam 
building up over falling earnings. 
It was the willingness of the CP shop stewards in these districts 
to bend with the wind that ensured that they were not broken. In 
isolation, high wages did not ensure strike-free factories, as 
Avro's showed, although it was obviously one important element in 
persuading workers not to strike. When Coventry stewards simply 
asked the unorganised not to strike, Avro stewards told their members 
to return in 1944, or (as happened more frequently) stewards acted 
in a similar way on the Clyde and Tyne, they ran into severe 
difficulties. 
In the piece working districts, an unbending attitude on the 
part of the anti-strike stewards was much rarer than it was in the 
Northern heavy engineering areas. There can be little doubt but 
that this was closely related to their role in organising workers, 
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for which there had been much more opportunity in the light engineering 
areasg and even in Manchester, where the aircraft industry became 
quite important. It was also related to their position as piece 
work stewards. Piece work demanded the daily and even hourly fixing 
of bargains; it almost enforced regular contact between the shop 
steward and his members. There was much less scope for him to become 
merely a dues-collector, and to thereby allow some of his members to 
slip into the back of his Wind. There was therefore much less danger 
that when these members struck work, his reaction could be closer to 
that of an outsider, more influenced by general political considerations 
than by the situation which had given rise to the strike. 
ýý* 
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CLTDESIDE. 
"ehe Clyde workers], are heroic fighters 
for their class, possessing a vitality 
invaluable to us, if we can guide it 
into the correct channels.., in such 
soil the fungoid growth of Anarchism, 
ILPism and all such theories of the 
mentally inert grow.... The wall of 
class suspicion erected as a result of 
painful experience prevents the light 
from breaking in and exposing the weeds. " 
(Jack Owen, in the Daily Worker, 
March 17,1943") 
(1) 
C.,,,, vdeside 
'September 1939 - April 1943 . 
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By mid-1939, Clydeside was beginning to emerge from the throes 
of the Depression which had affected it so acutely throughout the 
inter-war years. During the late 1920s and '30s, the area's 
dependence on shipbuilding and. marine and heavy engineering had been 
exposed as a severe weakness in a period of international industrial 
recession. Many shipyards and marine engineering works closed down 
completely; Beardmore's yard and marine engineering works at Dalmuir, 
for example, had been allowed to become derelict, with children 
chasing rabbits around the once busy slipway. 
l The North British 
Locomotive Co. was in the process of going out of business because 
its three factories with their annual capacity for 799 main line 
locomotives (their 1919 estimate) was largely unused. 
2 At the same 
time, the relatively buoyant motor and electrical engineering 
industries persistently failed to take root in the area. The result 
had been the highest rate of unemployment in the British Isles out- 
side of a few Welsh villages and some of the Tyne towns. In 1932, 
the average monthly rate of unemployment was 30.7%. 
3 Youth unemploy- 
went was especially high in certain districtss as late as February 
1940,14% of youths were unemployed in the Parkhead area, the second 
highest total in Britain after Sunderland. 
4 
I. Hay, op. cit., P"53 
2 W. R. Scott and J. Cunnison: The Industries of the Clyde Valley 
During the'War (Oxford, 1924 , p. 113. Document by J. S. Crawford marked 29 June, 1942 (Beaverbrook D/67). 
314. P. Fogarty, o . cit. 9 p. 33. 
4LAB 19/81. Number of Juveniles on Register, 12 February, 1940. 
Rearmament brought some signs of an economic revival, however. Beardmores 
began to re-equip their Dalinuir yard, the NBLoco Co. was awarded tank 
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contracts, Holls-Royce began building a huge aero-engine factory on the new 
industrial estate at Hillington(just outside Glasgow)and Howden's extended 
I 
and reconditioned their plant. By 1939, unemployment in Lanarkshire as a 
whole was down to I8.3%, and most of the Clyde was probably well below 
2 
that figure. Glasgow itself was beginning to expand; in 1938, the city had a 
population of I, 093,337, which represented an increase of 3.2% over its 
3 
1931 population, 
At least a part of the expansion of Glasgow had been the result 
of a small amount of immigration from the rest of Scotland. There had also 
been considerable changes going on in the housing and social structure of 
Clydeside. The old housing estates, which were largely owned by the major 
shipbuilding and engineering companies through holding companies gradually 
became less important as slum clearance programmes began in the late 
1930s, and council estates became more common all along the Clyde. Religious 
differences in housing patterns broke down with the development of 
municipal housing, and a rather less religiously segregated working class 
4 
community began to develop. 
Scotland, and particularly Clydeside, had provided the most 
important regional basis of support for the NUWq. Fartly, becaLusb-"of'the 
II. Hay, op. cit., p 6?; Beaverbrook D/67: Document by J. S. Crawford, loc. cit.; 
C. '6d. Hume: One Hundred Years of Howden Engineering. ABrief History, I854-1954. 
(Glasgow, 1954), p. 34" 
2Fogarty, 
op. cit., p. 27.. 
31bid., 
p. 30. 
4R. 
D. Lobban: The Irish Commu. nit in Greenock in the Nineteenth Century' 
n dý3B'bp1Znq, 
(9ontains 
a number of interesting remarks on wei TeM 
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involvement of a relatively large group of unemployed in collective 
activity, the area was well known as one in which left-wing politics 
were deeply rooted in working class consciousness. It is impossible 
to do justice to this tradition in a short space; it is hoped to 
document it for one brief period in the following pages. A couple 
of points should, be picked out, however. All the left wing groups 
had relatively large bodies of adherents here, as we have already 
seen: the CP, the Trotskyists, the Anarchists, the ILP all drew 
sustenance from the rich political soil of the Clyde. Indeed, there 
were several groups which existed nowhere else: Guy Aldred and Angelica 
Balabanova propagandised and published The Voice from Glasgow, whilst 
the Socialist Labour Party continued to function as a political 
tendency long after it had died elsewhere. 
In February 1939, the Socialist Labour Party held a meeting in 
Glasgow, at which the audience were harangued for some time by a 
speaker. - The Socialist drew attention to the impeccable orthodoxy 
of the diatribe: 
"Holding close to the principle of the class struggle, 
the speaker disentangled in fine fashion the knotty 
problems and made it clear to the audience that 
they could do the same if they would only apply them- 
selves to a diligent study of SLP literature, which 
would render them immune from (sic) the wiles and 
lures of reformers and labour fakers. " 
Perhaps this sort of lecture was predictable from sectarians of so 
long a pedigree, yet the audience numbered two hundred and stayed to 
discuss the speech. 
I 
The history of militancy on the Clyde during the war confirms the 
earlier inference that the disputations of the left wing groups were 
70Ss 
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1The Socialist, March, 1939. 
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not as academic as they may have been in other areas. Indeed, it 
will be shown that the history of the left wing is indispensable to 
a history of the local shop stewards' movement. 
, The Clyde provides a number of important comparisons with 
Coventry, 
and, in fact, with the rest of the country. The area had an 
exceptionally large number of working days lost through strikes: 
337,662 compared to 82,764 in Coventry. During 1940, the Clyde's 
shop stewards were mainly concerned with the same problem as their 
counterparts in the Midlands and elsewheres victimisation. After the 
Essential Works Order, victimisation took on another guise in the form 
of transference. The transfer of skilled workers was the preoccupation 
of stewards in the area, playing the same role in engineers' night- 
mares as piece work in Coventry. To a certain extent, the importance 
of transfers (which most affected the skilled) is predictable in the 
sense that the tone of trade unionism in the marine engineering areas 
was set much more by the skilled men than it was in other districts. 
What is surprising is the structure of militancy which arose from 
this central grievance. Strikes were concentrated in three large 
factories until 1944, when the pattern disintegrated equally 
dramatically. An opposition to the leadership of the CP in the shop 
stewards' movement grew up within these fortresses of militancy, and 
achieved a good deal of success in eroding the CP's position. This 
constitutes the second major peculiarity of the Clyde, the relative 
decline of the Communists when viewed in the context of their steadily 
growing influence everywhere else. 
The early months of the 'M'gr allowed the local CP to entertain 
sanguine hopes about their progress as the War dragged on, and workers 
became war weary. It was immediately apparent that the tempo of the 
m 
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class struggle had not abated in the district as a result of the 
outbreak of hostilities. Whilst the Conciliation Officers generally 
were reporting fairly stable situations, the Clyde Officer reported 
at-the beginning of October 1939 that "It is possible to sense a 
growing measure of unrest amongst the workers and certain concrete 
evidences of this have been forthcoming. "1 There had already been 
a strike threatened at Beardmore's Parkhead Forge, and one actually 
broke out at the North British Locomotive Co. 's Springburn factory. 
2 
The CP was able to capitalise on the mood of unrest, by setting up 
what the Conciliation Officer called "an organisation not unlike 
the Clyde Workers' Committee of the last war". 
3 This committee sent 
out a circular to all branches asking them for contributions to 
funding the committee, whose main object was the defence of established 
working conditions, especially with regard to the Conditions of 
Employment Act. Several branches did vote money, but they were soon 
prevented from sending it by their Executives. 4 Little more was heard 
of the Committee until the British Auxiliaries strike later in 1940" 
An explanation of the committee's quiescence may well be the 
difference between its ostensible objects and-the actual difficulties 
which began to present themselves on the shop'floor. Two strikes in 
the spring of 1940 made'it clear that the main issues in industrial 
LAB 16/360. October 7,1939. 
2lbid., Setpember 16,30,1939. 
3Ibid., December 23,1939. 
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relations were`to be the same as in Coventry: victimisation and the 
closely`related'drive for-trade union organisation. The latter problem 
was-less'acute than, in-Coventry since the expansion of local industry 
was mainly in the form of the extension of existing plant rather than 
the-building-of a ., large number of new factories, and because of the 
preponderance' of skilled men with a strong trade union tradition. 
Therefore, the question usually took the form of a movement towards 
a"100% union'shop. -A strike, broke out at Albion Motors at the 
beginning of March over the employment of a 'non'. 
1 
Almost simul- 
taneously, a strike broke out at Beardmore's Parkhead. over what was 
to be the more important issue, when five fitters were sacked. 
Little seems to`have come of these disputes at a district level, 
possibly because the factories concerned had a reputation for being 
well.. organised, and capable of looking after themselves. When the 
district as a whole became concerned, it was with a smaller and less 
prominent factory. This strike broke out at the beginning of 
September1940. The AEU--DC felt it necessary- to. intervene on this 
occasion, largely because of-the nature`of the dispute and its back- 
ground. The management of , 
the British Auxiliaries Co. had dismissed 
three AEU convenors?  during 1940, and. the Engineering Employers' 
Association were operating an embargo on workers from their factory 
because of the factory's reputation as a Communist stronghold. The 
last straw, was, the sacking of the CP convenor, Cunningham, only a 
few days after an unsuccessful strike to reinstate the previous 
7ýr 
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convenor who had also been sacked. 
I The management claimed that 
Cunningham was dismissed because he had 'interfered' with a woman 
working at. the . 
factory, an : 'interference' dismissed by the Daily 
Herald as nothing more than a 'jocular spar'. 
2 The shop stewards 
dismissed the whole matter of the woman as irrelevant. Their first 
leaflet ontthe dismissal drew attention not only to the company's 
history, but also to the involvement of Government departments, as 
Cunningham had earlier turned down the offer of a lucrative job 
3 
as-instructor at a Government training centre. In all, then, ' there 
was a good deal at staket the right of convenors to operate, and 
the right of workers to employment throughout the district, were 
both in contention. In addition, the shop stewards, and especially 
the CF-stewards, suspected the interference of the Government in shop- 
floor industrial relations to be behind Cunningham's isattan. 
The organisation of the dispute bore the mark of the, CP. An appeal 
for funds was sent to every trade union branch in Britain, and regular 
mass meetings were held which were attended by the strikers' wives 
to boost the morale of the men. 
4 The AEU DC supported the strike, 
although it was under some pressure from the EC to end it in favour 
of a Works Conference. 
5 A, further indication of the CPIs intense 
interest in the dispute was the-development of the earlier shop stewards' 
committee into the West of Scotland Shop Stewards' Consultative 
1LAB 10/361. September 28,1940. 
`Daily Herald, October 9,1940. 
31bid. 
4LAB 10/361. October 26,1940. 
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Committee (WSSSC). It was formally set up after the April 1940 
New Propellor conference, whose programme it adopted. Its first sign 
of life came with the outbreak of the British Auxiliaries strike. 
The committee had representatives from all the main factories, and 
was hailed by the Trotskyist Youth for Socialism as the successor to 
the Clyde Workers' Committee. 
1 
At the beginning of November, the WSSSC called a meeting of the 
district's shop stewards to ask the Conciliation Officer to step in. 
The stoppage had by then been going on for almost a month, with no 
signs of either side cracking, at a time when the average length of 
strikes in the district was one and a half days. Naturally, the 
Conciliation Officer refused to entertain an unofficial deputation, 
but the stewards relayed the request through the AEU DC, leaving the 
Conciliation Officer little choice. 
2 Unfortunately for him the 
employers were adamant that there would have to be a return to work 
if negotiations were to take place. On the other hand, the mass 
meetings that were being held every Monday were reaffirming the 
determination of the strikers to stick out. 
3 On Monday 7th October, 
the convenor, Cunningham, even made a speech advising a return to 
work, but he was howled down from the floor. 
4 By the end of October, 
there were conflicting accounts of the state of morale of the strikers, 
and the chances of success. The Daily Worker insisted on the 26th 
that "There is no sign of wavering on the part of the men on strike"g 
and headed an article on the strikes in Scotland with "Scottish 
1Youth for Socialism, November, 1940. 
2LAB 10/361. November 9,1940" 
3LAB 
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Strikes May Spread". ' At the end of the month, Galbraith reported on 
the other hand that some of the strikers were "very anxious to return", 
and some men began to return during the first week in October. 
2 
The strike 'was hanging in the balance, because the district's shop 
stewards had been showing signs of giving material support to it, 
even though it was beginning to fold up. The strikers had won support 
through issuing a leaflet which was distributed all over the district 
together with collecting sheets. The leaflet is worth quoting in full, 
not only because of the response it evoked, but also because it 
throws some light on how strikers justified their action at this stage 
of the wars 
British Auxiliaries Shop Stewards' Committee 
Go To It. 
We went to it - some of us enlisted and the othexa worked excessive 
overtime, etc. The management went to it and have disrupted every 
means we have in power for redress of any injustice. And they have encroached on our AEU status by taking up a dictatorial attitude in refusing to discuss our case when we had already resumed work in 
accordance with all legal procedure. 
Our Case. 
Our shop convenor has been sacked for his trade union activities. 
The men have taken an extended holiday pending his reinstatement. 
We have been forced to take this action as this is our third 
convenor to be got rid of in four months. We want to take part in 
our country's war effort, and we are willing to work in any 
factory. The Masters' Federation has closed its doors to us, i. e., 
preventing us from being employed elsewhere. 
Why are honest'shop stewards being persecuted and victimised? 
Because they are maintaining trade union rights and conditions. 
We appeal to you to send resolutions to Mr. Bevan (sic) demanding 
that this management be put in its place, and once and for all 
stopping all recurrences of this trouble elsewhere. 
We need your financial aid immediately. Please Help. 
Treasurer A. Turnbull. 3 
1DW, October 26,1940. 
2Daily Herald, November 6,8,1940. 
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The appeal brought in some money, and the promise of industrial 
action by the WSSSCrif the dispute was not satisfactorily settled. 
1 
It was thought by some at the. Conciliation Department that the WSSSC 
could not initiate'a district wide strike. A memorandum to Headquarters 
in London stated that they thought the Committee could make "a good 
show" at Beardmore, NBLoco, Rolls Royce and the Albion, but that the 
rest of the district'would be unlikely to follow suit. 
2 The 
Conciliation Department-may have been slightly optimistic in its 
estimate of the possibilities, because there were disputes going on 
during the British. . Auxiliaries strikes which could easily-be linked 
to it in the minds of the shop stewards. There was a strike at Rolls- 
Royce's foundry for the dismissal of a foreman who criticised the 
trade union, and one at Howden's, over a worker who had contravened 
union rules. -It may be that the Department was right, but they seemed 
to be ignoring. the, Howden's strike, as well as underestimating the 
effect of a, concerted strike action at the factories they named. 
In any case', the crucial determinant in the outcome of the strike 
proved to be not so much the ability of the CP to shore"it. up, but 
its will to'do so. Whilst the WSSSC was making'threatening noises, 
other members of the-CP, had been-. looking for 'a negotiated path out of 
the impasse. Three members{cf the-AEU DC met representatives, of -the 
management in the presence, of the Conciliation-Officer. 
3 The 
deputation consisted of. -Sillars, 
Cloakie and Gray., Sillars led off 
for-the DC, and castigated the employers for their . attachment 
to 
procedure. Concluding his remarks, he said that there might be a way 
1DW, 
October 18,1940. 
2LAB 10/126. Memo on British Auxiliaries Strike (n. d. ). 
ýWI October 7,1940. 
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out if Cunningham was reinstated after being formally suspended for 
one week. The other members of the delegation failed to agree with 
Sillars, and they had to have an adjournment to clarify their 
collective position, which was to withdraw Sillars' suggestion. 
1 
The first signs of the Communists' desire to be rid of the strike 
had been shown by Sillars, who was perhaps the leading Party member 
on the District Committee. Galbraith advanced the theory that they 
wanted to drop the strike because the National Committee of the AIJ 
was to meet soon, and the CPers feared that their credentials would 
be withdrawn if they persisted in supporting a strike which the BO 
had told them to end. He added that he thought that the instruction 
to follow this line had come from outside of the district. 
2 
Irrespective of the feelings of the CP on the matter, the strike 
had already begun to peter out. The critical moment which had been 
reached about the time when the WSSSC had pledged its support had 
been passed. They might have been able to resurrect the strike, but 
had suffered from indecision at the last minute. The dispute was 
settled by the intervention of David Kirkwood, M. P. at the invitation 
of the CP. He offered a document to the District Committee which 
gave him the right to negotiate on their behalf, and some Committeemen 
signed it. He negotiated a settlement with the employers which was 
that Cunningham should be reinstated for a fortnight after a return 
to work, and that he would find the ex-convenor work in a Royal 
Ordnance Factory. But the management were stiffened by the apparent 
desire of the strikers to settle, and they rejected the fortnight's 
1LAB 10/124. Memo from Galbraith to H. Q. (n. d. ) 
2LAB 10/126. November 15º 1940. 
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reinstatement. The strikers drifted back to work. 
The strike had ended in abject defeat. The CP had been seen to 
wash their hands of the strike for ulterior motives, and Galbraith 
thought that they were "not exactly in very good odour" as a result. 
2 
Serious splits in the ranks of the left had already. started to appear, 
and'they were further deepened later in November. 
The meeting of the WSSSC of 14th November had district strike 
action in support of the British Auxiliaries' strikers on the agenda. 
Obviously, the agenda had been overtaken by events, since the strike 
was settled, and there was a general return to work on Monday 16th. 
However, there were those who thought that there should be district 
strike action anyway, but in support of the national pay claim. There 
was "a very-sharp cleavage of opinion" on the matter, but the leaders 
of the committee prevailed. 
3 The Daily Worker claimed that "... 
on the date suggested, it would be difficult for a united move to be 
made. It was therefore decided not to take a holiday for the time 
being. "4 Galbraith, on the other hand, thought it not so much a 
minor tactical question, but more of a major political one, because 
he said that the'leaders of the committee had argued in favour of 
using the official trade union machinery rather than strike action. 
5 
Before following the fortunes of the Clydeside CP in the engineering 
factories' any further, some attempt must be made to discover the 
1LAB 10/126. November 15,1940. 
2LAB 10/360. December 7,1940. 
3LAB 10/124. Galbraith to Leggett, November 20,1940. 
4DW, November 26,1940. 
5LAB 10/124. Galbraith to Leggett, November 26,1940. 
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factories in which they were strong. The picture that emerges is 
vital to the analysis offered later. 
'British Auxiliaries was a factory which had had a CP convenor, and 
the Party had at"first profited by the strike. Acknowledgements of 
receipts by the Daily Worker's Fighting Fund for August and 
September 1940 showed two contributions from the factory. The other 
main contributors weres Beardmore's Parkhead Forge (nine contributions), 
Rolls-Royce (three), North'British Loco Queen's Park (one), Albion 
Motors (one). 1 Of these, Beardmore's was clearly the strongest CP 
factory, with the-foundry and the Locomotive departments sending in 
their own contributions separately. The total subscribed by the whole 
factory-to, 'the fund in these two months was just over ten pounds. 
Apart from showing the extent of CP activity at Beardmore's, the 
Fighting Fund contributions also show the main industrial strongholds 
for the Party, coinciding as they do with the Conciliation Department's 
picture of where they could initiate strike action in support-of the 
British Auxiliaries'-strikers. 
As we shall see, -, the CP was in a difficult position in Scotland' 
by the early months of 1940, because-of campaigns against them from 
various directions, but there is°a noticeable change in their 
attitude, in industry even before these campaigns really began to take 
effect. They adopted a much more 'moderate' tone of voice in 
industrial matters. At the beginning of January 1941,, the WSSSC 
called a meeting of all engineering and shipbuilding shop stewards to 
1DW, August 5,9,13,21, September 4,6,11,27,30. 
In addition, there were reports to the Daily Worker from 
. Beardmore Parkhead 
(August 30, October 4) 'Glasgow Loco Workers' 
(September 13), Rolls-Royce (September 
M. 
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discuss the national applications for wage advances in these industries. 
In Scotland, where wages had never been high, the inflation of 1940 
had eroded real wages: to an alarming extent, which was only disguised 
by the long hours of overtime being worked. It is not surprising, 
then, that the meeting attracted two thousand shop stewards. They 
might be expected to be in militant mood, but if they were, the 
Communist speeches did not connect with their feeling. The Conciliation 
Officer was so=struck by the moderation of the speeches that he 
erroneously reported to London that the CP had not spoken at all at 
the meeting. 
1 During-the following week, he discovered that in fact, 
six of the seven speakers had been CPers, and he explained his mistake 
in terms of the fact that they had been "eminently reasonable" in 
their approach. 
2 Later in the month, the negotiations led to an 
award of 3/6 on plain time rates for skilled men when Galbraith 
thought that the minimum acceptable to the rank and file would be 5/-t 
but the WSSSC did nothing, possibly because subscriptions to the 
Committee had declined "almost to the vanishing point. ,3 
The Communists in the district were already receiving a battering 
in the AEU elections. In the district ballot for AEU President, the 
CP candidate polled only about one quarter of the 1700 votes cast, 
4 
against the balance which went to an 'old-style' trade unionist. 
In the New Year, they had another setback when Sillars, their 
candidate for the National Committee, failed to be re-elected. 
5 
1 LAB '10/362. 'January 11,1941. 
Ibid., January 18,1941. 
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There were good reasons for the CP's declining support, quite apart 
from the criticism they had brought on their heads due to their 
handling of the British Auxiliaries strike. Of course, the CP came 
in for some criticism from the local press for organising the 
Scottish People's Convention, but this was no more than the rest of 
the CPCB had to. put up with. What was distinctive about Scotland 
was.. the_rper-sensitivity of the Scottish TUC to any suggestion that 
the left was organising effectively in its unions. The STUC opposed 
the Scottish People's Convention, and tried to cut the ground from 
beneath the WSSSC's feet. 
1 
At the beginning of 1941, the STUC 
circularised its member unions asking them whether they thought the 
WSSSC detrimental to the cause of trade unionism. Not surprisingly, 
given the way the question was posed, it was answered in the 
affirmative by all except three union offices, two of which had not 
heard of the committee, and one which failed to return the questionnaire. 
Taking this as a mandate, the STUC then circularised all unions again 
advising them to take disciplinary action against those shop stewards 
who were not acting in accordance with rule. 
2 
The left was not only under direct attack from above, but subject 
to some ideological pressure from below organised by the Government. 
In. the late summer of 1940, the Ministry of Information, conscious 
of the strength of Communist ideas on the Clyde, conducted a 
campaign to counter communism in industry in the West of Scotland. 
The scale of the campaign is not clear, but there was only one 
full-time organiser who sent in reports, one William Roberts. 
1Glasgow Evening News, September 27,1940. 
2LAB 10/362, February 22,1941. 
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Roberts' was helped by numerous assistants and informants, however, 
and his campaign is interesting not only in itself, but also for 
what it reveals about the sub-political roots of anti-communism in 
local working class consciousness. At the same time, Roberts has 
to be taken with more than a pinch of salt: after all, his job 
security was directly related to his success. 
Roberts organised informal discussions amongst shipyard and ordnance 
factory workers, gave film shows-in factory canteens, talks in 
tenement kitchens, 'and even organised`'study Circles' to discuss 
Russia and other topics. 
I 
Naturally, he gave full descriptions of 
his more successful meetings. In May 1941, he held a meeting at 
Clydebank, where he noted that the CP's defeatism had been gaining 
ground at the Royal Ordnance Factory. The first question came from 
'i 
a CPer, who asked him what he thought of the Hess affair. Roberts 
realised that this was very much a leading question which might 
involve him in defending the government against the charge of neo- 
Nazism (a line argued, amongst other places, in the May edition. Of 
tJ , 
World News and Views), and invited the questioner to give his own 
views. The CPer rose to the bait and put the Party line. When he 
had finished, Roberts produced a copy of World News and Views, 
threw it over to him, and said "Then it was you who would write 
this article? " His trick had the desired effect, because the audience 
turned on the Communist for simply reiterating the Party journal's 
views. One of the audience shouted out "You bloody babbling parrot" 
and another humourist followed this with: "Hey, you, you're just 
TZI 
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like Tennyson's brook - you chatter on for ever. "1 At another 
meeting, again attended by workers from the ROF Dalmuir, another 
element in popular anti-Communism came out when the Communists were 
criticised for not doing as the pacifists did, opting out of the 
war altogether. They were accused vehemently of reaping the maximum 
benefit from the war themselves through good wages, overtime and so 
on. Roberts thought the meeting "a good one indeed". 
2 His campaign 
had the air of a personal crusade, but his judgement about the CP's 
position in May 1941 was so emphatic that it must have had some basis 
in realitys 
"I cannot help feeling that if the Ministry of 
Information or the Labour Party or any other 
ou seize this moment the CP will be 
practically knocked out. " 3 (emphasis original) 
Roberts' judgement on the CP's position was, of course, far too 
optimistic. To 'practically knock out' the CP on the Clyde would 
have been a difficult task indeed. However, it is clear that they 
were in a very weak position at this point. Unfortunately for them, 
they were also unable to capitalise on the apprentices' strikes of 
March 1941. 
ýý 
It would be difficult to guess from a reading of Roberts's reports 
that a major industrial dispute was continuing during February and 
3ZZ 
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3 
Report, April 24,1941. 
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March 1941. Clearly he did not think that the apprentices' strike 
seriously affected the position of the CP in local industry. This 
was despite the fact that when the apprentices' movement had begun 
to revive under wartime conditions, the YCL had formed its leadership. 
On March 17 1940, delegates from thirty-five. factories responded to 
a call from an 'organising committee' for a meeting to discuss 
apprentices' problems. The organising committee (which became the 
Clyde Apprentices Committee) comprised nine delegates from local 
shipyards and engineering factories, eight of whom were members of 
the YCL. 1 Yet, at the end of a largely successful strike, the CP 
had not visibly improved its position amongst the Clyde shop stewards. 
The reasons for their failure to derive much comfort from the strikes 
are at first sight'difficult to see. Why this should have been the 
case has to be the central question asked in the course of our 
account of the dispute. 
The Clyde apprentices prepared assiduously for their battle with 
the employers. From their meeting'in early 1940 onwards, they 
propagandised for their demands, which weres 
1) 100%% wage increases for all apprentices from 
the first to the fourth years. 
2) The full district, rate less five shillings for the 
first six months of the final year, after which 
the full journeyman's rate should apply. 
3) A half day's technical training per week, in the 
-employer's time. 
4) A fuller all round training in the workshops. 
5 No victimisation of the apprentices elected as 
delegates. 2 
The demands allow us to understand the background to the apprentices' 
disappointment with the results of the national pay award for 1940. 
1INF 1/673, April 24,1941. 
2SA, June 1941. These demands were adopted by the Edinburgh 
apprentices in the interests of unity. (LAB 10/422. Leaflet 
issued by the Edinburgh Apprentices Committee, January 1941). 
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The adults had only received 3s. 6d., but the boys only received a 
proportion of this, 'ranging from tenpence-halfpenny for the first 
year apprentices to 1s. 7d. for fifth year lads. The Clyde Apprentices' 
Committee took the matter up in an agitational broadsheet which became 
a printed four page paper, the Clyde Apprentices' Map. Meanwhile, 
they set up apprentices' committees in the factories, trying to 
obtain the support of the adult shop stewards wherever possible. 
1 
At the beginning of February, they were able to link up with. 
apprentices from the rest of Scotland, when they attended a conference 
held to discuss strikes then taking place in Edinburgh. The Edinburgh 
lads were out in sympathy with striking apprentices at Henry Robb's 
Leith shipyard, whose representatives had been sacked whilst presenting 
the management with wage and other demands. 
2 The Clyde lads promised 
strike action in support, from Monday 10th February. 
3 In the event, 
they were overtaken by the AEU officials, who had succeeded in- 
obtaining a return to work by the Leith strikers. 
4 
The ending of the Leith strike was an important formative 
experience for the Scottish apprentices which seriously prejudiced 
them against the AEU officials. The official in question, at a mass 
meeting of the Henry Robb strikers, had, as the Conciliation Officer 
put its 
"... - probably due to excessive zeal - made a very 
pointed attack on the Chairman of the apprentices' 
1Clyde Apprentices Mag., No. 1. 
2LAB 10/422, February 5,1941. 
3LAB 10/362, February 15,1941" 
4LAB 10/422 February 5,7 (subjects Eng. and Shipbldg. Apps. 'Cttee). 
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committee and criticised strongly those who were 
'stupid enough' to be lead (sic) away by the advice 
of the Communists. " 
This speech led to a vote against a resumption of work, although the 
officials managed to persuade some lads to return on the following 
day, and the strike disintegrated. 
1 
On the next occasion, the apprentices showed considerable hostility 
towards the trade union officials. On February 28th, apprentices at 
a Kilmarnock factory stopped work for the Clyde demands, and they 
were supported a few days later by lads in some of the Edinburgh 
factories and yards. At the beginning of the second week in March, 
Clyde apprentices started to cane out, and by 15th March, there were 
six thousand of their number on strike. 
2 The Conciliation Officer 
reported that: 
"They had adopted an attitude of refusing to have 
anything to do with trade unions and of insisting on 
being allowed to put their.... own case... 
the reason for this attitude was, as one of them remarked, 
'disillusionment'. They now assert that they can gain 
more for themselves. " 3 
According to the Ministry of Information's informants, the apprentices 
were in a state of confusion because they did not know whether the 
trade union officials or the Apprentices' Committee was leading them. 
4 
Whatever the feeling of the striking apprentices themselves was, 
their committee was quite clear in its attitude to the officials, 
voting unanimously to reject the latter's offer to negotiate for them. 
1LAB 10/422, February 7 (subject: Messrs. Henry Robb, Leith). 
2LAB 10/362, March 15,1941. 
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Less than thirty percent of the strikers were members of a union, and 
the Committee claimed that therefore it was the only body with a 
legitimate=claim to represent the lads. They maintained their 
independent attitude-when they were asked by a Government Court of 
Inquiry, '(set up immediately the dispute spread to the Clyde) to 
recommend-a return to work if national negotiations were immediately 
started between the unions and the employers. The Apprentices' 
Committee initially refused to recommend a return unless they were 
represented on the negotiations. However, the officials strongly 
opposed. apprentice representation. The Court succeeded in extracting 
a promise that the apprentices would return by promising that they 
would review the settlement agreed between the unions and employers. 
In addition, the Court agreed to recommend to the unions that they 
accept some apprentice representation. 
1 
Having secured these under- 
takings from the Court, -the Committee was prepared to recommend a 
return of work. The Clyde strikers duly returned on Thursday 
17th March. 2 
When the negotiations began, the officials refused to allow the 
apprentices to attend. Nevertheless, the final settlement was reported 
by the Conciliation Officer to have been 'on the whole well received', 
and that the short time taken (less than a fortnight after the strike 
had started on the Clyde) was especially appreciated. 
3 
The settlement agreed byýthe employers and unions in national 
negotiations and rubber-stamped by the Court of Inquiry was quite 
favourable to the apprentices. Wages were to fluctuate with those of 
1LAB 10/362, March 15,22,1941. 
2LAB 10/362, March 22,1941. 
31bid., March 29,1941. 
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the adult journeymen, and in a fixed proportion to them. First-year 
apprentices received 25% of the adult district rate plus national 
bonus, ranging up to 60% for the fifth-years. For the fifth-year 
apprentices, previously receiving 31s/ 3d. per week, the increase 
amounted to about 14s/ 9d. There was still some discontent, because 
even fifth-years were still well away from receiving the full district 
rate, and in Lancashire, 25% of the adult rate would actually mean 
a reduction for first-years. 
1 It was this last grievance which 
sparked off the strikes in Lancashire. 
2 Nevertheless, substantial 
advances had been won on the basic rate which would be reflected in 
increased piece work bonus and overtime payments. Moreover, they had 
been won in a remarkably short time. 
Yet the CP itself does not appear to have gained very much from 
the strike, in terms of its influence in the shop stewards' movement. 
This was largely because the apprentices had refused to have anything 
to do with the unions as such. This refusal made it more difficult 
for any'steward, as a lay official of the union, to actively support 
the strikers. The situation was thus quite different to that obtaining 
in 1937, when one of the main demands had been for trade union 
recognition, and the full-time officials had therefore allowed and 
encouraged the stewards to support the apprentices. In 1941, the CP 
stewards must therefore have found the going much harder when trying 
to argue with other stewards and their members that the apprentices 
should be supported. Quite apart from the whole 'Imperialist War' 
1Inman, 
p. 334, note (1). 
2Inman 
does not distinguish between the original wave of strikes (mainly in Scotland), and the second wave (mainly in Lancashire) 
which followed the Court's ruling. (see pp. 333-4). 
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impediment, they'also had to try to explain the apparently anti-union 
attitude of the. apprentices. In addition, 'the CP stewards had been 
deprived of the Daily Worker, their-traditional vehicle for propagand- 
ising for strikes. 
-Under these circumstances, the CP stewards had been unable to 
reap much benefit-from the apprentices' strike. The reports of both 
Roberts+and'the-Conciliation Officer contain virtually no mention of 
the Communist stewards' activities in this period, in sharp contrast 
to their frequent remarks and long paragraphs of 1940. At this point, 
immediately before Hitler's invasion of the USSR, it is worth summar- 
ising the argument so far, 'and drawing out some comparisons between 
the position of the shop stewards' movement on the Clyde and in 
Coventry. The Scottish stewards had to deal with essentially the 
same central difficulty as their counterparts in the Midlands, that 
is, 'the victimisation of shop stewards. On-the other hand, they did 
not suffer from the mushroom-growth of munitions factories that was 
occurring in Coventry, whose new--workers had to be speedily and 
comprehensively organised if the town was not to become`a haven for- 
'none'. ' The only Coventry-style factory was Rolls-Royce Hillington, 
which-was organised by Communists during 1940. The district's 
stewards had a more solid base to build on for creating an unofficial 
body to fight the victimisations that existed in Coventry. There 
are signs that-Clydeside trade-unionists were willing to take advantage 
of their-comparatively good organisation through strikes which were 
singularly aggressive in terms-of their demands. Needless to say, 
these strikes-were at most factory-wide; and there were no district 
strikes over the important range of issues that had been raised by the 
factory stoppages. 
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This was not because there had not been any serious discussion of 
district action, because there had been during the British Auxiliaries' 
strike. But the strike had been lost, in contrast to its equivalent, 
the Standard Aero dispute in Coventry. The CP, under heavy pressure 
from the Executive, chose to bury the strike when some thoughtthat 
it was still alive. They had been under pressure from the officials, 
and from a Government political campaign, but this did not excuse 
them in the eyes of some of the shop stewards involved in the WSSSC. 
The Communists were rather red-faced (and began to act as if they were) 
because they had left their own comrades in the lurch. 
Serious political opposition to the leadership of the CP amongst 
a certain group of shop stewards dates from about this time. The 
number of shop stewards who were seriously interested in left-wing 
political alternatives to the CP was probably not above a few dozen, 
at least in the first instance, but it was a significant development. 
Of course, the Trotskyists and their old companions the ILPers had 
been voicing, their doubts about the CP for some time, and in strident 
tones, but they do not seem to have found a very wide audience. Now, 
they certainly had an audience, if they could only connect with it 
and carry it along behind them. As Roberts had remarked, there were 
splits within the ranks of the Party already, there were disagreements 
within the WSSSC-(some of whose members had been disappointed in their 
hopes of reviving the Clyde Workers' Committee) and there were soon 
to be'deep divisions on the AEU DC. If William Roberts had possessed 
a crystal ball, he might have been slightly more cautious in making 
his remark about the possibility of destroying the CF; the erosion of 
their influence by the Trotskyists and their fellow-travellers did not 
exactly gladden the hearts of his employers. 
*** 
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As in Coventry, -there was no change in the tendency for the number 
of 'working days lost through strikes to increase after the CP's change 
of line on the nature of, the War. On the contrary, there were more 
days lost as the %r wore on. The remarkable feature of strike activity 
on. the Clyde was the marked concentration of these strikes in three 
major factories. B eardmore's Parkheäd Forge, Rolls-Royce Hillington, 
and-the North British Locomotive Co. 's°factory'at Queen's Park. In 
1941, these factories accounted for nine strikes of the twenty-seven 
along the Clyde that year, but 29,205 of 31,799 days lost. In 1942 
and 1943, this imbalance persisted. In 1942, the three factories 
accounted for 28,694 days of 33,099 (15 of 35 strikes), and in 1943, 
for 108,860 of 114,449 (15 of 29 strikes). Thus, they accounted for 
between a third and a half of the strikes, but a considerably higher 
proportion (over 80%) of the total number of days lost. If we were 
able to take into account less well-recorded sanctions such as overtime 
embargoes (a favourite tactic at Beardmore's; see table) then the 
already prominent position of these plants would probably be increased. 
The causes of,; strikes on the Clyde were substantially different 
from the causes. in Coventry. The Clyde had a higher proportion of 
days lost through disputes on disciplinary questions (including the 
rights of shop stewards to operate). Just over 400 of the total 
number of days lost in the area were on these questions compared to 
just over 12% in Coventry, although too much should not be inferred 
here, since the Clyde figures include-the Albion Motors strike of 
1944, during which 107,000 days were lost. The main difference arose 
in the figures for strikes in the general area of. wages. Most 
strikes in the Scottish centre concerned base rates, the introduction 
of piece working systems, and lieu and merit rates. In the Coventry 
district, most wages disputes directly concerned the timing of jobs, 
as may be seen from tables 
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Table ?/ 
< , OVERTIME EMBARGOES IN BFARDMOiE PARKHEAD 
L1NICN/DEPARTMENT 
----- -- 
United Pattenraakera 
Ago. 
ý 3: 7.40-3 
22.2.41-19.4.41-' 
19"4"41 
26.4.41. 
26.4.41. 
31.5.41. 
all 
Bimakers 
all 
~B'makers _ý ullet- 
proof dept. ) 
Cranemen, 81ingers 
Electricians 
N 
7.6.41-28.6.41 
5.8.41 
N 
to 
27.6.42 
26.9.42-28.11.42. 
30.7.43 
28.1.44 
14.4.44 (reported as 
having started some 
months before) - 21.4.44. 
14.4.44^21.4.44. 
21.4.44-12.5.44 
28.4.449.5.44 
2.5.44 
4.8.44 
15"9"44 
Labourers 
Electricians 
Bricklayers 
Labourers 
Maintenance 
Steel fdry 
M/c shops 
Part of Steel 
Fdry. 
Maintenance, 
Ordnance and 
Heavy m/c shops 
Electricians 
Fdry Labourers 
Foundry 
Bricklayers 
Labourers 
Heavy m/c shops 
Heavy m/c shops 
CAUSE 
excessive overtime 
? 21 
wage claim one dept. 
wages 
delay in providing 
canteen 
delay in netotiationa 
for lieu rate 
for piece work- 
related bonus 
reimposed; bonus 
too low 
for lieu rate 
bonus dispute 
n 
bonus dispute 
for production bonus. 
for fair distribution 
of overtime 
demarcation 
for production bonus 
overtime arrangements 
for Sunday overtime 
overtime 
piece-work 
reimposition previous 
ban 
Sources Conciliation Officers' Reports. 
*Date of commencement given when duration unknown. 
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How does this pattern relate to the three main factories on the 
Clyde? How 'orthodox' were they in relation to the rest of the 
district? The most orthodox factory was Beardmore's Parkhead. Here, 
there were no strikes directly concerned with the timing of piece 
work jobs, although there were disputes on issues like the way in 
which bonuses were to be calculated, and so on. At the North British 
Loco., Queen's Park, there were again very few disputes concerning 
piece work times. Only 572 days of 19,787 between 1941 and 1945 
were lost through this type of strike, and the three that did 
occur were amongst Blacksmiths and Boilermakers, numerically small 
craft groups with long histories of piece-working. Rolls-Royce was 
quite different; here, the national propensity towards piece work 
disputes in the aircraft factories was reproduced, with over 
10% (6,891 Of 55,891) of days lost deriving 
TJZ 
4%ý 
4 
from piece work strikes. 
1 
Leaving Rolls-Royce aside for one moment, what was it that made 
the other two factories so strike-prone? 
2 To understand the real 
reasons for their strikes, which occurred on a whole range of issues, 
we must look beyond strikes as an indicator and towards issues that 
bubbled just under the surface. It is a commonplace of labour history 
and industrial relations that strikers' demands do not always faith- 
fully reflect their grievances. Nor is their immediate 'cause' always, 
or even usually, what lies behind them. The Conciliation Officer 
offered two main causes of friction at these factories that allow us 
to understand how deep-seated and long-term grievances built up there, 
fanning the everyday'sparks of workshop friction into the flames of 
strike action. Firstly, they contained an unusually high proportion 
of skilled men for the district, and were unusually well-paid. 
3 
Consequently, they were liable to feel the impact of transfers within 
the district more acutely than other skilled men. Imagine a typical 
example. A boilermaker, blacksmith or coppersmith at one of these 
factories might be uprooted from his mates and familiar work routines 
and transferred to a shipyard, where such men were desperately needed. 
He would have to brush up on unfamiliar aspects of his craft to 
The KBLoco is an interesting case, because a large body of 
skilled piece -workers existed there (Hinton, p. 88). During the 
Second World War, these workers were paid in groups, in a system 
apparently resembling the Coventry gang system. But the exceptionally 
high earnings of the skilled piece workers had not been won through 
strikes - most strikes occurred among time workers trying to catch 
up. Thus, in some respects, the NBLoco factories resembled the 
highest-paid Coventry factories. (See LAB 10/363,25 July, 1943, 
where the system of group piece work is referred to). 
2For further information on these factories, see Appendix. 
TR 
3LAB 10/363, October 31,1942. 
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establish himself with a 'squad' and to get the maximum amount of 
overtime to make his money up, since the chances were that he would 
be on plain time rates. Finally, he would have his income tax 
assessed on the previous six months earnings, thereby further 
diminishing his already considerably lighter pay packet. There was 
another important cause of strikes which arose out of the high earnings 
of piece workers within these factories. Other skilled workers such 
as millwrights, ____ maintenance electricians, and unskilled 
labourers 
fell behind because they were paid plain time rates. 
1 Naturally, 
this gave rise to demands for'better lieu rates for the skilled, and 
production bonuses for the unskilled. Both of these issues caused 
direct action themselves, but their importance went beyond the strikes 
that they actually caused. They underlay many other disputes, but 
more importantly, they were acute forms of district problems. The 
whole of Clydeside was a relatively skilled area, and transfers 
concerned everyone there, just as the problem of lieu rates did. The 
difference between Beardmores, NBLoco and the rest of the district 
was quantitative, not qualitative. Two possibilities co-existeds 
either the strike-prone factories would lead the rest, through a 
consciousness of the essential community of interest, or the two 
plants would become isolated as a result of the very deep form the 
problems took there. 
The causes of strikes at Rolls-Royce Hillington were rather 
different, and it is worthwhile making a slight digression into the 
position of women in these factories to help us come to grips with the 
1LAB 10/363, October 31,1942. 
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problem. Beardmore's Parkhead and the NBLoco were men's factories. 
Much of the work was very heavy, and was considered unsuitable for 
women not only by the management, but also by the men who were 
reluctant to see jobs which had been traditionally exclusively male 
taken over by women, even temporarily. It is also undoubtedly true 
that they genuinely wished to protect women from having to do this 
type of work. For whatever motives, they did not encourage women on 
to certain jobs. At the 1BLoco in July 1942, for example, the 
Communist shop stewards in the Tank Erecting shop threatened to strike 
if women were not removed; they claimed that they were 'not suitable' 
and that they would bring the bonus down. 
I 
This case reached the 
level of threatened strike action, probably because earnings were 
threatened, but we can also detect a degree of 'male chauvinism' in 
their response. 
In the NBLoco and Beardmore's, women did not constitute a large 
element in the workforce because of the heavy nature of the work. 
At Beardmores, the light machining areas were in any case only a 
relatively small part of the factory, and this was also true, though 
to a lesser extent at the NBLoco. Since the women were generally 
employed in these areas, many skilled men (like those in the NBLoco 
Tank Erecting Shop) could continue to work almost without seeing a 
woman in the course of their working day. This was definitely not 
true of Rolls-Royce Hillington, where less than 5p of the workforce 
of 25,000 were skilled males. 
2 
1LAB 10/363. July 25,1943. 
3 3' 
2Report by a Court of Inquiry concerning a Dispute at an Enrineerirr- 
Undertakinp in Scotland, Comnd. 6474,1943, para. 11. 
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Neither Beardmore's nor the NBLoco had any important women's 
strikes, but at Rolls-Royce, the women were to the fore in several 
disputes, culminating in the 1943 explosion over grading. Their 
different position in the workshop community was one factor in this, 
but there is another important explanation. We have seen how in 
Coventry the women (amongst whom there was a high proportion of 
young 'mobile' girls from Scotland and the North-East) looked for 
their trade union membership to yield them quick and concrete 
results, and their 'immobile' counterparts at home showed similar 
traits. The shop stewards at Rolls, led by the Cl', organised the 
women into the T&GWU during 1940,1 and they immediately brought up 
the fact that the Relaxation Agreement was not being properly applied 
to give them the men's rates. It was this grievance that went into 
procedure in early 1941 and re-emerged at the beginning of 1943 when 
the women grew tired of waiting. Rolls was quite exceptional in this 
sense as far as the West of Scotland was concerned. Scottish women 
in general were inadequately organised because the AEU convenors made 
strenuous efforts to keep the T&GWU out of their factories. 
2 In some 
cases, they were even prepared to actively hinder attempts to organise 
them, hoping to recruit them into the AEU when that union dropped its 
ban on Female membership. The practice of women paying the AEU 
convenor a penny a week to represent them became widespread over the 
next two years. 
3 
33c p 
1In October 1940, the Daily Worker had stated that the strike- 
of foundry workers there was "Unique in that three unions of 
skilled workers are fighting for the right of the TGWU to 
organise the women in this particular department. " (DW, October 22,1940)" 
2John Campbell argued against the Scottish convenors in a 
Daily Worker article of July 22,1940. 
3LAB 10/363. June 6,1942. The Conciliation Officer noted that this system "prevaled" in the West of Scotland. 
All of'these factories were large. Beardmore's and the NBLoco 
Queen's Park both employed around 10,000 and Rolls-Royce employed 
25,000 at its peak. It should also be pointed out that large numbers 
of workers outside these factories were employed by the same firms: 
Beardmore managed the ROFs at Dalmuir and Linwood, the NBLoco had 
another large sister factory across the Clyde at Polmadie, and Rolls- 
Royce had dispersal factories at Kirkintilloch and elsewhere. 
Beardmore in particular had always been looked to by Clyde workers for 
a lead. During the First World War and the 1937 apprentices' strike, 
the action ofýthe shop stewards there had been crucial. Finally, all 
these factories had Communist convenors in mid-1941, although this 
changed over the next two years. 
Having described the main bases of support for the CP, which were 
also the most militant factories, a brief outline of the small and 
scattered membership of the oppositional groups should be given. Of 
course, there-was at this point no, real comparison between the forces 
of the two sets of 'leftists' . on, the 
Clyde. One had ,a large body of 
stewards and`District Committeemen, and the other had only relatively 
few adherents, sown in ones and twos around the workshops. The ILP, 
of course, had a rather large membership, but neglected to organise 
them industrially and they therefore remained a rather amorphous group. 
Probably the best way to find out where these groups had active 
members is by reading their papers and journals, and locating articles 
which seem to have been written by someone with an intimate knowledge 
of the factory's internal affairs. The New Leader contained no 
information of this kind, as it was much less concerned with industrial 
matters than its counterparts on the left. The ILP's shop stewards' 
pamphlets published in 1943 did contain this sort of material though, 
and included articles from all of the three strike-prone factories. 
465 
The Socialist Appeal was no less well served, and had in. depth 
articles from Beardmore and Rolls-Royce Hillington over a year before 
the ILP's pamphlets appeared. 
1 The WIL branches on the Clyde were 
also the largest donors to the Socialist Appeal's Fighting Fund. 
The Anarchists do not seem to have had a lot of industrial strength 
at this time, although they later produced a pamphlet on the ROF at 
Alexandria, and they did have their bookshop and local headquarters 
in Glasgow. 2 
These political militants were swimming against the stream through- 
out the wiar, but their progress became steady after mid-1941, as 
sections of the rank and file began to incline more and more to views 
which at least allowed those of the militants as tenable. 
Mr. Galbraith, the Conciliation Officer, was a very acute observer 
of shifts of sentiment amongst the rank and file, and his reports to 
the Ministry allow us some important insights into the repercussions 
of the CP's change in line, and how the extreme left was able to 
capitalise on them. At the end of October 1941, he reporteds 
"A considerable body of the rank and file in the 
workshops seem to resent the invocation to do more 
from the very men who, not so long ago, were ad- 
vocating a policy of indifference as increased 
production was dangerous to the workers. Many of 
the rank and file cannot understand how it is no 
longer dangerous and are asking embarrassing questions. 
The answer normally given is to say that the organ- 
ised power of the workers can provide the necessary 
safeguards. But this explanation existed previously 
and is not very convincing. Accordingly, the 
workers who previously were all out for production 
are resentful and inclined to be perverse, whilst 
1SA, December 1941 (on Rolls), June 1942 (on Beardmore's). 
I-CP 
2Ibid., July, 1942. 
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those who lent an ear to the Left-Wing propaganda 
in the past are now unsettled. This seems to be 
one of the factors in creating the present difficult 
mood of so many-of the workers in this area. " I 
I 
He went on to say that the reason given by the CP themselves for the 
"perverse" mood of many workers at the time, Trotskyism, was "rather 
funny". 2 The loss of influence which the CP experienced at the end 
of. 1941 amongst a stratum of militants and shop stewards accelerated 
at the beginning of 1942. 
Galbraith himself-believed that the disaffection with the CP line 
was far from being limited to a small group. He thought that it 
was deeply rooted in the attitudes of the Clydeside workers towards 
the appropriate relationships between employers and men. So insistent 
txäa he on this point, and so graphic in his exposition of it, that it 
is worth quoting him again. At the end of January 1942, he wrotes 
"The rank and file of the workers do not seem to be 
very much stirred about this production question. 
They grouse and complain, murmur and mutter, but the 
impulse behind this attitude seems to be the ordinary 
one which makes the. Clyde employee inclined to grouse 
about his employer as a matter of habit. " 3 
F`. 
Several months later, he showed why and how the CP was losing some of 
its old supporters: 
"They (the CP - RC) are now emphatic in their 
insistence upon uninterrupted work at the highest 
standard of intensity. For this reason they are 
rather. suspect and have lost any influence which 
they had; in fact, they have stirred up a considerable 
1LAB 10/362. October 25,1941. 
2 Ibid. 
719 
3LAB 10/363. January 31,1942. 
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measure of suspicion amongst those who were 
previously willing to follow their leadership, although 
far from being converted to their doctrines. This is 
particularly noticeable in the case of those trade 
unionists - and there are many of them - who have 
associations with the ILP... " 1 
The remarks on the CP's influence are interesting, because they help 
us to see that although opposition to the CP had not yet taken an 
organisational form, some left-wing trade unionists were breaking 
away from the CP in terms of the way that they were thinking. 
Joint Production Committees, when they were raised by the CP9 
pushed this process further. The introduction of JPCs encountered 
a good deal of opposition on the Clyde (which it usually did not in 
other areas). In March 1942, Galbraith had remarked that "a 
considerable number" of the Glasgow District Committee of the AEU 
were opposed to the Committees because they would enable the employers 
to intensify exploitation when peace returned. The oppositionists 
were often young, and "most of them far to the Left". 
2 
It is already possible at this point, then, in March 1942, to 
see that the Communist Party was beginning to lose some of its 
influence amongst a stratum of workers. This had not yet reached 
the stage of left-wing oppositionists being able to lead the dis- 
affected stratum, but that stratum definitely existed. What type of 
worker was involved? At the end of July and the beginning of August 
1942, Galbraith supplied several indications. He remarked that 
Beardmore's reputation as the centre of trouble had been 'belied' 
latelyi. but added that there was a certain amount of strike activity 
I LAB 10/363, May 2,1942. 
ýý 
2Ibid., March 28,1942. 
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there, despite the new line of the 'previous agitators'. He want 
on to say-that these erstwhile agitators: 
"... are being described by the rank and file as 
dictators because they simply insist that what- 
ever, happens work must be continued. " I 
The location of the discontent with the Communists is significant, 
because it gives rise to the suspicion that this feeling derived 
from. the skilled men's view, of the nature of trade unionism. 
Galbraith confirmed this. suspicion in his next report to Headquarters. 
Reference was made to the 'frictions' which were occurring in the 
district, and it is worthwhile quoting him again: 
"ýý 
'. 'It is, quite evident that there is a considerable 
body of opinion in these (frictions) which rather 
resents the present tendency towards intensified 
co-operation between employer and worker. They 
belong to the old-school for the most part - the- 
school who thought it the duty of the Trade Unions 
to extract as much as possible from the employers, 
and they take the view that even in wartime this 
should be the. policy of the organisations. They are 
taking the place of the Communists in leading any 
group which has a grievance and in encouraging this (sic) to take action, normally apart from the trade 
unions, to get it removed. " 2 
Galbraith-thought, then, that the-, type of worker involved in-disputes 
was what he had.. oalled on a later. occasion (and in a similar connection), 
the worker with an. "ASE, attitude". 
3 Signs of discontent with the CP 
were proliferating, then, but there was no indication that the extreme 
left was making any headway,, with the important exception of their 
forming a bloc on the AW DC. 
1LAB 10/363. July 25, ` 1942. 
21bid., August 1,1942. 
31bid., August 22,1942. 
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During the summer of 1942, there was an instance of CP stewards 
losing their cards through a JPC dispute. A disagreement arose at 
Beardmore's Parkhead between the majority of the stewards and a 
minority who were opposed to the proposed JPC. The tension originated 
at the end of 1941, when the shop stewards' committee held a meeting 
to discuss increasing production. Many stewards stayed away, leaving 
the field open to the CP, who were in any case in a two-thirds 
majority on the committee. They passed a motion to hold a mass 
meeting, which in turn decided that a ballot vote should be taken 
on the question of a JPC. One thousand five hundred voted for, and 
seven hundred against. The Socialist Appeal claimed that shop 
stewards who had supported the JPC were being thrown out by their 
members in some areas. The factory won its JPC, but the newly-formed 
All Trades Works Committee disintegrated under the pressure of the 
dispute. The Socialist Appeal claimed that the committee had been 
destroyed by the CP because they had failed to gain control of it. 
1 
Their judgement seems likely to have been blurred by sectarianism in 
this detail, but it was definitely the case that the JPC's inauguration 
and the All Trades Works Committee's demise were closely associated. 
In any event, the CP was unable to prevent the continued outbreak 
of sectional strikes at Beardmore's or the other strike-prone 
factories. Through their involvement in the acrimonious JPC debates 
and by leading sectional strikes wherever possible, the Trotskyists 
began to gain support. In August 1942, Galbraith reported that: 
"To this disturbing element (the Trotskyists - RC) 
all the malcontents of one kind and another have 
34Z. 
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attached themselves, and it is this section which 
is, in the main, responsible for stirring up 
pettifogging bother wherever circumstances favour 
this... " 1 
As a result of heated debates amongst the shop stewards and District 
Committeemen, arising out of two relatively minor strikes at the 
North British Locomotive Queen's Park, the Trotskyists were able to 
form a revived Clyde Workers' Committee. Prospects then arose for 
going beyond "stirring up pettifogging bother". 
The first strike occurred over the management's insistence that 
piece work earnings would be reduced when the factory reverted to 
locomotive building after having been on aircraft work. Originally, 
the shop stewards' committee had argued at a mass meeting against 
strike action, but their arguments were rejected. Stiffened by the 
obviously militant feelings of their members, the shop stewards 
prevented local officials from speaking to the men at a further mass 
meeting. The Conciliation Officer thought that the strike had now 
become a "clear cut battle between the official and unofficial 
elements". If so, then the battle was won by the official elements. 
The AEU DC asked the shop stewards to call a strikers' meeting. At 
the meeting, the officials, District Committeemen and Galbraith 
addressed the strikers and talked them into a vote for a return to 
work. 
2 
During the strike, Galbraith had made an interesting remark about 
the "vendetta" which had developed between the shop stewards' committee 
at the IBLoco, whose leadership was ex-Communist, and the AtJ DC, which 
1LAB 10/363. August 8,1942. 
2Ibid., October 31, November 14,1942. 
was of course still under CP control. 
I The strike had confirmed these 
"renegades" in their views, and another dispute at this factory resulted 
in their initiating a campaign in the district to remove the CP from 
its position on the ABU DC. 
The strike was a stay-in strike of Boilermakers, who objected to 
new bonus payment arrangements. It started at the end of November 
1942, and continued into mid-December, until the Conciliation Officer 
initiated legal action against the strikers, which brought the stoppage 
to an end. 
2 It'was felt that the DC had done nothing to support the 
NBLoco men in-either of these. battles. A group of stewards and 
convenors accordingly-produced a leaflet which was circularised in 
the district condemning the CP's role, and calling for a good turnout 
at the next Quarterly meeting of shop stewards, which was to elect 
two of the four shop steward delegates to the DC. It was signed by 
two convenors, Gray and Menzies, and by an ex-convenor and senior 
steward at Beardmore Parkhead, Doherty. These men were also District 
Committeemen. 3 Enraged by their action, the Communists proposed a 
motion that these three should be suspended from holding all office 
for twelve months, which was upheld by thirteen votes to eleven. 
According to the Socialist Appeal, a deputation of shop stewards 
attended the next meeting of the DC to protest at being deprived of 
the services of their convenor, and some Communist shop stewards took 
issue with their comrade Sillars. 
4 
1LAB 10/363. November 7,1942. 
2LAB 10/364. January 2,1943. 
3WIL 
Industrial Bulletin, May 1943 (Modern Records Centre, 
University of Warwick. Tarbuck Collection, Folder 2). 
4SA, Januaryj February, 1943. 
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On 10th February 1943, a letter appeared in the Socialist Appeal 
stating that a meeting had been held in the Clyde district called by 
the shop stewards' committee of the NBLoco, to discuss the fining of 
the ninety boilermakers who had struck work there. Delegates from 
seventeen factories attended the meeting, and the delegate from the 
fined boilermakers stated that there was a "strong possibility" that 
the men would refuse to pay the fines if they thought that support 
would be forthcoming from other factories. A further meeting was 
called for the following Sunday (meeting day during wartime) to hear 
reports from the other factories. A feeling was expressed by the 
delegates that there was a need for an organisation like the Clyde 
Workers' Committee of the First war to provide a lead in the area. 
' 
* *0 
18A, January, Februaiyt 1943. 
(2) 
C decide 
The Clyde Workers' Committee 
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It nni,, týht he argued that this section devotes an inordinate amount of 
attention to a relatively small group of shop stewards when we consider 
the oppocitionists who went to make up the Clyde Workers' Comnlittee(C';! J), 
but there are several reasons for studying this admittedly small-group. 
T. he first is that they ? re important from. a cougar --tive point of view, 
since a similarly coherent opposition to the CP ai'. on3st shop step-. yard, 
did not develop eltiewhere. Secondly, these stewards exerted an influence out 
of all proportion-to their size: by -1944, althouüh disappointed by their 
experiences on the shop floor, they; were able to take over the AEU 
District Committee. F'inelly, their influence troubled a number of 
import, an: come pora. ries. ýýalhraith was very much concerned with their 
activitie sand the CP equally co. In Parch 1943, Jack Owen vi*: -ited the 
Clyde to write a series of article; for the Daily '., iorker. The Anarchist 
\1a. r Coe nentar., y(i. tüelf certainly not an unequivocal supporter of the 
C? dC) ascribed this visit to the development of the Committee'That their 
view was not far fetched can be illuotrated by one of Owen's reflections 
on Clydeiide politics: 
'°(The Clyde workers)are heroic fighters for their 
class, poses: ing a vitality invaluable to ua, if we 
can Cuicle it into the correct channels.... in such 
soil the fungoid growth of Anarchism, ILPisf and 
all such theories of the mentally inert grow. " 
2 
The Now Propellor t; was to become even more heated over the "agents of.. 
Hitler" active in the important strike at Rolls-Royce Hillinrton at the 
end of the year. 
Before outlining; the origins of the C, lC, it is necessary to 
briefly touch upon the hihtory of the extreme left-wing croups whose 
3 
ciecbert revived the Comu. ittcc, he main groups concerned were the 
s'rotckyi:; t workers' International League ('rJPIL)and the Independent 
Labour Party(ILP). 
1 
C, April 1943. 
? M,;, 17 March 1943. 
j"Xho following section is o. n outline of 2 loriCer account of 
the history of tlr; -: 7, e ; roupü(tjý, nty-tk: o which will be 
av ; ilahlc from L, y t. e11'. 
ý 
The micro--hi 3to_y of the various tiny Trotskyist grouplets between 
their foundation in the early 1930s and the outbreak of the Second 
World t Jar has not yet been written and it is not proposed to attempt 
this hers,,. It is sufficient to note just a few points. 
It 
All of these groups were tiry, nurnbering, only dozens; by 
September 1939 the two largest ý, roups, the Workers' International 
League and the Revolutionary Socialiot League numbered only thirty and 
eighty rc:., pectively. Ideverthelec ;, the g. rbup which most interests us 
(because of its importance during the war), the WIL, published a 
duplicated aSitational pamphlet entitled Youth for Socialism at 
irregular intervals from September 1938 onwards as well as its 
already established theoretical journal Workers' International Nc 
These paper, were published without any help from the Fourth 
4 
International, which the WIL(unlike the RSL)had refused to join. 
Up until the invasion of the Soviet Union, both the IJIL 
and the RSL were in a difficult position because of their insistence 
on a 'revolutionary defeatist, line on the war. However, the WIL was 
already laying some important foundations for its later industrial 
vork, by ocrdinG out its members from London with in$tructiona to 
find work in munitions factorieo, and to win otewardo cards as quickly 
an pos ible. In Scotland, where the Croup already had a small base, 
IdT. L workers %, et e encouraged to t; tay on: 
The 4t'IL started to make real, headway from June 141 onwards. 
1Interview 
with Jac1. Is: i7. liamnO November 19"l2. 
m 
Their paper, now called : Socialist Apncal, attracted quite a wide 
circulation in the absence of the Dail. , dorker(18-20,000 was claimed 
to be the averaGc paid sale in 1943)2By that year, rnembership was stated 
to stand at 230; the overwhelmin, majority of these metbers, an internal 
document:. of late 1942 claimed, were trade unioni , ts, and most of these 
If 
were nember3 of the AEU. This membership was localised, as the table 
below -hows: 
'TIQP[E Tz: 
TOTAL. ' CON. T'.; I'BUmIOI; S TO TIP. E :; OCI. ILI:, =T AP1'E! 1LIS FL'iIDä P> . Tt: ý; : iS C)GiOB: 'R , _. ý». _..... __... _ý 
1941A; iD OjJTOB?; R 1gtf5. 
G1Eý l £66.6 ,. 4d. 
Idewcaatle : w20.3s. 2d. 
Coventry:, £13.9s. 8d. 
I: ancher, tcr; P, 1.17s. 1d. 
Pfote: 'Theoe figures should not be taken a: 3 the actual totals received, 
as no contributions were acknowledged between July 19112 and Plovember 
1943. 
Ao the above table suCCesto, the number of members even in Glasgow was 
quite small. At the same tir. 7e, the orjw3Lr isation was well placed to 
intervene in industrial affairs, because WIL workers were organised 
into factory groups wherever a few of- then, worked together, as a result 
r 
of an internal initiative of late 1; 426-. 
All in ßz11, the outlook for the WIL was relatively good 
by 
late 19k3, and this was partly becauso, li!; e the CP, it %ins now much rsorc 
in line with , popular attitudes 
towards the ' war. TThe new line war, that 
J. Hi ; tins: "`y'en Years for tho Locust. British `frotckyism 
1n7 ý19481,, in Tnternat!.; ýr -l Socialism 14, E utumn 1(, -63- 
(Reprinted by 3:,: a1. ýca international Socialists, n. d. ), 
note 5a 
2. 
. 7i., ýGi. ns, o» «ci_t ., n. 
4. 
''Ur ýz. isationai _ioport of the Control Committee) 
19'+; '. (': "adern lRccord-, 
Centr8, Univerity of 
ýIr:, trial Committee: "Pmilding Iractory Groups" (Directive 
to .:. 11 Loc al s) (n. d. , p. rokinbly late 1942. ) (t"toaern Records Centre, ', tr. iver: _>>i. t, y of : 1arvick. ) 
V 
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Russia had to be defended, but that the British ruling class would have 
to be forced to do this even partially. The only satisfactory way of 
defending British or Russian workers from Nazism war, a worker's state 
based on worker's control in the factories. The appropriate'transitional 
drmand ' designed to wrest workers from the political Grasp of the 
British ruling class and towards a revolutionary worker's party 
included "worker's control of production to end chaos"Strikes were to 
be supported and JPCs opposed. 
The IILts desire to help the Soviet Union, and their 
determination to support strikes both helped them to build amongst a 
cmal], stratum of shop stewards who were at once sympathetic to the idea 
that the war was an anti-fascist crusade and to the view that workers 
had to defend themselves, by all means necessary, ai; ainst their own 
ruling classes' attempts to take advantago. One such type of shop cteusrd 
was the ILPer. 
Little time need be spent on the role of the ILP arxonct 
shop stewards (even in Scotland, where it was . trongcst). Althou h it has 
been estimated that the ILP grew to about two thousand members by the 
end of 1943, it did not interest itself as an organisation in the shop 
stewards except between October 1942 and November 1943? The ILP's 
Industrial Committee held*a series of meetings on worker's control in 
Bradford and Birmingham in the autumn of 1941, arid these were followcJ. by 
'further meetings in Glasgow and Motherwell in December 1942311owever, the; e 
gatherings were not intended to be solely for engineering stewards. It 
was the 'Total Time' strike of October 1942 which caused the ILP to 
publish a series of cheap and interesting pamphlets directed at militant 
chap stewards in the en5ineering and shipbuilding industries. 
4 
1SA, October 1941, 
Zrihä. 
o ostinate wau given to me by Peter 'rhwaiteu ofthe LSE, 
who derived it from a siSht of an (at present) unavailable 
internal ILP document. 
ýP3ý+ýýº Leýririex, ýSe:; tember 13 191+1 ; Dece: aber 26,1942. 4'm y cost one penny each. 
f.,; l 
The first ILP pamphlet-printed a proGramne or. its front page: 
1.1jaintain trade union practices. 
2.11estore right of works assembly and literature 
distribution. 
3-shop steward control of deferments transference and 
dismissals. 
41+. Equal pay for the job. 
. 
5-Independent trade unions and shop stewards-110T whips 
for bosses. 
6. For worker's control of production. 
Inside, the pamphlet argued fpr a national link up of shop stewards. 
This therie was to become important in , all of these publi. cationy, and 
certainly meant that the ILP stewards were amenable to a national 
organisation of-shop stewards such as that set up by the WIL(the 
Militant Workers! Federation, of which riorc below). 
The problem for the ILP stewards seems to have been 
securing an adequate circulation for their cheap and readable booklets;; 
the last one contained an appeal for money on the last page2Yet there eras 
a deeper reason for the end of this series: the collapse of the Clyde 
Workers' Committee a z: ion. th before the next edition was due for 
publi. cýtion. Thia was a fatal___ blow for thom, as indeed it was for the 
Trotskyist WIL, whose alliance with-the RSL to form the 
Revolutionary Communist Party in early 1gß+%+ brouCht only rrinir7a1 
gains. / good deal of the extreme left's hopes had been pinned on the 
Clyde t! orkera' Com: iittee. Ultiuately, they proved to have been in vain. 
s 
The Clyde Workers'Co. rmittee "proclaimed itself revived" in flay 191+3. 
Like the G WC of the First ': Jar, delegates did not have to repre. nent anyone 
but thcmzelvos, but the ci.: was. the affiliation of shop stewards cocmdtteeEs. 
It has not been possible to discover the size of the CWC. Sorie of the 
members are lir; ted below, but these are only those actually mentioned in 
contemporary decuments. ac definitely sitting on the Committee. There 
1? Lý': ýý,, n =,,, znocr , in Actian(Decc. mbcr 191+2. ) 
ziLl': 
'I'i1e 31, e, _;, on; of Bnarro ta. (n. d. 1 -.. ý.., __. _.,,..,.... _. _, _.. ý. . _.. ý. 
>>,. 
were at least three shop stewards from the IuBLoco Queen's Park. 
These were the three men who had been deeply concerned in the two 
strikes there. Galbraith remarked on their influence on the shop 
stewards' committee, and although their political affiliations are 
obscure, they were referred to in a WIL internal document as 'our 
members'. 
' 
Doherty, the ex-convenor at Beardmore's Parkhead Forge, 
and departmental convenor there until he was suspended from office 
for twelve months, was another member. He had been a signatory of 
the document calling for a good turnout at the shop stewards' 
quarterly meeting to remove the CP shop steward delegates to the DC. 
2 
There were also three shop stewards from Rolls-Royce Hillington, who 
later led the strike there on women's grading. 
3 Roy Tearse was 
elected secretary. Tearse was the industrial organiser of the WIL, 
based in Glasgow. He was an ex-shop steward from De Havilland's 
Edgware, excused from military service for medical reasons 
4 
It is 
almost certain that this does not constitute an exhaustive list of 
the CWC's membership, but some conclusions may be drawn from what we 
do know. Not only was there obviously a good deal of experience and 
ability available, but the committee was built on the solid foundations 
of the three most militant factories on the Clyde. The CWC's stewards 
were in the right places to make contact with strikers, and to try to 
develop their implicit rejection of the CP's policies into an 
explicit one. 
1WIL 
Industrial Bulletin, May 1943 (Modern Records Centre, University 
of Warwick). 
2SA, January, February, 1943. 
3NP, November, 1943. 
4DW, May 6,1944" Daily- Herald, May 3,1944. 
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The WIL had played a leading part in reviving the CWC but it was 
by no means simply another hat which they donned for their Sunday 
meetings. Serious debates took place. We can see this in action 
during the first important meeting which they called to try to link 
up with militants in the rest of the country. The CWC invited all 
stewards who could gain delegation to a meeting to decide on a common 
programme and united action to take place at the ILP rooms in Dundas 
Street on June 5th and 6th. There were about thirty delegates 
present, from Newcastle, Barrow, the Midlands and Yorkshire, in 
additidnto the Committee itself. Reports were given on the situation 
in these areas, and a consensus reached on the need for a national 
federation of workers' committees along similar lines to the CWC. 
Accordingly, each district was to delegate one of its number to a 
central committee, which was to call a national conference. In this 
way, the Militant Workers' Federation was set up. 
1 
So far, the meeting had been relatively. quiet, but there was a 
debate over one important question. The ILPers present argued 
that the organisation should be limited to engineering, but the WIL 
members opposed them, as they were in favour of a more catholic body. 
They wanted the CWC and the Militant Workers' Federation to include 
all workers from all industries; they thought that the first CWC had 
suffered from syndicalism and a lack of class political orientation, 
and 'that the ILPers were in danger of imitating these mistakes by 
limiting the appeal of the new organisation. 
2 
The WIL delegates were wildly optimistic in their assessment of 
1 SA, Mid-June, 1943. 
? s3 
2Ibid. 
48 2 
the possibilities. The CWC was as yet an embryonic organisation, with 
no more than a toehold in a few Clydeside factories. The CP was 
still in control, of. the vital. bodies like the AEU DC and the shop 
stewards' committees. By taking on tasks that were ridiculously out 
of proportion to their strength, they jeopardised their chances of 
success intheir original tasks on the Clyde. A programme was 
adopted which, was, suitable for industry in general, but which skimmed 
over issueaý, of, vitaltimportance to Clyde engineering workers. Its 
details were as. followss 
1 The co-ordination of all militant tu activity 
2 Annullment of all anti-working class legislation 
3 Lvrery shop a dosed shop 
4 Workers' control of transfers 
5a) A higher standard of life for all workers 
5b) A better standard of wages and allowances for 
workers in the forces- 
6A national confederation of workers' committees 
7 -Workers' control of industry 1 
The CWC never publicly issued any other programme. The general 
programme. which it had. was clearly quite inadequate for a localised 
committee based on one, industry., What. for example. was the meaning 
of item 4? "Workers' control, of transfers'! was; clearly a long way 
off, since, they were unilaterally determined by the National 
Service 
Officer in collaboration with other Government officials. What was 
required in-. this., situation was an adequate procedure to restrain the 
unbridled power, -of these officials, which 
included shop steward 
consultation. -The details, of such a procedure would 
have been well 
worth the effort of working out for shop stewards active in the 
three factories where transfers were a burning issue. 
At the'time, however, optimism was in the air as far as the left 
? S¢ 
1SA, 
Mid-June, 1943. 
ý5: i 
wing stewards were concerned. The CWC had been founded on defeats 
(the 14BLoco strike and the suspension of the three District Committee- 
men) but the left showed signs of increased activity in the area, and 
some little success. Whilst the Trotekyists had been sunk deep in 
their efforts to breath life into the CWC, the Anarchists had been 
busy arranging some meetings which were a useful corollary to the 
organisational emphasis of the former. They built up a series of 
weekly political discussion meetings, in which all the groups to the 
left of the CP participated (and which many individual CPers tentatively 
visited), called the-Open Forum. Audiences often numbered up to 
four hundred, and discussion was lively on a whole range of topics 
of interest to Socialists. 
I For the first time since the formation 
of the Communist Party, it was possible for left wingers concerned 
with developing socialist ideas in opposition to those of the CP 
itself to attend sizeable public meetings without attaching themselves 
to any specific faction. 
The oppositional stewards were also making concrete gains in their 
efforts to loosen the hold of the CP on the AEU District Committee. 
At the quarterly meeting of shop stewards held in early 1943 which 
stewards anxious to dislodge the CP shop steward representatives on 
the DC had been urged to attend, Tom Sillars lost his place, and the 
other CP delegate, McLaren (steward at Beardmore's Parkhead) was only 
elected as the fourth steward. 
2 
1A 'Workers' Open Forum' existed in Glasgow in 1936 (Reaeneraciön. 
. 
August 2,1936). $A# November 1943, contains an account of such 
a large meeting, addressed by Ted Grant of the WIL. The meeting 
was chaired by Alec Rioch, described as "a Clydeside militant 
and former member of the CP, " and "many shades of opinion were 
represented... " 
2 1RL Industrial Bulletin, May 1943" 
; ýý. 
The CWC had been built on the basis of the three most militant 
factories, and the opposition to the CP on the AEU DC, but most of the 
grist to the agitational mill of the oppositional elements both inside 
and outside of the CWC proved rather different. The strikes at Rolls- 
Royce, Barr and Stroud and the Clyde apprentices, all involved a 
considerable proportion of non-union workers, as many contemporary 
Coventry strikes did. These strikes half involved the three militant 
factories, and half not. The Rolls strike clearly did, the Barr and 
Stroud equally clearly did not, and the apprentices' strike occurred 
in these factories, as well as in others. It is worthwhile noting 
that the opposition to the CP had their greatest success in the two 
Rolls-Royce strikes, where they were able to actually lead the strikers 
out of the gates, and probably the least success in the Barr and Stroud 
strike, where they largely came from outside. Leading a strike in a 
stewards' own factory in the face of violent opposition was one thing, 
but introducing oneself to a group of female Glaswegian pickets on a 
wartime winter's evening was obviously another. 
The latter half of 1943 saw the beginnings of effective organisation 
by the C1IC on the shop floor at Rolls-Royce. In July, a mass meeting 
voted for strike action there over the reduction of a piece work time. 
The shop stewards' committee ignored the mass meeting's decision, and 
sought a third Works Conference on the matter with management. On 
2nd August, a thousand workers voted to come out on strike, and that 
Friday the rest of the factory voted to come out on the following 
Monday. On Saturday, 6th August A. McElroy, the convenor and prominent 
Communist, put a motion on the shop stewards' committee that the strikers 
be supported financially by the rest of the factory, but the motion 
was defeated in favour of one recommending a return to work. 
2A 
4Bj 
McElroy then announced his resignation from the CP. When the decision 
was made known-to a mass meeting of strikers the same day, it was 
booed. Craigie Hill, the departmental convenor, denounced the recommend- 
ation as "a scandal" and'called on the factory's workers to replace 
the CPers on the cornmittee. 
1 The strike ended, but five CP shop 
stewards lost their cards. 
2 The Trotskyists claimed that the CP were 
"on the retreat" in the factory as a result of the incident. 
3 
A 
leading CP steward later wrote to the Socialist Appeal denying that 
they were on the retreat, citing as evidence the fact that CP 
speakers had offered to speak in any part of the factory in defence 
of their anti-strike policy, but that they had not been taken up on 
their offer. 
4 It does not seem to have occurred to the steward that 
nobody wished to hear the policy defended, nor that he had not refuted 
the main thrust of the Trotskyists' interpretation of events. 
This incident was an overture to the much more important strike 
which took place that Autumn over women's grading, but it shows that 
the rank and file in the factory were beginning to have serious doubts 
about the Communist'shop stewards. ' It has already been-pointed out 
that women's wages were`a sore point at this factory, and there had 
been a large number of hours spent in' conference rooms trying to 
hammer out a solution. ' Eventually, the matter went to Central 
Conference, and a basic rate of'29/ was awarded to women with a 
certain degree of. skill, as opposed to the national basic of 25/-t 
1SA, Mid-August, 1943. 
2Ibid., October, 1943. 
31bid., Mid-August, 1943. 
ibid., September, 1943. 
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for unskilled women. 
1 The women were satisfied with the decision 
until they discovered that no less than eighty percent of them were 
2 
entitled to only the 25/ . On 24th October, women started to come 
out section by section, and during the next two days the rest of the 
factory followed suit. 
3 
Once the strike had started, the majority of 
the shop stewards' negotiating committee decided to support the strike, 
4 
despite the opposition of Wal Hannington, who had travelled up from 
London to replace the local official. The majority of the shop 
stewards' committee continued to adhere to their original attitude of 
opposing the strike. 
5 
Accordingly, the shop stewards proposed a return to work to a 
mass meeting held the following Monday, but only three hundred of 
the five thousand present voted in favour of their recommendation. 
6 
The New Propellor attributed this fact to the pernicious influence 
of the CWC stewards, who had held the meetings which had decided on 
striking, had: led them out, and who produced leaflets attacking the 
officials and the majority of the shop stewards for having passively 
accepted the agreement. The PJew Propellor also accused the leading 
CWC steward of-having held his own separate mass meeting, where he 
tried to set-up a separate strike committee. 
7 
By 9th November, it was becoming clear that Galbraith was becoming 
increasingly disturbed about the repercussions that the Rolls-Royce 
1LAB 10/364. November 5,1943. 
2SAl November, 1943. 
SLAB 10/364. November 5,1943. 
'1P, November, 1943. 
5LA13 10/364. November 5,1943. 
6Ibid. 
7NP, December, 1943. 
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strike was having in the district. Just after the main stoppage had 
begun, women at the adjacent Aeroplastics factory had also stopped 
work in support of the Rolls-Royce strikers. 
1 On 9th November, 
Galbraith had to report in a special letter to the London Head- 
quarters of the Ministry that women at the Coventry Gauge and Tool's 
Glasgow factory had also come out in support, and that women at Barr 
and Stroud's and the IBLoco had voted to do the same in response to 
the CWC's leaflet A Message to all Clydeside Workers. 
2 
That they did 
not actually do so was only due to the fact that the main strike was 
brought to a speedy conclusion. 
The Conciliation Officer, searching hard for a way to end the 
dispute suggested a means of achieving this end to the shop stewards, 
which they adopted: a ballot vote instead of a show of hands at a 
mass meeting. The shop stewards Galbraith was dealing with were 
enthusiastic about the idea, and in fact asked him to have the ballot 
papers produced. - The secret ballot is a device normally opposed by 
shop stewards because it allows workers to vote without having to 
explain their decision to their workmates, but in this case the 
majority of stewards were willing to use it in order to end the 
strike. It certainly had the desired effect because the ballot showed 
(in a poll of less than 25%) that 3,522 were against the strike and 
only 967 in favour. 
3 
However, this was still not entirely the end of the matter, because 
there was further trouble at the small Rolls-Royce factories at 
Thornliebank and Alexandra Parade. The women at these factories 
1 LAB 10/364. 
2LAB 10/281. 
3LAB 10/364. 
November 5,1943. 
Galbraith to Gould, November 9,1943. 
November 12,1943. 
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were demanding higher grading than they had been given, and struck 
work. There were attempts to get sympathetic action at the main 
Hillington factory, but only one section of one hundred women stopped 
work in their support. 
1 
What part had the CWC played in the dispute? Galbraith agreed with 
the New Propellor that they had led it: "a relatively small number" 
recognisable, by their. leaflets, had succeeded in "bringing about a 
most serious interruption of work". He hastened to add of course that 
the Conciliation Department had played its part to "overcome the 
temporary control of the position which this unofficial minority had 
secured ... "2 Leading strikes at a factory level was essential if the 
CWC was to have any real impact, but in itself it was only the pre- 
condition of leading the local oppositional elements out of their 
isolation and towards the construction of a viable alternative to the 
CP. In this case, they had made some indication of their willingness 
and ability to go beyond factory strikes. Firstly, they had persuaded 
the Conciliation Officer that sympathetic action in the rest of the 
district was a real possibility, although the speedy conclusion of 
the strike left little time to bring this about. 
3 Secondly, they had 
been able to lead one small group of women out in sympathy with their 
sisters at the smaller factories. 
The dispute itself went to arbitration, and the result was felt 
to be unsatisfactory, but the women had succeeded in stimulating an 
4 "acute interest" in the whole area of women's wages. One result 
was the strike at Barr and Stroud's for an increase on the basic rate. 
1LAB 10364., November 12,1943. 
2Ibid. 
366 
31bid. 
41bid, 
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The women at Barr and Stroud's were 75% unorganised, and earned only 
twelve shillings on the basic rate, about half the rate at Rolls- 
Royce Hillington. They demanded fourteen shillings to make their 
rate up to-twenty-six shillings, and were offered eight shillings for 
time workers and seven for piece. Two thousand women struck work, but 
the shop stewards' committee split right down the middle on whether 
or not to support them. The AEU Divisional Organiser, Allan, pointed 
out that'since there was no two thirds majority in favour of striking, 
there could be no: strike. 
I 
, Prom the beginning, the dispute was a battle royal between the 
leaders"of-the strike and, the CWC on the one side and the CP and the 
officials. on the other. Neither of the convenors were members of a 
political party, the CP convenor having been deposed some time 
previously. The strikers consistently excluded the local and national 
officials from-, their-mass meetings, but the officials concentrated 
on ensuring that the strike did not spread to the rest of the factory. 
They, were supported by-the CP, who also had, some women members 
following Party policy on what to do when forced to strikes coming 
out and arguing for a return on the, picket lines. One Miss Higgins 
was reported as saying to the Glasgow Evening Citizen "Isn't. it a 
shame that we are on strike in the middle of a War? " Miss Higgins 
was of course only echoing the Party line, but the AEU convenor, 
Charlie Menzies, pulled her up sharply by pointing out that the CP 
opposed strikes now, but had supported them at the time of Dunkirk. 
2 
At first, it seemed likely that the strike would be extended to 
1WC9 January, 1944. 
? 6/ 
2Ibid. 
A90 
the rest of the factory, because four hundred men came out. In fact, 
however, this did not really represent a strengthening of the strike, 
because those left in were a hard core of anti-strikers. Galbraith 
was pleased that the extension had occurred for this very reason. 
I 
The hard core could only be hissed and shouted at as they passed 
through the picket lines; the men strikers could not argue with them 
during the long wartime hours of work. 
Nevertheless, this paradox was not immediately apparent, and the 
morale of the strikers was initially boosted by the active support of 
the four hundred men. There were hopes that the rest of the district 
would come out. One shop steward was quoted as saying that they 
must "empty the river". Monetary support was certainly available 
from other factories: 48 was received from Albion Motors, £58 from 
the Beardmore factories, and £100 from Vickers Barrow. 
2 Galbraith 
even thought it possible that the strike would spread into a national 
one. He was therefore particularly worried by the high level of 
involvement of the extreme left in the dispute, singling out Roy 
3 Tearse of the WIL and CWC for special mention in dispatches. 
It was not long before it became clear that the existing position 
had reached stalemate. The management, with a masterly sense of 
timing, offered the convenors negotiations within forty-eight hours 
of a return to work. Charlie Menzies reluctantly advised acceptances 
"This is one of the rottenest jobs I have ever had to do, 
to recommend you to return to work on the basis of 
negotiations. I cannot offer you anything except 
1WC, 
mid-January, 1944. 
2Ibia. 
3LAB 10/445. January 7,14,21,28,1944. 
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negotiations... We took into consideration the fact 
that we have not had the support of the male workers 
in toto, nor have we had the support of the workers on 
the Clyde. " 1 
Obviously, Menzies did not consider the financial support they had 
received to be the kind of support required. When negotiations took 
place, the women gained an eight shilling per week increase for time 
and piece workers alike. 
2 
Galbraith had expected, like Charlie Menzies, that the strike 
would escalate. When it did not, and the strike ended, he recorded 
his satisfaction with the outcome. He considered that little had 
been won over and above the manägement's original offer, and that 
the failure of the "unofficial elements" would prevent the matter 
arising again. 
3 He clearly thought that to the extent that the CWC 
had successfully latched on to the women's movement for higher wages, 
they had lost their momentum, because the Barr and Stroud strike was 
considered a failure. 
These strikes taken together represented an important setback for 
the CWC. As Harry McShane wrote in the Daily Worker with regard 
to their support for the apprentices' strike of 1944: "Despite 
bombastic promises they have never led a successful strike". 
4 As 
McShane had so pointedly argued, their bark had been much worse than 
their bite. The Rolls-Royce strike had been promising, because it 
did have a good deal of effect in the district by stimulating an 
interest in women's wages and by showing (if only in a very small way) 
1WC, Februaryj 1944. 
2 LAB 10/445, January 28,1944. 
3lbid., January 14,28,1944. 
4DW, March 28,1944" 
that sympathetic action was obtainable even in the face of determined 
opposition. The Barr and Stroud strike again raised great expectations 
without realising them. In so far as the campaign on women's wages, 
(and the idea of district action as a weapon in that campaign) was 
sunk, the'CWC went down with it, as Galbraith had predicted. In the 
next two important disputes, those of the apprentices and the Albion 
Motors workers, the CWC remained very much in the background. 
The CWC had tried to extend the fight over women's wages beyond the 
factories of origin and into the district. But their main difficulty 
in achieving their aim was the fact that the women in the other 
factories were in a quite different position to those who went on 
strike. The atmosphere at Beardmores and NBLoco has already been 
remarked upon, and it remains only to add that with the CP working 
against solidarity action, there was virtually no chance of the CWC 
breaking down the residual craft conservatism in the centres of 
militancy. The campaign foundered on this rock of craftism, because 
without the support of"these factories, there could be no'district 
support worthy of the name. 
Nor was it possible for the members of the Committee to retreat 
to the citadels of militancy of 1941-3 and live to fight another day, 
because these factories had lost their primacy in terms of domestic 
strikes. It must be remembered that Rolls-Royce and the NBLoco had 
suffered two disappointing strikes each, whilst Beardmore Parkhead 
became isolated. In February 1943, the Beardmore shop stewards and 
local officials had negotiated a special agreement with the company 
and the Ministry of Labour, whereby the factory gained a uniquely 
privileged position with regard to transfers. The agreement gave 
a Government subsidy for workers transferred to lower-paid factories 
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on the°Clyde. 
1 The Conciliation Office was understandably pleased 
with the agreement, because it removed the other potential cause of 
district-wide strikes, by making Beardmore, the best paid and most 
important factory a special case. 
2 If the Beardmore stewards had 
taken the agreement to other stewards in the district and suggested 
a campaign to get similar agreements in other factories, the tactic 
might have backfired-on the Ministry, but they did not. The CWC was 
only just being formed`at that time, and the majority of stewards 
there were'no doubt pleased enough to have the agreement safely signed 
and sealed. = 
The Beardmore shop"stewards seem to have allowed themselves to 
slip into a , comfortable complacency. They had not been perhaps as 
militant as they might have been about the transfer issue, but their 
conservatism soonibegan to infect their internal affairs. Fifteen 
months'ýafter the transfer agreement, the management succeeded in 
establishing, -äfter only three weeks, that shop stewards who represented 
members in more, than one department did not have the right to move 
freely between them: 3 This represented an important inroad into 
stewards' rights. "The right to see"-had been established at 
Parkhead during the First World War, and it was now lost without a 
fight. 4 
1LAB 10/364. January 16,1943" 
2Ibid., February 20,1943. 
3LAB 1o/455-, 
- 
July 14, August 4,1944" 
48ee Hintonj. pp. 155-6 for the withdrawal of this right by Sir 
William Beardmore in February 1916. One thousand of the Parkhead 
engineers came out on strike in response at that time,. 
ý6ý 
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Beardmore's Parkhead wasp of course, only one of the three most 
militant factories, but it was the most important one. All of these 
factories declined in militancy in 1944 after the setbacks of the 
previous year, so that already by the time of the Barr and Stroud 
dispute, there was a relative lack of domestic aggression in these 
factories, which boded ill for the development of district action 
led by them. The number of days lost through strikes increased in 
the district in 1944, but declined in the three factories. Only 3,940 
days were lost in ten strikes, of 138,489 lost in sixteen throughout 
the area. It is also clear that their average size had greatly 
decreased: a disintegration of large-scale departmental and factory 
strikes into small scale sectional disputes was taking place. The 
average number of days lost through strikes at Rolls-Royce, NBLoco 
and Beardmore': declined from an average 4,276 in the previous three 
years to an average 394 in 1944. The trend in the district ran in 
the diametrically opposite direction, with 8,656 days lost per strike 
as opposed to 1,985 in 1941-43. 
'This, then, is the background to the decline of the Clyde Workers' 
Committee. The factories. in which these workers were stewards no 
longer constituted fertile soil for the growth of their type of 
opposition. Without strikes, and the increased tempo of workers' trade 
union activity, discussion and thought that they brought, the 
agitators were left high and dry. Moreover, where they had intervened 
in strikes, they had achieved some limited success in one, and none 
at all in the next one. For a small organisation, this was not a bad 
record, but they had taken on the mantle of the Clyde Workers' 
Committee, and they were judged by harsh yardsticks. The committee 
had-been founded on defeat, but defeat was an unappetising staple diet. 
More disgruntled-militants might move towards them, but they needed 
to, break outfrom these limited circles, if they were to influence 
the thousands of workers who had been recruited by the Clyde branches 
of the CP after July 1941. The CWC only had any real future to the 
extentothat., it was founded on a local trade union movement that was 
confident and well organised. It could operate in this context, and 
play its part in extending and deepening existing gains and workshop 
controls. When the local movement was itself weakened at vital points, 
and they-were unable: (quite understandably) to transcend these 
difficulties, they were finished as the heirs to the CWC's tradition. 
The CWC continued to meet, but their declining influence was 
illustrated by, the Clyde apprentices' strike of 1944. The strike 
was led by the Tyne apprentices, and was in support of a demand that 
the "Bevin ballot" scheme for calling up young engineering workers 
for national service in the mines be withdrawn. The Clyde apprentices 
were in contact with their. counterparts on the Tyne, and served 
notice on 13th March, that unless the call-up of three Tyneside 
apprentices was withdrawn, then they would strike in concert as from 
28th March. 1= The strike gathered momentum on the Clyde more slowly 
than, on the Tynes six thousand apprentices were out in the North- 
East on 28th March, and the strike spread over the next two days, but 
March 30th saw only 35% of the Clyde apprentices out (4,800). 
2 
Galbraith suggested that the strike was far from solid, and added that 
in at least two establishments, apprentices had only stopped work for 
1LAB 10/451. March 13,1944. 
. ýC7 
2lbid., March 28,29,1944" 
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two to three hours. I 
One reason for the strike's lack of cohesion was the firm opposition 
of the AST and Confederation DCs. The only concrete support for the 
strikers came from some members of the Open Forum, who ran what they 
called the "Solidarity Press", and who printed the apprentices' 
leaflets for them free. These men were identified by the Conciliation 
Officer as being "philosophic anarchists" who had split with the CP 
on the issue of the nature of the war. 
2 It is easily understandable, 
given their political philosophy, that they should want to be involved. 
The apprentices showed what they regarded as ideal qualities of 
militancysmany of them were non-unionists, and they exhibited a 
good deal of hostility towards the trade union officials. Nevertheless, 
the WIL was active amongst the Tyne apprentices and was therefore all 
the more conspicuous by its inactivity on the Clyde. 
The strike soon showed signs of disintegrating. By April Ist, 
John Brown's apprentices had decided to return to work, a number of 
individual firms in the East End had returned, and the 'mass meeting' 
of apprentices on Glasgow Green on March 31st had been a flop. 
3 
Three days-later, only 3,087 apprentices were still on strike, and 
the dispute would have ended had it not been for the viotimisation 
of some lads at John Brown'804 
The apprentices' strike had shown that the Clyde Workers' Committee 
had, temporarily at least, given way to the Anarchists as the leaders 
of the opposition. It had also shown that the CP was still in control 
of the District Committee, and capable of using its influence at 
I LAB 10451. March 30 j 1944. 
2lbid. 
3_, April 11,1944. 
41bid., April 4,5,10,1944" 
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John Brown's to secure a resumption of work. 
During-April, these circumstances changed considerably, when the 
CP majority on the AEU District Committee was deposed. 
I 
The 
oppositional left had always been active in trying to crack the CP 
hegemony on the district bodies, and had moved steadily towards 
success since 1941, but now they had at last arrived. Perhaps the 
decisive factor. was the failure of the CWC9 and a consequent turn 
towards the-official machinery of the union. This is speculation, 
but it did not'in fact represent an advance over the type of 
organisation that the CWC had tried to be. Politically, it represented 
a retreat.. -The AEU DC was, needless to say, an important body in 
the union's machinery, but this self-evident strength was also its 
weakness, in that it could be subject to strong pressure from the 
Executive, from which groups of shop stewards were relatively immune. 
The Executive had never interfered with the CWC, for example. 
Ultimately, the power of the`shop stewards rested in the workshops; 
they could carry out strike-action, pursue more limited sanctions, 
conduct collections and so on which, - if'well prepared, could all 
be 
protected from the 'outside influence' of the ED in London. 
The Albion Motors strike of 1944 pointed up both aspects of this 
argument, because it'showed how the DC could be restricted by the 
Executive, and how acutely the lack of-district shop steward support 
was felt inka major strike. The strike was the outcome of a complex 
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May`1944" soon after the political balance on the committee 
had changed, a motion was carried protesting against the arrest 
of Roy Tearse for his part in the apprentices' strike (ibid. 
of related grievances: the refusal of the company to allow a Works 
Conference on one particular Premium Bonus time, their insistence 
that an overtime ban would have to be lifted before any negotiation 
could take place, and finally, the fact that they had kept the 
convenor waiting for a full four hours before granting him an audience. 
1 
The strike began on Monday 29th August, and the shop stewards stressed 
the crucial nature of the dispute to their members. They told them 
that they were defending working conditions established during the 
war not just on their own behalf, but for the whole working class. 
They sent delegates all over the country to gain support, printing 
leaflets for the purpose. 
2 
The DC supported the strike from the start, 
the first strike to have been supported by that body since the beginning 
of the war, but the DC would have none of it. 
3 
After the strike had been on for a week, the EC instructed the DC 
to arrange a mass meeting to ensure a return. A motion was carried 
to simply communicate the EC's instruction to the stewards, without 
further comment. 
4 
The EC reiterated its original instruction to the 
EC, but the shop stewards sidestepped their intention by arguing to 
the DC (who accepted their contention) that since more than one union 
was involved, then these unions would also have to be invited to send 
speakers. 
5 The meeting was thus further delayed. 
Meanwhile, the company was beginning to crumble. They lifted 
their requirement for the overtime ban to be ended before negotations 
1LAB 10445" September It 8,1944. 
2WCj 
mid-September, 1944" 
3LAI3 
10/445. September 8,1944" 
41bid. 
j September 15,1944. 
51bid., September 22,1944. 
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could be started. 
' Two more mass meetings were held over the next 
six weeks. At the first, a District Committeeman proposed that only 
the improvement of premium bonus times within a fortnight of a return 
would be an'acceptable basis for an end to the strike, and this was 
accepted. The second meeting reaffirmed their decision. 
2 By now, 
the strikers were having to take street collections to alleviate the 
financial hardship which was afflicting many of them. 
3 At what was 
to be the last mass meeting, the Executive again instructed the DC 
and the strikers=that the strike must be ended. The convenor agreed 
with the DC speaker, saying that financial hardship was making the 
strike's continuation impossible. The EC's motion was put, and the 
motion adjudged carried by one vote. 
4 
The District Committee had done its best to support the strike, 
but it could not organise the sort of support that the Albion men 
and women needed. Since the EC was pressurising them so forcefully, 
it was all they could do to encourage the strikers to stand firm. 
District strike action or-a district levy: was out of the question, 
and would probably have led to their suspension,. as it had in the 
case of the Barrow DC the previous year. In the absence of a 
district shop stewards' organisation, they could not even conduct 
systematic and regular workshop collections to help those suffering 
extreme financial hardship. 
I LAB 10/445, September 22,1944" 
2lbid., September 29,1944. 
31bid., October 13,1944. 
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The Albion strike had been presented by the stewards as a strike 
in defence of the working class advances made during the war, and 
had been a failure. The trade union movement on the Clyde had been 
looking on the strike as a test case, and did not recover suffic- 
iently over the next year or so to fight redundancies. Determined 
action against-redundancies on the lines of the Coventry strikes 
was the exception rather than the rule, so it is perhaps not surprising 
that there was less resistance on the Clyde than in Coventry. Never- 
theless, there was a striking contrast between the Clyde's earlier 
militancy and the rather tired response to the problems posed by 
the advent of peace. In September 1945, Galbraith noted that shop 
stewards were making representations to MPs about the working of 
redundancy procedures, but that the rank and file were not really 
behind them in this because they were confident of better working 
conditions in the post-war period. 
I Their confidence in the newly 
elected Labour Government was shared by their brothers in Coventry 
rather less than wholeheartedly as they were at that moment locked 
in battle with the local employers over sackings. 
The history of the Clyde shop stewards during the rear has a quite 
distinctive hue to it. It is not so much the history of a locality 
pure and simple, rather it is the history of an especially class- 
conscious section of the working class, looked to by militants in 
the rest of the country as the pace-setters. An. awareness of this 
fact coloured the Clyde's shop stewards' view of themselves; when 
the Albion stewards told their members that they would have to 
371, 
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struggle to maintain their working conditions, they reminded them 
that they would be doing so on behalf of the entire working class. 
When the Humber shop stewards made a statement, they drew attention 
to the employers' attempts to depress Coventry's standards to those 
of the rest of Britain. The Clyde men frequently referred to their 
historical-patrimony and especially to the cherished history of the 
Clyde Workers' Committee of the First War. In their past, they 
found a uniquely apposite- justification for what might otherwise be 
called their slightly inflated view of their own importance. Almost 
every leaflet they produced contained some reference to the district's 
traditions, especially to the old CWC. By contrast, the Coventry 
stewards never used their past as a touchstone; it was as if the 
almost complete destruction of parts of their city was reflected in 
their consciousness, and they were wholly immersed in looking forward 
to its reconstruction on entirely new foundations. 
Although the comparisons drawn in these pages are mainly structural, 
these structures reflected and themselves conditioned the different 
textures and nuances of human relations in the workshops of these two 
very different towns. The Clyde stewards self-consciously forging 
forward on numerous important national questions, their Coventry 
counterparts fighting hourly skirmishes with rate-fixers. Naturally, 
this is an over-simplification, but is none the less rooted in the 
collective mentalities of the two local movements. 
In the first eighteen months of the war, 'Coventry had been 
afflicted with an epidemic of victimisations, centring on one 
important dispute at the Standard Aero, involving a Communist convenor. 
The strike had been successfully concluded after the threatened 
intervention of the district's shop stewards, marshalled by the leading 
771 
? 79 
c, 0 r. sý' 
shop stewardO committee in the district. The Communists had 
temporarily-wrested control of the AEU DC from the hands of the right 
wing, but they soon had to relinquish their semi-accidental ascendancy. 
On the Clyde, the district trade union organisations, from the Clyde 
DC'of the AEU to the unofficial and recently set up West of Scotland 
Shop Stewards' Co-ordinating Committee, were in the hands of the 
Communists in 1940. Their position was quickly called into question 
by the British Auxiliaries strike. This dispute, like the Standard 
Aero strike"in Coventry, was concerned with the victimisation of a 
Communist convenor, which was the bete noir of the Clyde shop 
stewardsnasýwell as that of their Coventry brothers. The British 
Auxiliaries strike was lost, partly because it had been abandoned by 
the CP for exterior reasons. The CP thus suffered a considerable loss 
of-'face among a small but important group of shop stewards who had 
looked to them to lead a"district fight back on victimisations. 
The performance of the Scottish'Communists was all the more' 
disappointing to the other left wing stewards 'when viewed against 
the backdrop of a generally militant response to wartime problems 
during 1940, aiextremely quiet year for industrial relations in the 
rest of the country. The Clyde had comparatively good trade union 
organisation, especially amongst the relatively numerous and important 
skilled men in the district, and a number of factory strikes showed 
there was a basis for-aggressive action on a more generalised scale. 
The Coventry stewards did not have these advantages in terms of 
trade union-organisation; indeed, industrial expansion there was 
such that they might have been excused for concentrating exclusively 
on"factory matters and the recruitment of workers into the unions. 
During the early part of the war, the concerns of shop stewards in 
both districts had been quite similar. A certain concern with the 
victimisation question continued, of course (it is a constant motif 
of shop steward history), but shop stewards both in Coventry and on 
the Clyde were able to take up other matters as gradually improved 
trade union membership made victimisation less likely. In Coventry, 
the issue which gave rise to the highest proportion of strike action 
was that of piece work times, whilst on the Clyde, the main issues 
were the transference of skilled men from the highest paid factories 
and women's wages. Both in Coventry and on the Clyde, the main 
Communist factories in the district were the best paid, and probably 
the best organised in terms of trade union membership. There was 
one important difference between the two groups of factories, however. 
In Coventry, the CP factories were the least strike-prone, whereas 
on the Clyde, they were the most strike-prone. Indeed, in terms of 
working days lost, the contrast is quite startling. 
This situation, combined with the precocious level of 'ultra-left' 
political culture on the Clyde, gave rise to an opposition to the 
leadership of the CP in the local shop stewards' movement. A series 
of debates around major issues (the British Auxiliaries strike, 
JPCs, the NBLoco strike) allowed this. initially incoherent grouping 
to establish a collective identity, and to claim the heritage of 
the Clyde Workers' Committee. 
The Clydeside oppositionists were able to draw on a shift in 
workers' understanding of the Communists' role in industrial 
relations which does not seem to have taken place in such a clear 
way in Coventry. The Clyde was exceptional in this respect, and it 
is not therefore necessary to advance a specific explanation for 
Coventry's lack of a similar shift. Iievertheless, there were 
powerful forces which militated strongly in the opposite direction 
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in the Midland town. Workers there had been recruited to trade 
unionism by CPers to a much greater extent than they had elsewhere; 
their whole-conception of the meaning of trade unionism was thus 
shaped by'the Communists, and one indirect reflection of this fact 
was the veritable' stampede into the-ranks of the local Party 
immediately after the entry of the USSR into the war. 
w 
The revived Clyde Workers' Committee was founded on the basis of 
support in the three main-CP factories, but this basis was removed 
from under them almost as soon as the Committee was founded. During 
1943, some serious setbacks were inflicted on the shop stewards 
(some of which resulted'in the crystallisation of the opposition in 
the first place) in these factories-which consequently lost their 
primacy. The CWC was active around two major strikes, both of which 
concerned women's basic rates. The first, at Rolls-Royce, occurred 
where they were strong, and were in a position to lead the strike. 
The second, at Barr and Stroud's, was lost, not through anything 
that could be-, described as their fault, but because the strike was 
not solid in Barr and Stroud's itself. As we saw in the case of 
the Standard Aero: "strike in Coventry in 1940, it was very hard to 
actually achieveiconcrete sympathetic action in support of a partial 
strike, even when the CP was supporting strikes. There were also 
additional general-difficulties involved with agitating around 
strikes at this time. Many of them involved non-unionists, like 
similar (but much smaller and more fragmentary) strikes in Coventry. 
Women had been systematically excluded from trade union membership 
by a small group ofAEi1 convenors with an ASE mentality towards 
females in the workshop. : These workers tended to be extremely volatile, 
in that it was hard to-predict when they would act, and equally hard 
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to tell when they had burned themselves out. Both the Rolls-Royce 
and the Barr and Stroud strikes ended soon after they had stopped 
attracting more strikers to their cause. They lacked not only the 
loyalty to the stultifying strictures of trade union discipline 
urged on them by the Communists; they also lacked experience of 
striking and of resisting the ideological and material pressures 
exerted upon them to return. It is doubtful whether an opposition 
could have been built on these foundations, even had the strikes been 
successful. Certainly, nothing came of them in Coventry, although 
this must partly be accounted for by the fact that they took place 
outside of the main centres of industrial-political life. In any 
event, the ground was cut from beneath the CWC, and ', it* collapsed, 
leaving the field open to the Anarchists of the Open Forum during 
the apprentices' strike of 1944" 
However, the extreme left was not entirely finished, even if the 
CWC was. They had been attempting to shatter the dominance exercised 
by the CP over the district's trade union bodies for at least three 
years, and they succeeded in taking over the AEU DC in 1944. 
Superficially, this gain might seem to more than compensate them for 
their earlier loss, but the Albion Motors strike showed that it did 
not. Pressurised by local and national officialdom, the DC could 
do little for the strikers except offer them their moral support 
and their leadership. Only a district organisation of shop stewards 
could have organised the large scale financial support and strike 
action which they really required. Paradoxically, it was the existence 
of a Communist Divisional Organiser which ensured that the strike 
would not drum up the necessary support in the district. Sillars 
could nip any nascent organisation in the bud, but in Coventry the 
AF 
existence of a District Committee and AEU local officials dominated 
by the right allowed and even drove the CP to organise to a much 
higher level until their action, too, was cut short by the national 
executives. 
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APPENDIX 
Beardmore Parkhead, NBLoco Queen's Park and Rolls-Royce Hillin on. 
Notes Since these three groups of factories were so important, it is 
worthwhile giving some more details about them. Rolls-Royce Hillington 
was a huge new aero-engine factory built at the end of 1939, and 
beginning production in early 1940 on a new industrial estate just 
outside of Glasgow. At its peak, it employed nearly 25,000 workers; 
by the end of October 1943, only 4% of these workers were skilled men, 
and 39% of the workforce were women. The CP played a considerable role 
in organising the factory. (Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning a 
Dispute at an Engineering Undertaking in Scotland (Cmd 6474, October 1943, 
para. II), DW, October 22,1940). B eardmore's Parkhead was a much older 
establishment, built during the late Nineteenth Century. At the end of 
1928, it covered a total area of 200 acres, with the West Works 
employed on steel production and the East Works on locomotive, ordnance 
and marine engineering work. The machinery was capable of machining 
castings up to sixty tons in weight, and there was only one light 
machine shop, 'M' shop. In the armour finishing shops, there was a 
whole range of heavy machinery for 'special machining jobs of a large, 
difficult and awkward character'. During the Second War, much of the 
work there was marine engineering and tank construction. Beardmore's 
total Scottish workforce was about thirty thousand, including the 
Dalmuir works and shipyard and the ROF at Linwood, which it managed 
from 1941. (Hinton, pp. 117-120,167-9; Daily Telegraph, October 29, 
30,31,1928; Lab 10/445,28 April 1944. ) The North British Locomotive 
Co. was an amalgamation of three companies, with three factories: the 
Atlas Works, Queen's Park and Hyde Park. In 1913, they employed 8,437 
workers. By the end of the First Wax, they were mainly employed on 
37 
ý, , ý; 
7ý 
aircraft work, with 1,781 women workers. Between the wars, they were 
the largest locomotive manufacturers in Earope, with a paid-up capital 
ofJ2,250,000, but were very much hampered by their failure to diversify 
and their lack of standardisation of components. Their rate of intro- 
duction of new machinery was called 'slow' by a 1928 Government 
Committee. During the Second World War, they were mainly employed on 
tank and locomotive manufacture. Their type of work, like Beardmore's, 
was considered unsuitable for large-scale dilution. (W. R. Scott and 
J. Cunnison: The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War, 
(Oxford, 1924), p. 113; Committee on Industry and Trade: Survey of 
Metal Industries (lIMBO, 1928), p. 182; LAB 10/363,25 July 1943; 
LAB 10/360,17 August, 1940). 
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TYNESIDE 
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The Tyne, like the Clyde, had suffered acutely during the inter- 
war years from its heavy dependence on the declining shipbuilding 
and marine engineering industries. Newcastle, the equivalent of 
Glasgow as the commercial and industrial kingpin of the river, was 
generally speaking marginally better off than Glasgow in terms of its 
rate of unemployment in the early 1930s. It had a monthly average of 
26.7% in 1932, compared to Glasgow's 30.7%. 
1 Some of the Tyne towns, 
and especially the renowned. Jarrow, fared especially badly. In the 
summer of 1932,. Jarrow registered the almost incredible rate of 80% 
of the total insured population as unemployed. 
2 
The only hope for 
the young men was to move out of the area, which they showed them- 
selves much more willing to'do than their Scottish counterparts. 
During 1935 and 1936, nearly 50,000 people transferred out of the area 
under the Government Transference Scheme, and although some of these 
people returned, the area was drained of young workers. 
3 Thus 
Gateshead, for example, lost 6.1% of its 1931 population by 1938, 
although Newcastle recorded a slight increase in its numbers, of 1.8%, 
to take it to 286,255.4 
However, Newcastle's increase was only just over half that of 
Glasgow's in the same period. This was partly because Tyneside was 
relatively poorly placed to take advantage of the rearmament orders 
which were helping the Clyde. Only Vickers Armstrong was being 
awarded munitions contracts, whereas Beardmores, NBLoco and Rolls Royce 
all had Government orders. 
5 Moreover, the area had been almost completely 
1M. P. Fo5arty, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 
2E. Wilkinson: The Town That Was Murdered, (1939), p" 155" 
3Re 
rt of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (&gland and Wales), 
February 1936, p. 34" November 1936, P. 24. 
4M. P. Fogarty, op. cit., pp. 26-30. 
5R_e t of the Commissioner etc., September 1937, P" 18" 
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unsuccessful in attracting new industry from private or Government 
sources: At the end of'1938, the Commissioner for the Special Areas 
reported that although four new (and very small) new factories had 
1 
been opened on Tyneside, 'the same number had also closed down. 
. _An illustration ofýthe"lack of success experienced by the Government 
in attracting` industry comes from their attempt to develop the 
derelict Gateshead-Tynebänk area. The Government commissioned a 
special report from a surveyor, who reported that "the area; as a 
whole presents an°extraordinary-and almost incredible picture of 
desolation"9 and, that the only hope was to try to make the site'a 
little less'likely to repel industry% It took until March 1938 for 
the'Commissioner for the Depressed Area to arrange for the site to 
be developed# but by the following year, it had been decided that the 
area`could'be reclaimed,, but that no provision could be made for 
factories there. 2 
{ By'1938j there was some glimmer of a revival in the local industrial 
scene, with-a alight decline in the number transferring out of the 
area. ' Some'Admiralty contracts were beginning to flow ins but amongst 
young workers especially, prospects of work were still not good. 
Newcastle, =Jarrow and North, Shields all had over 6% youth unemploy- 
ment-in February 1940; this represented the worst situation in Britain 
3 
with the"exception of-some Clydeside towns, Sunderland and Liverpool. 
1Rert 
rt of the Commissioner etc., September 1938, 'p. 23. 
2LAB 8/206. Report by Sir Alexander Gibb Und Partners, July 1936, 
and documents dated"September 10,1936, March 29,193 and May 3, 
1939 from the Commissioner to the Ministry of Labour in London. 
Another interesting file on a related topic i5i LAB 8205, 'Inducements for Industry to set up in Depressed Areas, r 
makes it clear that some areas were more or less written off as 
hopeless in terms of the prospects of attracting industry. 
TH 
3LAB 19/81. Number of Juveniles in Register, 12 February, 1940. 
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During the First World War, the Tyneside engineers had been 
relatively passive. From being one of the most combative areas in 
the fight for ! local autonomy' before 1914, the North-East had little 
more, than, the status of a backwater in the important national disputes. 
The inter-war experience of large-scale unemployment in the Tyne 
shipbuilding and marine engineering communities evidently did nothing 
to dispel this relative backwardness in the first half of the Second 
War. There was one specific reason which we have already seen in 
operation in the case of Manchesters relative freedom from the heavy 
bombing inflicted on the aircraft production centres of the South. 
The Conciliation Officer thought this was an important consideration 
in the workers' minds when he recorded that there. had been no strikes 
in the engineering industry on the Tyne up to September 1941.1 The 
district remained. completely strike free until March 1941, when the 
apprentices at Swan Hunter's yard came out for one day only in support 
of the Clyde lads' demand for a larger share of the adult national 
pay award of five shillings. 
The attitude of the Tyneside engineers and shipyard tradesmen 
epitomised one aspect of British workers' view of the war effort, in 
that they were willing to make tremendous sacrifices for the sake of 
production. It is>impossible to document this with any pretensions 
to comparative rigour, but the local papers often carried articles 
describing prodigious feats of endurance by local workers. Of course, 
this may partly be attributable to the political views of these papers, 
but even if this was the case, the influence of the papers themselves 
cannot be entirely discounted. Here is one example from the Journal 
3ý4 
1LAB 10/386, September 14,1940. 
,13 
and North Mail for 25th February 1943 (note the datesshipyard men were 
used to working overtime in the warm and light summer evenings, but 
were not accustomed to long hours in the winter). The article is 
headed; Yard Men Worked Until They Dropped, and deals 
with the gargantuan capacity for work of one gang of Boilermakers, 
who fitted out an aircraft carrier's boilers in three weeks, a job 
which normally took three months at least. All seven thousand tubes 
had to be carried'from the°quayside to the boiler rooms of the ship 
at anchor by lighter. The men worked through shifts, and "they lost 
count of the days and did not know whether it was daylight or dark on 
deck. " (emphasis original) Every third or fourth day, they worked 
a thirty-six hour shift, stopping only for meal breaks. When they 
finished, many of the men fell asleep on the quayside. 
1 The example 
comes from 1943, when much of the edge had rubbed off the "Go To 
It" atmosphere: of the immediate post-Dunkirk period, and tiredness 
and irritability were creeping in. 
It was difficult for the Communists to flourish in this type of 
industrial climate. The Conciliation Officer reported that the left's 
activities were "not representative'of more than a few individuals" 
(June"1940), that the CP was "not over-popular in this area" (March 
1941), or that "Little progress has been made so far by the Left" 
(November 1941). 2 The second half of 1940 saw a good deal of activity 
on the part of the local Communists, but without any great return 
in so far as the shop stewards were concerned. In July, a L9bour Monthly 
1Newcaetle 
Journal and North Mail, February 25,1943" 
3F! 
2LAB 10/386, June 8,1940; LAB 10387, March 1, November 15,1941" 
ý+4 
readers' group was set up in Newcastle, 
1 
and in November, a "represent- 
ative gathering'of friends from industry" heard Harry Pollitt speak, 
and contributed £20 to People's Convention funds. 
2 There was also a 
good deal of activity in shop steward circles. At the end of October, 
a quarterly meeting of AEU shop stewards passed a resolution demanding 
a People's Government, 
3 
and at the beginning of December the Vickers 
Armstrong shop stewards, Elswick, demanded the release of Mason, the 
interned Sheffield shop steward. 
4 
All this activity was quite creditable in CP terms, but it was 
still relatively limited. There were: -no major strikes to latch on 
to as there were in Coventry and'the Clyde, nor was any great success 
registered in organising support for the People's Convention (only 
one signature was gained from an engineering trade unionist, compared 
to three each'from Manchester and Glasgow). 
5 In the field of Air 
Raid Precautions, the CP stewards evidently made no impact despite a 
large local campaign. The Northumberland and Durham ARP Co-ordinating 
Committee comprised, among other bodies, six lodges of the Durham 
Miners Association, five railway trade union branches, two Trades 
Councils, and the CP District Committee, but not one branch of an 
6 
engineering union. 
The general picture of the CP's influence in the factories tends 
Ill, July 1940, p. 412. 
2DW, November 26,1940. 
31bid. 
41bid., December 6,1940. 
'DIP, October, 1940. 
TR 
6DNj 
August 26,1940. 
.eI- 
to confirm the impression of a lack of penetration in local industry. 
Contributions to the Daily Worker Fighting Fund were few and far between: 
the survey of contributions showed 10/- from Newcastle engineers, and 
E1 from Vickers Armstrong, but nothing else. 
1 Vickers was clearly the 
most important factory for the CP; there had been an interview with 
a 'prominent' shop steward there after the Q. zarterly meeting had 
demanded a People's Government, and it had been they who had demanded 
Mason's release. 
2 Nevertheless, strength in this factory, the 
largest munitions factory by far in the area, was important because 
of the leading role it had always had in the district. 
*** 
Towards the end of 1941 and in the first nine months of 1942 there 
were some small signs that the memory of the strike weapon had not 
been completely erased from workers' memories. Three small strikes, 
accounting for just seven hundred and five working days lost, took 
place on domestic issues. In October 1942, however, a strike broke 
out which altered the terms on which industrial relations were 
carried on nationally as well as locally. As the Anarchist War 
Commentary put it, the Second Front was opened at home. 
3 
1 DWt August 5,20,1940. 
2Ibid., October 30,1940. 
ýJ? 
3WCI 
mid-October, 1942. 
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The strike only concerned engineering workers indirectly, because 
the marine engineering works and 'inside' departments were not generally 
involved, and only shipyard engineers came out. Nevertheless, the 
strike was important to industrial relations in the engineering 
sector, because of the-impact it had on local views of the Communist 
Party, and because of the close relations which had always necessarily 
existed between the workers'in the two main parts of the shipbuilding 
industry. 
The stoppage arose from an apparently trivial issue, that did not 
fundamentally affect the material interests of the shipyard workers, 
but reflected their accumulated frustration with their wages and 
the conduct of their officials. The national pay claims had consist- 
ently yielded less than expected, and the employers were now asking, 
for clerical reasons, that the day taken as the end of the pay week 
be changed from Tuesday to Sunday. This would mean that on the first 
week of the new system, two days pay would be lost. The two days 
were to be repaid gradually, over several weeks, but the workers at 
Redheads, South Shields, overthrew the decision of their yard committee 
to accept the'new arrangement, and struck work. The employers offered 
to defer the introduction of the new system to allow negotiations, but 
on the following Monday, the whole of the Tyne stopped work. 
I 
The CSEU District Committee had opposed the strike and had pleaded 
with shop stewards not to take extensive strike action, but the men 
were in fighting mood. The CSEU District Committee and the Communist 
Party, consistently made every effort to ensure a rapid return to work. 
The'CP was anxious to establish its new line decisively. This was 
3Fy 
1 sÄ, October, 1942. 
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the first major-strike since both the lifting of the ban on the Daily 
Worker and the rehabilitation of Harry Pollitt. Pollitt travelled up 
to the Tyneside and contacted every steward in or close to the CP and 
asked-them not to strike. These stewards-(fifty in number, according 
to their leaflet)--issuedxa leaflet complaining that they were not 
allowed to-attend--the mass meetings of stewards which were running 
the strike, although this was denied by the strike committee. The 
Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards National Committee issued 
a, leaflet condemning the strike and urging a return. 
1 
The CP, then, was-not only not following its later tendency to 
strike with workers and to argue on the picket lines, but was conducting 
a campaign<for, a return with every weapon at its disposal. Their 
energy in putting their point of. view forward ensured that it was well 
known., The Socialist Appeal stated that: "As a result of this 
campaign the shipyard workers became more and more hostile to the 
Stalinists... the workers threatened to throw the leading Stalinist 
shop steward into the Tyne when he tried to address a meeting. "2 
Whether or not this-was true, it certainly seems to have been the case 
that the CP suffereda severe setback through opposing-the strike so 
vociferously.. -After eight days on strike, with no concessions from 
the employers, the Strike Committee called for a return to work. They 
added that they were all prepared to stand for re-election as stewards, 
and called on. all other stewards to hold meetings for the same purpose. 
Even the Daily-Worker admitted`that a, number of CP shop stewards lost 
1Political 
Statement of the Central Committee (of the WIL), 
November 1942 (Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick). 
2SA, }Octob er, 1942. One'reason for workers' hostility was the fact 
that some CPers refused to strike. (ibid. ) 
f 
their cards, although the strike committee (on which the MIL 
apparently had-some influence) 
I 
was entirely re-elected. The 
Daily Worker'called on'the District Committees to reinstate these 
stewards, °but theyrdid'not. 
2: 
'The Socialist Appeal claimed that a 
'strong bloc'-left'the CPO and the influence of the rest was "almost 
wholly shattered. "3 
The 'Total Time''strike, as it came to be called, had been at once 
an unnerving and formative experience for the CP nationally as well 
as locally. In later disputes, they were much more careful to take 
a"more sympathetic attitude towards the workers involved, and to 
avoid'strident denunciations which only brought them hostility. One 
factor which had influenced their view of the total time affair was 
the apparent triviality of the issue, but later strikes on the Tyne 
occurred on the quite fundamental questions of trade unionism and 
the'boundaries'of: the workshop frontiers of control. During 1943 and 
1944, 'well over ninety percent of the working days lost through 
strikes' concerned these matters. In 1943, the most important stoppage, 
that at'Swan Hunter'sjtook°place, with over ten thousand working days 
lost. ''-In-the following year, there was a brief strike for the removal 
of a management spy at Reyrolle's electrical engineering works at 
Hebburn. 
-"The'Communists-found themselves in an embarrassing situation when 
confronted with this sort of stoppage. They had always stressed 
that'one of the major rights for which workers were fighting the war 
1Political 
Statement of the Central Committee. November 1942. 
2DWj October 
_15,1942. 
39o 
3SA, 
October, ',,. 1942. 
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was the right to have effective trade unions which encompassed all 
workers, just as they had always stressed the importance of this in 
restraining the 'Bosstriches' from taking advantage of the workers' 
reluctance to strike by extending their authority in the shops. On 
wages questions, there was more room for discussion both about amounts 
and on tactics, but there was a good deal less room for manoeuvre on 
these more basic difficulties. 
Non-trade unionism was seen as an important question on the Zane, 
because the engineering shops were still dominated by craftsmen and 
apprentices who were sticklers on these matters and determined to 
eliminate the backsliders who had had some excuse in the depression 
years, but who were now earning enough to be able to afford their 
contributions. Equally, control of their working lives was crucial 
to the old-style engineers, and an issue which they could be expected 
toýtake a strong stand on. The men were now asserting themselves 
in these directions, and although they were, as it were, a whole stage 
behind their Clydeside counterparts in establishing these principles, 
they were no less determined to do so. 
This craftism was one reason for-the very low strike rate on the 
Tyne. The marine engineering shops on the Tyne and the Clyde alike, 
were very quiet-as far as strikes were concerned. This was largely 
because of the very low rates of dilution. Compare the rate with 
that in aircraft: 
. Tabb119_ý `I3 - Women as % of the Total Workforce: 
1 
Years: 19 3.9 t 40 t 41 + 42 143 144 t45 
(a2.1 2.5 4.8 9.1 14.7 15.8 12.9 
(09.5 13.0 23.0 31.9 36.6 36.5 31.8 
a)Marine Engineering b) Aircraft 
Y9 / 
1P. Inmang o . cit. 9 p. 80. 
T 2r: 
. 4ý 
Less dilution meant, of. course, less piece work and less disruption 
of jobs through technological change, and this is linked to the low 
strike rates in marine engineering in both areas. Even on the Clyde, 
only. 6,268 days were lost in the industry, of some three hundred 
thousand days for the whole period of the war. 
As the above figures show, the number of women working in the 
marine engineering industry was low both in comparison to the aircraft 
industry, and in absolute terms. Sixteen women amongst one hundred 
skilled engineers and their labourers must have felt very much on 
the defensive, almost as intruders. In general, as Mark Benney and 
J. T. Murphy pointed out, men were on their best behaviour in these 
circumstances in such matters as remembering not to swear and pouring 
out tea in the right order, but even Murphy (in a London factory) 
had to admit that there was a certain reluctance to help the women 
learn the trade. I There was some hostility to women's introduction 
into the workshop even in these Southern factories, and, as we have 
seen on the Clyde, this could lead to some action-against the women's 
employment in certain departments. On the Tyne, where the surplus of 
'mobile' women (women without families) was relatively high and the 
amount of additional skilled labour required relatively low, dilution 
was largely carried out via apprentices, and it seems quite likely 
that the Tyneside women were an even smaller part of the factory 
population than they were on the Clyde. Perhaps it is this which 
accounts for their general lack of militancy outside of the Rolls- 
Royce and Barr and Stroud strikes, where they were the overwhelming 
majority of the workforce. 
3,9z 
1J. T. Murphy, o . cit. v p. 52. 
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Women shop stewards were recognised comparatively late on the Tyne. 
The-first woman. shop steward to be given a card by the Tyne District 
Committee was a"veteran of-the women's section of the National Unemployed 
Workers Movement, 'Mrs. R. A. Dixon, a Labour Party member of fifty who 
was sufficiently self-confident to address a mass meeting at a Tyneside 
marine engineering works immediately after her recognition as shop 
steward. It, probably required a woman of Mrs. Dixon's age, experience 
and perhaps marital status-to stand up to the Tyne engineers. 
2 It 
is interesting to=see that she became"a steward six weeks after the 
New Year, and-that by'thenýthe-Coventry District Committee had 
recognised five women shop stewards. 
3 
There was another side to 
the'nature_of'the'women's'involvement in shop floor trade unionism, 
however, and this came out during the Swan Hunter strike: they were 
the most°enthusiastio advocates of 100% trade unionism. Positive 
towers, of strength, they supported the strike enthusiastically, forming 
a formidable section of the picket line. It seems°that the women had 
not suffered overmuch from their position in the workshops, but on 
the contrary, had taken up'the trade union question even more 
vigourously than the men who had started the strike. 
4'` 
1We find an example of the North-Eastern male chauvinism in the 
NUGMW Journal (May, 1944, P. 139), where the District Organiser 
actually argued against bringing light industry into'the Tyneside 
area, because it would create employment, for women. What was 
needed, he argued, was heavy industry, which created jobs for 
. men. 
Thus, the article allowed the interpretation that the 
writer disapproved of women's employment per sel 
2Newcastle 
Journal and North Mail, February 10,1943. 
3Coventry 
AEU DCj February 14,1943" 
? 4? 
4SA, March, 1943. 
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Probably the most important strike after the "Total Time" and 
apprentices disputes, that at Swan Hunter for the removal of five 'nons'V 
started at the end of January 1943. Although the4only demand was for 
the removal of the non-unionists, there was another underlying causes 
"a tightening-up of workshop discipline, which the Socialist Appeal 
called "increased regimentation". 
' On January 25th, over two hundred 
fitters and skilled machinists stopped work, and by the following day, 
they were followed out by the rest of the 'inside' and 'outside' 
departments, bringing the whole of Swan Hunter to a standstill. The 
support of the shipyard tradesmen and labourers inspired the Socialist 
Appeal to say that the strike showed promise of being "the most 
determined defence of trade union rights since the outbreak of war. " 
(emphasis original). The factory had been a trade union blackspot 
for a number of years, and the action was regarded as a test case by 
other workers on the Tyne. 
2 
The strikers had the perspective of several weeks of hard struggle 
in front of them. The strike committee warned them that the dispute 
would not, b a quickly resolved, and that they would find a good deal 
of opposition to their stoppage. The press and the Communist Party 
would be against them, they pointed out. 
3 Their resolve was to see 
them through five payless weeks. 
The stoppage was run very efficiently. The unofficial support of 
the Tyne DC of the AEU was secured, and a levy was imposed on all 
members. Other District Committees all over the country were asked 
15A, March, 1943. 
2Ibid. 
31bid. 
29¢ 
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for their support by the strike committee (the DC was careful to avoid 
doing this themselves for fear of Executive discipline). The strike 
committee's warning regarding the CP turned out to be very apposite, 
because MacEwan, the local CP organiser, produced a leaflet sayings 
"... stoppages of work in these circumstances are 
assisting fascism and weakening trade unionism. " 
The leaflet does not appear to have weakened the resolve of the Swan 
workers, who stayed out for another month after the leaflet was 
distributed. 
In general, the CP's attitude was rather less aggressive than it 
had been during the shipyard strike of 1942. The Socialist Appeal's 
correspondent reported that: 
"The activities of the Stalinists in this struggle 
have been less evident than in the... dispute of October. 
The CP have no desire to further antagonise workers 
in the district and bring about a depletion in their 
already diminishing ranks. " 2 
If there were any Communist stewards who were hostile, then they 
suppressed their views at a meeting of the district's shop stewards 
held on February 27th, one month after the beginning of the strike. 
Full support was unanimously expressed and the employers were served 
with notice of district strike action. A mass meeting of all shop 
stewards was called for March 6th, at which detailed plans were to be 
laid. 3 In the interim, the Journal and North Mail began to take an 
interest in the dispute, printing, on the Ist of March, a letter from 
the men against whom the strike was directed. The men said that when 
1SA, March, 1943" 
2Ibid. 
31bid. 
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approached by a steward on the day before the strike to ask if they 
were members of the AEU, they had replied that they were not. They 
stated that they were members of the G&MWU but the steward had 
approached the G&MWU to expel them, as they were lapsed members of 
the AEU. The letter went on: 
"We wish to state that we are not against trade unions, 
but are against shop steward dictatorship. These 
shop stewards have even overruled their own officials 
by not putting the case through the proper channels. 
We are at work and are doing our duty by our country 
for the men at sea and in the forces, not squabbling 
over trade unionism. " I 
There is just the faintest suggestion hero of the hidden hand of an 
official - possibly the Conciliation Officer, both in the reference 
to procedure, and in the timing of the publication of the letter, 
on the same day as a mass meeting was due to take place. In any 
event, the strikers were unimpressed and voted to continue their 
action. But on March 5th, the day before the district shop stewards' 
meeting was to be held, another letter was published in the Journal 
and North Mail stating that theýnoneýwere willing to meet trade 
union and Government officials to resolve the difficulties surrounding 
the question of their trade union membership. The officials mentioned 
persuaded the men to pay their AEU arrears later that day. 
2 Once 
again, the Conciliation and trade union officials had exerted an 
influence on the'nons', an influence which they chose to use in one 
way at the end of February, and in another less than one week later. 
They were waiting to see whether the district's shop stewards would 
hold firm, and decided'not to chance their arm at the last minute. 
1Newcastle Journal and North Mail, March 1,1943. 
2I-bid., March 5 and 6,1943. 
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, The strike was an unqualified victory for the Swan workers. On the 
following day, they voted by a majority of twenty-two to accept the 
men's statement as the basis for a return, although there was a strong 
minority who wanted the men's applications to rejoin the AEU accepted 
first. I Clearly, *the strikers had not lost any spirit over their 
five weeks out. 
One of the features-of the dispute which has already. been noted is 
the stern refusal of the engineers to listen to the CP's leaflets, 
ýýý_ 
and we can see this again-in the next large strike in the district. 
The dispute occurred at the large electrical switchgear works of 
Reyrolle, South Shields, where the workers felt that a spy had been 
planted by the management on the shop floor. They based their view 
on the fact that a man at the works had been charged with theft of 
company property, and fined E9.. It is clear that the. Reyrolle workers 
did not consider the "borrowing" of material as anything like as 
serious an offence as either the management or the magistrate, as they 
asserted their 'moral economy' by paying the man's fine from the 
proceeds of a 'whip-round'. Having disposed of the fine problem, "they 
decided to go to the root of the matter by exercising some workshop 
discipline. , They sat down at their machines and refused to work until 
the spy was removed. The 'sit-down' tactic was an effective one, 
because the factory had never had a strike before, and it was easier 
to police the stoppage efficiently from the inside than may have 
proved possible by pickets. Only three members of the CP continued 
working, according-to the Socialist Appeal. At a mass meeting, Temple, 
the convenor, who was a CP sympathiser, tried to persuade the workers 
to return to their work, but the latter had the bit between their teeth 
797 
I> 
1 SA, March, 1943. 
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and refused. The following day, the man was sacked. 
1 
The factory's 
first strike, as"is so often the case, whetted the appetite, and the 
Reyrolle apprentices (one of the largest bodies of lads on the Tyne) 
were to play their part in the district apprentices' strike which 
broke out only a few weeks later. 
" What was the industrial-political situation by this point, immediately 
prior to the apprentices' strike? Naturally, the CP was the largest 
and most influential-, grouping-on theýleft wing. Although they had 
suffered some serious blows during the strikes up to 1944, they still 
constituted a strong faction on the AEU DC, marshalled by Bill Craigs, 
the Jarrow No. 2 branch secretary. Perhaps rather more importantly, 
they were strong on the shop stewards' committee at Vickers Armstrong's 
Elswick works. Vickers seems to have had comparatively good wages 
and conditions for the districts in July 1943, the management there 
refused to pay out on some piece work jobs because of the excessively 
high earnings2; a year- later, tthe shop stewards there set a precedent 
by. obtaining a penny an hour-'obstruction money' for engineers 
working on torpedo tubes. 3, The-shop stewards-at Vickers Armstrong 
produced alpaper, called,. "Gun, from=1944 onwards. This factory 
followed the classical pattern of large factories in which the CP was 
important: it was free from strikes, it appears to have had good piece 
work earnings, 
_and 
the shop stewards had a factory paper. On the 
other hand, the CP's influence in the engineering factories of the 
district was not always up to the Vickers' standard. Generally, their 
influence was not strong: in a CP literature-selling competition held 
15A, March, 1944- 
2 AEU Monthly Journal, July, 1943. 
3Ibid., June, 1944. 
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in 1943, the North-East Coast came fourth, but not by reason of its 
factory sales. The only industrial sales deemed worthy of note by 
CP headquarters were amongst the miners and the Gateshead railwaymen. 
I 
Neither were they outstandingly successful on the Newcastle Trades 
Council; as the Council's historians have recently noted, their 
numerical presence was low and their influence difficult to detect. 
2 
Compared to the CP1 the extreme left was very weak in industry. 
The WIL had evidently had some influence in the 'Total Time' strike, 
suggesting that they had members working in the shipyards, but they 
had only a microscopic presence in the engineering factories. Nevertheless, 
they did have some members with a good deal of knowledge of the local 
industrial scene and the important militants. Heaton Lee, for example, 
was a mining engineer from South Africa who joined the local CP on 
his arrival in the North-East, and who soon became one of their 
leading speakers in the 'Imperialist War' period. 
3 
After July 1941, 
Lee publicly joined the WIL, taking an impressive knowledge of the 
local CP with him. Another WIL member in a similar position vis-a-vis 
the ILP was T. Dan Smith, who was appointed ILP Organiser in the North- 
East whilst a clandestine member of the WIL. Smith, was soon able to 
strike up relationships with a group of militant ILPers whom he 
influenced along Trotskyist lines whilst 'recruiting' for the ILP., 
4 
1Strengthen Our Organisation (M/S)v p. 11. 
2J. F. Clarke and T. P. McDermotts The Newcastle and District Trades 
Council, 1873-1973. A Centenary History Newcastle, 1973), 
pp. 36-37. The authors offer some useful comments on the problems 
involved in determining the size of the Communist presence on 
trade union bodies generally. (p. 36ff. ) 
3Lee 
was following an 'entriet' tactic. He had become a Trotskyist 
in South Africa, and had emigrated to Britain just before the war, 
together with a number of other South African Trotskyists. 
(Interview with Jack Williams, 7 September 1971). 
4/ir7ban Smith: An Autobiography (1970), p. 30. Mr. Peter Thwaites 
of the London School of Economics kindly filled out Smith's own 
brief reference to his early history for me. 
46o 
Amongst. his contacts-was the ILP North-East Industrial Organiser 
Jack Johnstone, who joined the RCP along with a number of other ILP 
officials in, 1945" 
In a district°that was generally speaking the preserve of the right 
wing, neither Trotskyists nor Communists flourished. Having said this, 
it undoubtedly remained true that the Communist Party was easily 
the most influential of the left groups, as indeed it was nationally. 
As far as the'WIL was concerned, no amount of energy nor good contacts 
could begin to make up for this. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt 
that it was the WIL who made the greatest gains from the apprentices' 
strike of-1944. 
ýý 
'-- The apprentices' strike was probably the most important strike of 
the War. AsAhe Government. documents frequently pointed out, it was 
the first: large'strike-directed directly at changing, Government 
policy. It failed to change : policy with regard to drafting apprentices 
into the mines, but it did stimulate Bevin into applying new repressive 
legislation (Regulation 1AA), designed to, prevent a recurrence of a 
similar large scale stoppage led by 'subversives'. 
Because of its importance, it is worth investigating the background 
to the dispute. on the Tyne. The area played a leading role in the 
apprentices 1944 action, the first time that the lads there had taken 
the initiative nationally. In 1937, the Clyde apprentices had 
constituted the national leadership, as they did again in 1941. On 
both occasions, the North-East had shown little inclination to take 
action on a similar scale. Why were the roles reversed in 1944? 
521 4oß 
Tyneside, of course, had been a centre of juvenile unemployment 
during thwlate 1930s, and remained so right up until the outbreak of 
War because of the lack of possibilities for alternative employment 
in the area. The local engineering and shipbuilding employers were 
not slow to exploit the situation; apprentices could be paid low 
time rates and thereby induced to work long hours of overtime. They 
could also be useful in other ways. In June 1940, for example, the 
Daily Worker took up the case of a body of lads from a 'large arms 
firm', who whilst at°the Technical College receiving instruction, 
performed rough turning operations for their company free of charge. 
I 
During 1940 and 1941, the employers began to expand the apprentice 
population tremendously. One firm had swelled the ranks of its 
apprentices from four to seventy two in the first months of 1941, 
for example. 
2 
A similar tendency to use apprentice labour was discernible on the 
Clyde, but it was more marked on the Tyne. The central problem, for 
the employers, as they explained to the Ministry of Labour, was that 
it was 'impossible'rAo employ women on a number of skilled machining 
jobs, 3 because they considered the peculiar skills required, combined 
with the manual strength needed, to be, beyond women, ors indeed, 
journeymen transferred from other areas. The only answer that they 
could think of was the use of existing apprentices, who had some idea 
of the methods involved. The Ministry of Labour recommended that 
4 
1DW, June 17,1940. 
2LAB 8/405. Minutes of a meeting between North East Coast Marine 
Engine Builders and Ship Repairers, and Ministry of Labour 
Officials, May 17,1941. 
31bid. 
41bid. 
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they follow a determined policy of 'dilution' by means of apprentices, 
since the number of skilled men required was much lower than it was 
in. the West of Scotland, and the problem was therefore amenable to 
solution in this way. 
1 Here we can see the beginnings of an important 
. difference in labour policy which was to make transference a major 
problem on the Clyde, and apprentices an equivalent difficulty on the 
Tyne. 
The only drawback that the employers could see was that the 
apprentices were 'disgruntled'. One manager complainedt 
"It is not a bit of use taking a job to them with 
the old price, they just turn their back on the lathe 
and are not giving the output. " 2 
4a Z 
Increasingly, as the employers used the apprentices on production and 
therefore neglected their training, the lads asserted themselves by 
forcing up piece work earnings. At the beginning of May 1943, the 
Journal and North Mail explained that the young engineering workers 
were discontented because they felt that they were becoming nothing 
more than skilled machine operators. 
3 It has been explained that the 
problem was most acute for the apprentices in the North-East, where 
a deliberate policy was followed, but apprentices nationally became 
more important to production as the war continued-and manpower became 
more of a problem. They took advantage of this as the national wages 
figures show. Between January and July 1943, youths in marine engineering 
leapt from earning 112.2% over their earnings in October 1938 to 147%, 
when the adult male increases were 60.3% and 77% respectively. 
4 
SLAB 8/405 Minutes of a meeting between N. E. Coast Marine Engine 
Builders and Ship Repairers, and Ministry of Labour Officials, 
May 8,1941. 
2Ibid. 
3Newcastle 
Journal and North Mail, May 4,1943- 
4 
Ministry of Labour Gazettej February, August, 1943. 
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By the beginning of the following year (when boys started at the 
beginning of the war were now seasoned fourth-year apprentices), 
they had shown that they were not to be trifled with. 
Ernest Bevin announced the pit ballot scheme in the House of 
Commons on 2 December 1943. In order to"expedite the production of 
coal, young workers from the shipbuilding and engineering industries 
who had either reached the age of twenty or who had completed their 
apprenticeships were to be conscripted, and sent to work in the mines. 
The unfortunate ones were to be chosen by means of a 'ballot', from 
which approximately one in ten would be selected. If chosen, it was 
still possible for either the lads or their employers to apply for 
examption, but it was made perfectly clear that there would be very 
few exemptions granted. 
1 
During January 1944, the Tyneside apprentices, only about 1CPf of 
whom were members of a trade union, began to join a body called the 
Tyne Apprentices Guild, which was organising in resistance to the 
Bevin scheme. Both the local MPs and the Conciliation officer 
considered that the TAG was capable of effective action, as they all 
stressed to Bevin himself. 
2 The Guild was run by three youths 
C. Hepplewhite, an apprentice fitter from the North East Marine 
Engineering Co., Wallsend (chairman); J. C. Brown, an apprentice plater 
from the Middle Docks and Engineering Co., South Shields, and 
J. W. Davy, from the Wallsend Slipway Co. (Secretary). 
3 
The Conciliation 
1H. M. D. Parkerg op. cit., p. 465. 
2LAB 10/451. Memos. of January 11,12,20. Enmerson to Sir G. Ince, 
February 8, Emerson to H. Q., February 9,1944. 
315merson to H.., February 14,1944" 
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Officer had excellent information on these important leaders. That 
on the first two described them as having 'no political inclinations' 
but Davy was rather differents 
"Has strong political views - fluent speaker - strong 
personality - has had Communist views since age 14 - 
recently expelled from the CP on account of his 
activities in connection with the Apprentices Guild. " 1 
Bill Davy was in fact in close contact with the Trotskyists Heaton Lee 
and Ann Keen at this time. 
2 
Irrespective of the views of their leaders, the mass of Tyneside 
apprentices were determined, as were their counterparts on the Clyde- 
side, not, to go-down the pits. In this, they naturally had the 
overwhelming support of their parents, who feared for their sons' 
safety as well as their comfort in the pits. 
3 Many of them knew what 
the young apprentices would face, having lived adjacent to mining 
areas: 
The determination of the apprentices themselves not to submit to 
the scheme was shown by the fact that the first lad to be, called up 
for mining duties, one Martin (who did not`in'fact work in ship- 
building, but for an electrical contractor) was immediately defended. 
Members of the TAG called at all the Labour Exchanges along the Tyne 
and informed the managers that unless Martin's call-up was cancelled, 
there would be a strike on 14 March. Similar notices were received 
by a number of factory and-yard staff. 
4 The Ministry of Labour had, 
in fact, decided when Martin's case was brought up, that he might be 
1FTmerson 
to HQ, February 14,1944" 
2lnformation 
from Bill Davy, 3 June, 1973. 
3House 
of Commons ebatee, 399,5sr P" 1134, (MP, Gorbals). 
Statement of Buchanan 
4 LAB 10/451" March 9,19449 
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eligible for deferment, but they chose not to disclose this to the 
apprentices, who had decided to lobby their MPs on the question. 
1 
It was decided to allow them to do so, but when the Ministry was 
asked by one of the MPs concerned, Ritson, as to what he was to say 
to the boys, he was told to tell theme 
"Go home and go back to work. The right way to handle 
this is to take it up through your union officials... 
(it was) emphasised that above all things the Minister 
would want to avoid any appearance that these apprentices 
were being given any recognition whatsoever. Mr. Ritson 
took the point very cordially. " 2 
The Ministry of Labour, then, knowing that Martin was to have his 
call-up deferred, decided to allow the lads to go through what they 
presumably hoped would be the sobering experience of an unsuccessful 
lobby. In fact, the Ministry was following a policy of 'wait and see'. 
They were anxious not to give the impression that they were giving in 
on Martin, 
3 
and wanted to see what the reaction of the TAG would be, 
since the news of his possible deferment could be released later. In 
the meantime, enquiries could be made regarding the leaders of the 
lads, as well as the mood of the rank and file. On 16th March, 
Ministry of Labour Headquarters wrote to inmerson, the Conciliation 
Officers 
"... it appears that it would be extremely useful 
to find out exactly who is at the back of the 
Clydeside Apprentices Committee and the Tyneside 
Apprentices Committee. One gets the impression that 
'LAB 10/451. March 9,1944" 
2Ibid., March 11,1944. 
3 
Ibid., March 17,1944. 
there must be an adult mind here, and it seems to 
me that your means of investigation might be able to 
get to the bottom of the matter. " I 
Four days later, Enmerson began filing reports on TAG meetings from 
J. L. Wilcock, local officer of the Ministry of Intelligence. 
2 
In the meantime, 14th March, the day of the threatened strike, 
had passed off without incident, largely. because of the confusion 
around Martin's deferment. On 11th March, Martin had received 
notice of the cancellation of his call-up, but this was later with- 
drawn. 3 The apprentices were obviously caught out. They thought 
that they had won a victory, but in fact, they soon found that they 
had not, and that the strike date had passed. 
Two days before the strike had been due to start, Martin's case had 
already ceased to be the immediate issue. It appears that the TAG, 
thinking that Martin had won, decided to take up the cases of three 
eighteen-year-old lads who had been called up. They contacted the 
Clydeside apprentices on the matter, and agreed to set ,a new date, 
28th March, for a co-ordinated strike. Three days before the strike 
was due to start, -the TAG began to marshal their forces. They held 
a mass meeting (which was something of a flop, since only about two 
hundred turned up), and issued their first bulletin, --in which they 
called for speakers, workers and couriers to help run the dispute. 
4 
But, by, this time, the opposition, too, was organising. The District 
1LAB 10/451iMarch 17,1944"; 
2LAB 10/451, March 20,1944" 
Low to Fhimerson, March 16,1944" 
31bid., March 17,1944. 
41bid., March 27, note signed 'WB'. 
.. 
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Officials were doing 'everything possible' to set up a Junior Workers' 
Committee as a . rival, to the TAG. 
1 
This body managed to make the 
strike less solid than it might have been over the next week. 
On 7th March, the TAG sent a letter to Bevin, drafted by Jock 
Haston and Bill Davy and typed by Ann Keen, threatening strike action 
if the Government did not introduce legislation to eliminate the 
anomaly whereby lads under twenty could be conscripted. 
2 During the 
next three weeks, the TAG prepared for a full-scale strike, whilst 
their opponents had some difficulty in opposing the idea of strike 
action. The main impediment to the development of any opposition 
to the TAG was the fact that the lads resolutely refused to allow 
anyone to attend their meetings (even in the workshops) unless they 
were apprentices themselves. Thus, when the CP's local organiser 
McEwan, and another Communist, Waters, tried to speak on one occasion, 
they were ruled out of order by the chairman. 
3 The apprentices were 
therefore effectively sealed off from outside influences. Just before 
the strike began, the District officials hit on the way to undermine 
the influence of the TAGS they formed an AJIJ Junior Workers Committee 
for the purpose of enrolling apprentices in the union, and taking up 
appeals against conscription via the official machinery. A young 
apprentice called William Kennedy was the secretary of tie Committee, 
and he toured the yards and factories during the strike trying to 
persuade the lads not to stop work. Accordingly, Davy decided to 
1 LAB 10/451, March 27, note signed 'WB'. 
2SA. Report on trial of Haston, Lee and Keen, July 1944" 
3LAB 10/451, March 229 1944" 
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leave the TAG and to oppose Kennedy's policy from within the Junior 
Workers' Committee. I 
On 27th March, the apprentices lobbied Parliament again, but 
failing. to gain any satisfaction, the lads struck work as agreed on 
the following day. Apprentices on the Clyde, Tyne and Huddersfield 
stopped work, but the strike was never 100% solid in any of these 
2 
areas. 
ti The first day of the strike foundý"about 6,000 apprentices out on 
the Zane, of which 3,473 were in shipbuilding and 2,560 were in 
engineering. This left 'a considerable number' still at work. The 
most important bodies of strikers were at Vickers Armstrong's yard 
(789), Swan Hunter yard and works (1,370), Reyrolle (564), Wallsend 
Slipway (350), and Parson's (270). 
3 On Tuesday, the strike spread, 
and another 1200 came out, including 731 from engineering. 
4 On the 
Wednesday, the Clyde Conciliation Officer reported about 7,000 out 
there, although in two instances, lads had been out but had returned 
within hours. He suggested that the strike was not at all solid in 
the West of Scotland. 
5 From the strikers' point of view, the Tyne 
was more reliable than the Clyde, and even the Newcastle Journal and 
North Mail admitted that the strike involved the majority of the lads 
on, the Tyne. 
6 
1LAB 10/451, March 27,1944" 
Zlbid., March 28,1944, Newcastle Journal and North Mail, March 28, 
30,1944. 
3LAB 10451. March 28,1944. 
ibid., March 29,1944. 
5, bid_, Clyde Conciliation Officer's memo., March 29,1944. 
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By April 1, the strike was already beginning to come under pressure 
from-two directions. Firstly, the Ministry of Labour was pursuing a 
policy of calling up apprentices for medical examination prior to 
conscription into the services, and one hundred and fifty had been 
called'up by April 1st. 
1 
Secondly, the Junior Workers' Committee was 
beginning to find its feet. 
2 Kennedy had been touring the Yards and 
shops trying to keep lads in where the strike showed signs of spreading. 
At Vickers Armstrong, for example, the strike was about fifty percent 
effective, and Kennedy, realising the importance of Vickers to the rest 
of the district, visited No. 22 shop to persuade the large number of 
apprentices working°in'it to stay at work. His success in doing so 
was=splashed all over the front page of the Journal and North Mail's 
3rd. April edition, together with the information that he had been 
equally effective at CA Parsons. 
3 
There was little that the TAG could do to defy these twin threats 
of the call-up, -and the JWC. Under the tutelage of the Trotskyists, 
they issued leaflets to the lads. (Fight, the Pit Compulsion Plot), to 
the miners and-toýother workers. They also organised°picketing to 
try, to spread the stoppage, and set up committees-to-deal with such 
questions as entertainments, picketing and so on. At the same time, 
the Trotskyists carried-on collections via the Militant Workers' 
Federation. By, this time, however, the Trotskyists had become an 
embarrassment to the lads. The national papers had taken up their 
°1LAB 10/451, April 1,1944. 
2Newcastle Journal and North Mail, April 1, _1944" 
3Ibid., 
April 3,1944. 
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involvement, and publicised the police raids on the RCP's offices 
throughout the country. Lurid stories detailing their exploits, 
stressing their extremism and mis-spelling their names abounded in 
the popular press. 
By the end of the week, another significant hole appeared in the 
strikers' ranks, which had always looked rather ragged outside of the 
Tyne. By the end of the week, the strike had ended on the Clyde when 
the John Brown's lads had returned; some lads had returned only to 
come out again when they found that some of their number were to be 
victimised. The failure of the Clyde strike to ever really take root 
induced the Huddersfield lads to decide to return. This left the 
Tyneside isolated. Ironically, they did not decide to return until 
the following week because their telegrams to the Clyde (and, of 
course, the replies) were being intercepted and delayed by the Post 
Office, and they were not inclined to believe the newspaper reports. 
2 
The last of the strikers straggled back to work on April 12th, a 
fortnight after they had-come out, having gained absolutely nothing. 
The strength of the lads' feeling against going down the pits 
persisted, although the back of collective resistance had been broken; 
up to the end of May, 285 lads failed to comply with their call up 
instructions, and thirty two of these were eventually imprisoned 
rather than submit. 
3 
The whole dispute was conducted on a different plane from previous 
strikes: the involvement of the extreme left and the Government in a 
1Newcastle 
Journal and North Mail, April 1; Daily Mail, April 6, 
Sunday Express, April 2, Morning Advertiser, April 8, Daily Dispatch, 
April 6. Apart from the first mentioned paper, none of these 
articles added anything of any real interest to the story of the 
strike itself. 
2 I, AB 10/451. 
3House of Commons Debates, 399,5s, P. 1135. 
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fight of fundamental importance to the terms of the battles on the 
Home Front which both sides realised lay ahead raised the stakes in 
the tournament. No previous strikers had challenged the right of the 
Government to direct labour as it saw fit. Neither had any previous 
strike in engineering even remotely impinged on the Government's 
problems in the. other troublesome industry, coal-mining. If the 
apprentices had won even the most minimal concessions, it would have 
been that much harder for them to solve their labour problems (which 
partially derived from the labour shortage) in the most strike-prone 
industry. For these reasons, Bevin was determined that the ground 
shouldýbe cut from beneath the RCP's feet, that the strikes in 
engineering and the pits should be defeated, and that legislation 
should be introduced to prevent a repetition of this brief but unnerving 
crisis. 
By the end of the apprentices' strike, the Ministry of Labour had 
sufficient material available to prosecute the members of the RCP who 
had been closely involved with the dispute. M15 had conducted raids 
on Davy's house at Wallsend, the RCP headquarters for the North-East 
(a house in, Walker) and the London Headquarters, to gather information. 
Jock Haston (organising secretary), Roy Tearse (industrial organiser), 
Heaton Lee (North-East area organiser) and Ann Keen were charged with 
conspiracy to cause an illegal dispute, inciting such a dispute, and 
furthering it, under the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act and the 1927 Trades Disputes Act. The main problem for the 
prosecution was to prove. that the accused had been involved in the strike 
after it began; they could produce the TAG's leaflets (which Haston 
admitted drafting, although he denied that the political sentiments 
expressed in them were entirely his own), but had they been active in 
spreading the strike either on the Tyne or elsewhere? Davy insisted 
I, & 
that none of them had attended any mass meetings, and none of the other 
witnesses disagreed with him, although one, James Lloyd, said that 
Tearse had helped explain how to organise a strike. The four were 
found guilty of furthering the dispute, but innocent of the other 
charges. Tearse and Lee'were sentenced'to twelve months each, Haston 
to six, and Keen to thirteen days. Ann Keen was immediately released, 
and was able to tour the'country'speaking in defence of the other 
three. 1 
Defence Committees were'set up under the auspices of the Anti-Labour 
Laws Victims' Defence Committee, a body which involved Jimmy Maxton, 
Aneurin Bevan, and a number of other sympathetic left wingers. In 
September 1944, the sentences were quashed on appeal, on the grounds 
that a dispute not in progress could not be furthered. 
2 Needless to 
say, the result of the appeal was hailed as a Victory for Labours as 
the RCP leaflet put'itg a victory quite clearly won through the 
successful agitation of the defence committees. 
The Newcastle Defence Committee was understandably the most active 
of all. Just after the sentences had been handed down, Ann Keen 
spoke in Newcastle, with Bill Davy and Jimmy Maiton. Len Harrison of 
the ILP chaired the meeting, and four hundred trade unionists 
attended. 
3 
The RCP locally had been active in the victims' defence, and could 
reflect with satisfaction on the outcome. But defence of their members 
from judicial victimisation was one thing, but as they themselves 
SA, July 1944" 
21bid. 
j September, 1944. 
31bid., 
mid-July, 19449 
realised, the defence of the working class from large scale redundancies 
was quite another. The local branches of the RCP were relatively 
active and well-connected in the local trade union movement: their 
paper sales were good (thirty per member per fortnight), they were 
able to send in exclusive reports from the convenor of a Vickers- 
Armstrong factory, the Walker Naval Yard, and Northern-Coachbuilders 
(who'had adopted the RCP's policy on redundancies as their own), and 
in 1945, they-recruited five leading ILPers, including Ken Johnstone, 
Divisional Industrial Organiser. 
1 
To. some extent, the health of the RCP rested on the relatively poor 
standing of the CP in the area. In January 1945, when RCPers were 
selling the Socialist Appeal to a queue of workers outside the 
magistrates court waiting to attend the hearing of some Boilermakers 
prosecuted for an illegal strike, one of them took the paper and 
walked down the queue sayings 
"Read the only paper that has given you a true write 
up brothers. This is the policy of the workers, not 
that disgusting slip of pink paper that the Communist 
Party are distributing. You remember, brothers, that 
they were the party that scabbed on us during the 
Total Time strike. " 2 
Naturally, such reports have to be taken with rather more than a pinch 
of salt, but it seems quite possible that some feeling against the 
13A, 
mid-October 1944, February, June 1945. RCP Party Organiser, March, 1946. This journal gave the average paper sale in 
early 1946 as 36.6, compared to the highest branch, (Nottingham) 
which sold fifty per member per fortnight. 
The RCP claimed that "The outstanding youth leaders of that 
struggle are now in the RCP or are sympathetic to it. " (5A, 
mid-August, 1945. ) 
2S-At January, 1945. 
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CP did persist because of their role in the 'total time' dispute. 
By, and large, however, it was not the extreme left but the right wing 
who benefited from the discomfiture of the CP. Jack Bowman, the 
A}JJ District Secretary, was well in touch with affairs at Vickers- 
Armstrongs, Elswick, the CP stronghold, both through his earlier work 
there and his association with the ex-convenor and President of the 
AhU Jack Little. l Bowman was extremely careful not to allow the CP 
to take over the District Committee, and although a group of Vickers 
shop stewards in No. 17 shop protested at the Government's intervention 
in Greece in 19442, this was about as far as they were able to go in 
that factory or-on the-DC. Under these circumstances, the CPI although 
they had a strong minority faction on the District Committee and in 
Vickers-Armstrongs, did not operate at a very high level of efficiency. 
At the beginning of 1943, for example, the Fighting Fund set the 
districts' quotas to be met which varied according to the size of the 
membership. Tyneside fulfilled only 9% of its quota, compared to 
Lancashire's 37.5%, Scotland's 35.62% and the Midlands 26.61%. 
3 
Something must have been wrongs possibly an inactive membership, 
possibly a hostile response from non-Party workers, probably a combin- 
ation of theýtwo. The recent recruits to the ranks of the CP had 
not been hardened by the 'Imperialist War' experience, and could 
easily become discouraged. 
In any event, the local branches of the CP were certainly no more 
able to put up a fight against redundancies than were Communists in 
most of the other main engineering centres. The majority of workers 
1Interview 
with Jack Bowman, 7 March, 1971. 
2DW, December 18,1944. 
3DW, January 22,1943. 
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feared unemployment at the end of the war, as a Ministry of Supply 
inspector reported"after a tour of the local factories in 1943. The 
point was, how were they prepared to resist it? Like workers 
throughout the rest of the country, they simply did not believe that 
the Government would allow the misery of the Thirties to be reimposed, 
in the face of massive working class political pressure in the 
opposite direction., - As far as resistance through strikes was concerned akog the 
lines of Albion Motors or the Humber; there was no equivalent upsurge 
here. The underlying cause may well have been the fact that the 
habits and traditions of militancy had been neither established nor 
reinvigorated in the area. Wartime militancy was probably the sine 
crua non of a fight against redundancies at the end of the war. 
ýý 
Tyneside hadsbeen-remarkable in a trade union sense only for its 
lack of militancy, in which it contrasted sharply with the Clyde. At 
the same time, those outbursts of strike action which had occurred 
were well-supported by the shop stewards of the district, partly, 
no doubt, because they took up an issue of vital importance to all 
trade unionists: the collective enforcement of trade union membership. 
The general passivity of the district is easily explained by 
reference to the industrial structure of Tyneside, where marine 
engineering was, much more important than the munitions sector. There 
was, if, we discount for a moment Vickers-Armstrong's Elswick, no 
real equivalent to the group of huge munitions works which were to be 
found on the Clyde (Beardmore, Albion, Rolls-Royce, NBLoco), with 
their dilutees on piece work. Marine engineering remained a backwater, 
with a consistently low rate of technological change and consequently 
ý. ýi 
slow rate of destruction of the old skills. Time work remained for 
a, large body of craftsmen the predominant method of wage payment, 
with all the gentle'working rythms, the craftsmanlike pauses to assess 
knotty technical, problems and the generally easy workshop ambiance 
which was the antithesis of-the frenetic Coventry piece work shop. 
The roots of militancy often lie in the nature of work, and in the 
marine engineering shops, there was perhaps less to complain about 
in; this direction. There were also fewer women to assert themselves 
as they did on the Clyde and Coventry: the Tyne was still a man's 
district in a sense that was not even true of the Clyde, where 
Rolls-Royce alone had challenged all that. 
The decision by the, Ministry of Labour and the North-Eastern 
employers to-use apprentice labour to carry out as much dilution as 
was possible determined to a considerable extent the. type of labour 
problems which they later''faced. The apprentices proved a group 
of dilutees who did not recognise the labels they were craftsmen 
in the making, and when they found their training thrust to one side 
in the scurry for-wartime output, they too thrust aside constraints 
and forced up piece work earnings-even higher than their mates in the 
aircraft industry. They made up for their inexperience by a combination 
of youthful combativity and craft pride deflected into wage militancy. 
When they brought about the strike which must rate as in many ways the 
most important of the war, -they did not however carry any section 
of-the-shop stewards' movementwith them. The stewards largely 
regarded the apprentices' cause as being worthy of some sympathy, 
but basically the result of a misunderstanding of the Government's 
intentions. - The mainstream of shop floor trade unionism was not 
prepared to help the lads. 
.1 
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It might, perhaps rather unkindly, be said of the Tyneside shop 
stewards, that like the Bourbons, they had learned nothing and forgotten 
nothing. They had been restored to the centre of the industrial 
stage, but one might be forgiven for imagining that they were following 
the not-very ambitious paths laid down by their First World War 
predecessors. 
Since the Tyne was such a non-militant area, how was it that an 
opposition of some influence developed there, just as it had on the 
Clyde? Before answering the question, a preliminary qualification 
should first be made. - The Tyneside Trotakyists were not as influential 
as their Clydeside counterparts. On the Clyde, they had established 
themselves as the leaders of a semi-permanent shop stewards' committee, 
and had led strikes from the inside. They were well based in the 
centres of militancy, and were eventually able to take over the AEU 
District Committee. The Tyneside WIL-RCP did not rise to even these 
heights. It-simply managed to develop itself into a group capable of 
servicing the apprentices strike quite efficiently, and of maintaining 
a respectable presence in the local-trade union movement. There 
were, on the other hand, some reasons for the fact that the CP had 
a significant body of critics to its left in both areas. Firstly, 
the Communists had played a less significant role in organising 
workers in to the trade unions on the Tyne than it had in Scotland, 
and engineers were not therefore predisposed to listen-to their 
arguments. Secondly,. the. protection of the people from air-raids 
both inside and outsidetof the workshops was rather less significant 
in these areas than it was in the Midlands or London. In fact, this 
was'just as well for the North-Eastern CPers, who had not in any case 
made a great deal of impact on local ARP organisations, least of all 
amongst the shop stewards. 
. w1. 
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There were also some-quite specific reasons for the modest but 
significant growth ofýthe extreme left. The'most obvious of these was 
the CP's; rigid opposition to the rl'otal Time'strike. This was perhaps 
simply unfortunate for"the. local CP in that their area happened to 
have the first really large dispute, of the war, but it was a blunder 
which-. they found it hard to live down. Another factor was the good 
connections which the WIL was able to make in the trade union movements_") 
.. ý, 
through the well-known Heaton Lee and Dan Smiths the Total Time 
strike Committee, the Apprentices' Guild, the Walker Naval Yard 
Committee, were all impressive associates to have. 
In general terms, however, the Tyne was an inhospitable area for 
left wingers of any tendency. One of the reasons for the Trotekyists, 
influence might in fact be found in this general weakness, in that 
there was rather less left wing opposition than elsewhere; this was 
certainly one reason for their influence within the local ILP, in 
which their energy and commitment helped them actually breath life into 
a moribund organisation. The right wing was well established, and 
very little occurred to loosen their hold during the war. They 
were sufficiently flexible to accommodate the Swan Hunter strike, 
and the apprentices could have little impact on the official machinery 
since only one in ten of them was in the union. Inside the union 
machinery, the apprentices would have been a powerful force for 
change, given their much strengthened position on the shop floor and 
their willingness to strike. 
The problem here, even more than on the Clyde (where the right 
wing was less important) is to investigate the activities of the 
right wing. Unlike the leftists, these men were not open agitators 
with their own papers and leaflets as well as policemen and Ministry 
of Information officials reporting their every action. Because of 
ýi7 
its very nature, the history of their activity is difficult to 
reconstruct; its might showed through during the apprentices' 
strike, when they were forced out to openly argue in the factories 
and the branches. Before and after their temporary surfacing in 
this dispute, they remained fairly well under cover. The subterranean 
history of this 'silent majority' remains to be written. 
ýýý 
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CONCLUSICBJ 
'//g 
In the introduction to this thesis, three important sets of assumptions 
were explicitly stated, because of their importance to the direction of 
the research, the organisation of the text, and, not least, the content of 
our arCuments. The assumptions all related to the tensions, that were 
considered to exist between different Croups of people: between shop stewards 
on the one hand and national executives. and district committees on''the 
other, between shop stewards and their members, and between Communist 
engineering workers and the national and international leadership of 
the CPGB. The purpose of our work was said to be to discover how these 
tensions developed and worked themselves out in practice, and to find-. '- 
the main determinants involved in their resolution. The aim of this 
conclusion is to suggest some answers to these questions based on the 
evidence adduced in the body of the thesis(though not in the came order 
as in the preceding chapters). 
The first, problematic relationship mentioned in the introduction 
was that between shop-stetiards. and the national executives and district 
committees. How and why did this relationship change in the period 1935-46? 
In establishing the size of the gap between the stewards and their 
executives, the obvious comparison to make. must be with the period 
between about the turn of the century and the onset of mass unemployment 
soon after the end of the First World War. It would be difficult to argue 
that the dimensions of the gap were not much smaller in out period than 
they had been in these years; suspicion of the executives was not 
widespread amongst members of the engineering unions(as it had been 
between 1898 and 1918), nor was there any move in any district towards 
'local autonomy' or anything anal/gous to it during the 1930s, nor did any 
national shop stewards' movement emerge in the Second World War as it had 
in the First. This was despite the growing number. of shop stewards elected 
from all types of engineering worker(both skilled and unskilled), the 
ascent of Communists to prominent positions amongst these stewards, and the 
'downward'pressure of the Government on executives to oppose unofficial 
strikes and unconstitutional action. The reasons for the differences 
`ýld 
betueen the two periods are many and varied. One interesting line of 
explanation has to do with the view taken by the Communist Party of the 
necessary direction of trade union %, ork, when compared to that of earlier 
organisations like the Clyde Workers' Committee. Communists were not working 
as oppositionists iithin their trade unions, but simply as an organised part 
of the rank and file. The'editorial of the first number of the CP paper for 
engineering, The"Conveyor, put it nicely: 
"The Conveyor is not an 'opposition' paper. The object 
of this paper is to express the desires of the rank 
and file ... "(The Conveyor, no. l, Jan. 1937. 
) 
Thus, even before the Second World War, the rank and file papers had rejected 
the idea of organising against the executives on a continuous basis outside 
of the union structnre, and this attitude changed little even during the 
'Capitalist War' phase. 
Yet the fundamental reason for the more harmonious relationship 
I 
existing between-shop stewards and their executives during the Second World 
War related not to such considerations as the views of the left-wingers 
amonCst them, but rather to the way workers as a whole saw the war itself. 
To the vast majority of working people in Britain, the Second War was, to the 
very end, a genuine and necessary fight against Nazism and Fascism, whereas 
-by the end of the First :, 'ar, a minority of workers had become willing to 
question the need for the war to continue at all. It is against this background 
that relationships between shop stewards and their executives must be seen. 
The feeling was "we're all in this together", and the main fear was that 
employers might not do their share. The trade union executives were felt to 
be helping to-ensure that there was-in, fact some equality of sacrifice by 
particinatinL in top-level committees and so on. 
This feeling on'the part of working people derived to a 
considerable extent from the nature of the Government's labour policy during 
the 1939-45 war. Key to the difference between the labour policies, pursued in 
the two wars was the sinple fact of Ernie Bevin's direct appointment to the 
War Cabinet in 1940. Bevin's strategy revolved around the central 
Tai 
proposition that the trade union leaders were the crucial 'moderating 
influence', and that they should not become too isolated from their members 
as a consequence of their support for the war effort. This in turn required 
that the material conditions inside the factories should not give working 
people too much cause for complaint: canteens, nurseries, concerts, a whole 
range of facilities decompanied the necessary compulsive legislation 
(again much more favourable to workers than in the First War: compare the 
Essential Works Order to the Itunitions Act). These benefits were 
important in ensuring that union officials were not subjected to an 
intolerable amount of pressure from below. 
The relationships. between shop stewards and their branches 
and district committees were rather more problematic than those between 
stewards and their executives, simply becau3e of the differences between 
the industrial structures of the engineering districts. However, in general, 
it is possible to say that shop stewards became increasingly independent 
of their branches and district committees during our period. In the inter- 
war years, it was relatively common for shop stewards to be appointed by 
their district committees or branches (depending on their union), rather 
than elected. In the late 1930s, as the scope for shop steward activity 
increased, so more stewards were actually elected. from amongst their 
workmates. As their numbers grew in the factories, they organised 
themselves into joint shop stewards' committees, and took shop floor matters 
there rather than to their district committees. By the end of the war, 
many shop-stewards had formed 'combine committees', linking stewards in 
the different workplaces of a sinCle company thereby becoming even more 
independent of their individual district committees, But within this 
general fr ework, the locality was all-important: in Jianchester, for example, 
the shop stewards were less independent of the district committee than 
in Coventry(witness the weakness of the lianchester Shop Stewards' Council 
in 1941), simply because trade union organisation in the workshops was 
much poorer. If there were no shop stewards' committee to attend, then 
stewards had to look to their district' committee and their representatives 
4Z 
on it. I'oreover, national trends often obscure such lunusunl' districts as 
Barrow, where, because of the overwhelming predominance of Vickers munitions 
works and shipyard in the town, the District Committee was dominated 
throughout our period by the senior shop stewards from that concern* 
It has already been felt necessary to remind the reader of the 
importance of different local situations whilst discussing the relations 
between shop stewards and district comrnittees, but it is even more difficult 
to say very much about the relationship between the shop steward and his 
members without descending to the local and factory level. Nevertheless, at a 
very general and national level, the picture is undoubtedly one'in which shop 
stewards became increasingly important to engineering workers. Several factors 
can be pointed to as being both causes and symptoms of this fact, but the 
underlying sine qua non was an increasing trade union xtembership. Iiaturally, 
the shop stewards played a crucial role in recruiting and retaining this 
membership, and were able (whilst increasing the density of their own coverage) 
very often to create arapport with their members which would be envied by 
some contemporary shop stewards. 
2The 
challenge to build such a relationship 
was thrown down by the 'Total War' itself and the large range of problems 
which it continually posed such as firewatching, rationing, income tax, hostel 
accomodation and transport to and from work in the blackout, to mention just 
a few. 1": any stewards-took this challenge up. Yet there wore at least two large 
groups of engineering workers(apprentices and women)who remained largely 
unorganised throughout the war and these arguments can in no way be applied 
to them. Indeed, during:. 1943 and 1944, the discrete but acute grievances of these 
groups caused them to engage in large-scale strikes 
1This 
cohesion probably explains why the Barrow DC was so 
2The 
current vogue for the "check-off" system amongst managements-. 
shows their appreciation of the importance of dues collections 
to steward-member relations. 
frequently a thorn in side of the EC of the AEU; it was twice 
suspended for supporting strikes in our period. (in 1937 and 1943) 
w. ' 
lärGely independently of : the 'shop stetrprdp. 
As we` n'oted at the beginntiing of thi. s'disQüssipn of. steitimrd-",. 
r. ie. -,, iber relationsflocal considerations are crucial. Amongst these, 
it, is, 
, important-to note such social factors as the 
different types of'immiC2ant 
into Coventry in the early months of war(who had varying trade union 
backgrounds), the intensity and effects of bombing in different, 
areas,, and 
so on. However, in this study, it has been what could broadly be termed 'the, 
$economic''and'technologicall situations in our, four cnginecring districts. 
which have received most stress. The, central contrast has been between, 
the piece-work shop steward of the more technologically advanced districts, 
and the time-work stqvtard of the more technologically backward. P, 
iecp_work, 
: 
(in'both its collective and individual variants)peant close,, and re ulpx,, 
, 
contact with the stewardsi constituents in order to arrange, 
jroduction 
itself(as in the sang system)or to discuss the inevitable't, iminaand 
earnings problems. Ti{ne working stewards tended, on the 
other hnnc, tb have°, 
rather less contact with their m embers 'pushed on there from this direction.. 
To-the extent that piepe-work spread throughout enhinecrina. during the 
war, as dih}tion was carried out, more and more sibop stewards were provided, 
with the opportunity of forging closer links between thecjeelves and 
their members. 
The third and final principal relationship which we set out 
to examine was that between Communist engineers and the national and 
I 
international leadership of the Communist movement. Although this topic. i& 
reg4rded as an interesting and important one, only a small f'agnent, of, it 
has been touched on in the corpus of this thesis, 'and therefore only'a few 
tentative conclusions can be offered'. 
As far as relations between 
the CPGB are concerned 
direct leadership over 
was allowed increasing 
can trace this through 
it is clear th ý 
the Communist International end 
the Cl exercised ;, ]es$ and less, 
the British party during the years 1927-43. T'he C}'GB 
control over trade union policy in, 'part icular*! we 
from the CT's insistence in 1927-8 that tho, CPGß 
follow the dual . unionapproach of 
the `1'hirdý Period"'tlýrou, h; t . 'e, early,, -, 
, dispensationto abandon this tactic given by, the RILU. in late 1931, and, the 
gradual slackening- of CI interest in trade union matters from the, mid-1930s 
ors, to the eventual dissolution of the Third International itself zrn 
1943. 
`"his steadily decreasinnpressure from flosc, otww allowed the CP more,,,,. 
freedom in adapting its trade union policy to Brit i, 51.4,, co, n4it'iOns'j Which, 
in 
turd contributed to the, party's increasing' influence among enC . neerinC 
wor1rers. Thus, the CP progressed from having no rank pnd file paper at all 
for 
engineering at times'durin; the oar]y. thirties, to having the New Propellor, 
which claimed a rising circulation aiiongst aircraft workers between 
1,935 and 
1940(when its paper supply was restricted by the Gov, eri1ment); Iater. 
Qn : in` 
the war, the r:, &ATS r1C was able to hold impressively large, me'etings 
of, shop 
stewards. However, the influence of the CP, let alone the, Clover a stratum 
of shop stewards was certainly not a simple and unnediated swayýCQrlmunist' 
shop stewards often distanced themselves from the, 'party '1inO ýýas tine 
have 
seen on several occasions. Communist shop stewards sometim'e3 neglected 
to 
mention that the war was a capitalist dog-fight in' 1940, jüst' as they were 
sometimes behind strike action in the'latter part of the war. British' 
ens, . neering shop ste,:! ards were certainly not 
the Irnarionettes of MoscoW', 
neither were they the marionettes of King Street, ; they had,, always to ponsider', 
the views and needs of those who'. elected them as their, representatives', in 
the 'workshop. 
* 
1This 
could hardly have'been such, a xelat. onhi even if 
only because during the, -war, AE delegates, formed 
by far the 
largest bloc of trade unionists at CP 
Congresses. 
Biographies of Individuals 
51. 9ý 
Mentioned in the Text. 
5L, 
These biographies, arranged in alphabetical order, are conceived of 
as an aid to reading the text. In general, they do not expand at 
length on comparatively well-known figures such as Jack Jones and 
Hugh Scanlon, nor on those individuals for whom biographies or auto- 
biographies (e. g. Douglas Hyde) are available. They are simply an 
attempt to make the rest of the thesis, in particular the local studies, 
of more interest to the reader. It is hoped that, in the process, some 
small contribution to labour biography has been made. Unless otherwise 
stated, the source of information is the subject himself. 
ýHiJi 
Robert Allan 
A Clydeside engineer, Allan was politically unattached throughout 
the 1930s and 40s, as far as I can tell. 
II 'aeý P Kk IJ: A skilled man, he had 
an excellent record as an organiser: in November 1936, he received the 
AEU's medal for recruiting the largest number of workers to the AEU 
in the country. Not surprisingly, he soon became Divisional Organiser 
until at least 1943. During the war, he continued to maintain his 
political independences in February 1942, he criticised the Labour City 
Council in Glasgow for refusing to arbitrate on a pay claim for 
corporation engineers. 
(Peter Kerrigan, AEU Journal, Nov. 136; War Commentary, mid-February X42) 
5ci 
Bill Abbott 
Born in Ancoats, Manchester in 1905. Became an apprentice pattern- 
maker at a firm of wire manufacturers at the age of fourteen. He 
worked there for eight years, from 1919-27, until he was sacked for his 
activities as a shop steward; in 1925, he joined the CP and the MM. 
In 1928, he became a founder member of the Openshaw branch of the 
National Unemployed Workers' Movement. In 1932, he went to work at 
. A. V. Roe's Newton Heath factory, losing his job there two years later 
for political reasons. He then became East Lancs* organiser for the 
NUWM. In 1935, he found regular work, becoming convenor at Metro- 
politan-Vickers by 1944. 
ýý 
H. G. H. Barratt 
Coventry engineer and life-long opponent of the CP. A member of 
the AEU, he was elected shop steward at the Daimler Co. in January 1941, 
where he became the convenor in March 1942. Frequently a delegate to 
the National Committee of the AEU, including in 1947, when he opposed a 
motion that the AEU should buy shares in the Daily Worker. In March 
1949, he was elected National Organiser of the AEU by 34,121 to 
George Crane's 32,505. The Daily Worker commenteds 
"Mr. 
-Crane, a 
fierce opponent of wage freeze, was 
subjected to considerable misrepresentation from 
certain Right-Wing quarters because of his views 
and membership of the CP. " 
(Minutes of the Coventry District Committee of the 
AEU; DWI June 28,1947, March 16,1949") 
927' 
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Claude Berridges 
Skilled engineer; member of the AEU. Founder member of the CP. 
Member of the All-London engineers' Lockout Committee, 1922. Member of 
the London District Committee of the AEU, 1924. Member of the Willesden 
General Strike Committee, 1926. Elected AEU Divisional Organiser, 
1935. Re-elected to this post in the first ballot until 1950s. 
(DW, Aug. 9,1951) 
ý-ý+ý- 
Jack Bowman 
Mr. Bowman became an apprentice in 1907. A member of the Steam 
Engine Makers, he took part in the long and bitter engineers' strike 
of 1908 on the North-East Coast against an attempt on the part of the 
local employers to reduce the district rate. He worked at Vickers- 
Armstrong's Elswick Works during the First World War, becoming a shop 
steward as a young journeyman towards the end of the war. He was also 
active in the SDF and then the SDP. He became District Secretary for 
the AEU just after the amalgamation of the SEMI and the ASE, and soon 
afterwards he was elected to the EC of the AEU. He retained his 
District Secretary's post until after the end of the Second World War, 
opposing the Communist Party at every point. After the war, he 
represented the AEU on the North East Regional Board for Industry. 
Mr. Bowman is still alive. 
(Bowman) 
*ý 
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J. Clokey 
Member of the AEU Glasgow District Committee, 1940-45" Supported 
the People's Convention in 1940. Shop steward at the Corporation Gas 
Works, Govanhill. Member of AEU National Committee, 1940. 
(Peter Kerrigan, New Propellor, Oct. 40). 
ý** 
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Harry Finch 
Travelled from London to Coventry as a WIL member in his late teens 
as part of the WIL's dispersal policy at the beginning of the war. 
Joined the Labour League of Youth on his arrival, and became an 
apprentice toolmaker. In 1944, he was sent to work in the mines in 
Cannock Chase, where he was involved in a series of strikes and 
disturbances over pay and living conditions in the hostels. He was a 
political prodigy, writing a number of articles in the RQP's Internal 
Bulletin on the problems posed for revolutionaries by redundancy. 
He remained a Trotskyist throughout the 1950s, writing for a number 
of left-wing journals and becoming convenor at Norton's. In 1956, he 
was sacked after a long strike there. He later worked at Dunlop's 
until sacked in 1971. He is now a member of the Workers' Revolutionary 
Party. 
***r 
Jim Gardner 
Member of the CP; and of the National Union of Foundry Workers. 
Narrowly defeated in the election for General Secretary of that union, 
in the spring of 1943, by Albert Wilkie, by 8,024 votes to 7044. In 
December 1944, he was successful in his candidature for the post, 
3': s-. 
defeating Tom Colvin in the second ballot by 10,900 votes to 9,562. 
A prominent Communist official throughout the 'Cold War' period, and 
a leading advocate of national strike action in the Confederation pay 
claim of 1953-4. 
,w 
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Jock Gibson 
Born 1908, A Communist from the early 1930s, active in the T&GWU 
and on the Coventry Trades Council throughout our period. Trades 
Council President, 1934-36 inclusive. Worked at Standard and Rootes, 
and'then became convenor at Daimler in 1941" Chairman, CSEU District 
Committee in 1942. Later became convenor at Chrysler, Ryton, retiring 
in 1973. 
*ý 
Percy Glading 
National Trustee of the AEU. Sentenced to three years imprisonment 
for espionage at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, in 1938. Member of the CP. 
(Palling, CPGB, p. 107) (War Commentary, mid-August, 1943). 
ýýa 
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Harry Hartshorne 
Member of the CP, although it is not known when he joined. He 
worked at Ford's in Detroit during the 1920s, and then worked at their 
Manchester factory. In 1931, he was moved from Manchester to Dagenham 
as one of a team of skilled men sent to the new factory, where there 
was some trouble over the lower rate being paid to the toolmakers than 
they had received in Manchester. He was active in the unionisation of 
Dagenham, and was a shop steward there in 1944" 
(kW, Feb. 9,1944; Richard Whiting. ) 
ý 
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Edmund Frow 
Born 5 June 1906, Lincolnshire. Apprentice to a Wakefield engineer 
at fourteen. Joined Leeds CP in 1924, and worked full-time for the 
Party in Castleford during the General Strike. Lost his job in 1926, 
and was unemployed for one year until he found work in Derby. After 
eighteen months in Derby, he moved to Liverpool. At the end of 1929, 
he went to Manchester and worked at Ford's for three months before he 
was sacked for political reasons. Between March 1930 and January 1934, 
he was unemployed, but worked with the NUWM and the CP, becoming a member 
of the CP District Committee. In October 1930, he went to the Soviet Union 
with representatives from other areas to the Communist International 
Commission on the state of the Party. In 1934, he started work at 
A. V. Roe's, Newton Heath, and then moved to Ferranti's Hollinwood, 
where he worked with Alf Jones (who was later to become a shop steward 
and District Committeeman) and Gardner's Eccles, where he worked with 
, 3i4. 
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the Walmsley brothers. In 1937, he moved to Salford Electrical Instruments, 
where there were no shop stewards at that time, and had some success in 
organising several hundred men into the AEU. He later had a good deal 
more success in this direction, and at the same time he became the shop 
steward representative on the District Committee (1938), Divisional 
Committee delegate (1941) and VC delegate (1942). He remained a District 
Committeeman for twenty years, eventually becoming District Secretary 
in 1961. 
ýý 
J. Gray 
Labour Party member and member of Yoker No. 2 AEU branch; he stood 
unsuccessfully (59 votes) for the Labour Party Conference in March 1942 
from the Scottish division of the AEU. He was shop steward and then 
convenor at the Albion, and District Committeeman in 1940. At the end 
of the war, he was elected Divisional Organiser for Division No. Four. 
Peter Kerrigan writes: 
".... we on the left considered on the basis of his 
actions that he was a 'Right Winger'. He held the 
D. O. position for a good number of years, retiring 
on reaching 65. I am not sure of the date of his 
retirement but would estimate between 1961-63. I 
cannot remember his first name. " 
(19.9.75) 
. %*ie 
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Jock Ha. ston 
Born 1912. Worked as a merchant seaman before becoming involved 
in extreme left-wing politics in the 1930s, becoming the leading 
theoretician of the Workers' International League before the war. On 
the outbreak of war, Haston travelled to Northern Ireland for a period, 
9j3 
with some of the rest of the leadership of the WIL, but soon returned 
when they realised that political work in the rest of Britain was still 
possible. Haston was continually hounded by the police, and had several 
passports with false names. This could cause problems for other members: 
Jack Williams, a man of about his height and an ex-seaman found himself 
visited by the police on several occasions when they were looking for 
Haston. The police eventually found him and arrested him for giving a 
false identity, the same day that Russia entered the war. He spent two 
months in jail when found guilty of the charge. 
Haston was a persuasive and resourceful schemer, as he showed on 
several occasions: he persuaded the paper controller that the Socialist 
Appeal had enjoyed a circulation of 20,000 before the war, which was 
quite untrue since the Socialist Appeal had not been printed before 
the war, and Youth For Socialism had a tiny readership. On the strength 
of this, the Socialist Appeal was able to secure ample paper when other 
papers had to struggle. Halton was active with Roy Tearse in Barrow, 
and again in Newcastle as the RCP's Organising Secretary during the 
apprentices' strike. On this last occasion he was arrested and convicted 
under the Trades Disputes Act, receiving twelve months despite his 
eloquent defence. The sentence was quashed on appeal, allowing him to 
stand as the RCP's candidate at the Neath by-election, where he received 
1,781 votes against the Labour candidate's 30,000. He continued as the 
leader of the RCP until the latter's dissolution in 1949. 
Mr. Haston is still alive. 
D. Herald, 8 April, 1944; Daily Dispatch, 6 April 44). 
(Jack Williams; Higgins) 
*ýý 
Gilbert Hitchings 
CPer. Joined the party in 1928. "To the South Wales unemployed 
marchers in the grim 20s and 30s, who stayed in and marched through 
11 1 ,_ 
Bristol, the name Hitchings is a household word. " Member of the AEU 
National Committee, 1937 to 40. Elected to the X of the AEU in 1943, 
where he remained until 1952, when he failed to be re-elected. He 
returned to his native Bristol to work in an engineering factory as a 
turner, but died only a year later. 
(DU, Nov. 24 and Nov. 27,1953). 
ýý 
Walter Holmes 
Born 1892, his father was a member of the ASE. Imprisoned for 
conscientious objection, 1916-19. Joined the staff of the Daily Herald 
under George Lansbury in the early 1920s. At this time he was a Guild 
Socialist, but he became a founder member of the CP. He was editor of 
the Sunday Worker until the appearance of the Daily Worker in 1930, 
when he became DW roving correspondent. Visited Russia, Manchuria, 
China and Abbysainia (1935). Organised Industrial and General Information 
Service when the DW was suppressed in 1941. Visited Nuremberg trials 
as the DW correspondent. Chairman of the Communist Party Committee at 
the DW, 1952. 
Oct. 29,1952. ) 
*** 
Jack Jones 
Born in Liverpool in 1913, into a militant left-wing family. His 
father sympathised with James Connolly and Jim Larkin. Jack Jones 
would have liked to have served his time as an engineering apprentice 
but was sacked (and his indentures thereby broken) by an engineering 
firm during the Depression. He then worked in the docks for a spell, 
934 ' 
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becoming a leading figure in the TGWU locally. Fought for the Spanish 
Republic for a period, and then returned to Britain and took up the post 
of District Secretary in Coventry just before the outbreak of war in 
September 1939. 
Jones was responsible for setting up the only functioning T&GWU 
District Committee, which was still the only such body in that union 
until the late 1960s. He was also responsible for setting up the local 
CSEU District Committee in 1942, and was elected its first President. 
His relationship with the CP was always close, but never close enough 
for him to be mistaken for a Party member; he frequently made statements 
to the Daily Worker, but these never touched on delicate political or 
industrial matters. 
Mr. Jones is now the General Secretary of the T&. GWU. 
ýý 
William Joss 
Founder member of the CP. Born 1879. For many years CP education 
organiser in Scotland. Treasurer, Scottish District of CP, 1954" 
(DW, Feb. 11,1954. ) 
ýý 
Peter Kerrigan 
Demobilised from the Army in April 1920, and finished his apprentice- 
ship in the winter of that year. Became Chairman of ASE Springburn No-4 
branch. Joined CP in April 1921. Member of the Central Lockout Committee 
in Glasgow, in the Engineers' Lockout of 1922. Started in 'M' shop, 
Beardmore's Parkhead Forge in October 1923. Elected shop steward and 
becoming a leading figure in the TGWU locally. Fought for the Spanish 
Republic for a period, and then returned to Britain and took up the post 
of District Secretary in Coventry just before the outbreak of war in 
September 1939. 
Jones was responsible for setting up the only functioning T&GWU 
District Committee, which was still the only such body in that union 
until the late 1960s. He was also responsible for setting up the local 
CSEU District Committee in 1942, and was elected its first President. 
His relationship with the CP was always close, but never close enough 
for him to be mistaken for a Party member; he frequently made statements 
to'the Daily Worker, but these never touched on delicate political or 
industrial matters. 
Mr. Jones is'now the General Secretary of the T&GWU. 
ýý 
William Joss 
Founder member of the CP. Born 1879. For many years CP education 
organiser in Scotland. Treasurer, Scottish District of Cl', 1954" 
(DW, Feb. 11,1954. ) 
*0 It 
Peter Kerrigan 
Demobilised from the Army in April 1920, and finished his apprentice- 
ship in the winter of that year. Became Chairman of ASE Springburn No-4 
branch. Joined CP in April 1921. Member of the Central Lockout Committee 
in Glasgow, in the Engineers' Lockout of 1922. Started in 'M' shop, 
Beardmore's Parkhead Forge in October 1923. Elected shop steward and 
% lu 
then convenor in 1924. Vice Chairman of the Glasgow Central Strike 
Co-ordinating Committee, in the, General Strike. After three days, 
Kerrigan was elected Chairman, as Jock McBain, Scottish Organiser for 
the National Union of Foundry Workers, received instructions from his 
Executive to concentrate on his work covering the whole of Scotland, 
and therefore had to vacate his seat as Chairman. Leader of the West 
of Scotland contingent in the National Hunger March of October 1936. 
Volunteered for the International Brigade, and took the biggest 
contingent to go there from Britain (120 volunteers) in December 1936. 
Appointed Political Commissar for the English speaking volunteers 
then assembling at Albacete and training in the surrounding villages. 
Accompanied First British Company, which fought in the South until 
taken out of the front to become the core of the British Battalion 
which fought at Jarama. 
In April 1937, he was recalled to Britain (he was on the Clyde at 
the time of the Apprentices' strike), but returned to Spain in May 1938 
as a Daily Worker correspondent, this time on the Catalonian front. 
Present at the last great Republican offensive as war correspondent in 
the Army of the Ebro until they were withdrawn in late September 
along with the remnants of the International Brigades. Returned to 
England in late October 1938. Worked on the Clyde until 1943, when he 
moved to London to work full time for the CP. Parliamentary candidate 
for Shettleston (covering Parkhead) in 1945, and then for the Gorbals 
(1948,1950,1951,1955,1959)" 
Now the Minutes Secretary of Greenwich No. 2 AUEW branch. 
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Heaton Lee 
Born 1916 in South Africa, where he trained as a mining engineer. 
Came to Britain with a number of other South African Trots1 rists just 
before the war. During the 'Imperialist War' period, he seems to have 
followed an 'entrist' tactic in the Communist Party, and to have spoken 
for them publicly. After the CP's change in line on the war, he became 
an open member of the WIL, and their North-Eastern area organiser. He 
was arrested with Haston, Tearse and Ann Keen for his role in the 
apprentices' strike of 1944, receiving six months before the sentences 
were quashed on appeal. - 
ýýý 
Jock MoBain 
Skilled moulder. A shop steward during the First World War, he 
was a prominent member of the Clyde Workers' Committee. Together with 
Tom Bell, he led a strike of moulders in'aeptember 1917, which won. an 
increase not only for the moulders, but for the whole engineering 
industry. He was later Scottish Organiser of the British Ironfounders 
Union. In the early 1920s, he became Scottish and Northern Irish 
Organiser for the National. Union of Foundryworkers. In 1926, he was 
elected Chairman of the Glasgow Central Strike Co-ordinating Committee, 
and called out the workers in locomotive factories in the first wave of 
strikes. The BO of the Nt0W instructed him to attend to business outside 
of Glasgow, and he had to resign his chairmanship after only three days. 
It was clear that McBain had brushed with his National Committee 
because the NC said that they had heard nothing of the instruction of 
the TUC General Council calling for the action that he had taken. 
. In March 1936, it was clear that he was still carrying on in his 
old way, because the NC had to "respectfully point out to Mr. McBain" 
that a ballot of the membership would be required before the affiliation 
of the Communist Party to the Labour Party was adopted as union policy, 
and that the NUFW was already affiliated to the Labour Party, and therefore 
to that Party's Constitution. In 1940, he was still discussing the 
reform of the union with other militants, but he died in January 1941. 
Nan Milton% John Maclean, pp. 107,150; Fyrth and Collings The 
Foundry Workers, pp. 173,241; Minutes of the NC of the NUFW, 
23 March, 1936. 
ýýý 
Tommy McLaren 
Skilled Engineer. Worked at Mavor and Coulson's, on the Clyde, 
during the late 1930s and the war, but one of the supporters of the 
People's Convention was a 'J' McLaren, convenor at Howden's. -It-seems 
likely that this was in fact Tommy McLaren, as the CP had already 
made some mistakes in establishing the trade union positions of their 
members (see New Propellor editorial of November 1940, where a correction 
to the previous information given about two supporters was corrected in 
small print. ) 
He had been a member of the CP, but left to join the Labour Party. 
Glasgow District Committeeman during the war. Elected to the Glasgow 
Town Council after the War, and became a Baillie. 
(Peter Kerrigan: New Propellor, Oct. 40) 
*ýý 
Harry McShane 
Born in the Gorbals on 7 May 1891. His father was a builder's 
labourer and a Catholic, of Irish descent, his mother a Protestant. 
;ý 
Lived with his grandparents from when he was a few weeks old until he 
started work. He was brought up a Catholic in a Catholic school. 
Became an apprentice sailmaker, which he gave up after eighteen months. 
He then worked at wire-weaving for six months whilst waiting to start 
an apprenticeship in engineering. 
First became interested in Socialism through John Wheatley's 
Catholic Socialist Society. In August 1909, he joined the Kingston 
branch of the ILP. He became interested in Marxism largely through the 
publications of the Socialist Labour Party which had a bookshop in 
Renfrew Street, Glasgow, and by attending John Maclean's economics 
classes. 
On 5th August 1910, he filled in a form printed in the Clarion 
asking for further details of a proposed British Socialist Party. The 
BSP was formed in 1911, and Harry became involved with John Maclean in 
holding street meetings to propagandise for the new party. In 1912, 
McShane completed his apprenticeship, and was dismissed soon afterwards 
for refusing to do the work of apprentices who had gone on strike. In 
1914, he joined the Army, but he later deserted and returned to Glasgow, 
where he worked at several shops under a false name. Went to sea 
after being recognised on several occasions, and on his return, obtained 
work at Beardmore's Parkhead Forge, where he was given an exemption 
card. Went to work for a small firm in Bridgeton in 1916, which sent 
him to fit some plant at Stephen's. He lived in Salcoates, and got 
the local socialist to go out and hold anti-war meetings on Sunday 
afternoons. Was arrested there, and nothing came of it, but when he 
returned home, he found the police searching for him. After a brush 
with the police, Harry moved to another engineering factory, and joined 
the Clyde Workers' Committee as a shop steward. During 1920, he broke 
with the BSP, and joined with MacLean in a propaganda campaign which 
centred on unemployment. In July 1922, he decided to join the CP. 
McShane and Maclean decided to hold their unemployed organisation aloof 
from the National Unemployed Workers' Movement, but his views on this 
question changed, and the movements united. In August 1923, he moved 
to England. Early in 1925 he went to the Yukon, and remained there 
until January 1930, when he returned to Glasgow. Clashing almost 
immediately on his return with the local CP Organiser, he enlisted the 
support of a representative of the Communist International who was in 
Glasgow, to defend himself against the charge of 'ILPism' because he 
wanted a demonstration to be accompanied by a deputation to the town 
hall. He soon became Scottish Organiser of the NUWM. He was arrested 
on several occasions, including the demonstration on International 
Fighting Day-Against Unemployment (6 March 1930), and 1 October 1931. 
In 1932, he led a Scottish contingent on the National Hunger March to 
London. In 1933, he helped to lead a Scottish March to Edinburgh. One 
of the leaders of the '1934 National Hunger March, and of the Edinburgh 
contingent on the 1936 March. 
Parliamentary candidate for the CPGB in the Gorbals in 1931, and 
fought the Gorbals ward almost every year in the Municipal elections. 
In 1939, he became Scottish correspondent for the Daily Worker until 
the paper was closed down on January 1940. He then became Glasgow 
Secretary of the CP. Moved back to his former position when the 
Daily Worker reappeared. He was a member of the Scottish Committee of 
the CPGB from 1930 until 1953, when he resigned from the CP. He had 
doubts on many issues, but he seems to have concentrated his fire on 
the lack of democracy within the CP. His resignation was discussed by 
Harry Pollitt in the pages of the Daily Worker, and 'replied' to. 
After eight months unemployment, found work at his trade in a shipyard. 
An active member of his trade union branch, and delegate to the Trades 
Council. He remains an active revolutionary socialist. 
(R. H. C. Hayburns The Responses to Unemployment (Hull Ph. D. 1970 
Daily Worker, July 30,1953, August 8th, 1953. Harry McShane. ) 
ýýý 
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J. W. Mitchell 
Mitchell was a skilled engineers and a friend-of Jack Bowman and 
Jimmy Brownlie before he was elected Divisional Organiser for the North- 
East Division of the AEU in the 1930s. A member of the Labour Party, 
he was elected Mayor of South Shields in November 1944. 
*A-* 
J. T. Murphy 
It is impossible to do justice to Jack Murphy without writing a 
full-scale biography, a task which has not yet been undertaken. Only 
a brief summary of the main events of his life can be given here. Born 
in 1888, Murphy went to work at Vickers Brightside works in Sheffield 
when he was fourteen, where he worked until 1918. A member of the ABE, 
he became a shop steward during the war, and, 'wrote  
The Workers' 
Committee. (1917) This pamphlet established him as the leading theorist 
of the National Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committee Movement. 
Murphy was -a very political animal. 
A member of the 
Socialist Labour Party, he educated himself by reading Marx, Connolly 
and other revolutionary writers whilst turning gun barrels at Vickers'. 
In 1918, he stood for the SLP at Gorton, polling 1300 votes. A leader 
of the SLP's Unity Committee in 1919-20, he became a founder member of 
the CP. In 1920, he was elected by the 5S and WCM to the Second Congress 
of the Communist International, where he was overwhelmed by what he saw 
and heard. In December 1920, he returned to Britain with money to 
found a British Bureau of the Provisional International Committee of 
Trade and Industrial Unions. From 1922 until 1932, he was a member of 
the CP's Central Committee. He made frequent visits to Moscow, where 
he was held in high regard. 
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In 1932, he left the CP in protest at the 'Third Period', but 
although he later became involved with the Socialist League, he 
retained a political outlook close to that of the CP. The outbreak 
of the Second. World War saw him in opposition to the CP on the nature 
of the war, as he argued that it was an anti-fascist struggle from the 
start. He spent the first two years of the war working in a London 
aircraft factory, where he was an inspector's shop steward, a story 
recounted in his book Victory Production! (1942). Murphy died in 1966. 
(iiinton; Martin; Victory Production. 
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Jack Owen 
Skilled engineer. A member of the Social Democratic Federation 
whilst an apprentice before the First World War. Member of the 
Manchester. ASE District Committee. Worked at the Woolwich Arsenal 
during the First World War, where he became a shop steward. He was 
sent as a delegate from the Arsenal shop stewards to the Clyde when 
the shop stewards there were deported. Attended Ruskin College, Oxford, 
where he helped to found the national Council of Labour Colleges. 
Election agent for Alf Purcell when he fought Moss Side. Elected to 
the Manchester City Council in 1937. On July 30th 1940, he took the 
chair at a Daily Worker rally in Manchester, and was expelled from the 
Labour Party as a result. He returned to the factory, but immediately 
accepted a position as a journalist and member of the Daily Worker 
editorial board. 
(DW, August 8th, 1940). 
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Dave Ramsey 
Born 1884. Patternmaker, an active shop steward during the 
First World War. Represented the National Shop Stewards'and Workers' 
Committee Movement together with Willy Gallachei and Jack Tanner at 
the Second Congress of the Communist International. Founder member of 
the Communist Party; active in the Hands off Russia Movement. Scottish 
Organiser of the CP after 1926. Harry Pollitt's election agent in his 
contestwith Ramsay MacDonald at Seaham Harbour in 1929. Died in 1948. 
DW, March 4,1948. A. Rosser, Lenin's Moscow. ), 
*HW* 
Hugh Scanlon 
Shop steward, Metro-Vickers Manchester, and District Committeeman, 
1940. Supported the People's Convention. Elected Divisional Organiser 
immediately after the War, and soon became Secretary of the Confederation 
District Committee. 
(New Propellor, Oct. 1940. DW, March 10, June 28,1949") 
*4* 
Joe Scott 
Joined the ASE in 1917. He was sacked and forced to take a job 
in the Smithfield meat market, where he joined the Transport Workers Union. 
In 1923 he returned to the engineering industry. Member of the Minority 
Movement, Active in the Members' Rights Movement in the AEU, and was a 
member of the London District Committee of the AEU. In September 
1935, he was elected Divisional Organiser of the AEU. In 1940, he was 
chairman of the Shop Stewards' Committee at Bett's, London. Elected to 
the EC of the AEU in June 1942 for No. 1 Division (London and South 
East). He retained his seat there until 1957" 
Scott was elected to the DC of the CP in 1929. He lost this 
Z, . IA j> 
position in 1931, but he was elected again in 1940. Remained on the EC 
until 1951. Now lives in Potters Bar, Middlesex. 
(Peter Kerrigan) 
ýýý 
Tommy Sillars 
Born 1900. 
Worked at Glasgow Corporation Gas Works, Govanhill. Member of the 
CP. The remarks of the Scottish Conciliation Officer concerning him 
are quite interesting. He said that Sillars'position as a District 
Committeeman was slightly precarious in 1940, because it was felt that, 
as a shop steward at the Gas Works, he was rather 'leading from behind'. 
In any case, the Conciliation Officer was of the opinion that the 
Gas Works management did not recognise shop stewards. At the 1940 
meetings of the AEU Conference and National Committee, he made two 
speeches which were rather radical: in the first, he proposed that the 
DC's report on 'subversive influences' be referred back, and in the 
second, at the NC, he argued in favour of the use of the strike weapon 
as 'the last resort'. The following year, he failed to be re-elected to 
the NC, despite the fact that he was, as the Conciliation Officer put 
it, 'the chief cell of that body (the CP)". In 1945, he was elected 
Scottish Divisional Organiser. Elected to DC, 1950, and won a court case 
against Ben Gardner and seven members of the EC who refused to accept 
his election. Died in 1952, aged 52. 
(DW, June 1,1940, March 20,1951, May 13,1952. LAB 10/360, 30 November 1940,18 January 1941. ) 
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Billy Stokes 
Born in Earlsdon, Coventry in 1894. Left school at twelve years 
old-to work in a Coventry cycle factory, painting wheel rims. Later 
served his apprenticeship as a fitter. Worked at the Daimler during 
World liar One, where he became an ASE shop steward and developed his 
left wing views with another young steward, George Hodgkinson (Labour 
Lord Mayor of Coventry in the immediate post-war years) and an older 
socialist steward, Robert Thompson. Stokes did not join the Communist 
Party at its formation, but shortly afterwards, in early 1922. In that 
year, he was elected secretary of the engineers' Lockout Committee. 
He was also a prominent figure in the local branch of the Minority 
Movement, being Secretary for most of the MM's existence in the town, 
and delegate to the Midland Bureau of the MM. 
In 1931, Stokes was elected District Secretary. Six years later, 
he was elected Divisional Organiser, although he did not have the 
support of the CP in his candidature. His break with the CP came at 
this point, and although he remained friendly to the Party until the 
outbreak of war, he steadily distanced himself from them from 1940 
onwards. During the Cold War period, he became a vociferous opponent 
of the CP, and later became Personnel Manager at the Armstrong Siddeley 
and a JP. Mr. Stokes is still alive. 
ýý 
Bill Tattersall 
Unlike most of the other trade unionists dealt with in these 
biographies, Tattersall was already well into middle age'by the beginning 
of our period, and is no longer alive. Consequently, precise details 
ýL-':, 
of his career have been difficult to come by. However, he was an 
important figure in the Coventry trade union movement during the war. 
Originally from the North, Bill Tattersall was AEU Convenor at 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft, Baginton (Coventry) by the mid-1930s. 
Harold Taylor (q. v. ) described hims 
"I met a bloke called Bill Tattersall, who looked to 
me as old as Methusela. You've got to remember at 
this time I wag 27, and Bill Tattersall was probably 
about 54. He was tousle-grey hair, a bit thin on 
top, and a rugged face - rugged character, and as 
fearless as they come... I would pay tribute to 
Bill Tattersall, who died marry years ago, to being 
that factor that made Baginton a very unified, cohesive 
group of shop stewards. " 
(Interview of 12 April, 1976) 
Tattersall was never a member of the CP, although he was prepared to 
associate himself with the New Propellor NP' February 1944. ) 
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Harold Taylor 
Born 1910. Joined the Army soon after leaving school (Royal Army 
Service Corps), leaving in 1933 to work on the Coventry buses. On 
the buses, he met a Communist active in the NUM, Walter Wellings, who 
persuaded him to join the T&GWU. Started work at Armstrong Whitworth 
Aircraft Whitley (Coventry) in 1935, becoming a shop steward and CPer. 
Moved to AWA Baginton in 1937, where he became senior steward. Moved to 
the standard Motor Co. 's Canley plant in 1940, where he became T&GWU 
convenor until he resigned in 1944. Started a small engineering business 
at the end of the war, in which he employed his old friend Ernie Roberts 
(vide p. 102). 
ý 
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Roy Tearse 
Born 1916. Despite ill-health, Roy (christened Rowland) Tearse 
went to work at Handley-Page's factory in North-West London at the 
beginning of the war, as part of the WIL's ! industrialisation' plan. 
Tearse soon gained a shop steward's card in this Communist-dominated 
factory, but obtained his release (probably in 1942), and worked full- 
time for the WIL-RCP. He was active in the Barrow strike, then at 
Barr and Stroud'sl. After this last dispute, he returned to England, 
to help strengthen the Nottingham branch which was already quite strong 
in the Royal Ordnance Factory there (the convenor, Bartholomew, and 
several stewards were members). Soon afterwards, he was elected 
chairman of the Clyde Workers' Committee, a position he held at the time 
of his arrest for his activities in London and Newcastle around the 
apprentices' strike. At this time, he was industrial organiser for the 
RCP (a job involving a good deal of travelling, it seems). He continued 
a member of the RCP until its dissolution, and is still active in left- 
wing politics. 
(kW, 6 April 1944, Daily Dispatch, 6 April 1944). 
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F. E. Walker 
Skilled engineer. Joined the ASE in 1906 in Manchester. His 
trade union activities were confined to the branch. Before the war, 
he initiated an 'Industrial Union Groups in Manchester (part of Tom 
Mann's Industrial Syndicalist Education League? )l which "did good work 
in the branches by way of militant propaganda before the Minority 
Movement came into existence". Secretary of the Chester 1922 Lockout 
Committee. Member of the Manchester District Committee of the AEU 
from 1924 onwards. Elected Chairman of the Divisional Committee in 
1927. Defeated in the final ballot for DC Chairman, 1923. Vice Chairman 
of the Manchester Labour Party in 1926. 
9W. 
Member of the DC of the AEU.. 
(Letter from Smethurst of AEU EC for branches, dated 
18 February 1928. Attached to the letter is a 
Minority Movement circular on the national elections 
in the AEU. TUC Library: HD6661/M5255") 
iiiHi 
Arthur Walmaley 
Born in Salford, December 1895. Went to work at Vulcan Loco. 
Works at the age of thirteen. Three years later, he joined the ASE. 
Joined the Army in the First World War (6th and 13th Battalions 
Manchester Regiment). Returned to Salford in 1918. Worked at 
L. Gardners (Oil Engines) Ltd., Patricroft, 1922-29, becoming a shop 
steward. Joined the CP and MM in 1924. Worked at Metro-Vickers 
1929-31. Lost his job at Metro-Vickers when he was delegate to the 
Red International of Labour Unions in Moscow in 1931. Worked in the 
NUWM, 1931-32, and then at Ford's Dagenham with Harry-Hartshorne 
(q. v. ). Returned to Manchester and Gardner's in 1933, working there 
until 1946. Became Chairman of the shop stewards' committee and 
convenor there. Member of the AEU District Committee for a large part 
of his career, being made an honorary member because of his exemplary 
attendance record. 
ýý 
Albert Walras ley 
Born 1902, younger brother of Arthur and William (q. v. ). Worked 
in most factories in Manchester. Joined CP in the early '30s. Shop 
I 
steward at Gardner's 1934-41. Shop steward at Ford's Manchester for 
the Merlin Engine section. District Committee member. 
ýý 
William Walmsley 
Born 1892, brother of Arthur and Albert (q. v. ). CPer. Shop steward 
at Fords Manchester during the war, and member of the AEU District 
Committee. 
it %* 
William Lower Warman, 
Born 9 March 1908 at South Norwood, Surrey. Apprenticed as sheet 
metal worker at 16, but was sacked at the end of his apprenticeship, 
and only worked sporadically until 1939" First joined a union at 
Hawkes, Kingston. Moved to Coventry in late 20s, and was elected as 
the youngest member of the Coventry committee of the NIßMW in 1931. 
Chairman, Coventry Trades Council, 1938-41. Joined the CP in November- 
1939, becoming a member of the CP's District Committee in 1940, and 
chairman in 1942. He remained chairman until 1973. 
Chairman of the shop stewards' committee at Standard Motors, 
1944-58, involved in the major strike there against sackings in 1956. 
Became a member of the Central Committee of the CP in the 1950s, 
staying on for eight years until he became a full-time official for the 
Midlands area of the NUSMW. 
;v 
Bill Wellings 
Born in 1905, Bill Wellings started work in a Coventry engineering 
factory in 1920. Two years later, after being sacked, he started work 
as a Corporation bus driver. In 1924 he came into contact with the 
CP and the Transport Workers' MM, and was active in the Council of 
Action during the General Strike. ' For much of the 1930s he was 
unemployed and active in the NUWM. In August 1939, he started work with 
the London firm Karriere, then carrying out contract work inside the 
Standard Motor Co's main factory at Canley. He was soon able to start 
work in the machine shop there, but moved to Rootes No. I shadow factory 
in February 1941, where he became a T&GWU Shop steward. Later in the war, 
he was moved to the Daimler No. 2 shadow factory, where he became a 
shop steward and a District Committeeman. He was actively involved in 
the Daimler Combine Committee during the strike of 1945. 
Mr. Wellings worked at the Humber (Chrysler Stoke) until he 
retired in 1970. I am sorry to have to record that Bill Wellings died 
in 1975. 
ý 
Jack Williams 
Jack Williams was ä merchant seaman who travelled to the Soviet 
Union in the late 1930s, and, disillusioned with what he saw, joined 
the WIL on his return to London. He went to work in Coventry just 
before Harry Finch at the beginning of the war, sleeping in the 
Labour Party HQ in Coundon Road, when he could not find anywhere else 
in 1940. He worked at the Daimler Co. at Sandy Lane, and soon became 
T&GWU shop steward, the first in the factory. In 1943, he was con- 
scripted into the Army, and was later court-martialled under King's 
Regulations for disobeying orders. On his return to Coventry, he went 
back to the Daimler, regained his shop steward's card, and became 
95ä 
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District Committeeman and Trades Council delegate. 
Mr. Williams was a valuable and committed political shop steward 
who helped me in my work on several occasions. I am sorry to have to 
record that he died suddenly in 1975" 
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ARCHIVAL MATERIAL' 
A. GOVBRNiMAL SOURCES 
1) Ministerial Papers at the Public Record Office. 
The PRO housed by far the most important body of source material used 
in this research. The main classes of documents for aqr purposes are 
listed below, in descending order of importances 
i) LAB 8 and LAB 10. These two classes'of files must be central 
to any research on wartime industrial relations. LAB 8 is 
generally concerned with general labour matters touching on 
industrial relations, e. g. dilution, the transfer of labour, 
provision of canteens, etc, whilst LAB 10 contains the reports 
of the regional Conciliation Officers, special strike reports 
and Headquarters files, memoranda, etc* 
ii) LAB 34, Ministry of Labour Disputes Books. The raw material for 
all strike statistics given in this study* 
iii) INF 1. Ministry of Information documents relating to home 
security, 'Fifth Columns activities, home morale, etc* 
iv) AVIA 15 and 22. Records of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. 
These are rather difficult to use because of the non-consecutive 
numbering used in the indices, and the tendency for industrial 
relations material to be mixed with technical files. 
v) CAB 65, WX series. -Minutes of the War Cabinet, consulted 
selectively with the subject index. CAB 98.18. Minutes of the 
Cabinet Committee on Communist Activities* 
vi) Various files from the SUPP (Supply) MEPOL (Metropolitan Police) 
and ADM (Admiralty) records were looked at. The only ones of 
much interest for our purposes were the Admiralty documents on 
industrial relations ADM 178/162-31 'Dismissal of Communists 
from employment in War Department and Navy Department, 1927-37' 
(open without restriction) and ADM 197s Admiralty Whitley Council 
Papers. But these records were only on the fringeof this topic. 
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2) Beaverbrook Papers atýthe House of Lords Record Office. 
The main category relevant to the Second World War is Series D 
(88 boxes). Unfortunately, the entire collection of papers is still 
in a chaotic state, despite the claims made in the official guide 
(A Guide to the Political Papers. 1874-1970. deposited by the First 
Beaverbrook Foundation. (H. L. R. O. Memo. no. 54,1975. ) 
Be ' SOURCES, 
1) Monthly and fortnightly Minutes of the Coventry ingineering 1hployers 
Association, 1930-46, at Davenport Road, Coventry. 
2) Sundry documents made available to me at the headquarters of the 
Engineering Hnployers' Federation in London. 
C. TRADE ZüdION SOURCý. 
1) Weekly Minutes of the Coventry District Committee of the ABU, 1935-45, 
at the Coventry AUM District Office, Corporation Street, Coventry. 
2) Minutes of the Coventry Branch of the National Union of Sheet Metal 
Workers, 1935, at the Coventry Record Office. 
3) Minutes of the Coventry branch of the National Union of Vehicle 
Builders, now at the national museum of the Automotive Group of the 
TGWU, Holyhead Road, Coventry. 
4) Minutes. of the Glasgow Trades Council, Mitchell Library, Glasgow. 
5) Minutes and Reports of the Manchester and-Salford Trades Council, 
including the Minutes of the Metal Trades Group of the Council, 1930-46, 
at the Central Reference Library, Manchester. 
6) Minutes and papers of the TUG Organisation' Committee, in the TUG 
Library, Congress House, London. 
7) Minutes of the Humber Shop Stewards' Committee, 1951- 
8) Minutes of Works and Local Conferences in Coventry, in the Modern 
Records Centre, University of Warwick. 
D. POLITICAL SOURCES. 
1) Tarbuck Collectiön, Modern Records Centro, University of Warwick. 
This is a comprehensive collection of internal Trotskyist documents, 
which have been used for the period 1939-49., 
2) Aldred Papers, Mitchell Library, Glasgow. 
3) Trotskyist papers in the Brynmore-Jones Library, University of Hull. 
4) Papers relating to the Peoples' Convention in the Marx Memorial 
Library, London. 
Na ürHER SO[ktCES. 
Maas Observation archive, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton. Like 
the Beaverbrook papers, this archive is difficult to use because it has 
not yet been properly catalogued. 
*0* 
PRINTED MATERIAL 
A. Collections 
1) The Maitland-Sara collection of pamphlets at the University of 
Warwick. This invaluable collection of pamphlets consists of five 
cabinets of pamphlets, 'arranged by author but not catalogued. 
2) Marx Memorial Library's collections of pamphlets. 
3) Library of the Working-Class Mavement, III, King's Road, Manchester. 
An excellent collection of pamphlets, factory and rank and file newspapers. 
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B. 'Important Individual Documents. Series of Documents, eta. 
1) Governmental Publications. 
Annual Re_., op its of the Chief Inspector of Factories, 1935-45- 
Census of Population, 1931. 
Census of Production, 1925,1930,1935" 
Committee on Industry and Trades Survey of Metal Industries (1928). 
House of Commons Debates, 58, used selectively 1939-45- 
Reports of the Select Committee on National Expenditure. 
Statement by His Majesty's Government on Price Stabilisation and 
Industrial Policy (Csmd. 6249). 
2) Trade Union Publications. 
Amalgamated Engineering Unions Monthly Journal and Proceedings of the 
National Committee, 1935-45- 
Labour Research, 1935-45" 
National Union of General and Municipal Workerss Journal, 1935-45- 
National Union of General and Municipal Workerss NaRineering Indus_ trys 
Types of Machines Operated and Wages Paid (1923) fuffield College 
Library, Oxford; 
TUC and s'UC annual Reports, 1935-45- 
Transport and General Workers' Unions RR_, 1935-45- 
United Patternmakers', Associations Report. 1930-39. 
3) Political Journals (excluding newspapers) LAll in the Maitland-Sara 
Collection, University of warwic]. 
Communist International (Communist International), 1933-39" 
Communist Review, 1934,1935"- 
Controversy (ILP), 1936-39. ' 
Discussion (CP), 1936-39" 
ILP Shop Stewards Pamphlete, Na. 5.1-5,1942-3" 
Labour Xonthly (CP), 1935-45" 
Xarxist Quarterly, 1939" 
Party Organiser (CP), 1932-39" 
Workers International Newsý(WIL-RCP), 1940-19459 
World News and Views (CP), 1935-45" 
NEWSPAPERS 
A) Nation &l 
The Times, selectively, 1935-45" 
Oocasional numbers of various other national newspapers, eg. DailyMirror. 
B) Local 
The Citizen, Gloucester, 1935. 
C naardl 
1,1946. _v sn r an '. 
Glasgow Evening News, 1939-45" 
Manchester Evening News, 1939-45- 
Manchester Guardian, 1935-45- 
Midland Daily e egraph# 1939-45" 
Newcastle Journal and North Mail, 1939-45" 
C) Political and Industrial 
Clyde Apprentices' Mag. (no. 1,1941 only) (Library of the Working Class 
Movement, Manchester). 
Conv , or, Jan. 1937-JulY 1938. -(Library of 
the Working Class Movement, 
Manchester. ) 
Daily Worker, 1935-55" 
Home Front, 1940-41 (Kaitlandr-Sara Collection, University of Warwick) 
Lpbour's Northern Voice, 1941-45 
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Wew Leader, 1939-45. 
New Propellor, 1935-45. (Marx Memorial Library and Library of the 
Working Class Movement, Manchester. ) 
ReaýaoiSn, July-October 1936. 
Socialist Appeal (Maitland-Sara Collection, University of Warwick. ) 
The Socialist, 1939-45- 
The Voice, 1940-45- 
War Commentary, 1939-45- 
Youth for Socialism, 1937-40. 
D_ Factory Pa (reproduced from typewriting unless otherwise stated) 
'ACsDCs Current News' (Laurence Scott and Electromotors), 1944-47- 
'The Battle' (Fairey Aviation, Stockport), 1938-39" 'Factory News' 
(Vickers-Armstrong, Openshaw), 1942-44. 
'Gun' (Vickers-Armstrong, Newcastle), 194445" 
'Humber Clarion' (printed), (Humber, Coventry), 1944-46. 
'Journal of the Siemens Shop Stewards' Committee' (printed)(Siemrms, 
London), 1934-39- 
'Trade Union News and Tatler' (Ferguson Failing Manchester), 1945-47" 
'Vanguard' (Gardners, Eccles), 1943-47. 
NB. As this thesis is being submitted, Mr. Mike Woodhouse of the 
Cambridge College of Art and Technology informs me that he has discovered 
a continuous run of a paper produced by the shop stewards at A. Y. Roe, 
Manchester. This important find calls into doubt my tentative suggestion 
that Manchester had fewer factory papers than Coventry. Clearly, more 
research needs to be done in this area. 
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